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P 020417Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8824
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1145
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NICOSIA 000348 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/27/2023 
TAGS: PGOV PREL UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: MAINTAINING POSITIVE MOMENTUM ON CYPRUS 
 
REF: EMBASSY NICOSIA-EUR/SE EMAIL OF 02/14/08 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION:  Prospects for substantive 
progress toward a Cyprus solution appeared bleak in December 
¶2007.  RoC President Tassos Papadopoulos enjoyed a clear lead 
among Greek Cypriot voters, and re-election of the celebrated 
hard-liner seemed likely.  North of the Green Line, an 
opposition "parliamentary" boycott and continued political 
infighting presented real threats to Mehmet Ali Talat's 
pro-solution CTP "government."  The July 8 (2006) Agreement 
lay unimplemented, the sides unable even to agree on names 
for its envisioned technical committees and working groups. 
And doubts over UN Special Representative Michael Moller's 
continued employment -- Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots long 
had believed Moller harbored pro-Greek sentiments -- left 
UNFICYP in lame-duck status. 
 
¶2.  (C) Fast-forward to today and the picture grows 
considerably brighter.  Voters disgruntled by Tassos's 
arrogance and his CyProb policies' failures dumped the crusty 
septuagenarian in February and replaced him with pro-solution 
leftist Demetris Christofias.  Calls for early T/C elections 
in 2008 have mostly disappeared, as "opposition" UBP and DP 
have failed to capitalize on CTP's weaknesses.  Christofias 
and Talat met March 21 and green-lighted a modified July 8 
process; their representatives subsequently developed agendas 
for six working groups and seven technical committees that 
are meeting regularly and making headway.  Ban Ki-Moon in 
April designated respected UN diplomat Taye-Brooke Zerihoun 
as Moller's replacement, a move both Cypriot communities 
welcomed, and is considering nominating a figure "of 
international standing" as his Special Adviser on Cyprus. 
 
¶3.  (C) Leaders Christofias and Talat met again on May 21 
amidst a still optimistic (though guardedly so) climate. 
Emerging from the "summit" was a joint statement that 
clarified points of concern for both sides and called for 
additional stock-taking gatherings between the community's 
representatives.  Left unclarified, however, was the 
64,000-dollar question:  whether and when full-fledged Cyprus 
Problem negotiations would commence, and on what basis.  Both 
men have invested significant political capital in the 
preparatory process and desire it to morph into formal talks, 
yet the pressures they feel and the timetables they confront 
are distinctly different.  For a variety of reasons, Talat 
needs an early start to negotiations and claims his side was 
ready yesterday.  Christofias, on the other hand, must 
satisfy demands from his nationalist partners for ill-defined 
"progress" before he can agree to upgrade the process.  The 
UN will not take a stand either way, committed as it is to 
facilitating, not imposing, a "Cypriot Solution." 
 
¶4.  (C) In February, the Embassy offered thoughts on 
re-energizing the then-stalled Cyprus process (Ref). Our goal 
was to see the impasse broken and the sides engaged in 
serious, substantive negotiations before the end of 2008, an 
outcome that now seems reachable.  This telegram recaps 
events on the island and elsewhere in the last four months, 
evaluates elements of our strategy as employed thus far, and 
provides additional suggestions to spur success.  END SUMMARY 
AND INTRODUCTION 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
Change in Leadership Spawns Improved Climate 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Christofias's June 2007 decision to break the 
coalition and challenge Papadopoulos in the February 2008 
presidential elections destroyed the sense of inevitability 
surrounding the incumbent's re-election prospects and offered 
hope that a more constructive CyProb stance might materialize 
on the G/C side.  Still, most predicted the veteran 
politician would manage to emerge victorious on the strength 
of his nationalist credentials and proven capacity to resist 
"imposed" Cyprus solutions.  It therefore came as great 
surprise when Tassos not only lost, but failed to advance to 
the second round.  Reasons for his eventual defeat were many, 
but most analysts attributed the outcome to the incumbent's 
unsuccessful Cyprus policies -- he had failed to deliver a 
better solution than the 2004 Annan Plan, which he had 
actively demonized -- and to his personal arrogance.  Local 
analysts here, perhaps optimistically, surmised that the 
two-thirds of the electorate voting against Papadopoulos 
preferred a new, less confrontational approach to the 
national issue. 
 
¶6.  (C) Victor Christofias belonged to this camp, and in 
 
NICOSIA 00000348  002 OF 005 
 
 
substance and tone, sought to portray himself as the 
anti-Tassos.  In one of his first actions upon taking office, 
he held a press conference for island and international 
journalists in which he made brief comments in Turkish -- 
unthinkable under the previous regime.  He dumped hard-line 
Papadopoulos acolyte Tassos Tzionis as negotiator and 
replaced him with the more moderate (at least in G/C eyes) 
former Cypriot Foreign Minister, George Iacovou, then 
instructed Iacovou to engage T/C counterpart Ozdil Nami in 
hopes of energizing the July 8 process.  Only three weeks 
into his tenure, Christofias managed to accomplish what 
Papadopoulos had failed to do in 18 months:  secure a deal 
with the Turkish Cypriot side that would enable the working 
groups and technical committees (WG/TCs) to form and begin 
work.  While Nami and Iacovou failed to reach agreement on 
the sticky issue of terms of reference for the groups, they 
did craft the agendas and a basic understanding on process. 
Six groups and seven committees commenced meeting in April. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Sides' Impressions of Process Progress Varies 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) In the month since the WG/TC process began, the 
Embassy has met Iacovou and Nami, a majority of the sides' 
committee leaders, and a half-dozen UN facilitators, seeking 
readouts and urging constructive engagement.  Unsurprisingly, 
accounts of the WG/TCs' activities and progress achieved thus 
far have differed greatly, with the facilitators' 
observations normally falling somewhere in between. 
Underpinning in part the differing perceptions are the sides' 
divergent approaches and goals vis-a-vis the current process. 
 Turkish Cypriots discount the need to "prepare the ground" 
for full-fledged negotiations, a current G/C demand. 
Forty-four years of CyProb negotiations mean few issues are 
left to tackle, they argue, and the sides' positions on core 
matters are clear to all.  Further, the Turkish side argues, 
the July 8 Agreement, which Talat contends he felt pressured 
to sign, was but Tassos Papadopoulos's electorally-motivated 
attempt to convince a then-skeptical international community 
that there existed an active process.  (Comment:  Here, 
Turkish Cypriots ignore the fact that the sides reached ad 
referendum agreement to start the July 8 process in March 
¶2007.  The T/Cs backed out, however, after a secret visit to 
the island by Turkish MFA Undersecretary Ertugrul Apakan 
later that month.  End Comment)  T/Cs wish to commence formal 
negotiations soonest, with Christofias and Talat regularly 
meeting and instructing their respective teams to handle 
technical and substantive details.  It thus follows suit that 
our Turkish Cypriot interlocutors mostly have praised the 
WG/TCs' work so far, particularly that of the economy, EU 
affairs, and governance working groups.  Expected examples of 
non-convergence in the property, territory, and 
security/guarantees WGs were wholly expected, they explain, 
since only the leaders themselves could hope to resolve these 
complex, political-in-nature disputes. 
 
¶8.  (C) Papadopoulos likely was seeking electoral benefit 
from July 8, and his minions did stall the process for months 
with demands such as "Undertake a detailed study of federal 
governments in place throughout the world" (the G/C side's 
slow-down was roughly from July 2006 to March 2007, at which 
point Talat, in hopes of subverting Papadopoulos's electoral 
prospects, took his turn at delaying the process).  Yet the 
2006 agreement also reflected a more mainstream G/C aim:  to 
devise a new basis for a Cyprus settlement bereft of 
"asphyxiating" timetables and international arbitration, 
ensuring that new talks did not commence where the "imposed" 
and "unworkable" Annan Plan left off.  Christofias therefore 
surprised many observers when he approved the March 21 
arrangement, which stipulated that the leaders had "agreed to 
meet three months from now to review the work of the working 
groups and technical committees, and using their results, to 
start full-fledged negotiations under the auspices of the UN 
Secretary General."  Barely two weeks after Moller read the 
statement, however, government officials applied caveats, 
claiming that G/Cs would only allow formal talks if the 
groups and committees had delivered tangible (but undefined) 
progress.  With few exceptions, Greek Cypriot media and some 
staffers on the WG/TCs have called their T/C counterparts 
intransigent, controlled by Ankara, determined to revive the 
dead-and-buried Annan Plan, and unwilling to engage in 
brainstorming or other constructive activities. 
 
¶9.  (C) Feeling similarly intense but substantively different 
pressure -- Talat to obtain a date for formal talks to 
commence, and Christofias to win commitment for real progress 
from the WG/TCs -- the leaders met again on May 23 and issued 
a joint statement.  Neither man got all that he wanted from 
 
NICOSIA 00000348  003 OF 005 
 
 
the "summit," but the document in general was balanced.  The 
leaders "reaffirming their commitment to a bi-zonal, 
bi-communal federation with political equality as defined by 
relevant Security Council resolutions" calmed G/C fears that 
Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots were working toward a loose 
confederation or two-state solution.  Meeting T/Cs' political 
needs regarding terminology, the statement also described a 
partnership having a federal government, as well as 
politically equal Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot 
constituent states.  Our contacts north of the Green Line 
liked the communique, and press coverage spun generally 
positive.  Most Greek Cypriot media, many still hewing the 
Papadopoulos line, argued the text heavily favored Talat's 
positions, however.  Surprised by the attack, the Christofias 
team went immediately on the defensive and repeated its 
demands for progress before the next leaders' meeting, 
planned for the second half of June. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Plenty of Reason to Push the Process 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (C) While we're not yet chilling champagne or readying 
fireworks, the sides have made notable CyProb advances the 
last few months.  In the run-up to the May 23 gathering, 
however, we were worrying over a possible derailment.  What 
would happen if Talat, insisting on a strict interpretation 
of the March 21 communique's 90-day negotiations calendar, 
engaged a similarly dug-in Christofias, demanding unspecified 
progress in the WG/TCs before he could bless formal talks? 
Happily, that clash never occurred.  In a May 28 lunch with 
P-5 ambassadors, UNFICYP leader Zerihoun reasoned that the 
leaders' recent meeting and their commitment to engage again 
in mid-June had rendered moot the 90-day deadline.  Besides, 
the UN had no desire to box in either side based on a need 
for a few additional weeks of preparatory talks.  Turkish 
Cypriot contacts expressed a surprisingly similar position, 
with Talat spokesman Hasan Ercakica implying May 28 that T/Cs 
would be "tolerant" of Christofias's domestic political 
needs.  A two- or three-week extension would be acceptable, 
we inferred; two or three months would not. 
 
¶11.  (C) Even without an imminent deadline, pushing the 
process forward makes sense for numerous reasons.  Talat's 
CTP may not face a serious political threat today, but by no 
means are they comfortably ensconced in power.  A decaying 
economy, an inability to deliver measurable CyProb progress 
despite a campaign platform promising it, and an opposition 
recently buoyed by positive polling numbers all conspire 
against the party's continued dominance in "parliament." 
Should nationalist UBP somehow regain power via early 
elections (unlikely before 2009, but not impossible), the 
change would represent a step away from solution. 
Christofias's grip on government is not nearly so tenuous. 
That said, he, too, won election on a pro-solution stance, 
and failure of the current process would undoubtedly spawn a 
public and influential "I told you so" from the hard-line 
camp. 
 
¶12.  (C) The international community's many "Type A" 
personalities would love to roll up their sleeves and get 
involved directly in the current process.  Such an approach 
looks counter-productive, however.  While Papadopoulos's 
ouster reduced somewhat the Greek Cypriots' aversion to an 
proactive international role (especially by the Americans and 
British), that sentiment has not disappeared.  In fact, the 
G/C side has cottoned to a phrase attributed ironically to 
resident UK High Commissioner Peter Millet and repeated often 
by top UNFICYP officials -- "the solution must be a Cypriot 
one."  Any overt pressure on the G/C side to agree by X date 
to start full-fledged negotiations likely would put 
Christofias into a corner and force him to push back. 
Turkish Cypriots have not bought into the "Cypriot Solution" 
model, however, and would prefer the UN to return to its 
traditional mediation (vice facilitation) role. 
 
---------------------------------- 
Revisiting the Short-term Strategy 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶13.  (C) Four months ago, when a Papadopoulos re-election 
seemed likely, the Embassy submitted its suggestions on 
overcoming the President's intransigence in order to get to 
full-fledged negotiations; the Department and our sister 
missions subsequently contributed as well (Ref).  While the 
efforts of the Embassy and broader USG were not the driving 
force behind the improved negotiating climate and recent 
(albeit limited) substantive progress -- G/C voters deserve 
that accolade -- they did convey a sense of reward to the 
 
NICOSIA 00000348  004 OF 005 
 
 
sides for taking positive steps.  Recapping our strategy 
memorandum, in the 120-day interim we managed to: 
 
-- Prevent U.S.-Cypriot relations from becoming a factor in 
the presidential elections, maintaining cordial relations 
with all candidates.  Christofias privately believs this 
stance helped him win the election; 
-- Press both sides to voice continued support for spirit (if 
not process) of July 8 agreement; 
-- Lobby T/C authorities and resident Turkish leaders to take 
bold step on Ledra Street crossing (it opened in April); 
-- Convey message of USG support to newly-elected President 
Christofias; he subsequently voiced his hope that bilateral 
ties strengthen further; 
-- Urge Christofias to meet Talat immediately; 
-- Engage UN elements locally, in Washington, and in New York 
for the deployment of an assessment mission; it was received 
well here and generated a helpful UNSC Presidency statement; 
-- Voice publicly USG support for an eventual UN Good Offices 
mission; 
-- Conduct necessary legwork for assigning a U.S. Special 
Cyprus Coordinator; and 
-- Help shape message in UNFICYP's June report to the 
Security Council. 
 
¶14.  (C) Two as-yet-unimplemented strategy elements merit our 
immediate attention.  In February, we envisioned deploying a 
high-level U.S. official to visit Cyprus after the UN mission 
departed, aiming to "spur movement via July 8 to get to 
substantive negotiations ASAP."  Cypriots in both communities 
value Washington's attention, and rarely do we engage MFA 
contacts or journalists and not receive inquiries over 
planned visits by prominent USG officials.  We continue to 
believe that an A/S-level (or above) call holds great value 
in leveraging our own efforts to break down the last barriers 
to formal negotiations.  His message would require careful 
fine-tuning, voicing our desires and expectations for the 
process without seeming overly demanding; we should aim 
strongly to support a process, but not be saddled with 
ownership of it.  As to timing, we suggest late June; at that 
point, the leaders will have just met, presenting our visitor 
the opportunity either to congratulate or chide the outcome. 
Our British colleagues have informed us that the RoC has 
promised to repeal formally the "Jack Straw rule" that 
prohibits visitors from seeing President Christofias if they 
also intended to see Talat in the "TRNC Presidential Palace" 
(the Brits recently were forced to postpone a visit by their 
Europe Minister on its account).  The success of our VIP call 
depends on our ability to engage both leaders. 
 
¶15.  (C) As much as the Cypriots would appreciate a 
high-level visitor, they would value the appointment of a USG 
Special Cyprus Coordinator (SCC) even more.  At this point, 
however, we see little benefit in taking this step before the 
sides agree to full-fledged talks.  The UN would seem to 
agree; while last week we heard from normally reliable 
UNFICYP contacts that Ban Ki-Moon had offered the Special 
Advisor on Cyprus job to former Australian Foreign Minister 
Alexander Downer, Zerihoun informed us May 28 that the 
decision had not yet been made.  Perhaps the UN shares our 
hesitancy -- without the commitment of the communities to 
formal talks, what might their Adviser and our Coordinator 
actually do?  On the other hand, there may be some utility in 
public mention of our intent to nominate, based on progress 
in the local talks.  Such a message could come either from 
the DOS spokesman in Washington, the Ambassador, or our 
high-level USG visitor. 
 
-------------------------------- 
Help, Not Hindrance, From Ankara 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) Nearly all Greek Cypriots publicly lament -- and 
some Turkish Cypriots privately concur -- that Turkey truly 
calls the shots in northern Cyprus.  We know the interplay 
between T/C authorities, civilian leaders in Ankara, and the 
Turkish General Staff is more complex than that, yet we 
cannot dispute that mainlanders play outsized roles in 
shaping T/C thinking on the national problem.  On security 
matters, we would even argue the TGS has near-exclusive 
authority, most recently shown in its handling of the Ledra 
Street opening.  Turkey has genuine interests at play in the 
negotiations, of course.  It will even have a formal role, 
when and if the sides begin tackling final status and the 
1960 founding treaties, which gave Ankara guardianship 
responsibilities in Cyprus.  Yet at this stage in the 
process, a light, "enabling" touch from the mainland would 
benefit the process immensely.  It would allow Talat needed 
room to maneuver, to make the tough compromises necessary to 
 
NICOSIA 00000348  005 OF 005 
 
 
satisfy G/C demands for progress from the WG/TCs.  South of 
the Green Line, a halt in "provocative" acts and statements, 
such as the recent pronouncement of Turkey's NSC-equivalent, 
would help insulate Christofias from his own nationalist 
"allies" and dispel somewhat the belief that Ankara stands in 
the way of a deal.  Last, Ankara itself stands to benefit, 
especially as its EU accession review grows nearer, since all 
signs point to Brussels and member-states demanding that 
Turkey more actively support a Cyprus solution.  We therefore 
urge that the Department, Embassy Ankara, USEU, USUN, and 
others convey this message in their high-level interactions 
with Ankara's political and military leadership. 
SCHLICHER