VZCZCXRO8257
PP RUEHGI RUEHMA RUEHROV
DE RUEHKH #0821/01 1531333
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 011333Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY KHARTOUM
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0941
INFO RUCNFUR/DARFUR COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CJTF HOA

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 KHARTOUM 000821 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR AF/SPG, S/CRS, SE WILLIAMSON 
DEPT PLS PASS USAID FOR AFR/SUDAN 
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PREF PHUM EAID KPKO SOCI UNSC SU
 
SUBJECT: DARFUR PLANNED COMPENSATION SCHEME FAULTY 
 
REF: A.) KHARTOUM 816, B.) KHARTOUM 817 
 
¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY.  Compensation is the number one issue raised by 
virtually every segment of society in Darfur.  To implement 
components of the Agreement dealing with reparations and 
compensation, the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) established the 
Darfur Compensation Commission (DCC).  Although it was established 
in August 2007, Khartoum has not released funding for the Commission 
and it is not yet accepting claims.  If the process is not 
implemented in a fair and transparent manner, the issue threatens to 
deepen the Darfur conflict and possibly even derail future political 
progress.  The DCC's complicated process for adjudicating claims, 
coupled with its obvious political agenda, make it unlikely that it 
will contribute to reconciliation absent both reform and technical 
assistance.  See recommendation - para. 8.  END SUMMARY. 
 
------------------------------ 
The Mechanics of Compensation 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (SBU) Although not yet fully functional, the DCC has been 
operational since August 2007.  Since then, the Commission's 180 
employees have undertaken preparations to start compensation 
activities, such as developing the claim form to be distributed to 
victims who are entitled to make a compensation claim.  Individuals 
will be limited to one claim per person, and must detail all losses 
in that one claim.  DCC teams will investigate and verify claims, 
talking to tribal leaders to confirm assertions, and taking sworn 
testimony from claimants and other witnesses.  The types of losses 
that will be covered by the Commission include loss of life, 
property, and livestock.  The Commission's Executive Director claims 
to have "consulted other countries' methods" in developing their own 
plan, and thinks that "the DDC has covered 90% of the possible 
cases." 
 
¶3. (SBU) Claims will be evaluated on a case by case basis, using 
tribal administration principles and records, and awards will vary 
accordingly.  "The price of a horse is different throughout Darfur," 
the Director explained, "and there are many different types."  Due 
to organizational weaknesses, including overstaffing, a claim filed 
with the Compensation Commission will be "investigated" or 
"evaluated" by at least three departments before a determination is 
made.  The DCC will only consider claims from civilians - generally 
IDPs and refugees.  The Darfur Security Arrangements Implementation 
Commission, which has not yet begun operations, will deal with 
issues affecting the military and armed movements, but will also 
have the ability to recommend individual cases to the Compensation 
Commission for consideration. 
 
----------------------------- 
The Politics of Compensation 
----------------------------- 
 
¶4. (SBU) The DCC, like most organs of the Transitional Darfur 
Regional Authority (TDRA), is led by Sudanese Liberation Army/Minni 
Minawi (SLA/MM) relatives and close associates.  The DCC Director is 
clearly eager to begin handing out compensation awards, and wants to 
begin working as soon as funds are received from Khartoum.  When 
asked whether that was wise, or even feasible, considering that 
there was no real ceasefire in place and losses were sure to 
continue, the Director noted predictably, given his SLA/MM 
affiliation, that "we are going to start in SLA-MM areas and other 
places that are secure, like IDP camps."  When there is better 
x5Q5QQQe commission could expand 
its work.  (Note: SLA/MM areas, particularly in North Darfur, are 
arg5!zi(SBU) Senior DCC leadership complain bitterly that Khartoum has 
not released the promised funding for them to start compensation 
activities, but considering their obvious political agenda, the 
delay may actually be an opportunity.  Compensation is the number 
one issue raised by virtually every segment of society. 
Fortunately, conflicts between tribes and groups in Darfur don't 
appear to run deep, and most Darfuris agree that if compensation is 
done properly as part of a political solution (i.e., a ceasefire and 
political agreement that hold), reconciliation is possible. 
¶6. (SBU) Unfortunately, it does not appear that the DCC is on the 
right path, neither in terms of its approach nor in terms of its 
agenda.  Establishing time consuming case by case investigations and 
multiple layers of bureaucracy in the claims process decreases 
transparency and increases the possibility for arbitrary or 
politically motivated compensation awards.  In addition, the 
 
KHARTOUM 00000821  002 OF 002 
 
 
Commission's desire to take care of its own first (i.e. SLA/MM), and 
then worry about leftovers for other groups later, risks undermining 
the commission's credibility and alienating large sectors of the 
public.  There is also a very real possibility that the commission 
will run out of funds before compensation has been completed, 
leaving SLA/MM to benefit at the expense of other Darfuris.  If the 
commission continues with this plan of action, it actually stands to 
deepen the conflict and possibly even derail the political process. 
 
-------------------------- 
Comment and Recommendation 
-------------------------- 
¶7. (SBU) COMMENT:  Although the UN has extensive experience in 
transitional justice and rule of law issues, and the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights just released a comprehensive 
report on reparations, UNAMID has neither the technical skills on 
the ground, nor the personnel to focus on this issue.  The DCC has 
said that it wants to meet with local and international NGOs, and if 
properly packaged, for example in the cloak of "capacity building," 
is open to partnerships. 
¶8.  (SBU) RECOMMENDATION:  Post recommends that, as part of the 
broader dialogue on TDRA reform, the issue of compensation 
specifically be raised as the highest priority in an appropriate 
donor forum (ref B).  In addition, we should push the TDRA and 
UNAMID to consult transitional justice experts, like the 
International Center for Transitional Justice, to ensure that any 
compensation scheme meets minimal fairness and transparency 
standards before the commencement of any compensation activities. 
POWERS