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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 NAPLES 000036 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE PLEASE PASS TO ONDCP; TREASURY FOR OFAC 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  6/4/2018 
TAGS: PGOV KCRM ECON SNAR KCOR IT
SUBJECT: ORGANIZED CRIME IN ITALY I:  THE POLITICAL DIMENSION 
 
NAPLES 00000036  001.2 OF 005 
 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: J. PATRICK TRUHN, CONSUL GENERAL, AMCONGEN 
NAPLES, STATE. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary and introduction:  This is the first of a 
three-part series; this message offers some background on 
organized crime in Southern Italy and examines its political 
dimensions.  Organized crime is one of Southern Italy's greatest 
challenges to economic growth and political stability, and yet 
Italian politicians, for various reasons, are unable or 
unwilling to address it in an effective manner.  The major 
organized crime groups based in Southern Italy all negatively 
impact on U.S. interests.  They weaken an important ally by 
contributing to corruption and stagnant economic growth, and 
they traffic in drugs (thereby indirectly providing resources to 
terrorist groups in Colombia and Asia) and pirated movies, music 
and software.  The Sicilian Mafia maintains ties with organized 
crime groups in the United States, historically providing the 
American Mafia with recruits.  Organized crime influences 
Italian politics, according to numerous experts, either by 
ensuring the election of their associates, or by keeping corrupt 
politicians, bureaucrats and law enforcement officials on their 
payroll.  This corruption is a major component of the vicious 
cycle of poverty and the breakdown of the state in southern 
Italy.  Part two of this series will examine the economic impact 
of organized crime, and part three will suggest why the United 
States should pay greater attention, and will offer 
recommendations for a broader strategy to deal with the 
phenomenon.  End summary and introduction. 
 
¶2.  (SBU) Organized crime is a deep-rooted phenomenon afflicting 
southern Italy, but affecting the economy of the entire country 
and extending its tentacles internationally.  Contrary to common 
misapprehensions, in Italy the mob is not one unified 
organization, but three main groups, each originating in a 
different region and each very different from the others.  All 
of them impact negatively on U.S. interests.  In Sicily, the 
Cosa Nostra has a long history of ties to organized crime in the 
United States.  In Campania, the clans collectively known as the 
Camorra help flood European markets with counterfeit and pirated 
goods, including American-made software, music and movies.  And 
from its base in Calabria, the 'Ndrangheta runs a lucrative drug 
trafficking business that extends beyond Italy.  (There is also 
a smaller group in Apulia, the Sacra Corona Unita, which 
operates on a lesser scale, mostly via the protection racket; 
successful law enforcement operations in recent years have 
largely dismantled the group.)  Despite their differences, all 
three major organized crime groups have some activities in 
common, including running protection rackets and money 
laundering.  They do business with each other; for example, the 
Cosa Nostra and Camorra clans purchase narcotics from the 
'Ndrangheta.  They also have close ties with Chinese, Turkish 
and Balkan mobs (particularly Albanian and Bulgarian). 
According to a 2005 FBI intelligence assessment, there have been 
numerous instances of "opportunistic interaction" between the 
three main Italian organized crime groups and Islamic 
extremists.  And all three have the ability to influence 
politics and politicians, and use that ability to varying 
degrees, contributing to corruption at various levels of the 
Italian government.  In public documents, the FBI notes that all 
three groups have members and/or affiliates in the United States. 
 
Cosa Nostra:  Unified Structure in Sicily 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶3.  (SBU) Sicily's Cosa Nostra operates throughout the island 
with a unified, hierarchical structure.  Inter-clan violence is 
rare; the last major war between "families" was over twenty 
years ago (the conflict resulted in the emigration of members of 
the Inzerillo family to New York, where they joined the Gambino 
clan).  Membership in the Cosa Nostra is selective, and the 
organization has recruited personnel from all socioeconomic 
classes, including professionals.  The unified structure works 
well as long as members maintain their vow of secrecy.  The Cosa 
Nostra's principal sources of income are the protection racket, 
 
NAPLES 00000036  002.2 OF 005 
 
 
drug distribution, rigging of government contracts, trafficking 
in persons, loan sharking and illegal construction. 
 
Camorra:  Gang Wars in Campania 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶4.  (C) The groups that operate in Campania are traditionally 
known as the Camorra, but, as one expert, former MP Isaia Sales, 
tells us, the label mistakenly gives the impression that there 
is some unified structure.  In fact, many different rival clans 
operate in Campania, mainly in the provinces of Naples, Caserta 
and Salerno.  There is no central organization or even a 
confederation; attempts by some bosses to unify some of all of 
these clans have failed miserably.  Thus, there is no single 
"Camorra"; in fact, mobsters do not even use the word, 
preferring "O Sistema," Neapolitan for "The System."  The clans' 
enterprises are conducted within territorial boundaries, which 
are constantly being tested, leading to almost continuous gang 
violence.  Unlike the Cosa Nostra, membership in Camorra clans 
is open to virtually anyone, as each family seeks to build an 
ever-larger army.  The "soldiers" come from the lowest 
socio-economic echelons (the "urban sub-proletariat," according 
to Sales), who often find crime to be their only avenue to 
regular employment.  Many wind up in prison or die violently, 
factors that contribute to Camorristas' risky behavior.  The 
clans' principal sources of income are the protection racket, 
illegal transport and dumping of toxic waste, drug trafficking, 
production and distribution of pirated and counterfeit products, 
illegal construction and trafficking in persons.  Money 
laundering is rampant, consisting largely of investments in 
hotels, restaurants and small stores that also serve as a sort 
of life insurance policy for family members.  Franco Roberti, 
the top anti-Mafia prosecutor in Naples, tells us that the 
powerful Casalesi clan, based in Caserta, has huge interests in 
the construction industry in northern Italy.  Roberti adds that 
Camorra clans are making more money than ever from drug 
trafficking, partly because of purer and less expensive cocaine, 
and partly because they have eliminated middlemen and now deal 
directly with Colombian suppliers.  The Camorra pays cash for 
drugs, or trades cocaine for hashish and heroin. 
 
'Ndrangheta:  The Most Dangerous of All 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (C/NF) Our contacts both in and outside of the 
law-enforcement sphere agree that the 'Ndrangheta is the most 
successful and dangerous organized crime group in Italy.  The 
'Ndrangheta has come a long way since its founding by villagers; 
according to University of Cosenza sociologist Giap Parini, in 
the last thirty years the group has established ties with 
Colombia's FARC and suppliers of heroin and hashish in Central 
Asia, providing them with arms and cash, and has extended its 
reach throughout Western Europe.  And according to 
Calabria-based Anti-Mafia Prosecutor Santi Cutroneo, the 
'Ndrangheta is far more sophisticated and international than 
most people believe, maintaining bank accounts in Monte Carlo 
and Milan, and transplanting operatives to Colombia, Spain, 
Germany, the Balkans, Canada and Australia.  The Italian 
Parliament's Anti-Mafia Committee recently characterized the 
'Ndrangheta as having an international structure similar to that 
of Al-Qaeda.  'Ndrangheta membership is based exclusively on 
family (including marital) ties, making it extremely difficult 
to penetrate; arrested members almost never reveal information 
about their colleagues, as they are relatives.  There is no 
central structure, as in the Cosa Nostra; autonomous 'Ndrangheta 
clans operate within well-defined geographic boundaries, and 
territorial disputes are settled through peaceful negotiation or 
arbitration.  Parini asserts that these clans control the 
economy, politics and society in Calabria.  The 'Ndrangheta's 
main sources of income (according to law enforcement contacts 
and open sources) are drug trafficking, the protection racket, 
 
NAPLES 00000036  003.2 OF 005 
 
 
rigging government contracts, illegal construction, loan 
sharking and trafficking in persons.  Both Parini and Reggio 
Calabria Prefect Salvatore Montanaro told the CG that the 
'Ndrangheta pays the Colombian FARC for drugs with both cash and 
arms.  (Comment:  Neither of these sources is a law enforcement 
official; their comments on links to the FARC may be 
speculation.  DEA investigations in both Italy and Colombia have 
turned up no evidence to support this allegation.  End comment.) 
 During a May 2008 visit to Italy, U.S. Deputy Attorney General 
Mark Filip declared to the media that the 'Ndrangheta is a 
growing threat to the United States with a presence primarily in 
the U.S. Northeast. 
 
How Organized Crime Influences Politics 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (C/NF) All three organized crime groups influence politics 
in Italy.  Camorra clans have been known to "get out the vote" 
for local political figures, but often prefer bribes and 
kickbacks to trying to influence elections.  If they want 
someone elected, though, they will buy votes; up until this 
year, when Parliament banned the use of cellphones and cameras 
in voting booths, the cost of a vote was reportedly a $75 cell 
phone.  According to sociologist Amato Lamberti, the Camorra can 
move up to ten percent of the vote in Naples province.  The Cosa 
Nostra has a reputation for being able to deliver votes in 
Sicily; a number of analysts attributed the success of Silvio 
Berlusconi and his Sicilian allies in 2001 to the influence of 
organized crime (the accusation, whether true or not, is not 
that there was vote fraud, but that the mob was able to 
influence voter turnout in Berlusconi's favor).  The vice 
chairman of the Italian parliament's Anti-Mafia Committee, Beppe 
Lumia, claims that the Cosa Nostra controls around 150,000 
votes, enough to determine whether a party achieves the minimum 
eight percent required for a Senate seat.  According to 
'Ndrangheta expert Parini, it is organized crime that decides 
who holds elected office in southern Calabria, creating a web of 
dependencies to ensure election victories for inept politicians 
that are guaranteed to produce policies favorable to organized 
crime.  Anti-Mafia prosecutor Nicola Gratteri states that in 
some parts of the region, the 'Ndrangheta controls up to 20 
percent of the votes.  It is clear from our meetings with 
elected officials in Calabria that they are a step down in 
quality from those in other parts of Southern Italy; some are so 
devoid of energy and charisma that it is hard to imagine them 
mounting -- let alone surviving -- a real electoral campaign. 
According to former Senator Lorenzo Diana, an organized crime 
expert based in Naples, 34 of 50 regional assemblymen in 
Calabria have problems with the law.  The corruption of elected 
officials and bureaucrats allows organized crime to win 
government contracts and sub-contracts, and to obtain permits 
and certificates to conduct illegal construction and 
transportation of toxic waste, among other things.  In the end, 
even elected leaders without direct ties to organized crime 
often come to some sort of accommodation with the mob; as the 
GOI's chief prosecutor in Naples, GianDomenico Lepore, tells us, 
"The decision to live with the Mafia is a political choice, as 
is the decision not to make fighting the Mafia a priority." 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) In addition to the corruption of elected officials, 
organized crime in Italy has successfully recruited law 
enforcement and judicial personnel through a combination of 
bribery and intimidation.  Many judges, prosecutors, police and 
customs officials have been exposed for collaborating with the 
Mafia.  This corruption allows the various clans to evade 
justice, as well as to ensure that authorities look the other 
way when illegal activities are being conducted.  One need look 
no further than the port of Gioia Tauro on Calabria's Tyrhennian 
coast for an example.  Europe's busiest transshipment port is 
outfitted with the tightest security measures, yet according to 
public sources, the port is used as a drug entry point.  The 
 
NAPLES 00000036  004.2 OF 005 
 
 
port is also used in the illegal arms trade; there have been 
several seizures of assault weapons in recent years.  Logic 
would dictate that the 'Ndrangheta could not move narcotics and 
arms without the acquiescence of customs authorities and 
Treasury Police.  Honest politicians and judicial personnel who 
stand up to the mob are routinely assassinated (among the higher 
profile cases were the killings of anti-Mafia prosecutors 
Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in 1992, and the Vice 
President of the Calabria Regional Council, Francesco Fortugno, 
in 2005). 
 
¶8.  (C) The pervasiveness of corruption -- Italy ranked 41st on 
Transparency International's 2007 Corruption Perception Index -- 
has led to a breakdown of the state in large portions of 
Southern Italy.  The central government has little control over 
large areas of Sicily, Calabria and Campania, where organized 
crime maintains a tight grip over even mundane aspects of daily 
life, such as renewing a driver's license.  And this perception 
of corruption dissuades investment in the South, which further 
aggravates poverty and unemployment, which in turn feeds 
organized crime as it recruits desperate young men with no job 
prospects.  A report issued in May 2008 by the think tank 
Eurispes classifies all provinces in Campania, Calabria, Sicily 
and Apulia for their susceptibility to Mafia penetration. 
Naples heads the list (probably because of the number of city 
governments dissolved by the courts) with a whopping index of 
68.9 percent, followed by Reggio Calabria (60), Palermo (41.9) 
and Catanzaro (33).  The reaction of Southern Italy's 
politicians to organized crime, even at the highest levels, 
seems to be one of either denial or defeatism.  Campania 
Regional President Bassolino and then-Sicily Regional Assembly 
President Micciche both assured the Consul General last fall 
that their regions had largely licked the problem of organized 
crime.  Countless other politicians argue that organized crime 
is so pervasive that there is no point even in trying to do 
anything about it.  (One told the Ambassador that to defeat 
organized crime, Italy would have to go to war against the mob 
and suspend personal liberties in the process, but that to say 
this publicly would be political suicide.)  Even Sicily's upbeat 
Industrialists Federation President Ivan Lo Bello, when asked in 
early 2008 whether it was plausible for a serious candidate in 
Sicily's then-upcoming elections to run on an anti-Mafia 
platform, told the CG he honestly did not know. 
 
¶9.  (C) These groups also try to wield influence through the 
media.  One prosecutor told us of a newspaper in Caserta 
(Campania) whose sole purpose was to serve as a way for criminal 
operatives to convey coded messages to each other.  A number of 
journalists who have exposed criminal enterprises have been 
threatened with death.  Roberto Saviano, author of a 
best-selling expose of the Camorra, told the CG in April 2008 
that it is not his message that has made him dangerous, but the 
fact that millions of readers have read and understood it. 
Saviano is now on the clans' hit list and is one of about a 
dozen Italian journalists under police protection, according to 
the rights group Reporters Without Borders.  According to Lirio 
Abbate, a correspondent under protection in Palermo, "Violence 
is only one means of applying pressure.  Journalists can also be 
corrupted and bought." 
 
¶10.  (C) Comment:  Of all the social elements involved in 
combating organized crime -- including law enforcement, business 
and social groups -- the politicians, many of whom owe their 
very survival to organized crime, appear to be the least 
committed to finding a solution.  Until this situation changes, 
even the best police work (and much of it is outstanding) will 
be unsuccessful in stemming the tide.  "No one will win next 
month's elections in Italy, especially not the nation's 
citizens," warned Roberto Saviano, author of a best-selling 
expose of the Camorra, in a March 2008 "Time" magazine article, 
because "everyone seems dead set on ignoring the country's 
 
NAPLES 00000036  005.2 OF 005 
 
 
fundamental problem: organized crime."  The second part of this 
series of cables will examine more closely the economic impact 
of organized crime in Southern Italy. 
TRUHN