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C O N F I D E N T I A L TEGUCIGALPA 000541 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/11/2018 
TAGS: EAIR EFIN ECON MARR MASS MCAP MOPS PBPTS PGOV
PINR, PINS, PNAT, PREL, ES, HO 
SUBJECT: AT A HIGH COST OF LIVES AND MONEY, ZELAYA 
MAINTAINS SINGLE-MINDED FOCUS ON SOTO CANO 
 
REF: A. TEGUCIGALPA 527 B. 07TEGUCIGALPA1678 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Charles A. Ford, reason 1.4(b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY and ACTION REQUEST: Twelve days after the 
TACA 390 crash at Tegucigalpa's Toncontin International 
airport (Reftel A), the initial investigation points mostly 
to pilot error, and the fuselage should be completely removed 
from the highway by Wednesday. President Zelaya has found 
himself backed into a corner. At his discretion, flights to 
and from Tegucigalpa of other than small aircraft (less than 
42 passenger capacity) remain cancelled. A chorus of public 
and private opposition is mounting, as are economic losses. 
The military, including the Defense Minister, Honduran Air 
Force and Joint Chiefs, is dutifully attempting to put into 
action President Zelaya's impulsive announcement that a 
civilian/commercial dual use facility would be opened at Soto 
Cano (Palmerola) airbase within 60 days. Their option-less 
strategy to is urge the United States to allow use of almost 
all key services and equipment at the base for a temporary, 
yet unspecified period. Post has strong concerns about legal 
liability and technical capacity tied to assisting GOH with 
civilian operations at the base, even for a temporary period 
and requests guidance in the shortest time period possible, 
in coordination with SOUTHCOM, on a response to this request. 
END SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (C) In recent days, President Zelaya is finding himself 
with fewer and fewer supporters in his bid to keep Toncontin 
Airport effectively closed to international flights. Some 
private airlines reportedly have indicated they would rather 
keep their flights at San Pedro Sula, the current alternative 
destination for international traffic, than move to Soto 
Cano. Taca has maintained its position that it would not use 
Toncontin again if it opens, probably in an attempt to reduce 
its own liabilty for the crash. In the face of public 
opposition, always fickle President of Congress Roberto 
Micheletti has reversed his previous support for moving the 
international airport and is calling to reopen Toncontin. 
Zelaya has responded by declaring that he has already 
completed 290 of the 300 required steps to open an 
international airport, but local press deftly pointed out 
that he failed to specify the 10 steps he had not completed, 
which surely include construction of a terminal, viable 
runway, sewage and water systems, and buildings for customs 
and migration. 
 
¶3. (U) Local press is also reporting that there have been 
300 deaths in the last three years on the highway connecting 
Tegucigalpa to Soto Cano, underscoring the real safety 
factors involved in this rash decision. Post has also heard 
informally of at least two deaths, and another now comatose 
victim, of traffic accidents which occurred on the same road 
while in transit from Tegucigalpa to the airport at San Pedro 
Sula. Press also reports economic losses of at least USD 21 
million over the last week due to the airport closure, and 
laments rising job losses, cancellations of international 
conferences and visits by investors, and empty hotels in 
Tegucigalpa. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
Crash Investigation Points to Pilot Error 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶4. (C) The leader of the NTSB/FAA team assisting Salvadoran 
investigators looking into the May 30 crash gave Embassy 
staff a close-hold, preliminary readout of his findings on 
June 6, stressing that final conclusions might not be 
available for more than a year. Preliminary indications 
point to some level of pilot error coupled with a wet runway, 
and landing long with a significant tailwind. The NTSB 
expert, who hopes to return periodically to continue to 
assist the Salvadoran investigation, said crowning and 
grooving the runway would enhance its safety. But he said 
the runway was still usable and "I would land on it with my 
family tomorrow" and pointed out that the Taca 390 crash was 
the first serious accident at Toncontin Airport in more than 
17 years. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
Military Charged with Creating a Civilian Operation 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶5. (C) Despite strong evidence that the crash was caused in 
large part by pilot error, President Zelaya has maintained 
his public position that he is concerned about the potential 
political costs of another accident at Toncontin, and has 
declared the airport indefinitely closed to Class C and D 
flights until further notice. (Note: The Honduran Civil 
Aviation authorities are defining Class C and D flights as 42 
passengers or more. Class A and B, defined by the 
authorities as 42 passengers or less, have been operating out 
of the airport as normal since the evening of May 30. 
Federal Aviation Authority, ICAO, and aviation experts on the 
ground have told post that the international standard for 
classifying aircraft is actually based on landing speed, and 
suspect that the GOH definition is arbitrary. End Note.) 
Under the guise of a transport "emergency," Zelaya charged 
the Honduran military, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
the Air Force, and the Ministry of Defense with drafting and 
executing a plan to open the Soto Cano joint air base as a 
dual-use military-civilian airport within 60 days of the 
accident. His order stipulates that the civilian use may not 
interrupt existing military operations at the base. 
 
¶6. (C) Mil Group Commander, DATT and Econ Off attended a 
meeting June 9 with the Honduran military, headed by CHOD 
Vasquez Velazquez, to discuss the GOH plan for creation of 
this dual-use facility on such short notice. CHOD 
underscored at every opportunity the need to achieve this 
transition without affecting current military operations at 
the base. Honduran military presented the plan under the 
assumption that developing an international airport at the 
base which follows International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) regulations would require at least two years and USD 
50 to 100 million. The presentation recognized the need for 
involvement of over 13 Honduran government agencies in 
long-term conversion of the base to a dual-use facility. 
 
¶7. (C) But the real focus of the conversation was the need 
for "strong JTF-Bravo cooperation" in the short term, meaning 
provision by Joint Task Force-Bravo of all critical base 
operations utilities, personnel, and equipment. These 
include: electricity, water, sewage, trash collection and 
incineration, fuel storage, runway maintanence, control tower 
operations and equipement, navigation equipment, radio 
communications equipment, fire and rescue personnel and 
equipment, and medical infirmary. Additional consultations 
on temporary parking, security entrance and exit from the 
base, and the security perimeter, would also be necessary. 
Finally, despite previous discussions about division of the 
military and civilian sides of the base (Reftel B), the 
military indicated it plans to use the same runway and ramp 
for both, and had not developed concrete plans to divide the 
two sides. The presentation did not mention other details 
such as animal/bird control, ramp lighting and HAZMAT 
response and disposal. 
 
¶8. (C) Vasquez told Embassy offs that GOH has no 
alternatives if the U.S. denies this assistance and meekly 
admitted he would have to consult airport concessions manager 
Carlos Ramos to find other solutions. Near the conclusion of 
the presentation, Minister of Defense Mejia joined the 
meeting, and started by declaring that Zelaya had hastily 
made the decision without the advice of experts, and that it 
was up to Mejia and his military advisors to lay out the 
options "in black and white" for the President, including 
what the United States can and cannot do. Mejia strongly 
implied that the military does not back Zelaya's plan and is 
looking for a pretext to scrap it. 
 
¶9. (C) Embassy PolCouns, DATT and Econ off were summoned to 
a meeting at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on June 10. 
Though the diplomatic note informing us of the meeting 
implied we would be observers, the meeting was an abbreviated 
version of the day before. The only difference were that 
interlocutors from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were now 
present, including lawyers form the MFA's treaty office. 
Twice during the meeting, they expressed their willingness to 
quickly negotiate changes or addendums to the existing 
Bilateral Military Assistance Agreement of 1954 if it were 
required to commercialize the airstrip. Embassy offs 
reiterated that we would need a few days to seek guidance 
from SOUTHCOM and U.S. policy makers and would provide a 
formal response when we have been able to study the legal 
implications of providing this type of assistance. 
 
------------ 
COMMENT 
------------ 
 
¶10. (C) There is mounting evidence that the GOH has no 
physical excuse to keep Toncontin closed and the political 
game is becoming more clear. Post has concerns about the GOH 
assignment of a team from El Salvador to head the ongoing 
investigation and report about the causes of the crash. Taca 
is based in El Salvador, and we believe there are serious 
possible conflicts of interest. We would urge Embassy San 
Salvador to underscore the political implications of 
threatening operations at Soto Cano for the entire region. 
 
¶11. (C) Minister of Defense Mejia's search for an excuse to 
cease planning of a Soto Cano dual-use facility on a 
compressed schedule is understandable, but post is proceeding 
with caution. We want Mejia to deliver the news in a way 
that does not give Zelaya, who is rumored to be flirting with 
airport financing offers from Hugo Chavez and a construction 
offer from the PRC, fuel to vilify the United States. We 
also see a continued lack of strategic thinking on the part 
of advisors, who have twice summoned U.S. diplomatic and 
military officials to meetings, hoping for immediate answers 
to their request for our temporary assistance. Strikingly 
absent in these discussions with GOH officials is the 
possibility of making temporary improvements to Toncontin, 
which would entail crowning and grooving the runway at a much 
lower price, and/or moving the international airport to a 
more practical location closer to Tegucigalpa. Feasibility 
studies at three sites were done years ago. In the last 
week, according to one World Bank representive, World Bank's 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), has expressed 
interest to GOH officials in financing construction or 
reconditioning of Honduran international airport, wherever it 
ends up. 
 
¶12. (C) Post believes our response to the GOH should be 
clear that we cannot provide utilities, logistical support or 
equipment for commercial use at the base, and that the 
response must focus on legal liability issues and the fact 
that we cannot accept payment for these services. We request 
guidance from SOUTHCOM, with interagency input, as soon as 
possible. Post has already informally reminded Honduran 
officials that we have been working with them on the possible 
joint commercial/military use of the Soto Cano airbase for 
several years, most recently in October 2007 (see Reftel B), 
and that we have not objected to the idea. In October, the 
meetings concluded with an agreement that the GOH would 
develop and present a plan focused on commerical cargo - not 
passenger flights - which to date we have not seen. When the 
plan to convert Palmerola on short notice fails within the 
next week to two weeks, we should be prepared to respond to 
the GOH by publicly presenting these facts. End Comment. 
 
FORD