VZCZCXRO8259
RR RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0822/01 1531335
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
R 011335Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 0943
INFO RUCNIAD/IGAD COLLECTIVE

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 KHARTOUM 000822 
 
SENSITIVE 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KSCA OTRA EAID CDC SU
SUBJECT: AEC VISITS DEVASTATED ABYEI TOWN AND REFUGEES 
 
REF:  A) KHARTOUM 777; B) KHARTOUM 806 
 
¶1.  (U) Summary: An Assessment and Evaluation Committee (AEC) 
delegation visited Abyei and associated refugee sites May 28 to view 
the effects of recent fighting between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and 
Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) units in that town.  Abyei is 
now completely under the control of SAF forces, and much of the town 
has been burned to the ground. Armed civilians and SAF patrols were 
observed walking the streets, which were littered with looted 
household belongings.  UNMIS members spoke of frustrations over 
limits on their movements and even on their reporting that prevent 
them from effectively keeping the peace.  The AEC delegation also 
visited Agok town, where most of the Dinka refugees fled, and spoke 
with representatives of international relief NGOs.  NGO reps said 
two of their biggest immediate needs are the establishment of a 
humanitarian "no-fly zone" above the town (i.e., an end to 
harassment by SAF Antonovs circling the town), and the need to open 
roads north of Abyei to allow shipments of relief supplies.  The 
team also spoke with representatives of the SPLM/A, and the Dinka 
and Messeriya communities.  The AEC delegation came away convinced 
once again (see reftels) that UNMIS or new Joint Integrated Units 
(JIUs) of combined SAF and SPLA troops must be allowed freedom of 
movement throughout the Abyei area, as the local situation remains 
extremely volatile.  SAF forces control the town, but unless they 
are replaced by UNMIS forces, the town could be the scene of renewed 
fighting by SPLA units to drive them out.  END SUMMARY 
 
UNAMIS forces frustrated by controls 
------------------------------------ 
¶2.  (U) The high-level AEC delegation -- including GoNU foreign 
minister and SPLM polit-bureau member Deng Alor, ambassadors of the 
Netherlands, UK, Italy, Norway, France (representing EU Presidency), 
and the African Union, a political officer from the U.S. Embassy, 
representatives of the NCP, and AEC chairman Derek Plumbly -- 
arrived in Abyei aboard a Russian-piloted UN helicopter for the 
start of a one-day tour of the area.  A meeting with UNMIS 
commanders and forces opened the day's agenda.  Members of UNMIS 
spoke of their many frustrations in carrying out their mission, 
including the fact that the town had been burned and looted right on 
the other side of the fence demarcating their compound.  AEC members 
were struck by the fact that many of the troops they spoke with had 
never been in the town.  Special Envoy Richard Williamson was 
informed during a tour he made of Abyei on May 30 that only African 
members of the UNMIS force in Abyei were being allowed by the SAF to 
make patrols into the town, further limiting the ability of UNMIS to 
carry out its mission. 
 
¶3.  (U) The UNMIS commander described the situation in Abyei town as 
"tense," with SAF soldiers in control.  The commander said the town 
had been burned and looted by "suspected Messeriya" tribesman (a 
charge later denied by Messeriya leaders, but confirmed to 
Ambassador Williamson on May 30th by UNMIS).  The troops described a 
situation where their ability to patrol and monitor the area was 
subject to on-again, off-again restrictions by the SAF.  Even their 
ability to report on what they observe is hampered.  One female 
African soldier reported that "you're only supposed to report what 
is 'comfortable,' otherwise your report can just be thrown away. 
And that was a contributing factor in the escalation" of tensions 
and violence," she said. 
 
¶4.  (U) Another officer noted that, with "one faction" (SAF) in 
control of the town, this amounts to an open invitation for "other 
factions" to return to fight them.  It would be best if UNMIS were 
allowed to take control as a neutral force, he concluded. 
 
Tour of the town: Armed men wander the charred ruins 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶5.  (U) The AEC delegation was then given a drive-through tour of 
the town escorted by armored UNMIS vehicles.  It was clear that 
nearly all of the population had fled.  The tour crossed paths with 
several SAF foot patrols.  Very few women and no children were seen, 
and no civilians at all were observed by the Williamson delegation 
on May 30th.  The dirt streets were littered with large heaps of 
looted belongings, mostly beds and chairs, from the traditional 
round straw-roofed residences.  All high value items had already 
been carried away.  No vehicles undamaged by the fighting were 
observed left in the town, for instance.  (Comment: Since the SAF 
was clearly in control of the town, the looting had been carried out 
with at least their consent, if not outright participation.)  Many, 
if not most, of the homes had been burned down.  The entire market 
area in particular was destroyed and lay in ruins.  Walking the 
streets were civilian men, many armed with firearms or the 
occasional spear or ancient sword, or even just a stick.  No 
civilians were observed in the town at all on May 30th. 
 
Agok town is now a refugee camp 
------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (U) Following a one-hour helicopter flight, the delegation saw 
firsthand many of the IDP victims of the Abyei fighting at Agok 
 
KHARTOUM 00000822  002 OF 003 
 
 
town, where many of the Dinka community had fled.  (Dinkas tended to 
flee south, with the considerably smaller Messeriya IDPs fleeing 
north.)  Hundreds of refugees milled around the dirt landing strip. 
Representatives of the NGO humanitarian relief agencies - some of 
whom had fled Abyei themselves - briefed the delegation.  For the 
time being, the agencies are providing adequate services to the 
refugees - each family receives a plastic sheet for shelter, two 
mosquito nets, and a ration of food.  The agencies are drawing on 
provisions they had pre-positioned in the area to the south in 
anticipation of a repeat of last year's serious flooding. 
 
¶7.  (U) The relief workers told how they are working hard to locate 
about 100 children reported missing by their parents after their 
arrival in Agok.  Also, about 50 children had arrived unaccompanied. 
 A further 50 children have now been reunited with their families. 
About one-third of the IDPs in Agok are children aged five or 
under. 
 
¶8.  (U) The NGO representatives expressed two immediate needs: 
First, the need to create a humanitarian no-fly zone over the IDP 
camps to end harassment by circling flights of Antonovs of the 
Sudanese Air Force.  These flights often scatter frightened refugees 
back into the bush, making them much harder to assist.  Second, the 
GoNU must begin allowing relief agencies to move relief supplies in 
by road from the north.  The area's main road links are to the 
north, and the SAF prevents the relief agencies from using that 
route.  Currently, the agencies have few supplies they can move in 
from the south, a much more difficult and expensive route.  The 
relief representatives stressed that the rainy season had already 
begun in the area, gradually putting more isolated groups of 
refugees beyond reach of assistance.  Another need is for the two 
area airstrips to be upgraded so they will be usable during the 
rainy season. 
 
SPLM, Dinka leaders make plea for protection 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) At a separate site in Agok, the AEC delegation met with 
representatives of the SPLM, SPLA, and other leaders of the Dinka 
community.  The chief spokesman was Kwal Deng, the brother of SPLM 
leader Luka Biong Deng.  Deng spoke eloquently and passionately, 
saying Dinkas and the SPLA/M (he was apparently speaking for both) 
had long worked with the Messeriya community to promote peaceful 
co-existence.  What had happened in Abyei, he charged, was 
deliberately planned by the SAF.  The NCP had long declared its 
intention of "cleansing" the Abyei area, he said, to leave the 
Messeriya in control.  Deng and other community leaders spoke 
bitterly of the failure of UNMIS forces to protect the population. 
The SPLM handed out a position paper urging members of the 
international community to demand the immediate withdrawal of SAF 
from Abyei, to intervene in Abyei under the UN charter, and for the 
GoNU to fully and immediately implement the Abyei protocol and the 
ABC border North-South demarcation as stipulated in the 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). 
 
Messeriya Leaders:  We were not involved 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (U) Following another one hour helicopter flight to the town of 
Muglad north of Abyei, the AEC delegation next met with leaders of 
the Misseriya community. In contrast to Agok, there was no visible 
evidence of a refugee community.  Messeriya leaders claimed that 
local families had provided accommodations for the relatively 
smaller number of refugees who had headed north. 
 
¶11.  (U) Messeriya leaders stressed their peaceful intentions, 
referring to the Dinka refugees as their brothers who were in dire 
need of assistance.  Everyone who spoke insisted that Messeriya had 
taken no part in any of the violence and looting that had taken 
place.  After the meeting had formally broken up and the delegation 
was heading back to the airstrip, French Ambassador Christine 
Robichon scolded the Messeriyap ;Q(Q to 
participate in the fighting and the looting. 
 
¶12.  (U) Significantly, Messeriya leaders had no clear answer when 
they were asked, repeatedly, what actions needed to take place 
before the IDPs could return to a peaceful Abyei.  The closest one 
came was to say that there were two possible solutions - one 
political, between "the two sides," the other "social".   Another 
said "we ask only that you support us so that things can return to 
normal."  The meeting concluded with one headman's assertion that "I 
am sure we will reach a solution.  No Messeriya took part in that 
situation." 
 
¶13.  (SBU) COMMENT:  Abyei was a powder keg waiting to explode given 
the close proximity of SAF and SPLA forces and the lack of a true 
buffer zone or civil administration in the region to regulate police 
and other civic functions.  The recent attempt by the GOSS to 
 
KHARTOUM 00000822  003 OF 003 
 
 
establish a Southern Governor for Abyei, and the NCP attempt to 
establish a counter administration through Messeriya proxy forces, 
only made the situation more tense.  Although the spark that set off 
the explosion of violence did not appear to have been planned, and 
both sides can share in the blame, the result has allowed the NCP to 
sweep the town completely clear of its formerly large Southern 
population. 
 
¶14. (SBU) Comment Continued: The AEC delegates were struck by the 
destruction in Abyei, and the resulting human misery that the NGO 
community is struggling to address.  The delegation did not attempt 
to pin down responsibility for what had taken place.  Instead, they 
asked what needed to be done to stabilize the situation and allow 
refugees to return to their homes in a peaceful situation.  Dinka, 
SPLM and UNMIS sources agreed that UNMIS forces should take over 
security in Abyei town to remove the immediate cause for additional 
violence.  The SPLM (which is to say, the Dinka community 
leadership) is adamant that the ABC report should be implemented 
immediately as part of a longer-term solution, as called for in the 
CPA.  As for improving the lot of the IDPs, the NCP seems to hold 
all the cards: Only they can concede a no-fly humanitarian zone over 
the refugee camps, and only they can allow the NGOs to move in 
supplies from the north.  During the May 28 meetings, NCP 
representatives had very little to say.  Embassy has heard that the 
NCP now wants to augment the visit with additional meetings in 
Khartoum.  Embassy will continue to press the case that Abyei 
remains a very volatile situation that needs urgent action, by both 
parties, to defuse.  Providing adequate security in the town so that 
IDPs can safely return, either through a new UNMIS mandate or 
through the installation of new Joint Integrated Units (JIUs) of 
combined northern and southern troops, or both, is a paramount 
requirement. 
 
 
POWERS