VZCZCXYZ0000
RR RUEHWEB

DE RUEHPL #0189/01 1551126
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 031126Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY PORT LOUIS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 4023
INFO RUEHAN/AMEMBASSY ANTANANARIVO 0768

C O N F I D E N T I A L PORT LOUIS 000189 
 
SIPDIS 
 
AF/E MARIA BEYZEROV; ANTANANARIVO FOR DATT 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/03/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL MP
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S COURTESY CALL ON MAURITIAN PRIME 
MINISTER 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Cesar B. Cabrera for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
 ¶1. (C) On June 2, 2008, Ambassador Cabrera paid a courtesy 
call on Mauritian Prime Minister Ramgoolam; DCM served as 
notetaker.  The relaxed and pleasant hour and a half 
discussion touched on a wide variety of topics, including 
U.S. elections, Kosovo, and Mauritian U.N. voting records. 
The two agreed to meet periodically to continue to update 
each other on issues of mutual interest. 
 
-------------- 
U.S. ELECTIONS 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) Prime Minister Ramgoolam spent about a half hour 
discussing U.S. elections, particularly the primary process. 
He was interested in the Ambassador's thoughts on the process 
and Ramgoolam noted that he received an invitation to attend 
the Democratic Party Convention in August.  Ramgoolam said he 
was considering going to the event, and was pleased by the 
Ambassador's offer to assist in arranging side-bar meetings. 
The Ambassador encouraged the PM to let the Embassy know his 
travel plans (and additional meeting requests) soonest, so 
Post could help support the trip, as needed. 
 
------ 
KOSOVO 
------ 
 
¶3. (C) Ambassador took advantage of this courtesy call to ask 
for GOM to further consider formally recognizing Kosovo.  The 
PM blamed the recently dismissed Foreign Minister for not 
being in favor of such recognition, but added that as PM he 
did not have all the details on the issue.  The PM asked for 
an updated briefing paper to review their position on 
recognition of Kosovo.  The PM seemed positively inclined 
toward recognition of Kosovo -- and was particularly 
receptive to the Ambassador's appeal that the Mauritian 
Muslim population, upon which the current coalition relies to 
remain in power, would perceive GOM recognition of Kosovo 
favorably. 
 
---------------- 
UN VOTING RECORD 
---------------- 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador also raised the issue of the GOM's 
voting record in the UN, noting that it did not appear to 
accurately reflect the positive and friendly relationship 
shared between the United States and the GOM.  The PM seemed 
genuinely surprised by the GOM's low percentage of 2007 votes 
with the US (only 6 votes with the US, and 65 votes in 
disagreement), and asked for a vote-by-vote readout.  Post 
will follow-up with the PM's office in the coming week. 
 
-------- 
ZIMBABWE 
-------- 
 
¶5. (C) Noting that our highest rate of agreement in UN votes 
was in the realm of Human Rights, the Ambassador turned the 
conversation to Zimbabwe.  The PM opined that leader of the 
opposition, Morgan Tsvangirai, would win the upcoming 
election.  He added that previous comments by Tsvangirai 
regarding not running had been alarming, as the PM believed 
allowing Mugabe to run unopposed would be a disaster.  In the 
last elections, Mauritius sent only the head of the electoral 
commission as an observer.  According to the PM, Mauritius 
will send a "much larger" delegation for the upcoming 
run-offs. 
 
--------------- 
MILITARY ISSUES 
--------------- 
 
¶6. (C)  During the meeting, the PM agreed in principal to 
consider a Status of Forces Agreement, noting the positives 
both countries enjoy during ship visits to Mauritius.  The 
Ambassador discussed the variety of military and security 
assistance programs, highlighting recent projects including 
the crisis management training, peacekeeping training, and 
assistance to the GOM reaction procedures and infrastructure 
for natural disasters (specifically flooding and tsunamis). 
The PM asked for additional police training, particularly 
vis-a-vis criminal investigation.  The PM is looking for 
international assistance to ensure better police procedures 
which result in more criminal convictions.  Post will explore 
this request further with appropriate USG counterparts. 
 
------- 
 
COMMENT 
------- 
 
¶7. (C) Since the dismissal of the Foreign Minister, the PM 
has taken on the Foreign Minister role.  This has caused a 
good deal of confusion within the MFA, as offices grapple 
with waiting for PM response to matters that were previously 
decided by the FM. Ramgoolam noted that he is generally 
unhappy with the performance of the MFA, and planned 
"comprehensive changes" in the coming months. These changes 
would take place, he said, before he assigned another person 
as Foreign Affairs Minister.  Ramgoolam is often criticized 
in the press and by Embassy contacts for his inability to 
delegate authority.  Post has observed the PM's tendency 
toward micro-management and the negative impact it can have 
on actively following through on foreign affairs issues. 
During the meeting with the Ambassador, the PM specifically 
asked for any and all follow-up to take place between the DCM 
and the head of the PM's office and that the DCM not/not take 
any of the at-play issues to the MFA.  The PM noted this was 
to "ensure they are fast tracked" and that he is briefed; he 
added that many foreign affairs issues and briefs never make 
it to him as Prime Minister. 
CABRERA