VZCZCXRO7985
RR RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHPA RUEHRN RUEHTRO
DE RUEHOU #0514/01 1641958
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 121958Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY OUAGADOUGOU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 3804
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUEHGG/UN SECURITY COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
INFO RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0654
RUEHZO/AFRICAN UNION COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 OUAGADOUGOU 000514 
 
DEPT FOR IO/UNP ROBIN MEYER AND REBECCA GOLDENBERG 
AF/W FOR TOM DOUGHERTY, EMILY PLUMB 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 6/12/2023 
TAGS: PREL PHUM PINR UNSC ZI UV LY SF
SUBJECT: Burkina Faso: Demarche on Security Council Meeting on 
Zimbabwe 
 
REF: STATE 63183 
 
¶1. (C) On June 12, DCM, accompanied by PolOff, presented reftel 
demarche to MOFA Cabinet Director Vincent Zakane.  While DCM noted 
that President Compaore had informed Secretary Rice of Burkina Faso's 
intention to support a Security Council meeting on Zimbabwe, Zakane 
only acknowledged that Compaore had spoken positively about working 
together on Zimbabwe with the Secretary, and had expressed the desire 
to "implicate Burkina Faso more in the work of the UN Security 
Council."  Zakane added, however, that he would have to consult 
internally to be able to give a more detailed response to the 
demarche, and agreed to meet with Emboffs at 10:00 on June 13. 
 
Waffling on "Yes" Vote on UNSC Meeting on Zimbabwe 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶2. (C) Comment: Zakane's cautious response re Burkina Faso's position 
in favor of a Security Council meeting on Zimbabwe may have simply 
reflected the fact that information from Compaore's meeting with 
SecState had not yet filtered down to him.  We understand from IO/UNP 
that the Burkinabe were not able to commit to voting "yes" to a 
formal UNSC meeting on Zimbabwe on June 12 in New York.  At the same 
time, in a June 12 telcon by Ambassador to Burkinabe Ambassador to 
the United States Paramanga Yonli, Yonli stated that he had been 
present at the Compaore-Rice meeting, and that his President had 
clearly committed Burkina Faso to vote in favor of a UNSC meeting on 
Zimbabwe.  Yonli called back Ambassador to say that the Burkinabe UN 
PermRep had assured him that Burkina Faso would vote affirmatively 
for the meeting on Zimbabwe.  We hope that Zakane will be more 
forward leaning on June 13.  End comment. 
 
African Approach: Regional Bodies, then African Union 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶3. (C) Zakane then explained the larger context of relations with 
fellow African nations that would shape Burkina Faso's approach to 
the issue of Zimbabwe.  He explained that, when there is a conflict 
between two African states, African Union (AU) members wish that, in 
the first instance, the relevant regional body intervene to seek a 
peaceful solution.  For Zimbabwe, the relevant regional body is the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC).  If the regional body 
is unable to find a solution, then the AU can intervene, even 
militarily, if necessary.  A third but relatively rarely used option 
if for one AU country to engage bilaterally in the conflict 
situation.  This AU country is usually a neighbor of the countries in 
conflict, but in theory even Burkina Faso could be an interlocutor 
with Zimbabwe.  While Burkina Faso could be a useful, neutral 
interlocutor, this approach would be problematic without South 
Africa's support because of Pretoria's important national interests 
in Zimbabwe, Zakane said. 
 
¶4. (C) Zakane stated that it would have been President Compaore's 
preference that SADC advocate a solution to the Zimbabwe crisis, but 
that clearly it had failed so far to do so.  He also stated that he 
had not yet seen the agenda for the "June 30" AU Summit in Egypt to 
see whether Zimbabwe was on its agenda.  (Note: the AU's website 
indicates that the Summit will be from June 24-July 1.  End Note.) 
When DCM noted that an AU meeting starting June 30 would fall after 
the June 27 Presidential run-off elections in Zimbabwe, Zakane said 
that another option would be for the Permanent Representatives of AU 
countries on the AU's Peace and Security Council to call an urgent 
meeting to discuss Zimbabwe, out of which could result a 
"declaration, final communiqu, or resolution."  This new AU action 
on Zimbabwe could, in turn, facilitate African countries' ability to 
support potential UNSC decisions on Zimbabwe, Zakane felt. (Note: 
Zakane stated that South Africa was a current member of the AU Peace 
and Security Council, Zimbabwe was not, and that he was uncertain 
whether Libya was a current member.  Burkina Faso, South Africa, and 
Libya are the three current members representing Africa on the UN 
Security Council. End Note.) 
 
Advocates UN-Africa Union Joint Approach on Zimbabwe, Citing March 
UNSC Communique, Failure of EU Approach 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5. (C) Zakane acknowledged that the UNSC could bring up the question 
of Zimbabwe without a concurrent effort to win support in the AU, but 
warned that the Security Council needed to be "careful" about doing 
so.  SADC has yet to officially ask the AU to intervene in the 
Zimbabwe issue, even though it is clear from the planned presence of 
AU observers that the AU wants the Presidential run-off election to 
go well.  To win African buy-in, the UN should work collaboratively 
with the AU and, if at all possible win SADC's support as well, he 
said.  (Comment: While Zakane advocated that the UN engage SADC on 
Zimbabwe, he also acknowledged that key SADC member-country South 
Africa had not been helpful on Zimbabwe.  While recalling hearing 
 
OUAGADOUGO 00000514  002 OF 002 
 
 
radio reports from June 11 that South African President Thabo Mbeki 
had admitted "mistakes" in its recent policies toward South Africa 
(and also implying that some positive adjustments might be possible), 
Zakane felt that SADC was unlikely to substantively address the 
Zimbabwe issue in the coming days.  End Comment.) 
 
¶6. (C) To reinforce his point about the need for AU support, Zakane 
recalled that South Africa, during its one-month rotating Presidency 
of the UN Security Council, had won the adoption of a March 17, 2008 
communique indicating that the United Nations needed to work 
cooperatively with regional bodies, particularly on issues related to 
security and peacekeeping.  He said that, whatever the UNSC 
initiative on Zimbabwe, it needed political legitimacy.  To win the 
"adhesion" of Africans, and overcome their "reticence," the UNSC and 
AU "needed to work together," he emphasized. 
 
¶7. (C) As a second example to make his point, Zakane cited what he 
described as the European Union's failed approach on Zimbabwe - an 
issue that "divided European and African countries."  He suggested 
that the (December 8-9, 2007) EU-Africa Summit in Lisbon had been 
controversial, with several African countries threatening not to 
attend if Zimbabwe were not invited (and if Zimbabwe itself became a 
focus instead of relations between the two continents).  Instead, 
Zakane advocated, the EU should have worked first collaboratively 
with the AU to come to a "common vision regarding Zimbabwe." 
 
Calling on United States to 
"Prepare the Terrain" for More Activist Burkina Faso 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (C) In summarizing, Zakane stated that Burkina Faso -- in both the 
UNSC and AU Peace and Security Council-- found itself at an 
"intermediary echelon" (hinting perhaps that he considered Burkina 
Faso to be a weaker, second tier player).  He specifically requested 
the help of the United States to "prepare the terrain" for Burkina 
Faso by convincing South Africa to be more forthcoming on Zimbabwe. 
While not stating clearly that Burkina Faso would not vote in favor 
of a formal UNSC meeting on Zimbabwe, he said that we needed to try 
to convince South Africa and Libya to vote in favor of the meeting as 
well.  If at least two of three African UNSC member-countries - and 
preferably all three - voted in favor of the meeting, then other 
African countries would follow in supporting it, he said. 
 
¶9. (C) DCM called Zakane back after the meeting to give him a heads 
up that Ambassador would be seeking an appointment with President 
Compaore to urge Burkina Faso to take, as a Pan-African leader, the 
most forward leaning positions possible on Zimbabwe.  When Zakane 
asked whether the United States would be seeking a vote on a 
resolution on Zimbabwe, DCM indicated that we needed nine affirmative 
votes and therefore sought Burkina Faso's clear vote in favor of the 
agenda for a formal Security Council meeting, and not just an 
abstention. 
 
Cabinet Director Plays Influential 
Role in Foreign Policy Formulation 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Zakane, who works concurrently as a professor of law at the 
University of Ouagadougou, views foreign policy issues through the 
eyes of a jurist.  Because Burkina Faso's Foreign Minister is a 
gendarme (rural policeman) by background, and because the Vice 
Minister is more of a Compaore loyalist than intellectual, Zakane 
likely plays a more influential role in formulating Burkina Faso's 
foreign policy than his roughly number three ranking in his Ministry 
-- and quiet demeanor -- might suggest.  While some of his comments 
appeared to reflect personal musings, they were interesting in 
revealing what, in many ways, were also representative of a typical 
African cautiousness to issues affecting the continent. 
 
¶11. (C) Zakane, for example, noted that one potential difficulty with 
attempting to win the African Union's support for a more activist 
policy on Zimbabwe would be a response by the Zimbabwe Government, 
and possibly also South Africa, that its intervention represented a 
violation of the principle of non-interventions in the internal 
affairs of a country, and that the current situation in Zimbabwe did 
not represent a threat to international peace.  Making his own 
counterargument, Zakane stated that the UN had developed in recent 
years a new concept of peace that could justify its intervention in a 
country where national instability threatened a broader regional 
conflagration.  Referring again to reftel talking points, DCM noted 
that the situation in Zimbabwe was clearly already threatening 
stability in the region - to which Zakane agreed. 
 
Jackson