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C O N F I D E N T I A L BOGOTA 002387 

SIPDIS 

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/01/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PTER PHUM CO
SUBJECT: POLO PARTY:  FAR LEFT CONSOLIDATES POWER 

Classified By: Political Counselor John Creamer 
Reasons 1.4 (b and d) 

SUMMARY 
------- 
¶1. (C) The opposition Polo Democratico Party is becoming 
increasingly dominated by the far-left, with Party moderates 
such as former Bogota May LuchoGarzon distancing themselves 
from the group.  The Party's decision to fire moderate 
Secretary General Daniel Garcia Pena ahead of a critical 
Party Congress in February, 2009 will likely lead to 
continued dominance of the party machinery by orthodox 
Communists, Maoists, and Chavistas.  Polo President Carlos 
Gaviria told us he would not run again in 2010, but admitted 
he will face heavy pressure to carry the far left's banner. 
Former Bogota Mayor LuchoGarzon told us it would be better 
for the left in the long run if the Polo split, allowing 
moderates to move forward with a social democratic agenda 
untainted by the FARC or Venezuelan President Chavez.  End 
summary. 

LEADERSHIP CHANGES A BAD SIGN 
----------------------------- 
¶2. (C) Polo DemocraticoAlternativo Party Secretary General 
Daniel Garcia Pena was forced from his job the week of June 9 
after far-left Party President Carlos Gaviria threatened to 
resign if Garcia remained. Garcia told us that he was 
relieved to be out of the "Polo circus," noting the hard left 
had opposed his effort to promote a more pragmatic, open 
party.  Garcia said problems with campaign finance from 
October local elections and a poor Polo showing gave Gaviria
the excuse he needed to oust him.  Gaviria claimed Garcia's 
removal was done for financial, not political, reasons. 
Gaviria said he saw no signs that Garcia engaged in any 
wrongdoing, but alleged that Garcia spent $750,000 on the 
campaign without authorization or documentation--$500,000 
more than was authorized by the Party. 

¶3. (C)  LuchoGarzon and former Valle de Cauca Governor 
Angelino Garzon (no relation) -- two of Colombia's most 
respected leftist politicians -- told us Garcia's removal 
represented a victory for Polo's far-left, including orthodox 
Communists, Maoists, and Chavistas.  The two Garzons said 
Maoist Senator Enrique Robledo --with Gaviria's support -- 
orchestrated Garcia's removal.  LuchoGarzon called Robledo's
faction "the contras," saying they oppose everything, 
including Uribe's democratic security policy, free trade, 
extradition, drug fumigation, and political reform. 

¶4. (SBU) TheGarzons said party rules require that a new 
Secretary General be approved by 80% of the Polo Executive 
Committee--a near impossibility due to the splits caused by 
Garcia's ouster.  If the Secretary General post remains 
vacant, they concluded that Polo hard-liners will have a 
significant advantage in the internal August party elections, 
as well as the Party Congress in February, 2009 that will set 
the Polo's policies and leadership ahead of the 2010 
presidential and congressional elections. 

CENTRISTS MAINTAIN DISTANCE 
--------------------------- 
¶5. (C)  The Polo's highest-profile and most experienced 
figures -- Lucho Garzon and NarinoGovernor Antonio Navarro 
Wolff -- do not hold  Polo leadership positions nor 
participate in Party meetings due to the party's "closed and 
extreme" policies.  LuchoGarzon met with ex-president and 
Liberal Party chief Cesar Gaviria on June 16 to discuss a 
possible alliance to block a third Uribe term and to seek a 
"consensus" opposition presidential candidate for 2010. 
Lucho told us that he hoped his approach to the Liberals 
would lead the Polo to expel him from the party.  Angelino 
Garzon told us the Polo's far-left wing of the Party is 
moving towards a pyrrhic victory, gaining internal power at 
the expense of the party's long-term unity and political 
viability. 

¶6. (C) Mayor of Bogota Samuel Moreno, who won under the Polo 
banner in October, has stayed out of the Party's squabbles, 
and generally followed Lucho's pragmatic and moderate line on 
security and trade.  Moreno met with U.S. Senator Barack 
Obama in Miami on June 20, at the National Mayor's Conference 
and invited Obama to visit Bogota.  Garcia told us that 
Moreno had previously offered him jobs in the Mayor's office, 
including a new position as the Bogota "Foreign Minister." 
Still, Moreno relied on the support of the party's hard left 
factions to win the Polo mayoral primary last year. 

PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE UNCERTAIN 
-------------------------------- 
¶7. (C) The Polo does not have an obvious front-runner for its 
2010 presidential candidate, and many key figures either 
remain outside the party or claim they will not run.  Garcia 
told us LuchoGarzon's overture to the Liberals further 
frayed his already tenuous ties with Polo leaders, and would 
make it difficult for him to be the Polo's candidate.  Carlos 
Gaviria, who finished a distant second to Uribe in 2006 (but 
with a record number of votes for a leftist candidate), told 
us on June 26 he would not run again in 2010.  Gaviria is the 
far-left's favorite son, and Gaviria said he expects "huge 
pressure" to join the race from that segment since they have 
no other viable candidate.  Carlos and Cesar Gaviria also met 
on May 18, and agreed to work together to block a third term 
for President Uribe. 

¶8. (C) Carlos Gaviria told us he would support Senator 
Gustavo Petro (former M-19) forpresident.  Petro, who has
moved from a close Chavez friend and 21st Century Socialist 
towards the more moderate Lucho wing of the Polo in the past 
year, has also distanced himself from the Party leadership. 
Petro has been a Party "free agent," condemning the FARC, 
anachronistic Polo security policies, and Uribe with equal 
fervor.  Garcia told us that Petro's former-Chavista
supporters (20% of Polo activists) found themselves "lost and 
leaderless" after Petro's defection to the center-left. 

POLO, FARC, CHAVEZ 
------------------ 
¶9. (C) Both Polo leaders and dissidents confirmed that the 
FARC, and to a lessor extent Chavez, remained the biggest 
obstacles to the left's political ambitions in Colombia. 
LuchoGarzon told us the unreconstructed left could not 
resist the temptation to rhetorically sympathize with the 
FARC's "all forms of struggle."  This "justifiably doomed" 
the Polo's chances in general elections given Colombia's 
historically right-of-center electorate.  The Prosecutor 
General's (Fiscalia) request last May that the Supreme Court 
investigate Polo Senator Gloria Ines Ramirez and 
Representative Wilson Borja for possible ties to the FARC 
based on information in the Raul Reyes computers added to the 
Polo's problems.

¶10. (C) Carlos Gaviria said Chavez represented "the biggest 
challenge for the progressive left in Latin America."  His 
"undemocratic populist" acts damaged the efforts of real 
reformers the same way that the FARC's cooption of issues 
like land reform or indigenous rights harmed the Colombian 
left.  LuchoGarzon, who told us he had rejected repeated 
offers of "assistance" from Chavez (cash, physicians, food) 
while mayor, concluded that it would be difficult for the 
Polo to remain intact given its growing ideological 
divisions.  It would be better for the left in the long-run 
if the Party split, allowing moderates to move ahead with a 
social democratic agenda untainted by the FARC or Chavez. 

BROWNFIELD 

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