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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 HONG KONG 001108 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/CM 
NSC FOR DENNIS WILDER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/17/2033 
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PINR CH HK MC
SUBJECT: COORDINATION KEY TO HONG KONG LEGCO ELECTION IN 
SEPTEMBER 
 
REF: A. 07 HONG KONG 003103 
 
     ¶B. HONG KONG 000573 
     ¶C. 07 HONG KONG 002949 
 
Classified By: E/P Section Chief Laurent Charbonnet; Reasons 1.4 (b, d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  On September 7, Hong Kong will hold its 
fourth legislative election since the 1997 handover.  The 
various pan-democratic parties will need to coordinate 
candidate selections and election strategies to maintain 
their current number of seats (26 of 60) in the Legislative 
Council (Legco).  Election engineering and tactics will be 
particularly vital in the highly competitive geographic 
constituencies.  The pro-democracy Civic Party (CP), which 
may supplant the Democratic Party (DP) as the largest 
pro-democracy group in Legco, will be a prime target of 
criticism from the pro-establishment side.  One contact 
criticized Chief Executive (CE) Donald Tsang for his recent 
controversial political appointments in advance of the Legco 
election, describing Tsang's timing as "horrible," and the 
move as a failed attempt at "Chinese-style politics" and 
cronyism that has created a serious vulnerability for the 
pro-establishment side in the Legco race.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) Comment:  The outcome of the September election will 
strongly affect Hong Kong's path and pace toward eventual 
universal suffrage, as any potential amendments to the Basic 
Law )- necessary for reform of the Chief Executive (CE) and 
Legco electoral procedures )- must be vetted and passed by a 
two-thirds majority of Legco members.  If the pan-democrats 
are unable to maintain their blocking power in Legco, then 
the CE and his political allies can push through the 
requisite Basic Law amendments during the next four years. 
To maximize their prospects, it will be vital for the 
pan-democrats to canvass and analyze each constituency and 
construct ballots accordingly to minimize fratricide in an 
election where each seat is critical to the camp's future. 
If the pan-democrats are successful this September, then the 
Hong Kong Government (HKG) likely will offer only limited 
reform proposals covering the 2012 CE and Legco elections, 
and defer any consideration of out-year reform until the next 
(2012-16) Legco.  (Note: The PRC National People,s Congress 
Standing Committee (NPCSC) has authorized universal suffrage 
for the Hong Kong CE election in 2017, and for the Legco in 
2020 or later (ref A).  End note.)  For this election, 
however, the pan-democrats appear to face an uphill battle, 
as the Hong Kong economy is strong, the CE enjoys generally 
high ratings, and last month's Sichuan earthquake and the 
upcoming Beijing Olympic Games (just weeks before the 
election) have generated a wave of patriotism in Hong Kong. 
In the pan-democrats' favor, CE Tsang's badly managed 
political appointee controversy continues to resonate and 
seems likely to become an election issue.  End Comment. 
 
Arcane Electoral System 
----------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) On September 7, Hong Kong will hold elections for 
the Legco that will serve until 2012.  Legco is comprised of 
sixty members, thirty from geographical constituencies (GCs), 
or districts, and thirty from functional constituencies 
(FCs), which for the most part represent professions.  The 
nomination period for candidates in the election runs from 
July 19 to August 1.  Over the past few months, the Hong Kong 
media have conveyed a slow trickle of rumor, gossip and 
speculation about who will run for which seat, and which 
candidates will lead each ticket.  Under Hong Kong's arcane 
"List Voting System," each party must carefully construct its 
candidate lists for the GCs.  This system, which is not 
widely understood among Hong Kong voters, favors party 
tickets that are limited to only the strongest candidates, 
though parties can also be rewarded for long list tickets 
under the "largest remainder formula" used in the election. 
(For more detail on the mechanics and need to formulate 
tickets by party, vote counting, and related electoral 
processes, see http://www.eac.gov.hk/en/legco/lc guide.htm.) 
 
Pan-Democrats: Prospects Uncertain 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Most Hong Kong politicians and political observers 
agree that the pan-democrats need to retain their strong 
one-third blocking minority in Legco, which in practical 
terms means at least 20, but preferably 22-23, seats in the 
60-member legislature.  There is wide disagreement, however, 
on whether they will be able to do so.  Under Hong Kong's 
complicated electoral system, the outcomes are difficult to 
predict.  Election engineering and vote matching -- the 
 
HONG KONG 00001108  002 OF 003 
 
 
practice of maximizing the chance of success for candidates 
by coupling them on ballots based on complementary voting 
pools -- will be especially key in the six highly competitive 
geographic constituencies, which will elect a total of 30 
Legco members.  For example, in the New Territories East 
district there likely will be four incumbent and four 
non-incumbent pan-democrats, pitted against three incumbent 
and two non-incumbent pro-establishment candidates; that is, 
13 candidates will contest seven seats. 
 
¶5. (C) Professor Ma Ngok recently told us that the 
pan-democrats, who lack funding and a coordinating body with 
reach across the camp, are particularly disadvantaged in 
election engineering this type of complex race.  When he 
studied the strategy and mechanics of the pro-democracy 
parties in the 2004 election, Ma said he was disappointed to 
find that the pan-democrats had not applied the lessons 
learned in the 2001 elections, which he feared would happen 
again this year.  Former legislator and current Civic 
Exchange CEO Christine Loh agreed, and said that when she 
studied the results of the 2004 election she found there was 
"a total lack of coordination" among pro-democracy parties. 
Professor Michael DeGolyer (strictly protect) of The Baptist 
University of Hong Kong said, however, that the uppermost 
leadership of the Democratic and Civic parties -- the two 
largest parties in the camp -- often rely on their close 
personal and professional relations to coordinate informally 
on strategic and tactical political decisions.  He noted that 
Martin Lee, Albert Ho, Ronny Tong, Emily Lau, Audrey Eu, Alan 
Leong, Margaret Ng, all of whom are lawyers, share 
professional history either through their education, legal 
cases, or membership in local associations, and rely on these 
associations to inform their political decisions. 
 
Pro-Establishment Parties Coordinated 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) Professor Ma believes that the Central Government 
Liaison Office (CGLO) in Hong Kong serves as a coordinating 
body for pro-establishment parties.  The CGLO can use a 
"carrot and stick" approach, backed by enormous resources and 
sway over business deals, political appointments and other 
favors on the mainland, he said.  Christine Loh echoed Ma's 
view, saying that the CGLO wielded "significant political 
reach and influence" in Hong Kong.  Loh estimated that 400 
members of the Communist Party in Hong Kong "led by the CGLO" 
have, with increasing effectiveness in past elections, lured 
patriotic voters to register, conducted research and analysis 
as well as exit polls, and mobilized voters on election days 
to ensure success at the polls.  Loh mentioned her interest 
in the subject as she is in the final stages of preparing a 
manuscript detailing the modern record of Chinese Communist 
Party influence in Hong Kong. 
 
¶7. (C) Ma and Loh both predicted that the CGLO this year 
would target the Civic Party, which Ma predicted would 
surpass the Democratic Party's vote share in some districts. 
He also argued that the pro-establishment side increasingly 
viewed the Civic Party's "clean image" as a challenge, 
especially following its successful bid to field a candidate 
(Alan Leong) to challenge incumbent Donald Tsang in the March 
2007 Chief Executive race.  Ma went on to say that Martin 
Lee's decision to leave the DP (ref B), the party's losses in 
the District Council elections in November 2007, and waning 
support for "radical democrats" such as the League of Social 
Democrats, might prompt voters to shift allegiance to the 
more moderate CP.  The pan-democrats will have to carefully 
factor this and other shifts in the electorate, and monitor 
voter interests throughout the nomination and campaign 
period, to construct their ballots accordingly.  Regardless, 
he surmised that these factors could easily make the CP the 
pro-democracy camp's "flagship party" following the September 
election. 
 
Races to Watch 
-------------- 
 
¶8. (SBU) The most hotly contested geographic constituency 
seats include the six seats in the Hong Kong Island district, 
and the seven and eight seats in New Territories East and New 
Territories West, respectively.  On Hong Kong Island, the key 
variable for the pan-democrats is whether independent 
pro-democracy legislator Anson Chan, who won her seat in a 
December 2007 by-election (ref C), decides to run for 
re-election.  Chan thus far repeatedly has declined to 
disclose her intentions.  Chan's eventual decision will 
impact strongly the candidacies, strategies, and prospects 
for success of DP candidate Kam Nai-wai, independent Cyd Ho, 
 
HONG KONG 00001108  003 OF 003 
 
 
the the CP's newcomer Tanya Chan, as well as independent Lo 
Wing-lok.  Pro-establishment candidates seeking election on 
Hong Kong Island, include Choy So-yuk, Jasper Tsang, and 
Horace Cheung of the DAB, as well as independent Regina Ip. 
 
¶9. (SBU) In the New Territories, vote matching will again be 
a key determinant of each candidate's success.  Strong 
incumbents such as pro-democracy Emily Lau (The Frontier) and 
Ronny Tong (CP), and pro-establishment Liberal Party chairman 
James Tien and DAB vice-chairman Lau Kwong Wah, will need to 
engineer solid campaigns to hold or gain seats, as there is a 
long list of competitive non-incumbents on both sides.  The 
same situation prevails in the New Territories West, where 
even Fernando Cheung (CP), a strong incumbent FC legislator 
attempting to move to a GC seat, will face keen competition 
from three other pan-democratic non-incumbents attempting to 
ride the coattails of Albert Ho (DP), Lee Wing-tat (DP) and 
Lee Cheuk-yan (CTU). 
 
¶10. (C) In the functional constituencies (FCs), including 
nine that are determined by individual votes in professional 
sectors such as accounting, legal, and education, and 21 that 
are selected by corporate votes, several are shaping up as 
battles for the pan-democrats, who won seven of the nine 
individual vote seats in 2004.  For example, in the Medical 
FC, independent democratic incumbent Kwok Ka-ki may be 
vulnerable because of public concerns over healthcare reform 
options currently under debate, according to Professor Ma. 
In 2004, Kwok benefited from the "July 1 effect," which 
refers to the massive July 1, 2003 protests over proposed 
national security legislation that propelled many 
pan-democratic candidates into office in the 2003 District 
Council and 2004 Legco elections.  Kwok reportedly will face 
two opponents in this year's race, Louis Shih and Ho 
Pak-leung, both of whom are independent but influential 
members in the medical community here.  Ma also said that 
incumbent CP legislator Mandy Tam (Accountancy FC) might lose 
her race to either Paul Chan or Ronald Kung Yiu-fai (both 
independents).  Similarly, deputy DAB spokesperson and 
solicitor Christopher Wong Kwok-yan reportedly plans to 
challenge the CP's Margaret Ng, the Legal FC incumbent who 
has held the seat since 1995 (except in 1997-98 when Hong 
Kong's provisional legislature was in operation). 
 
Political Appointee System Disappoints 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) Over the past few weeks, the HKG's announcement of 
two new layers of political appointees in various ministries 
has ballooned into a public and political controversy that 
threatens to persist into the September election campaign 
(septel).  Professor DeGolyer said, "off the record," that he 
recently exchanged views with Chief Executive Tsang via 
email, expressing his concerns over the CE's 
"miscalculation."  DeGolyer opined that Tsang's timing was 
"horrible" and had created a serious vulnerability for 
pro-establishment candidates.  He said the crux of the 
dispute was whether the appointees are being "groomed" or 
"recognized," and that the pan-democrats will attempt to 
convince voters that the appointments constitute heavy-handed 
political jockeying by CE Tsang.  He said Beijing initially 
probably viewed the appointees as a positive "stop-gap 
measure" that could help manage the political landscape in 
Hong Kong during the transition to universal suffrage, but 
Tsang's message of grooming has been overtaken by one of 
"Chinese-style politics" and cronyism -- with its long 
history of rule by politically neutral civil servants -- for 
which Hong Kong has no taste. 
Cunningham