VZCZCXRO8474
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHKUK RUEHLH RUEHPW RUEHROV
DE RUEHRH #0853/01 1531553
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 011553Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8507
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNISL/ISLAMIC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 0673
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 07 RIYADH 000853 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2018 
TAGS: ECON KDEM KIRF KISL PGOV PHUM PREL SA
SUBJECT: STATE OF THE SAUDI SHI,A 2008 
 
REF: A. 07 RIYADH 2221 
     ¶B. 07 RIYADH 2223 
     ¶C. 08 RIYADH 121 
     ¶D. 08 RIYADH 371 
     ¶E. 08 RIYADH 372 
 
RIYADH 00000853  001.2 OF 007 
 
 
Classified By: Consul General John Kincannon for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d 
) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY:  Despite an ongoing dialogue between Saudi 
Shi'a leadership and the SAG, and slightly greater autonomy 
of religious and political action in the sub-governate of 
Qatif, the Shi'a community of Saudi Arabia continues to feel 
itself a second-class citizenry, facing both formal and 
informal manifestations of discrimination.  This unequal 
status remains apparent in institutions from all aspects of 
life - political, legal, educational, religious, and 
economic.  The challenge of changing this institutionalized 
condition, however, is less daunting than the challenge of 
changing the individual prejudices held by many Saudi Sunnis. 
 Community leaders argue that this personal prejudice, still 
condoned - if not promoted - by the state, belies the 
government's supposed efforts to incorporate Shi'a as equal 
citizens, and undercuts the small amount of progress made. 
In spite of widespread dissatisfaction with superficial and 
uncoordinated SAG efforts to improve treatment of the Shi'a, 
all powerful actors in the community remain firmly committed 
to working peacefully for reform within the context of the 
Saudi state.  These leaders, however, do express the fear 
that an atmosphere of stagnated reform creates the 
possibility of fueling unrest in younger generations. END 
SUMMARY. 
 
¶2. (S) This cable is the product of numerous conversations 
held and cables written by officers at Consulate General 
Dhahran, both past and present.  Some of the statistics 
presented regarding proof of discrimination against the Shi'a 
of al-Ahsa have been taken from a report researched by 
leading Hasawi Shi'a activists and presented by these 
activists to the Human Rights Commission in early 2008.  This 
unpublicized report was shared with post by National Society 
for Human Rights member Mohammed al-Jubran (protect).  Post 
cannot independently confirm these statistics.  For a 
similarly broad review of conditions for the EP Shi'a 
community in 2007 and 2006, please refer to 07 Riyadh 910 and 
06 Riyadh 1196. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
CONTINUED DISCRIMINATION AT THE INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
Political 
--------- 
¶3. (C) Despite comprising at least one third of the Eastern 
Province population (NOTE: Population data is highly 
politicized and reliable figures regarding the size of the 
Shi'a community are unavailable.  That stated, post estimates 
the Shi'a population to most likely fall between seven and 
twelve percent of the Saudi population. END NOTE) only 3 of 
the 59 government-appointment municipal council members in 
the Eastern Province (EP) are Shi'a (NOTE: 11 of the 12 
elected municipal council members in al-Ahsa and Qatif are 
Shi'a.  END NOTE).  In al-Ahsa, an area estimated to be 
approximately 60 percent Shi'a, all 46 government offices are 
headed by Sunnis.  At the national level, only 3 of the 150 
members of the Shura Council are Shi'a.  There are no Shi'a 
ministers or deputy ministers, governors or deputy governors, 
or municipality heads in the country, and there are no Shi'a 
diplomats in the Saudi Foreign Ministry.  Likewise, there are 
no Shi'a that represent Saudi Arabia in Islamic institutions 
such as the Muslim World League or Assembly of Muslim Youth. 
 
¶4. (C) The token Shi'a who work in government institutions 
such as the Human Rights Commission, or, for example, in 
mayoral positions in the townships that make up the Qatif 
sub-governorate, are widely considered "in the pocket" of the 
SAG, and not representing the concerns or interests of the 
Shi'a community.  One example is long-time Tarut island mayor 
Abdulhaleem al-Kader, a Shi'a widely reviled by his own 
community for his corruption and lack of character. 
Al-Kader, who is known to be illiterate, was arrested in 
February on charges of accepting bribes in exchange for 
concealing drug trafficking and unlawful land dealings.  He 
has since been released from jail and has resumed his office, 
though a further investigation and trial are still pending. 
 
RIYADH 00000853  002.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
Legal 
----- 
¶5. (C) Post has previously reported on the evolution of the 
Jaafari court structure from a system of only one judge to 
the current format in which courts in both Qatif and al-Ahsa 
have two judges, with an additional "appeals" court located 
in Qatif and staffed by three judges.  While previous cables 
initially portrayed the new seven-judge system as a possible 
sign of progress for the Shi'a community, the system now 
serves as a strong reminder of the stagnation and lack of 
commitment from the SAG in its addressing of Shi'a concerns 
(Reftel A).  While the size of the court was increased to 
seven judges, the court's authority has steadily eroded.  The 
Jaafari court's power has been reduced to ruling only on 
personal affairs - for example, wills, inheritances, 
marriages, divorces, and endowments.  If either party 
disagrees with some aspect of the court's ruling, he can take 
the case to a "Shari'a" court (NOTE: In Saudi Arabia, Shari'a 
refers to the Hanbali school of Sunni Islam. END NOTE).  The 
ruling of the Sunni court renders the previous Jaafari ruling 
void.  The court also has no ability to rule on Shi'a matters 
for citizens living outside of the Qatif and Al-Ahsa oases. 
Meanwhile, sixteen months after Minister of Justice al-Sheikh 
promised the Qatif court a new building to replace the 
previous sub-standard accommodations, the court continues to 
operate out of a rented house. 
 
¶6. (C) In September 2007, six of the seven Jaafari judges 
threatened to resign if the court was not given more 
authority to resolve Shi'a affairs. (NOTE: The seventh judge, 
Sheikh Abu al-Makarem, had threatened to resign, but withdrew 
his name after two weeks.  He was widely considered 
unqualified and not representing Shi'a interests.  Al-Makarem 
died in early October of 2007 and has subsequently been 
replaced by Sheikh Mohamed al-Jurani, who has a similarly 
poor reputation and is rumored to be close to the Ministry of 
Interior. END NOTE).  In the course of meetings with the 
Ministry of Justice (MOJ) in late 2007 and early 2008, both 
the judges themselves and other community leaders were told 
that the SAG would work to address Shi'a concerns but that 
threatening resignation was not an acceptable tactic. 
According to Al-Ahsa community leader Sadeq al-Jubran, the 
MOJ responded to the judges' demands with a power play of 
their own, threatening to replace the judges with others 
whose views would more closely match those of the SAG.  The 
judges found themselves with few options, and the resignation 
threats ended, seemingly without action on either side. 
 
¶7. (C) In an April 3 meeting, head Qatif judge Sheikh 
Mohammed al-Obaidan told PolOff that the Shi'a judges do not 
see any reform ahead, and remain frustrated with their 
marginalization.  He described the three-judge court in Qatif 
not as an "appeals" (tameez) court, but as a court limited 
only to verifying information (tadqeeq).  Though these three 
judges are fully qualified, their role is no more than that 
of law clerks, checking grammar and spelling in court 
documents.  On April 13, al-Obaidan, who had been quite open 
in admitting his leadership in efforts to gain more authority 
for the Jaafari court, was removed from his position by the 
SAG, supposedly for his role in demanding reform.  At the 
writing of this cable, a high-level community delegation is 
attempting to meet with the SAG to file a complaint regarding 
Obaidan's removal. 
 
Educational 
----------- 
¶8. (C) Little has changed in recent years with regards to the 
under-representation of Shi'a in education.  Shi'a are not 
permitted to open private schools.  Of the 319 public boys' 
schools in Al-Ahsa, there are only 7 Shi'a principals, and 
only 30 Shi'a vice principals. In the 309 public girls' 
schools in Al-Ahsa, these same numbers are 0 and 7, 
respectively.  Likewise, in Qatif, there are no Shi'a 
principals of girls' schools.  Shi'a are not permitted to 
teach religion past the elementary level.  At the university 
level, Shi'a are regularly underrepresented in faculty 
positions.  At King Faisal University's Al-Ahsa campus, for 
example, of the 287 faculty only 7 are Shi'a.  Despite the 
fact that it is equal to Khobar in population, Qatif has only 
two junior colleges, and no universities. 
 
¶9. (C) While the Ministry of Education has made progress with 
regards to removing specific anti-Shi'a language from school 
textbooks, there remain troubling references.  For example, 
 
RIYADH 00000853  003.2 OF 007 
 
 
in books for scholastic year 2007-2008, there are passages 
that cite as wrong "those who call for the celebration of the 
birthday of the Prophet."  School memoranda show calls for 
punishment of Shi'a students that are absent during Shi'a 
religious occasions, such as Ashura.  According to community 
activists, the SAG's lack of real commitment to addressing 
prejudiced teachings is further shown in its reported 
handling of two recent cases in which Sunni public school 
teachers in the Qatif-area were said to have been espousing 
anti-Shi'a ideology.  In response to a public outcry from the 
Qatif community, the MOE did nothing more than transfer the 
teachers to Anak village, one of the few villages in Qatif 
with a Sunni majority.  Shi'a suspicions were only further 
stoked when a recording of Qatif-area religion teacher 
Ibrahim al-Zayat was made public in January of this year.  In 
the recording, al-Zayat, who was speaking to a private 
gathering, speaks harshly against Shi'a and claims that in 
his time as a teacher, during a field trip to Mecca, he was 
able to convert nine students to Sunnism.  Post contacts 
report that al-Zayat remains a teacher in the Eastern 
Province, though he has been transferred out of the Qatif 
area. 
 
Economic 
-------- 
¶10. (C) It is often difficult to move beyond anecdotal 
evidence when examining economic discrimination.  For 
example, infrastructure, critical to economic progress, is 
sub-standard in the areas of running water, sewage systems, 
and road quality in Qatif, al-Ahsa and their surrounding 
villages.  This only becomes apparent when one drives through 
these various neighborhoods and villages.  Shi'a are 
underrepresented in both security and government services, 
primary employers in Saudi Arabia.  In Al-Ahsa, there are 
only three Shi'a officers in all security services (including 
all agencies under the heading of the Ministry of Interior, 
Saudi Arabian National Guard and Ministry of Defense and 
Aviation).  Many parastatal companies, chief among them 
Aramco, are widely known to have glass ceilings on 
advancement for Shi'a employees, and do not employ Shi'a in 
sensitive security areas, such as installation protection. 
Of the eleven members of the board of directors, the 
President, the Executive Vice President, and the seven Senior 
Vice Presidents, none are Shi'a. Only two of thirty-two 
executives comprising the ranks of Vice President are Shi'a. 
Of sixteen general managers at the company, none are Shi'a. 
And, of 164 Department Managers at the oil giant, only seven 
are Shi'a.  This clear under-representation at Aramco is 
particularly painful for the community, considering the oil 
that makes up the economic lifeblood of Saudi Arabia comes in 
large part from the areas of Qatif and al-Ahsa. 
 
¶11. (C) Many Qatifis and third-country national residents 
report a rising level of street violence and petty crime in 
Qatif, which they attribute to particularly high levels of 
unemployment in the area.  Economic discrimination is further 
illustrated when considering zoning laws dictating the height 
of buildings allowed in various areas.  Though buildings of 
eight stories are allowed to be built along the highway 
leading from Dammam to Qatif, zoning rules change upon 
entering the first Shi'a majority village, Seihat, requiring 
that buildings be less than four floors.  On the island of 
Tarut, which has a mixed Sunni/Shi'a population, regulations 
allow for buildings of up to three floors in the Sunni 
village of Dareen, but only two floors in the Shi'a areas 
surrounding Dareen.  Shi'a businesspeople and community 
leaders regularly comment that these regulations impede 
development in the Qatif area, and have more to do with 
sectarianism than urban planning. 
 
Religious 
--------- 
¶12. (C) While Sunni mosques and imams are funded by the 
Ministry of Islamic Affairs, Shi'a mosques do not receive any 
funding from the SAG.  The bureaucratic process for obtaining 
a license to open a Shi'a mosque is often dependent upon the 
whims of local government officials, and is described as 
opaque and arduous.  Though they comprise a core element in 
Shi'a socio-religious life, husseiniyyas are never officially 
licensed by the government.  This leaves the husseiniyyas 
vulnerable when the SAG decides at times to close 
husseiniyyas on the grounds of operating without a license. 
For example, during this year's Ashura celebration, the 
al-Ahsa husseiniyya of Sheikh Mohammed al-Harz was closed 
despite having thirty-five years in operation.  The SAG 
 
RIYADH 00000853  004.2 OF 007 
 
 
likewise prohibits the importation or publishing of Shi'a 
religious publications, and blocks websites that discuss 
Shi'a religious, political or social topics.  (NOTE: Over the 
past few years, importation of books has become more 
prevalent, in a sign that perhaps Saudi authorities have 
become less vigilant in their attempts to enforce this ban. 
END NOTE). 
 
¶13. (C) The community of al-Ahsa continues to face 
particularly repressive government attempts to prevent the 
public celebration of Shi'a holidays.  Contacts in the Shi'a 
community report that more than 160 people have been detained 
over the past eight years on charges relating to religious 
expression.  Normally these arrests are on account of holding 
religious rituals in unlicensed husseiniyyas or in homes, 
participating in religious festivals, or selling religious 
books or videos.  After being contacted by the Mabahith 
(Ministry of Interior General Intelligence), the subjects are 
usually detained without trial for periods of between two 
weeks and one month.  In a period from mid-January through 
the end of August 2007, there were at least 39 arrests in 
al-Ahsa on such charges (Reftel B). 
 
¶14. (C) On January 5, 2008, al-Ahsa governor Badr bin Jiluwi 
convened a meeting of approximately thirty Shi'a sheikhs to 
warn them against any attempts to publicly celebrate upcoming 
holidays, namely Ashura and Arbaeen.  Any attempts to hang 
banners or flags, common for Shi'a celebrations, were met by 
security forces removing the displays.  This led to low-level 
confrontations between local youth and security officers in 
the Shi'a village of Rumailah during the week leading up to 
Ashura, which this year was celebrated on January 19 (Reftel 
C).  Despite these confrontations, and surprisingly 
considering the trend of arrests over the past years, there 
has been no wave of arrests following this year's period of 
Shi'a holidays (NOTE: This unofficial period ends with the 
celebration of the birth of the Prophet Mohammed, this year 
held on March 25. END NOTE).  Hasawi contacts are not sure 
whether this lack of detentions represents some small ray of 
sunshine, or perhaps the calm before the storm.  Due to the 
arbitrary nature of the previous arrests, and now an 
unexpected lack arrests, the Shi'a of al-Ahsa state that they 
do not know what to expect. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
DESPITE DISCRIMINATION, SOME MANNER OF PROGRESS 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
IMPROVED COMMUNICATION 
---------------------- 
¶15. (S) Despite clear and continuing discrimination, there 
are some positive signs of a better future relationship 
between the SAG and Shi'a minority.  The regularity and 
breadth of communication between the leadership of the Shi'a 
community and the SAG continues to improve.  While in the 
past Shi'a leaders would be hesitant to meet with SAG leaders 
for fear of losing credibility, and SAG leaders would only 
meet to issue demands rather than listen, increasingly an 
exchange of ideas exists.  Though the vast majority of Shi'a 
would claim this exchange has led to little tangible action, 
Shi'a leaders now regularly meet with the Royal Court and the 
leadership of various ministries, including the MOI, MOJ, and 
Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs.  The National 
Dialogue, which began in June 2003 as a vision of then-Crown 
Prince Abdullah, continues to be an important forum, and has 
even seen participation in previous years by Hassan al-Nimr, 
among the leadership of the Saudi Hizbollah movement.  (NOTE: 
Per Qatif sheikh Hussain al-Bayaat (protect), even Abdulkarim 
al-Hubayl, often considered the religious leader of Saudi 
Hizbollah, has participated in meetings between Qatif leaders 
and SAG officials. END NOTE)  And, while many view him as too 
constrained to institute any real change, most in the Shi'a 
community continue to believe that King Abdullah does desire 
a more inclusive Saudi state. 
 
¶16. (C) A microcosm of the improved but still imperfect 
dialogue that now exists is a current campaign of the Human 
Rights Commission (HRC).  Over the past months, a five-member 
team from the HRC, including Shi'a HRC member Mohammed 
al-Khunaizi, have met with numerous leaders of the EP 
community with the goal of drafting a report for King 
Abdullah about the status of the Saudi Shi'a.  The 
unpublished fifteen-page report, which also offers 
recommendations for improving the SAG/Shi'a relationship, 
remains in limbo, unseen by the Royal Court and waiting for 
 
RIYADH 00000853  005.2 OF 007 
 
 
the approval of HRC President Turki al-Sudairi.  PolOff has 
been informed by multiple sources, including al-Khunaizi 
himself, that the source of this stalemate is HRC members 
opposed to addressing the Shi'a issue.  Whereas in other 
cases the action of the Committee would be put up for vote, 
al-Khunaizi told PolOff in April that he does not see any 
such referendum upcoming on the fate of the Shi'a report. 
 
"QATIFI SPRING" 
-------------- 
¶17. (C) While the improvement of high-level dialogue is 
progress at an intellectual and more ethereal level, progress 
at the street level has come in the form of more autonomy for 
the Shi'a of Qatif.  Though PolOff received unconfirmed 
reports of a meeting in Qatif similar to the one held between 
Governor bin Jiluwi and the Hasawi sheikhs (described in 
paragraph 14), the community of Qatif continues to see a 
greater number of, and greater participation in, religious 
celebrations for Ashura and Arbaeen.  Government intervention 
in this year's celebrations was minimal, with the most common 
overt security presence being that of officers helping direct 
traffic at the larger events.  While only two cultural forums 
- one Sunni and one Shi'a - currently operate in al-Ahsa 
following the crackdown that took place at the beginning of 
2007, cultural forums in Qatif continue to blossom.  The 
largest forums, such as that held by Shi'a leader Jafar 
al-Shayeb, advertise widely and even maintain websites 
(al-Shayeb's is www.thulatha.com).  Others hold gatherings 
that are by personal invitation only, so has to discuss a 
wider range of topics without incurring the government's ire. 
 Husseiniyyas in Qatif are able to operate largely without 
government interference, broadcasting loudly and passing out 
food during religious celebrations. 
 
¶18. (C) Qatif has also experienced successes through the work 
of its municipal council.  The Qatif municipal council - 
previously considered a sub-entity to the Dammam municipal 
council - in September 2007 gained control of budgetary 
authority and now receives finances from and reports directly 
to the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs.  With control 
of its own purse strings, Qatif has plans to, among other 
projects, invest in encouraging tourism from other areas of 
Saudi Arabia.  In addition to gaining greater autonomy, Qatif 
municipal council member Isa al-Muzel has sought to encourage 
greater citizen participation in the area.  This vision took 
the shape of neighborhood councils in the Seihat village of 
Qatif, under which neighborhood representatives chosen by 
their communities hear directly from the people and report in 
regular meetings to al-Muzel.  The success of the grassroots 
program has resulted in its spreading to other Qatif 
villages.  Al-Muzel did not seek consultation or permission 
from the SAG before establishing these councils and is fond 
of saying that if anyone asks who gave him the right to 
establish such groups, he simply responds that the people of 
Seihat gave the authority. 
 
¶19. COMMENT: There are many theories regarding why the SAG in 
recent years seems to have allowed a greater amount of 
freedom for the Qatif Shi'a community, while Shi'a in al-Ahsa 
have arguably seen their freedoms increasingly constrained. 
Undoubtedly, the political ability and strength of the 
Shirazi leaders that also serve as Qatif municipal council 
members serves the area well.  Others point to the personal 
prejudices of al-Ahsa sub-governor Badr bin-Jiluwi and his 
local administrators as a primary factor in deterioration of 
Shi'a liberties.  A third line of reasoning suggests that the 
SAG, in an effort to prevent a unified Shi'a voice from 
emerging, has tried to create disparate realities for the two 
Shi'a communities. END COMMENT. 
 
------------------------------------------- 
EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT IN THE SHI'A COMMUNITY 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶20. (C) Though the context of suffering and battling 
discrimination is pervasive in the mindset of a vast majority 
of the Saudi Shi'a and taps into a long history of Shi'a 
seeing themselves as victims of persecution, the relative 
calming of attitudes between the SAG and Shi'a, along with 
high-level signs of reconciliation evident in King Abdullah's 
calls for interfaith dialogue, has resulted in a slight but 
important shift in the attitude of some Shi'a.  While the 
self-identity of Saudi Shi'a remains firmly rooted in their 
position as the downtrodden "other," the limited achievements 
of a strong, well-educated and well-organized political class 
 
RIYADH 00000853  006.2 OF 007 
 
 
has caused some to focus greater attention on reforming the 
Shi'a community itself, and not simply its status relative to 
the SAG.  Perhaps signaling a maturation process, calls for 
greater education, greater economic independence, greater 
international engagement, and an increased focus on 
non-political ideals such as human rights are gaining 
strength.  The idea that formal barriers to success, though 
still existent, can be overcome has also taken root. 
Further, some in the Shi'a leadership - including influential 
voices such as Tawfiq al-Saif and Jafar al-Shayeb - believe 
that the SAG must and will expand its traditional Wahhabi 
power base to incorporate previously marginalized groups 
including moderates, liberals, Ismailis, and Shi'a.  While 
recognizing the importance of tradition and conservatism to 
Saudi Arabia, these men argue that the state must and will 
continue to move away from the most puritanical of voices if 
it hopes to continue to preserve national stability and 
improve upon its status as an educational, economic, and 
political power. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
THE DIFFICULTY OF CHANGING A COLLECTIVE MINDSET 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶21. (C) While high-level dialogue may signal hope for the 
future, the challenge of changing the personal biases of the 
large percentage of Saudi society that views Shi'ism as akin 
to a form of heresy will be the most daunting task on the 
road to reconciliation.  Many already believe that uneven, 
often random patterns of discrimination against Shi'a is not 
the result of high-level policy, but rather the prejudices of 
mid-level officials who personally assure there is not 
equality in opportunity.  The theory goes that these mid- and 
lower-level officials are able to use such a free-hand 
because there is no high-level consensus on the idea of 
eradicating discrimination against non-Sunnis. 
 
¶22. (C) A large number of Shi'a leaders feel that this lack 
of commitment to true reform and incorporation of all Saudis 
is shown by the SAG's unwillingness to remove discriminatory 
rhetoric from even official sources.  For example, local 
contacts in al-Ahsa point to the fact that when one searches 
the word "rafida" or rejector (an insulting term used to 
refer to Shi'a) on the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs 
website, it appears four hundred nineteen times.  Contacts 
also note that figures such as Sheikh Salah al-Luhaidan, 
Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Council, regularly 
incorporate anti-Shi'a remarks into his rhetoric.  Changing 
years of academic and societal education to now promote 
interfaith dialogue at the individual level is no easy task, 
and the Shi'a community would argue that while these 
sectarian comments are condoned, if not promoted, by the SAG, 
it is a task that will remain impossible. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
SHI'A LEADERSHIP REMAIN COMMITTED TO SAUDI ARABIA 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶23. (C) Despite varied views on the sincerity of SAG talk of 
reform, the important power centers of the Saudi Shi'a 
community remain committed to using nonviolent means to work 
within the state.  Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar, leader of the 
"Shirazi" movement, continues to hold considerable power in 
the community, and seems committed in his efforts to promote 
reform with the SAG through continued dialogue.  Sheikh Munir 
al-Khabaz plays an important role as one of the most popular 
purely religious, non-political figures in the EP Shi'a 
community.  The politically active group rumored to look 
toward al-Khabaz for spiritual guidance and referred to as 
"Diwaniyat al-Qatif" similarly has no ambition to violently 
oppose the SAG.  Last year's reports of growing Hizbollah 
appeal seem to have been largely linked to superficial 
support - for example, Nasrallah shirts or Hizbollah flags at 
Shi'a events - following the August 2006 Israel-Lebanon 
military conflict.  Nearly all post contacts report that 
Saudi Hizbollah finds itself largely marginalized as a 
power-player in the community.  And, though difficult to gain 
a full picture of the group's ambitions, post contacts and 
the group's participation in SAG-sponsored dialogue suggest 
that Saudi Hizbollah, or elements within the group, may have 
retreated from previous radicalism.  Instead, the current 
prevailing description of Saudi Hizbollah is as a group more 
closely affiliated to Iran and more outspoken in its 
criticism of the al-Saud, but one that is not actively 
engaged in efforts to destabilize the Kingdom. 
 
RIYADH 00000853  007.2 OF 007 
 
 
 
¶24. (C) Despite obvious cultural and religious ties to 
Iranian Shi'a, and some respect for the original goals of the 
1979 revolution, Post does not see any growing Iranian 
influence in Saudi Arabia.  The anecdote of recently sacked 
Shi'a court judge Sheikh al-Obaidan is illustrative, the 
Sheikh telling PolOff that despite twelve years of study in 
Qom, and multiple years in Najaf as well, he has no doubts 
about his identity as a Saudi.  With regards to Iraq, if a 
trend among the Saudi Shi'a can be identified, it would be 
most accurately described as exhaustion or disappointment. 
In the years following the beginning of U.S. military 
activity, the Shi'a of Saudi Arabia viewed events in Iraq 
through a somewhat optimistic lens, envisioning the prospect 
of Iraq's Shi'a coming to power through an electoral process. 
 Ayatollah Sistani, the leading marja of Saudi Shi'a, enjoyed 
great popularity.  Years of bloodshed, political stalemate, 
the fracturing of Iraq's Shi'a into multiple rival movements, 
and Sistani's diminished political role has left many in the 
Saudi community with no favorite, only disenchantment with 
the seemingly unending turmoil. 
 
------------------------------- 
DESPITE CALM, FEARS STILL EXIST 
------------------------------- 
 
¶25. (C) While the prevailing opinion is that relations 
between the Saudi Shi'a and SAG are, at the least, not 
deteriorating, there is still a strain of concern about the 
effects of stagnating reform on the youth of the Eastern 
Province.  There are many indications that the community's 
political and religious leadership has less influence with 
younger generations in the Saudi Shi'a community.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that youth gangs are becoming more 
prevalent, particularly in Qatif.  There is no proof that the 
increasingly strident language of such hard-line anti-SAG 
sheikhs such as Nimr al-Nimr, largely recognized as an 
independent in the political circles of the EP, has gained 
any traction over recent months (Reftel D).  But, the Arbaeen 
confrontation on the morning of February 28 in Anak, a 
primarily Sunni village in Qatif, reminded many that unrest 
still exists (Reftel E).  In the Anak case, young Shi'a 
attempting to celebrate the Arbaeen holiday in the primarily 
Sunni neighborhood ended up in a street brawl that saw cars 
and houses damaged and shots fired.  There were no reports of 
casualties or injuries, and Sheikh Hassan al-Saffar led a 
group of Shi'a Sheikhs who met with Anak-based Sunni Sheikhs 
to resolve the issue.  The Shi'a community has agreed to pay 
all property damage costs incurred, and Qatif contacts regard 
the issue as resolved.  This episode served as a reminder, 
however, of the raw emotions that do exist just beneath the 
surface in Saudi Arabia. 
 
(APPROVED: KINCANNON) 
GFOELLER