VZCZCXRO4269
PP RUEHAG RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHLB #1075/01 2051516
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 231516Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2549
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 2636
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 2908
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 001075 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA, PM/FO 
ALSO FOR IO A/S SILVERBERG AND PDAS WARLICK 
P FOR HERRO MUSTAFA 
USUN FOR KHALILZAD/WOLFF/KUMAR/PHEE 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH/YERGER/GAVITO 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/22/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PINR UNSC MARR MOPS SY LE
SUBJECT: LEBANON:  JUMBLATT WARY OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS, 
VIEWS TRIBUNAL AS BIGGEST STICK 
 
REF: BEIRUT 1068 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affaires a.i. William Grant for reasons 1.4 (b) 
 and (d). 
 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) Druze leader Walid Jumblatt remains skeptical of 
Syrian intentions toward Lebanon and continues to press for 
expedited action on the Special Tribunal as the only way to 
pressure Damascus, especially in light of recent French 
overtures toward Syria.  Agreeing that released Lebanese 
prisoner Samir Kantar, a fellow Druze, is "not a hero," 
Jumblatt explained his presence at Kantar's welcome home 
ceremony in the Chouf as politically necessary.  Jumblatt 
praised majority leader Saad Hariri's recent trip to Iraq as 
helpful in promoting better Sunni-Shia relations, reiterated 
his support for army intelligence chief Georges Khoury as the 
next commander, and stressed the need to overcome disputes 
among March 14 Christians as key to ensuring the majority's 
success in the 2009 parliamentary elections.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (C)  On July 22, Charge Grant, accompanied by A/DCM and 
Senior LES Political Advisor, met with Druze leader Walid 
Jumblatt at his residence in Clemenceau.  Druze MP Akram 
Shehayyeb also attended part of the meeting. 
 
SKEPTICAL OF SYRIAN INTENTIONS 
------------------------------ 
 
¶3. (C) Commenting on Syrian Foreign Minister Moallem's visit 
July 21 to Lebanon (reftel), Jumblatt said Moallem raised new 
challenges when he said that "even if international forces 
are deployed in the Sheba'a farms instead of the IDF, then we 
will still consider the land occupied."  This would further 
complicate the issue of Sheba'a, Jumblatt warned.  On 
Sleiman's upcoming visit to Damascus, he said March 14 should 
stand by Sleiman to strengthen his position and avoid 
allowing him to fall into the trap of the expected Syrian 
charm offensive and lobbying by pro-Syrian Lebanese officials 
such as Michel Samaha.  (Note: Sleiman's office issued a 
statement saying he would not travel to Damascus as soon as 
July 26, as reported in the media, but would wait until the 
cabinet has completed the ministerial statement that it is 
currently negotiating.  End Note) 
 
¶4. (C) Jumblatt did not believe Syria would establish 
diplomatic relations with Lebanon or take action on Sheba'a 
Farms until after the 2009 parliamentary elections, but would 
continue instead to deliver "vague" promises.  "If March 8 
wins these elections, then we will not have diplomatic 
relations with Syria," he predicted.  He expressed support 
for disbanding the Higher Syrian-Lebanese Council as well as 
the subsequent treaties that were signed between Lebanon and 
Syria, notably the ones related to security and foreign 
relations.  However, Jumblatt said PM Siniora asked to be 
cautious on this front because abrogating these treaties 
requires the endorsement of both parties. 
 
"Thanks to Sarkozy, Bashar is no longer isolated" 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Jumblatt criticized French President Sarkozy for 
opening up to Syrian President Bashar Asad, saying, "Thanks 
to Sarkozy, Bashar is no longer isolated."  He feared Sarkozy 
and Asad might strike a deal to stop the investigations into 
the Hariri assassination or to divert its course, adding that 
the "Syrians are excellent at bazaars."  Jumblatt reiterated 
his concerns about what he perceived as continuing delays in 
the Tribunal, admitting, "I am obsessed by it."  He warned 
that action needed to be taken sooner rather than later 
since, now that the opposition has a blocking third of the 
cabinet, it will scrutinize every detail of the process, 
tying March 14's efforts to move things forward. 
 
¶6. (C) Jumblatt disclosed that Sarkozy had sent his aide 
Claude Gueant to meet Saudi King Abdullah, whom Jumblatt 
described as the only staunch supporter of March 14 in the 
Arab world.  Gueant reportedly told Abdullah that the Syrians 
were not involved in the 1983 Drakkar bombing in Beirut that 
killed 56 French servicemen, the same day the U.S. Marines 
headquarters was bombed.  Gueant's implication, Jumblatt 
extrapolated, was that the Iranians were behind the attack, 
and since Imad Mughnieh was an Iranian agent, the whole case 
was "closed."  This in turn would imply that the Iranians 
were responsible for the assassination of former PM Rafiq 
Hariri and others, further undermining the Tribunal, he 
warned. 
 
KANTAR WELCOME 
POLITICALLY NECESSARY 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) Charge raised strong USG concern at the welcoming 
reception given to freed prisoner Samir Qantar.  Jumblatt 
stressed that he did not attend the airport official 
ceremony.  He discounted his participation at the rally held 
in Abey, Kantar's hometown in Jumblatt's Chouf Mountain 
stronghold that gathered a mere 500 supporters, as necessary 
for local political reasons.  "I couldn't but assist," he 
explained, adding, "I know he is not that much of a hero." 
Jumblatt shrugged when asked whether he expected Kantar to 
run for parliament, noting that Kantar had told al-Manar he 
would not. 
 
¶8. (C) Jumblatt criticized German Chancellor Merkel for 
blaming Siniora for participating in the welcome ceremony 
when it was a German who had brokered Kantar's release, 
adding that Merkel should blame Israel for releasing Qantar 
instead.  He further criticized Israel for dealing with 
Hizballah on the exchange, rather than the GOL. 
 
CONCERNS FOR CHOUF 
------------------ 
 
¶9. (C) Jumblatt said his current concern is to reduce tension 
in the mountains between Shia and Druze.  He said that a 
field committee consisting of his MP, Shehayyeb and 
Hizballah's head of security apparatus Wafiq Safa was formed 
in order to fix any problems on the ground, a level of 
contact with Hizballah he deemed "acceptable."  He noted that 
the Druze were still worried about Hizballah's continuing 
development of its fiber optic network, adding that the new 
Telecom Minister (and staunch Aounist) Gebran Bassil would do 
nothing to challenge it. 
 
¶10. (C) Jumblatt said he is still waiting for the day when he 
will tour the Chouf and Aley areas along with Speaker Berri 
and Hizballah to alleviate tensions.  Rival Druze leader 
Talal Arslan also would be acceptable, he said, but not Druze 
hard-liners such as Wiam Wahab or members of the Syrian 
Socialist National Party.  He said he knew his overtures to 
Arslan during the May events was not a popular gesture, but 
one that he considered necessary to avoid a conflict with 
Hizbbalh. 
 
PRAISE FOR SAAD'S 
TRIP TO IRAQ, SUNNI- 
SHIA RECONCILIATION 
-------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Jumblatt praised Saad Hariri's recent trip to Iraq, 
dubbing his meeting in Najaf with Shia religious leader Ali 
Sistani a good step in reconciling Shia and Sunnis that 
should be followed by further positive steps.  Jumblatt 
stated that Najaf, the Shia holy place in Iraq, should be 
given greater influence in order to compete with Qom, to whom 
Lebanon's Hizballah Shia looked.  Jumblatt, noting that Saad 
was coming for dinner that evening, said he did not know 
whether Saad intended to meet with Hizballah SYG Nasrallah 
soon. 
 
¶12. (C) Jumblatt dismissed Saad's Shia advisors, Akab Saqr 
and Bassem Saba, as "not serious."  On the other hand, the 
appointment of independent Shia Ibrahim Shamseddine, whom 
Siniora had lobbied heavily for (and whom Jumblatt himself is 
close to), as a minister could be an overture to the Shia in 
the long term.  He stressed that Shamseddine should remain 
independent; if he is seen as being a member of March 14, "he 
is over," Jumblatt warned.  He also praised Shia such as Saud 
Mawla ("my good friend") and Mohamad Matar, but again 
stressed the need for them to work independent of March 14. 
 
CRITICAL OF 
SECURITY FORCES 
--------------- 
 
¶13. (C) Jumblatt expressed his support for current Lebanese 
Armed Forces (LAF) Director of Intelligence (G-2) George 
Khoury as the next LAF Commander, noting that Hariri and 
Siniora oppose his nomination.  He warned that Hariri and 
Siniora should be cautious in handling this matter because 
Aoun could benefit politically if the position goes to a 
Maronite appointed by Hariri (i.e., not Khoury) by accusing 
the Sunnis of once again usurping Christian positions. 
 
¶14. (C) Jumblatt said the LAF is exhausted and even UNIFIL 
commander Graziano is complaining about the absence of the 
LAF in the south.  Jumblatt said he is working with the 
acting LAF commander al-Masri to isolate the Chouf in the 
region between Mashghara and Niha by blocking roads to 
prevent Hizballah troops from entering this area; 
subsequently, the LAF troops currently deployed in this area 
could be moved the south. 
 
¶15. (C) Jumblatt strongly deplored the corruption within the 
ISF, complaining that ISF chief Ashraf Rifi is doing nothing, 
while the role of Wissam Hassan, head of the ISF Intelligence 
department, will be reviewed in the cabinet by Aoun's 
ministers.  Jumblatt praised newlyappointed Minister of the 
Interior Ziyad Baroud ut questioned whether he would be able 
to addres the corruption within the ministry. 
 
MARCH 14 MUST OVERCOME 
CHRISTIAN SQUABBLES 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Jumblatt said the main purpose of his dinner with 
Saad was to "reassemble" March 14 to gear up for the 2009 
parliamentary elections.  This will not be easy, he 
predicted, especially following the difficult process of 
cabinet formation that pit them against each other. 
 
¶17. (C)  Jumblatt said that he had had a "little dispute" 
with Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, notably over the 
Greek-Catholic seat that was occupied by Nehmeh Tohme, close 
to Jumblatt.  Jumblatt said  he had had to "sacrifice" 
Minister Tohme to find a compromise between him and a 
pro-Geagea candidate, with the result being the compromise 
appointment of Raymond Audi, CEO of Audi bank, as Minister of 
the Displaced. 
 
¶18. (C) Jumblatt added that Geagea needs to understand that 
the Christians are not split between the Lebanese Forces and 
Michel Aoun; rather, some 30 percent of them are neither with 
Geagea nor with Aoun.  A major test would be in the Baabda 
electoral district where, if March 14 is able to win 55 
percent of the Christian votes, March 14 will win all six 
seats in that district.  However, Jumblatt warned, if imposes 
his candidates in that district, March 14 will loose all six 
seats. 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶19. (C) Asked what the USG can do to support the majority, 
Jumblatt's answer invariably is speed up the Tribunal.  With 
his domestic constituency always at the forefront of his 
motivations, we are not surprised at Jumblatt's presence at 
Kantar's welcoming home ceremony, nor of his moderated 
approach to Hizballah, which we view primarily ashis way of 
keeping his options open until he detrmines which way the 
winds are blowing.  We will continue to keep an eye on him, 
but progress on the Tribunal will go a long way to ensuring 
that he does not wander too far over to the dark side.  End 
comment. 
GRANT