VZCZCXRO2227
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0694/01 1701121
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181121Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1686
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN PRIORITY 1956
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD PRIORITY 1247
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 1108
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 3144
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/WHITE HOUSE WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 KUWAIT 000694 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018 
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: KSS TO WAINSTEIN:  KUWAIT CT LEGISLATION INADEQUATE 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 557 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 512 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 565 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1.  (S) Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, in a June 11 
meeting with Kuwait State Security (KSS) Director Muhaylan, 
conveyed the President's appeal for increased 
counterterrorism (CT) cooperation and information sharing 
among partners.  Muhaylan complained of inadequate 
legislation to effectively pursue and prosecute suspected 
terrorists, and cited the Kuwaiti constitution as a limiting 
factor in CT cooperation.  Muhaylan claimed that current 
intelligence sharing is not on an equal footing, as KSS, has 
received "not one word" of information or evidence against 
Kuwaiti's eight former GTMO detainees.  He noted that 
continuing tensions between the Kuwaiti legislative and 
executive branches ensure that there will be no near-term 
improvement in Kuwait's inadequate CT legal framework.  The 
best course forward, according to Muhaylan, is for the Amir 
to dissolve Parliament and impose CT measures by decree.  As 
he states in every conversation with USG officials, Muhaylan 
lamented the dissolution of the Security Courts.  End summary. 
 
Urging Cooperation and Information Sharing 
------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S)  Assistant to the President for Homeland Security and 
Counterterrorism (APHSCT) Kenneth Wainstein, accompanied by 
Ambassador, spoke on June 11 to Kuwait State Security (KSS) 
Director, Major General Suleiman Al-Muhaylan about the 
President's call for increased counterterrorism (CT) 
cooperation and information sharing among partners.  He also 
relayed that, in a previous meeting  with Kuwait's Prime 
Minister (septel), he had delivered a letter from the 
President to the Kuwaiti Amir that called for increased CT 
cooperation. 
 
¶3.  (S)  Muhaylan welcomed the visit as a continuation of 
ongoing substantive CT dialogue, including recent visits by 
S/CT Dailey (ref A) and S/I Satterfield (ref B), and noted 
the utility of learning from the experience of others: 
"Working together is a must, not an option."  He noted that 
Kuwait is especially vulnerable because of its location, and 
lamented that terrorists continually change their priorities 
and their tactics to keep one step ahead of security 
services. 
 
No Adequate CT Legislation in Kuwait 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S)  APHSCT Wainstein stressed to Muhaylan that, despite 
recent CT gains in the region, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist 
organizations remain a threat.  He pointed to the growing 
menace of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan's tribal areas, and added that 
free societies like the United States and Kuwait are the 
intended targets of terrorists.  The key CT focus must in 
Kuwait remain on terror facilitators, he stated.  CT 
legislation in Kuwait is inadequate, and reflects permissive, 
pre-9/11 norms.  APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan not to 
underestimate the threat, and stressed the need to continue 
enhancing U.S.-Kuwaiti joint CT efforts. 
 
Limits on Sharing 
--------------------- 
 
¶5.  (S)  According to Muhaylan, KSS is ready to arrest or 
detain suspected extremists; but, unfortunately, "the law is 
not on our side." He lamented that KSS has "no influence" 
with the government.  When asked by APHSCT Wainstein about 
sharing specific information on activities of Kuwaitis, 
Muhaylan replied that KSS provides everything to the USG that 
it can, within the confines of the constitution.  KSS has no 
immunity from the law, which prohibits the release of some 
types of information to foreign governments.  Nevertheless, 
KSS passes "a mere fraction" of information to Saudi Arabia 
than it shares with the United States. 
 
 
KUWAIT 00000694  002 OF 004 
 
 
¶6.  (S)  APHSCT Wainstein urged Muhaylan to be creative in 
relaying information without breaking any laws, and advised 
him to use the Kuwaiti intelligence apparatus to push the 
drive for new CT legislation. 
Former GTMO Detainees 
----------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (S)  Muhaylan contended that the USG presented a double 
standard in its requests for more intelligence on Kuwaiti 
nationals and its demands for prosecution of suspected 
terrorists because "not one word" of evidence on eight 
Kuwaiti former GTMO detainees has been shared with KSS.  He 
asked for information that the GOK can use to prosecute other 
detainees or suspected terrorists.  APHSCT Wainstein agreed 
to review GTMO-related information sharing with CT partners 
upon his return to Washington. 
 
Kuwaiti Democracy 101 
---------------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S)  Muhaylan contended that democracy in Kuwait began 
its descent into chaos after the liberation of Kuwait in 
¶1991.  From that time, legislative anti-terror efforts were 
scaled back to protect freedom of speech, the Kuwait State 
Security Court was dismantled, and suspected terrorists were 
set free for lack of criminal evidence.  He expressed little 
hope for new CT legislation in the near future, because the 
dysfunctional relationship between MPs and the Cabinet 
ensures that any such initiative would be stillborn.  Though 
he had hoped for a new, more collaborative Parliament, he was 
profoundly disappointed that the May 17 election produced an 
even more recalcitrant body than before.  (Ref C) 
 
GOK CT Actions 
-------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Muhaylan cited some CT efforts undertaken recently by 
the GOK: 
--A Kuwaiti team visited terrorism rehabilitation centers in 
Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and submitted a report to the GOK 
assessing the viability of developing such a center in 
Kuwait. 
--All mosques in Kuwait must now have KSS approval for Imams. 
--All foreign teachers must now have KSS approval. 
 
Saudi Radicals Influence Kuwaiti Extremists 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶10.  (S)  Muhaylan opined that radicalization in Saudi Arabia 
has directly affected the Kuwaiti outlook on extremism; 
religious hard-liners in Kuwait are inspired and motivated by 
fatwas issued by Saudi clerics.  Due to passport control 
system flaws and family connections on either side of the 
border, many Kuwaiti extremists--as described by 
Muhaylan--have dual Saudi/Kuwaiti nationality, enabling easy 
passage between the two countries, and creating difficulty 
for Kuwaiti authorities in reconciling watchlist names with 
documents. 
 
Profiles of Kuwaiti Extremists 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶11.  (S)  Muhaylan profiled Kuwaiti extremists as young, high 
school dropouts with no standing in the community or 
potential for the future.  Compared to jihadists from the 
earlier stages of OIF, he described the new generation of 
extremists as less impassioned and less able to seduce 
vulnerable recruits.  He added that, since most Gulf recruits 
for Al-Qaeda are tasked with suicide operations in Iraq, they 
are taking another look at Afghanistan as a battlefield to 
prove their valor in combat. 
 
Downplaying Mohammed Al-Dossary's Role 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S)  Muhaylan downplayed the role of Kuwaiti suspected 
terrorist facilitator Mohammed Al-Dossary, whom he described 
as psychologically ill, stating that earlier reports 
exaggerated his connections to Syrian terrorist, Abu Ghadiya. 
 He added that Al-Dossary's current activities in Syria were 
limited to the shoe trade with Syrian merchants. 
 
Border Concerns 
 
KUWAIT 00000694  003 OF 004 
 
 
-------------------- 
 
¶13.  (S)  Muhaylan claimed that, because of improvements in 
border monitoring, Kuwaiti jihadists have found it 
increasingly difficult to cross into Iraq via Saudi Arabia 
and Syria.  This, he added, has opened up concerns that 
Kuwaiti jihadists now travel through Bahrain and the UAE en 
route to Iraq or Afghanistan. He added that the MOI was 
modifying controls on sea borders, with new abilities for 
close, far and land monitoring, with hopes to be fully 
operational by 2009. 
 
Charities 
----------- 
 
¶14.  (S)  APHSCT Wainstein emphasized the importance of 
cooperation efforts in identifying charities used in whole or 
in part to fund terrorism.  He noted the disparity of views 
on this matter, but urged more operational officer level 
cooperation, promising continued efforts to encourage more 
transparency and cooperation. 
 
Future Scenarios 
-------------------- 
 
¶15.  (S)  Muhaylan stated that Kuwaitis do not understand the 
terror threat that faces the country and speculated on likely 
scenarios: 
 
¶A.  Kuwait suffers a major catastrophe. 
¶B.  (Sarcastically) Kuwait adopts the Jordanian model of 
repeatedly dissolving parliament to intentionally exhaust and 
bankrupt candidates. 
¶C.  The Amir dissolves the Parliament unconstitutionally 
(i.e. without the required new elections within 60 days) and 
begins issuing, by decree, CT laws that allow the GOK to 
bring to justice suspected terrorists. 
 
"Subverting Democracy" the Best Course for Kuwait? 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶16.  (S)  Muhaylan remarked that the best solution is an 
unconstitutional dissolution of Parliament by the Amir. 
However, he contended should this action take place, the GOK 
would have to endure USG condemnation for subverting 
democracy. 
 
Comment 
-------- 
 
¶17.  (S)  Ironically, Muhaylan blasted the Ambassador halfway 
through the meeting for the recently published TIP report 
placing Kuwait on Tier III.  Claiming that Kuwait's human 
rights protections were the best in the GCC, Muhaylan faulted 
the USG for relying on unsubstantiated press reports and said 
the GOK had discovered that the various human rights groups 
operating in Europe had proven ties to Islamic extremists. 
End comment. 
 
¶18.  (S/NF) The participants of the meeting, which took place 
at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters, included: 
 
U.S. 
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones 
Kenneth APHSCT Wainstein, Assistant to the President for 
Homeland Security and Counterterrorism 
Nicholas Rasmussen, Senior Director for Combating Terrorism, 
NSC 
John Duncan, Director for Combating Terrorism, NSC 
Kate Gladney, Aide to APHSCT Wainstein 
GRPO Head 
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker) 
 
KSS 
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security 
Affairs and de facto KSS Director 
KSS Officers, names not provided 
 
¶19.  (U) This cable has been cleared by APHSCT Wainstein. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
KUWAIT 00000694  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
MISENHEIMER