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C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 001191 
 
SIPDIS 
 
EUR/SE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MARR CY TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY/CYPRUS: MFA TAKING WAIT AND SEE APPROACH ON 
NEGOTIATIONS 
 
REF: NICOSIA 434 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Daniel O'Grady, Reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary and comment: In a June 27 meeting, MFA Cyprus 
Section Head Can Oztas told us the MFA remains supportive of 
current negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, 
but has no plans to propose any concessions or gestures 
towards building momentum for a resolution.  He rejected 
recommendations contained in the recent ICG report for Turkey 
to undertake unilaterally the opening of ports and airports 
to Greek Cypriot traffic, or to directly engage the Greek 
Cypriots.  Expressing disappointment over perceived 
backsliding on the part of Christofias, Oztas cited the MOU 
between UK and ROC (reftel) and language contained in the UN 
report attendant to UNFICYP's mandate extension as 
indications that Christofias is unreliable.  He rejected 
Christofias call for the removal of fifty percent of Turkish 
forces in the north, saying any reduction in Turkey's 
military presence, even a symbolic one, would happen only 
after an agreement has been reached, but might take place 
before public referenda on the agreement.  Blaming the Greek 
Cypriot side for foot-dragging, Oztas indicated that Turkey 
did not expect full-fledged direct negotiations to begin 
until September.  Oztas posited that Turkey's basic policy on 
Cyprus is unlikely to change, regardless of the outcome of 
the closure case against the AKP.  End Summary. 
 
No Mood to Be Flexible 
---------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) MFA Cyprus Section Head Can Oztas told us on June 27 
that there are no policy discussions taking place in Ankara 
on steps Turkey should take to support the negotiations in 
Cyprus.  He confirmed that Cyprus was not on the agenda 
during the National Security Council meeting on June 26. 
While acknowledging the May 23 statement by TRNC "President" 
Talat and ROC President Christofias was positive, Oztas noted 
that recent developments such as the UK-ROC MOU, and the 
language contained in the UNFICYP report associated with its 
mandate renewal (reftel - both documents omitted language 
concerning "two constituent states") indicated that 
Christofias was trying to distance himself from the May 23 
statement and raised doubts about his reliability as a 
negotiating partner. 
 
¶3. (C) Reacting to the June 23 International Crisis Group 
report, Oztas said Turkey has no plans to undertake any 
unilateral moves.  He said implementation of the Ankara 
Protocol would occur when a settlement has been reached, not 
beforehand.  Implementation, even on a provisional, limited, 
partial basis is not being considered.  Similarly, there are 
no plans to directly engage Greek Cypriot representatives. 
 
Movement of Turkish Troops? 
--------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Oztas reaffirmed the commitment to withdraw all but a 
residual amount of Turkish troops (650) from Cyprus on the 
basis of the Annan Plan upon reaching a settlement. 
Referring to Christofias' call for Turkey to withdraw half of 
its troops, Oztas said Turkey would never contemplate such a 
move.  Only if the two parties have reached agreement and 
only if the agreement is submitted for referenda might the 
Turkish military consider a symbolic troop reduction to build 
support for a settlement. 
 
No Red Lines, Just "Dark Orange" Ones 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Talat has wide latitude in negotiating with the Greek 
Cypriots, and only in areas related to security does Ankara 
plan to engage, Oztas insisted.  While maintaining that 
Ankara has no "red lines" in current negotiations, Oztas 
characterized two issues as "dark orange lines" for Turkey. 
First, there must be assurances that property restitution 
cases currently active in the European Court of Human Rights 
against Turkey will be withdrawn and no new cases would be 
filed.  Second, all property restitution cases would be 
resolved on the island without involving Turkey.  Unless such 
guarantees are made, Oztas reasoned, Turkey fears these cases 
will continue even after a final settlement.  Oztas pointed 
to the Russians taking a similar position during negotiations 
 
for the reunification of Germany. 
 
No Major Changes Anticipated in Turkey's Cyprus Policy 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) Regardless of the AKP closure case's outcome, Oztas 
viewed any dramatic shift in Turkey's Cyprus policy as 
unlikely.  Oztas reiterated Turkey's support for the 
negotiations and view that the Annan Plan formed the basis of 
these talks.  He expected full-fledged negotiations to begin 
in September, and blamed Greek Cypriot foot-dragging for the 
negotiations not starting sooner.  Oztas said Talat wanted to 
start full-fledged negotiations in June, but Christofias 
pushed not to begin them until after August. 
 
Visit Ankara's Classified Web Site at 
http://www.intelink.sgov.gov/wiki/Portal:Turk ey 
 
WILSON