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C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 062452 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNSC UNMIK PBTS SENV PINR KO RS
IZ, GG, XQ, SW 
SUBJECT: Under SECRETARY BURNS DISCUSSES IRAQ, KOSOVO, 
GEORGIA AND NORDIC SECURITY WITH SWEDISH FM BILDT 
 
 
(U) CLASSIFIED BY EUR ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY KURT 
VOLKER FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
REF: STATE 60125 
 
¶1. (U) PARTICIPANTS: 
 
U.S. 
---- 
U/S WILLIAM J. BURNS, P 
PDAS KURT VOLKER, EUR 
SUMONA GUHA, SPECIAL ASSISTANT, P 
¶H. MARTIN MCDOWELL, EUR/NB DESK (NOTETAKER) 
 
SWEDEN 
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CARL BILDT, FOREIGN MINISTER 
AMBASSADOR JONAS HAFSTROM 
HAKAN MALMQVIST, DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL, SWEDISH MFA 
ERIKA FERRER, POLITICAL COUNSELOR, SWEDISH EMBASSY 
INGRID ASK, FIRST SECRETARY, SWEDISH EMBASSY 
 
¶2. (C) Summary: Under Secretary Burns thanked Swedish FM 
Bildt for Sweden's hosting of the International Compact 
with Iraq conference, during their June 4 meeting in the 
Department.  Bildt told Burns that Sweden and the EU were 
prepared to help clean up the "mess" in Kosovo, but wanted 
to see a prolonged UN presence, especially in the north, 
where the EU was not able to deploy.  On Georgia, U/S 
Burns said the U.S. was urging Tbilisi to show restraint, 
but he and Bildt agreed that Russia was playing a "very 
dangerous game" in Abkhazia.  Bildt said that the Swedes 
were trying to quietly bring the Georgians and Abkhaz 
together, and suggested that the 2014 Sochi Olympics and 
economic measures might prove effective ways to pressure 
Russia and the Abkhaz to resume progress toward a conflict 
settlement.  Bildt also said that Sweden was supporting 
closer security cooperation and integration with like- 
minded Nordic neighbors that would have a significant 
long-term impact.  End Summary. 
 
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Iraq 
---- 
 
¶3. (C) Under Secretary Burns initiated the June 4 meeting 
by thanking FM Bildt and Sweden for hosting the May 29 
International Compact with Iraq (ICI) Annual Review 
Conference.  Bildt said that the conference had been a 
"small, but successful step" toward increasing European 
engagement in Iraq, but added that more needed to be done. 
Bildt said that he had spoken at length with the Secretary 
about Iraq in Stockholm (reftel) and hoped to follow-up 
with her soon about next steps. 
 
------ 
Kosovo 
------ 
 
¶4. (C) Bildt said that Sweden wanted to see ongoing roles 
for both the EU and UN in order to straighten out the 
"mess" in Kosovo - progress was slow and difficult.  U/S 
Burns noted that Russia was not making the situation easy 
for UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon.  Bildt added that 
the EU favored an extended UN role in Kosovo.  It was 
necessary, he said, not only to handle tasks which the 
Kosovo Government was not yet able to handle (for example, 
issuance of travel documents or international 
representation), but especially needed in the north where 
the eventual EU-led mission (EULEX) can't yet go in, but a 
prolonged UN presence would help prevent losing the 
northern border.  Bildt noted that the Kosovars needed to 
cease focusing on "lofty political thoughts" and get down 
to the more boring but necessary details of daily 
governance, such as taxes, transportation, and other 
bureaucratic but important matters.  U/S Burns and EUR 
PDAS Volker noted that we need the UN to transition, and 
the EU to build up, recognizing that progress on the 
ground in Kosovo would take time and required continued, 
strong international support. 
 
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Russia/Georgia 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (C) U/S Burns and Bildt agreed that Russia continued to 
employ strong pressure tactics in Georgia.  Burns said he 
did not believe Russia wanted Abkhazia to obtain 
independence; this would open a "can of worms" because of 
the implications for other ethnic enclaves and conflicts 
in the Caucasus, including inside Russia. However, Russia 
was playing a dangerous game by walking as close to 
possible up to the line, without crossing it.  Burns said 
the U.S. was encouraging direct talks between the 
Georgians and the Abkhaz.  Bildt noted that, given current 
tensions, it was a wonder that there had not been more 
border skirmishes and deaths, adding that the situation 
could worsen at any moment.  He said that the EU and 
Washington had to find more effective ways to deal with 
Russia in response, instead of "feeble" declarations that 
were of little comfort to Georgian President Saakashvili, 
whose frustration at Russia trying to "take parts of my 
country," (as Bildt said he had been told) was 
understandable.  Burns noted that Saakashvili had spoken 
with Russian President Medvedev by phone recently and that 
the two would meet face-to-face on June 6 at the Economic 
Forum in St. Petersburg. 
 
¶6. (C) Bildt related that Sweden had been trying to 
quietly arrange talks between Tbilisi and Abkhazia in 
Stockholm, but was wary of leaks or media attention, as 
discreet, cautious steps were needed for dealing with the 
complex issues of the conflict - not a "media show" such 
as the German-hosted talks that the Russians, among 
others, favored.  Burns replied that the U.S. appreciated 
Swedish efforts to support the peace process.  Volker 
later followed up with Bildt noting that we believe that 
German-hosted talks also have promise, provided they serve 
as a vehicle to allow the Abkhaz and Georgians to speak 
with each other directly. 
 
¶7. (C) Bildt suggested that the West play the "Sochi 
Olympics card" with Moscow by pointing out that enormous 
investment was needed to get the existing facilities up to 
snuff and implying that successful hosting of the games 
might be "endangered" by the fact they would be held only 
a few kilometers from an unresolved - and potentially hot 
- conflict.  Burns agreed that the Russians would be 
sensitive to such arguments, and that Bildt's suggested 
wording would likely prove more effective than boycott 
threats.  Bildt added that another way to get Russian and 
Abkhaz attention would be to apply pressure to entities 
financially benefiting from business dealings with 
unrecognized, unregistered entities based in Abkhazia. 
Burns agreed that it was a suggestion worth exploring. 
 
¶8. (C) Bildt and Burns agreed that it was still too early 
to read the internal political impact of the new Medvedev 
presidency on Russia.  Bildt said that the EU would 
finally begin Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) 
discussions with Russia in June, but added that the 
discussions would take time. 
 
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Closer Nordic Security Cooperation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Bildt described Swedish interest in building on 
growing international interest in the High North to 
strengthen Nordic cooperation on a number of issues, 
including security, energy, climate change and the impact 
of increased commercial traffic.  He said that initial 
efforts to coordinate the trilateral security interests of 
Norway, Sweden and Finland were expanding to include 
Denmark and Iceland.  He told Burns that the Swedes were 
exploring security integration with their neighbors - 
starting with surveillance efforts - that he hoped would 
gradually have "great significance" down the road.  Bildt 
said the Swedish Government would soon present draft 
legislation to Parliament that would establish the 
cornerstone for his "new doctrine."   As an aside, he 
noted the importance of expediting U.S. ratification of 
the Law of the Sea Convention.  The Under Secretary 
agreed, but lamented that the process appears to be 
"stuck."  Bildt suggested that, in the absence of 
ratification, the U.S. was missing a "seat at the table" 
while other countries - including Russia - were shoring up 
their basic legal positions in the High North. 
 
RICE