VZCZCXYZ0016
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHTH #0966/01 1891331
ZNY CCCCC ZZH (CCY ADB20AED VSF0237 538)
O 071331Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2116
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO PRIORITY 0971
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMNAVREG EUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0349
RHMFISS/COMSIXTHFLT  PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L ATHENS 000966 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y  (TEXT) 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT ALSO FOR EUR/RPM AND EUR/SE 
USNATO ALSO FOR MILDEL 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2018 
TAGS: MOPS NATO MARR PREL PGOV TU GR
SUBJECT: GREECE/TURKEY - NEXT STEPS ON NATO AEGEAN EXERCISES 
 
REF: A. ATHENS 678 
     ¶B. ATHENS 721 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Daniel V. Speckhard for 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
------- 
SUMMARY 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) In the aftermath of NATO's May 2008 decision not to 
support a Greek exercise that would overfly the island of 
Agios Efstratios (AE)(ref A), the Greeks are considering 
developing a new exercise that would again seek to overfly 
the island.  Various Greek contacts have told us that they 
believe the United States recommendation to the NATO SG 
not/not to support the May exercise, due to Turkish threats 
to intercept Greek aircraft flying under NATO command and 
control, was the decisive factor in withdrawal of NATO air 
support. We have told our Greek interlocutors that our 
understanding of what transpired is quite different, and that 
the authority to provide support or deny support for an 
exercise rests solely with NATO authorities.  Visiting CC-AIR 
Commander Lt Gen Lee McFann, Commander, NATO Air Component, 
Izmir (U.S.) emphatically told Greek civilian and military 
interlocutors that this issue is a "political problem" and 
that Greek officials must take the matter up with NATO 
political authorities.  We are telling the Greeks that before 
proposing a new exercise they need to ensure that NATO SYG de 
Hoop Scheffer has issued clear, written assurances that he 
will allow the exercise to proceed.  We are also advising the 
Greeks not to force the issue by rescheduling the exercise 
absent such assurances from de Hoop Scheffer, otherwise they 
are headed for a repeat performance.  The Greeks are 
attempting to make this a U.S. problem; we shouldn't let them 
do so.  End Summary. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Agios Efstratios - Recent History 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Although the Turks and Greeks have long disagreed 
about the status of certain islands in the Aegean (ref A) the 
question of the status of the island of Agios Efstratios (AE) 
was first raised in the year 2000 when Turkey raised 
questions related to AE's status in the course of planning 
for a NATO exercise, "Destined Glory 2000."  Prior to that 
date, we are aware of no suggestions that it was anything 
other than Greek sovereign territory with the same status as 
the rest of Greek territory, i.e. with no demilitarized 
status.  We are aware that Turkey argues that AE can be tied 
to treaties pre-dating the Lausanne Convention that would 
suggest it may be demilitarized. 
 
¶3.  (C) In 2007, Greece sought NATO support for a training 
exercise "Noble Archer," that included the Limnos Terminal 
Military Area (TMA) as well as AE.  (Limnos, unlike Agios 
Efstratios, is specifically mentioned in the treaties whose 
interpretation is disputed by our two Allies).  After review, 
NATO did not support the exercise, as Limnos has long been 
the subject of a Greek/Turkish dispute (Greece claims that 
the Montreux Convention amended Lausanne provisions allowing 
Greece to "remilitarize" Limnos and Turkey has long 
challenged this claim), and NATO policy has long been to 
avoid exercises related to Limnos.  Following cancellation of 
the exercise, the Greeks expressed concern that its 
cancellation could be construd also to support the more 
recent Turkish claims related to AE.  This led the United 
States to do two things: 
 
-- Then-U/S Nick Burns made a public statement standing next 
to Greek FM Bakoyannis that the United States considered AE 
to be Greek territory, that the U.S. has the impression it is 
not demilitarized, and that this is an issue for NATO to 
review to see if it can reach an arrangement to allow such 
military exercises to proceed (ref A). 
 
-- Privately, U.S. officials in Washington and Athens pressed 
the Greeks to raise Greek concerns with NATO officials -- 
civilian and military. 
 
¶4.  (C) Greece then took our advice and consulted with NATO 
authorities.  On the military side, the Greek Commander of 
CAOC 7 and other Greek military representatives were in 
frequent touch with NATO officials at CC-AIR Izmir (including 
a number of U.S. military officers) and SACEUR to lay out 
their intentions to develop an exercise that excluded Limnos 
and included Agios Efstratios. In the course of these 
consultations, the Greeks believe they received assurances 
that such an exercise -- if it followed all of the detailed 
NATO requirements for Aegean exercises -- would be approved. 
On the civilian side, we understand that the Greek Ambassador 
to NATO met with various officials in Brussels, including 
 Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer in December 2007, to make 
the same points.  The Greeks also believe that de Hoop 
Schaeffer expressed willingness to allow an exercise that 
overflew AE to go forward provided it did not touch on 
disputed areas and met all of the other criteria for Aegean 
exercise support.  The Greeks believe they planned an 
exercise that met this criteria. However, at no time in this 
process was any official NATO guidance issued on the subject. 
 
 
----------------------------- 
Greek Suspicions of U.S. Role 
----------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) When NATO authorities informed the Greeks that they 
would not support "Noble Archer" this year the Greeks were 
deeply frustrated (refs).  Various contacts in the Greek MFA, 
MOD and Prime Minister's office have told us that they 
understand NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer took this 
decision only after consulting with the United States and 
that the United States had recommended not/not approving the 
exercise due to Turkish threats to intercept the Greek 
aircraft flying under NATO AWACS command and control. 
Various contacts -- including the Chief of the Hellenic Air 
Force, the Director of the MFA NATO Office, the Diplomatic 
advisor to the Minister of Defense, and the Deputy Diplomatic 
Advisor to the Prime Minster -- have told us that they 
believe the United States stopped this exercise.  They cite 
as sources the Secretary General's office and the other 
Missions to NATO consulted by the SYG. 
 
¶6.    (C) We have responded that we have a very different 
understanding of these events.  Either SACEUR or the 
 Secretary General of NATO could have approved this exercise 
without any consultations with the United States.  However, 
the Secretary General chose not to exercise his inherent 
authority, and to solicit our advice, presumably because he 
had doubts about the wisdom of proceeding.  We are telling 
the Greeks that if Greece is unhappy with the outcome of this 
process, it needs to take up its concerns with the NATO 
 Secretary General and with SACEUR, and not/not with the 
United States.  We will continue to make this point, but we 
have thus far been unable to alter the Greek conclusion that 
the U.S., as a disproportionately strong force within NATO, 
is the ultimate obstacle to proceeding. 
 
¶7.    (C) During a June 30 to July 2 visit to Athens NATO 
CC-AIR Commander Lt Gen McFann (U.S.) was direct with Greek 
interlocutors that this is a "political problem" and that 
Greece needs to address it by consulting with NATO political 
authorities.  He also recommended that Greece seek written 
guidance from NATO political authorities before pressing any 
further for NATO support for any activity overflying AE (or 
any other Aegean area under dispute). 
 
¶8. (C) During LTG McFann,s July 1 meeting with Constantinos 
Bitsios, Deputy Diplomatic Adviser to the PM, the DCM 
strongly emphasized to Bitsios: 
 
-- The participation (or not) of a NATO AWACS during the 90 
second overflight of A.E. by Greek fighters would have zero 
significance for the military preparedness of either Greece 
or NATO. 
 
-- Despite the popular perception in both Athens and Ankara, 
no one else believes that NATO is the referee in these 
arguments. 
 
-- Any action NATO takes, or does not take, on these 
exercises will have zero real impact on the eventual 
resolution of Aegean issues. 
 
DCM urged Greece not to set itself up for another 
disappointment by rescheduling the exercise since, as we have 
just seen, the best-laid plans can have unpredictable 
results.  Nor should Athens focus on the .S. as the source 
of its problems, as Athens nd Washington already have enough 
difficult issues to deal with in the real world.  Bitsios was 
utterly unconvinced, and remained focused on: Greece,s 
"right" to conduct such an exercise; a domino theory of 
constantly expanding "o-go" zones imposed by Turkey; and his 
beliefthat the U.S. has the dominant voice in decisions 
taken by the NATO SG. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Greek Concerns about an Elastic "No Fly" Area 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C) We have heard Bitsios' concerns from virtually all 
interlocutors at the MOD, the General Staff, and the MFA. 
The Greeks assert that the Turks are seeking to extend their 
concept of a "grey zone" where NATO does not exercise in an 
effort to build support for Turkish claims in the Aegean. 
The standard Greek talking point is if the Turks can simply 
claim AE as a "disputed area," why can't they claim Athens or 
Thessaloniki?  The Greek refrain is that the practical effort 
of NATO "neutrality" in such situations is to favor Turkish 
claims in the Aegean.  We push back, noting that NATO is not 
an arbitrator in the zero-sum Aegean game, and that whether 
NATO exercises or not above a given island will have no 
practical effect on any eventual solution of Aegean issues, 
but that we also agree that specious claims - when they are 
truly specious - should not be countenanced. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Next Steps - Embassy Athens' Recommendations 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) The Greeks have intimated that they want to try 
again to develop an exercise that would overfly AE (and the 
Greek press have reported that NATO SG de Hoop Scheffer gave 
positive signals in this regard on the margins of the recent 
Defense Ministerial).  We intend to give them the same advice 
that we gave last year with an addition: like last year, we 
are telling the Greeks to proceed carefully in developing any 
such exercise, and to consult closely with NATO military and 
civilian officials every step of the way.  However, we are 
also telling the Greeks that before they even start the 
process, they need to ensure that NATO SYG de Hoop Scheffer 
has issued clear, written assurances that he will allow the 
exercise to proceed.  Absent such assurances from de Hoop 
Scheffer, we are advising the Greeks not to force the issue, 
as the only possible outcome will be another failed exercise 
and further frustrations. 
 
¶11.  (C) The Greeks are already countering that de Hoop 
Scheffer will not provide the necessary assurances absent 
signals from the U.S. that it supports such an exercise. 
They are likely to press in Washington, Brussels, and here in 
Athens for the U.S. to tell de Hoop Scheffer to let such an 
exercise go forward.  We recommend that our response be 
simply to refer to Greeks back to the Secretary General as 
this is not/not a U.S. issue.  The NATO Secretary General has 
the authority to provide guidance to NATO military 
authorities, and we should not prejudge the advice we will 
provide to him at any given time.  The Greeks are trying to 
make this a U.S. problem; we shouldn't let them -- as this 
issue should remain firmly in NATO's corridors. 
SPECKHARD