VZCZCXRO7069
PP RUEHPA
DE RUEHUJA #1270/01 1830838
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 010838Z JUL 08
FM AMEMBASSY ABUJA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3264
INFO RUEHZK/ECOWAS COLLECTIVE
RUEHYD/AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE 0290
RUEHOS/AMCONSUL LAGOS 9520
RHMFISS/HQ USAFRICOM STUTTGART GE
RHEBAAA/DEPT OF ENERGY WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHINGTON DC
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUZEJAA/JAC MOLESWORTH RAF MOLESWORTH UK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ABUJA 001270 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR AF/W, INR/AA 
DOE FOR GEORGE PERSON 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: EPET PGOV ENRG MOPS ASEC NI
SUBJECT: NIGERIA: AMBASSADOR MEETS WITH SHELL AND EXXON 
EXECUTIVES 
 
REF: ABUJA 1184 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Walter Pflaumer for reasons 1.4. (b 
& d). 
 
¶1. (S//NF) SUMMARY: Ambassador met with Shell Executive Vice 
President Anne Pickard June 25.  Pickard described in detail 
the June 19 militant attack on the Bonga platform (see 
reftel), and claimed there was likely internal collusion in 
the attack; that members of the National Assembly accused 
Shell of not doing enough to protect itself from the attack; 
that members of President Yar'Adua's administration knowingly 
feed him false information concerning the true state of 
Nigeria's oil industry; and that Shell oil output at Bonga 
should be back up to pre-attack production levels by June 26 
or 27.  (Note: Septel will report on a new attack affecting 
Shell which took place on weekend of June 28-29, following 
Pickard's meeting with Ambassador. End note.)  Ambassador 
ensured that Shell's security representative also briefed the 
RSO.  On June 26, Ambassador met with Exxon-Mobil Nigeria 
Chairman and Managing Director John P. Chaplin.  Chaplin 
related to Ambassador Exxon's top priorities for her to 
convey to President Yar'Adua at the next opportunity.  Both 
executives portrayed an industry whose Nigerian government 
partner is at best inefficient and inept, and at worst 
antagonistic and systematically corrupt, listing 
incompetence, GON lack of Joint Venture funding, and sanctity 
of contracts as major issues.  END SUMMARY. 
 
The Bonga Attack 
---------------- 
¶2. (S) On June 25, Ambassador met with Shell Executive Vice 
President for Africa Anne Pickard, who opened the meeting by 
describing details of the June 19 Bonga platform attack. 
Using ship-based radar, Shell staff realized there was an 
impending attack at around midnight, June 19, giving Bonga 
about two hours' warning before the militants arrived, 
allowing for ample time to go into security lockdown. 
Militants attempted to gain access to the platform for around 
four hours, she said, hitting living quarters with machine 
gun and small arms fire and using a blowtorch to successfully 
penetrate every security door except the last one, which 
would have given them access to the entire Bonga operation. 
Able to monitor attackers' communications up until the last 
minute before the attack, Shell personnel overheard that the 
attack on living quarters was a deliberate effort at 
terrorizing Shell's workers.  Attackers used three speedboats 
to approach the vessel, Pickard reported, and another three 
stood off, apparently to provide back-up and fueling.  Bonga 
called the Nigerian Navy for help at 0230, but a Nigerian 
Navy vessel did not arrive until 1930 that evening, and upon 
arrival needed to be provided with both food and fuel.  The 
Shell executive also noted that the Navy provides Bonga with 
almost no protection, having visited only three times since 
January.  She guessed that the militants may have had an 
inside source on the platform's security arrangements, as had 
happened in attacks on platforms belonging to other 
international oil companies (IOCs).  She was also concerned 
that the militants will have gained additional valuable 
intelligence from penetrating as far as they did this time; 
Shell is reviewing its security posture. 
 
¶3. (S) Pickard reported that Shell's Niger Delta-wide 
intelligence sources, which she described as very good, 
informed them that the speedboats used in the attack were 
loaned to militants by Bayelsa State Governor Timipre Sylva, 
ostensibly to be used for the protection of the Pennington 
River.  Upon hearing of their use in the Bonga incident, 
however, Sylva apparently was extremely upset, and dispatched 
his aides to secure the release of an Amcit kidnapping victim 
taken from a Tidewater vessel in a separate incident 
(reftel).  In response to Ambassador's question about whether 
a larger vessel was involved to assist the speed boats, 
Pickard said no, as Shell was very familiar with the new line 
of boats and thought they did not need a mother ship as an 
intermediary transport to carry out the atatck. 
 
The National Assembly 
 
ABUJA 00001270  002 OF 003 
 
 
--------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Pickard said that in a later appearance before members 
of the National Assembly two days later, some Nigerian 
Representatives accused Shell of not performing due diligence 
to prevent the attack, and suggested that if Shell could not 
provide adequate security for its facilities and equipment, 
then perhaps it should not be allowed to operate.  (Note: 
Pickard surmised that National Assembly members were 
referring to the practice of some other IOCs -- like Chevron 
and Agip -- of bringing Nigerian soldiers on board their 
vessels to provide protection, a practice Shell eschews 
because of the possibility of being accused of collusion in 
any human rights abuses that might subsequently occur. She 
added that, given the circumstances, Shell may reconsider its 
stance.  End note.)  Pickard said that Assembly members in 
her meeting also accused the USG and UK of worsening the 
Niger Delta crisis by "their conversations with the 
militants."  Ambassador assured Pickard that this was not the 
case and the reference may have referred to communication of 
some sort that we understand may have involved the Carter 
Center.  Pickard asked for the Embassy's help in reminding 
the GON that security in the region is first and foremost its 
responsibility, and not that of Shell or the other IOCs. 
 
Misinforming the President 
-------------------------- 
 
¶5. (S//NF) Pickard claimed that President Yar'Adua is 
deliberately fed misinformation by individuals in his 
administration seeking to protect their own positions.  After 
the May 15 announcement that Angola had surpassed Nigeria as 
the continent's largest oil producer, Yar'Adua called 
Engineer A. L. Yar'Adua (no relation to the President), head 
of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, with whom 
Pickard was meeting at the time.  She listened incredulously 
as Engineer Yar'Adua assured the President that Nigeria still 
outproduced Angola, with a total output of 3.4 million bpd; 
after the phone call ended, he openly admitted to Pickard 
that he had added in gas figures so as to ensure a larger 
total than Angola's reported petroleum output, intentionally 
misleading the President. (Note: Nigeria's current oil 
production hovers around two million bpd when there is 
respite from the too-frequent militant attacks on production 
operations; of late reports are that it is down to around 1.8 
million bpd. End note.) 
 
Exxon's Wish List 
----------------- 
 
¶6. (C) On June 26, Ambassador met with Exxon-Mobil Nigeria 
Chairman and Managing Director John P. Chaplin to hear his 
challenges in the current tense (more so than usual) IOC-GON 
relationship.  When asked what Exxon's top priorities in 
Nigeria were for changes in GON policies and practices, 
Chaplin responded with the following four items: 1) 
protecting the sanctity of contracts; 2) gaining confidence 
in funding by GON in Joint Venture oil production 
institutions for the medium term; 3) ensuring security, 
against both militants and criminals/pirates; and 4) 
providing reliable electrical power  -- specifically, a 
resolution of the GON's debate over whether power should be 
publicly or commercially provided.  Ambassador assured him 
she would take his views into account in preparing her key 
points for her next meeting with President Yar'Adua. 
 
¶7. (C) COMMENT:  A main theme from both meetings is the lack 
of responsibility taken by the GON at all levels for 
insecurity in the Niger Delta region and the problems with 
oil production in Nigeria.  GON officials readily shift the 
blame for militant attacks onto the oil companies themselves, 
are unwilling to tell their own top officials the truth, 
particularly the President, and the GON leadership gives 
indifferent support to agencies (e.g. the Nigerian Navy) 
tasked with improving security -- which are themselves 
riddled with corruption.  All of this is capped off by the 
various moribund regional and Niger Delta security 
initiatives which the GON either sponsors or is supposed to 
 
ABUJA 00001270  003 OF 003 
 
 
be a major player in, from the planned Niger Delta Summit 
scheduled for July 2008 to the Gulf of Guinea Commission to 
the Gulf of Guinea Energy Security Strategy.  For now, the 
GON is hamstrung by its own lack of capacity and political 
will to work toward any positive change, and oil production 
will continue to suffer as a result.  END COMMENT. 
SANDERS