VZCZCXRO8310
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHAM #1983/01 1841525
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 021525Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
TO RUEHTA/AMEMBASSY ALMATY 0040
RUEHKB/AMEMBASSY BAKU 0051
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 2987
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 AMMAN 001983 
 
SIPDIS 
 
FOR NEA/ELA 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/04/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV ECON KISL ZK ZJ TU IR JO
SUBJECT: JORDANIAN FOREIGN POLICY REACHES INTO CENTRAL ASIA 
 
REF: A. AMMAN 1329 
     ¶B. AMMAN 898 
     ¶C. 07 AMMAN 4678 
     ¶D. 07 AMMAN 4430 
     ¶E. 07 AMMAN 4207 
     ¶F. 07 AMMAN 3755 
     ¶G. 04 AMMAN 9152 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary: Jordan, with the heavy personal engagement 
of King Abdullah, has been reaching beyond the Middle East 
for partners on a variety of energy, economic, and political 
issues.  Of particular note are the efforts expended on 
improving and expanding ties with former Soviet republics in 
Central Asia, particularly Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan.  The 
motivation for extending Jordan's foreign policy reach seems 
to be a mixture of diversifying energy and food sources, 
finding new strategic allies, enticing foreign investment, 
spreading Jordan's brand of moderate Islam, countering Iran, 
and even a dose of the King's boyish adventurism.  End 
Summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) We spoke recently to a number of foreign policy 
experts and practitioners about Jordan's budding relations 
with former Soviet republics in Central Asia, especially 
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan.  A consensus formed on several 
points: 
 
--Jordan needs more reliable sources of energy and wheat. 
Both are potentially available from those countries. 
 
--Arabs are unreliable.  While the King has substantially 
improved the poor relations with Gulf dynasties that he 
inherited from his father, those improved ties are not 
delivering sufficient economic benefits or a strategy to 
defeat Iran's regional agenda on the scale of Jordanian 
expectations. 
 
--The King is looking beyond the Arab cesspool.  Unlike his 
father, Abdullah has little patience for inter-Arab politics 
and develops practical foreign policies to promote an 
ambitious program for economic development.  As a result, he 
casts his eyes beyond the immediate neighborhood.  He also 
believes moderate Islam can be a binding factor, both in 
challenging extremists and finding common ground on other 
issues.  He sees the Hashemite legacy - descent from the 
Prophet - as a useful tool in this effort. 
 
--Diversification is good.  Commentators saw a benefit in 
developing new markets for trade and the export of Jordanian 
labor, although they had a harder time identifying what goods 
Jordan could export there or what language Jordanian laborers 
would use to communicate in those non-Anglophone markets. 
 
--Countering Iran is also in play.  The King believes, and 
some commentators concur, that Central Asia could function as 
a counter to Iran's agenda, by showing an alignment with 
like-minded states fearful of Iranian hegemony.  The King 
advocates stronger intelligence and military cooperation with 
the states on Iran's northern border.  He also sees an 
opportunity - not very well defined, or shared in Baku - to 
use the sizeable Azeri population inside Iran as a pressure 
point on the Tehran regime. 
 
--Personalities Matter.  The King is also partly motivated by 
the sheer fun of projecting Jordan into frontier territory, 
such as Central Asia, where money, oil, security challenges, 
and grand strategy all mix.  The fact that this causes him to 
look at tyrants as possible comrades doesn't faze him. 
According to an Azeri diplomat here, there is a longstanding 
personal friendship between Abdullah and President Aliyev, 
stemming from the 1990s.  (The Azeri diplomat acknowledged 
the many common interests between Jordan and his country, but 
downplayed the importance of a shared Iran strategy, seeing a 
gap between Azeri and Jordanian interests and issues, given 
the Azeri-Iranian shared border.) 
 
--Military Cooperation?  We know the Azeris and Jordanians 
have talked about arms transfers and other areas of security 
cooperation - something the King thinks makes sense 
strategically, and also provides a market for his budding 
domestic arms industry.  Ambassador has made clear to the 
King directly U.S. policy on the transfer of U.S.-origin 
military equipment to Azerbaijan, but this area bears close 
monitoring. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
AMMAN 00001983  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶3.  (C) The King sees his relationship with the U.S. as the 
foundation of his national security strategy.  However, he 
sees in an increasingly multipolar world the need to expand 
ties elsewhere, so long as they do not conflict with his U.S. 
relations.  Frequent trips to China and East Asia aim at 
developing Jordan's relations there, and leadership changes 
in Western Europe have opened up the prospect for better ties 
there, as well, especially with the French and German 
leaders.  The King's effort to knit together a "Group of 11" 
- eleven countries from around the world with similar lower 
middle income rankings - has gotten less traction, primarily 
because the group has little else in common. 
 
¶4.  (C) The idea of developing relations with historically 
marginal areas like Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan appeals to the 
boy adventurer in him - which is reflected in the somewhat 
furtive fashion in which this portfolio is being handled (by 
a palace aide who is uncomfortable talking about his role). 
Moreover, he sees those countries as able to engage with him 
in below the radar activities such as arms sales or 
containing Iran.  For the moment, Jordan has not seen a big 
payoff on the oil issue with either of the two former Soviet 
republics.  As one contact said, nobody in the palace is 
overly-optimistic about the prospects of Jordan's outreach 
strategy (except perhaps the King), but nonetheless these are 
avenues to pursue. 
 
Visit Amman's Classified Website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman 
Hale