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AMCONSUL PESHAWAR

S E C R E T PESHAWAR 000372 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/25/2018 
TAGS: PTER MOPS PGOV PINR PK AF
SUBJECT: FATA SECRETARIAT ON BEATING AN INSURGENCY 
 
REF: A) PESHAWAR 370, B) PESHAWAR 205 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Lynne M. Tracy, Principal Officer, Consulate 
Peshawar, State. 
REASON: 1.4 (a), (b), (d) 
 
Summary 
------- 
 
¶1. (C) National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for South Asia, Peter 
Lavoy, his team, and Peshawar PO met with senior personnel from 
the Federally Administered Tribal Areas' (FATA) Secretariat on 
June 17.  The officials believe that security forces in the FATA 
are unable to confront an "insurgency," and suggested adopting a 
nimbler, less conventional approach.  Tehrik-i-Taliban is a 
serious threat to FATA officials who are deeply concerned by 
brutal attacks in recent months.  A systematic campaign to 
eliminate tribal elders has led many tribesmen to avoid siding 
with a political administration that is perceived to be "weak." 
FATA Secretariat officials see peace agreements as a tactic not 
a strategy and predicted that they will inevitably be violated. 
While there are a few signs of improved coordination at the 
provincial level, a widening disconnect with Islamabad may sink 
these efforts.  End Summary. 
 
ACS Questions GOP's Capacity to Confront an Insurgency 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶2. (C) Additional Chief Secretary (ACS) Habibullah Khan told NIO 
Lavoy on June 18 that Pakistanis have made a commitment to 
confronting militancy as evidenced by the "1,000 people who have 
been killed on the frontier" during recent years.  He 
questioned, however, whether Pakistani security forces have the 
capacity to "stop an insurgency."  The ACS noted that militants 
are often better armed, trained and disciplined that the Levies, 
Khassadars and even Frontier Corps troops stationed on the 
Pakistan/Afghanistan border.  "Even the army," he stated, "is 
trained to fight only on the plains of Punjab." 
 
¶3. (C) The ACS said that Pakistan's security forces have 
responded to the terrorist threat in a "conventional manner." 
He emphasized a need for a deeper focus on counterinsurgency 
tactics and equipment to better confront a "highly mobile" 
militant threat.  The FATA's security forces need night vision 
goggles, better training and increased intelligence sharing in 
order to be able to respond to militant ambushes. 
 
¶4. (S) Habibullah suggested a guarantee from India not to attack 
Pakistan's eastern flank.  Such a guarantee, he said, might help 
in making the case for redeployment of troops stationed on the 
Pakistan/India border to the Northwest Frontier. 
 
Tehrik-i-Taliban 
---------------- 
 
¶5. (C) Responding to a question posed by NIO Lavoy, the ACS 
stated that Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) does not have the 
"strategic support" of people in the FATA.  Habibullah said that 
tribal people are "being held hostage" by militants and if they 
try to organize against the terrorists, they are killed.  The 
ACS stated that TTP and Baitullah Mehsud are essentially 
interested in establishing their own "fiefdom."  FATA Director 
of Projects, Fakr-e Alam added that TTP "has become a very 
serious threat to us."  He said that the organization is now 
threatening the Northwest Frontier Province's (NWFP) settled 
districts and risks engulfing Pakistan's other provinces if it 
is not checked. 
 
¶6. (C) Alam said that there is no longer any safe ground for GOP 
officials in Pakistan's northwest.  As an example, Alam 
referenced the February 29 murder of a Deputy Inspector General 
(DIG) of police and three other officers in the NWFP's Lakki 
Marwat district (ref. B).  A suicide bomber detonated explosives 
only hours later at a funeral gathering in Swat for the DIG, 
killing at least 40 people and injuring 70 others.  Fakr-e Alam 
said that the DIG was targeted because he had chosen to confront 
Tehrik-i-Taliban.  "If you choose to fight them," Alam said, 
"they will track you down, kill you, and then target your 
family."  Alam also noted the impact of TTP on Political Agents. 
 In the past, PAs had been able to transfer out of a "hot" area 
to a safer posting.  With TTP's growing presence and links 
across the FATA and the settled areas, the ability to 
manage/reduce risk has suffered, he said. 
 
Tribesmen Will Follow the Strong 
-------------------------------- 
 
 
¶7. (C) Alam, who has twice served as Political Agent in North 
Waziristan, criticized the GOP's military response to TTP.  "We 
have tried to swarm them, but this simply provided more targets, 
not additional security."  Alam said that even contractors 
working for the GOP have been targeted.  According to Alam, the 
GOP has failed to take out local militant leadership with the 
exception of Nek Mohammad who was killed in an air strike in 
June 2004.  He said that tribal people will support whichever 
side appears the strongest, and a perception is growing that the 
government is the "weaker party."  Alam believes that additional 
investment in quick reaction forces would lead to GOP victories 
and confidence building. 
 
¶8. (C) ACS Habibullah echoed Alam's emphasis on the importance 
of the government appearing "strong" in the tribal areas and 
stated that the systematic murder of hundreds of tribal elders 
(maliks) from 2006 to the present has demoralized entire tribes. 
 Habibullah stressed that maliks are much more than just 
individuals, but instead, represent the local manifestation of 
the FATA's political administration.  "When an elder is killed, 
it is an attack on a village as well."  He said that when maliks 
see that the government is strong, they will "take the foxes 
[read: militants] out of their holes" because they know that 
they will be backed up. 
 
Peace Agreements 
---------------- 
 
¶9. (C) ACS Habibullah Khan said that he is in favor of 
conducting peace talks in the FATA, but noted that such talks 
needed to be used to buy the GOP time to instigate in-fighting 
between militant groups, gain the loyalty of FATA-based leaders, 
and develop a longer term strategy to root out insurgency. 
Habibullah implied that the GOP was not using the time as 
effectively as it could.  He further added that the agreements 
will "undoubtedly be broken, as they always are."  He echoed 
NWFP Governor Owais Ghani's theory that peace agreements create 
space for GOP-sponsored development projects to proceed (ref. 
A).  The key, the ACS said, was for the GOP to move in quickly 
after an agreement to provide security and deliver services. 
Qazim Niaz emphasized the need for a clear-cut strategy and 
goals for what the GOP wanted to achieve in the brief interlude 
the peals deals provided. 
 
¶10. (C) The ACS differentiated the current round of peace 
agreements from previous iterations by highlighting built in 
enforcement mechanisms.  Habibullah mentioned that the GOP had 
taken religious leaders into confidence during the present round 
of talks and could therefore use their buy-in as justification 
for carrying out punitive actions.  He doubted though that the 
GOP was prepared under present circumstances to respond rapidly 
to violations of peace agreements. 
 
Mohmand 
------- 
 
¶11. (C) Qazim Niaz, the FATA Secretary for Coordination and 
Administration and who served as Mohmand's Political Agent 
immediately prior to his present post, noted that Mohmand is 
coping with five different militant groups at once.  He said 
that it is very hard to determine who is doing what in the 
agency and he indicated that some of the groups are solely 
criminal in nature.  The ACS said that Mohmand's capital city of 
Ghalanai is particularly vulnerable to militant attacks because 
it is surrounded by hills on three sides where militants have 
taken up positions. 
 
Frustration Mounting 
-------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Niaz added that the increase of narcotics revenue coming 
from Afghanistan has precluded the GOP from matching salaries 
offered by the militants.  Niaz went on to express frustration 
at the GOP's inability to kill Baitullah Mehsud when so many 
other militant leaders are killed "because they are using mobile 
or satellite telephones." 
 
¶13. (C) The ACS and his two colleagues closed the meeting by 
expressing their own growing frustration over being "ignored" by 
Islamabad.  The ACS said that he is "crying and shouting that 
militancy is a Pakistani problem; that this is an insurgency." 
He emphasized that he has been very disappointed by the glacial 
pace of Islamabad's responses.  NIO Lavoy concurred with the 
ACS's assessment that more cooperation is required and said that 
we would continue to work with the GOP on a counterinsurgency 
strategy. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶14. (C) Frustration is growing among FATA and NWFP officials. 
ACS Habibullah's inability to procure quick decisions from 
Islamabad echoes similar frustration expressed by NWFP Governor 
Ghani (ref. A).  While there are a few signs of improved 
coordination at the provincial level between NWFP and FATA 
officials, a deepening disconnect with Islamabad may sink these 
efforts. 
 
TRACY