VZCZCXRO8267
PP RUEHAG RUEHROV
DE RUEHDM #0388/01 1531502
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 011502Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5035
INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE
RUCNMEM/EU MEMBER STATES COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 5579
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0105
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RHMFISS/HQ USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0415

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 DAMASCUS 000388 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/FO, NEA/ELA 
NSC FOR ABRAMS/SINGH, GAVITO 
LONDON FOR TSOU, PARIS FOR JORDAN 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/31/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL SY LE
SUBJECT: SYRIA STAYS LIMBER TRYING TO BALANCE ISRAEL, IRAN, 
AND LEBANON 
 
REF: A. DAMASCUS 381 
     ¶B. DAMASCUS 348 
     ¶C. DAMASCUS 341 
 
Classified By: CDA Michael Corbin, American Embassy Damascus, Reasons 1 
.4 b and d. 
 
¶1. (C)  Summary:  President Asad departed June 1 on a 
three-day official trip to UAE and Kuwait more confident 
about his internal standing and upbeat after a productive 
round of negotiations with the Israelis in Istanbul that may 
have included lower-level, face-to-face meetings.  Asad also 
received an unexpected May 29 phone call from French 
President Sarkozy, who reportedly acknowledged Syria's 
positive role in reaching the Doha accord and reiterated a 
long-standing invitation to attend the July 13 heads of state 
meeting of the Mediterranean Political Union in Paris.  Still 
searching for a formula to defrost relations with Saudi 
Arabia and generate an opening with the U.S., Bashar 
consulted with Qatari Emir Sheik Hamad bin-Halifa al-Thani 
over the weekend, made noises about visiting Beirut and 
establishing diplomatic relations with Lebanon, and endorsed 
the idea of starting a Israeli-Lebanese peace discussion.  To 
calm Iranian anxieties since the May 21 announcement of a 
Golan track,  Damascus publicly rejected  suggestions that 
Syria would diminish its ties with Iran, inked a new 
Syrian-Iranian memorandum of defense cooperation, and allowed 
Hamas leader Khaled Meshal to visit Iranian FM Mottaki (in 
Iran.)  While Bashar has no intention of breaking relations 
with Tehran, many here argue that a Syria-Israeli peace deal 
would fundamentally change this relationship.  They also 
depict a Syrian regime that is becoming disenchanted by 
Iran's efforts to discredit the Turkish-brokered talks on the 
Golan.  These upbeat comments often (and conveniently) 
overlook the regime's strategic interest in maintaining 
security ties to Iran and Hizballah.  End Summary. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
Bashar's Confidence Growing, Goes on the Road 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C)  Asad departed Damascus June 1 for an overnight stop 
in the UAE and then onto Kuwait.  The public agenda for both 
visits is to follow up the Arab League Summit.  Privately, 
according to press contacts, Bashar will be urging the 
Kuwaitis and Emirates to use their influence with fellow GCC 
member Saudi Arabia to find a way to ease bilateral tensions 
between Riyadh and Damascus.  Both stops are expected to play 
up Syria's role in helping to broker a deal in Doha that 
brought at least a temporary pause to Lebanon's political 
crisis.  Preceding his departure, Bashar addressed the 
Council of Ministers May 29 (on the occasion of the official 
opening of the new Prime Ministry building) and highlighted 
the need to continue with domestic and economic reforms. 
Embassy business contacts told us Bashar's order that 
ministers submit a financial disclosure statement represented 
a move against government corruption. 
 
¶3.  (C)  Bashar's trip also comes on the heels of a recent 
round of preliminary and indirect discussions with Israel, 
conducted in Istanbul, and a May 21 deal on Lebanon's 
political crisis in Doha.  According to MFA Advisor Samir 
al-Taki, he (but not Riad Daoudi, the head of the Syrian 
delegation) had face-to-face meetings with Israeli officials. 
 Though Israel, Syria, and Turkey have agreed not to announce 
this fact, they nonetheless have all reported rapid progress 
in agreeing to core principles and main agenda items for 
future discussions.  Details on more controversial subjects 
(such as establishing a Golan "peace park," allowing access 
to Israelis and Syrians) will give negotiators plenty of 
substantive issues on which to focus. 
 
¶4.  (C)  According to several contacts, the SARG is closely 
watching the ongoing investigation of PM Olmert's alleged 
receipt of illicit funding.  Al-Taqi suggested that most 
Syrian officials do not believe the Golan discussions will 
end if PM Olmert steps down.  Both FM Livni and MOD Barak 
would be likely to pursue peace discussions with Syria, 
 
DAMASCUS 00000388  002 OF 004 
 
 
al-Taqi predicted.  Even if Likud were to take over the 
government, there would be a large incentive for Israel to 
pursue the talks, he said.  The SARG remained confident but 
not overly so that talks would continue, commented Al Hayat 
Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi.  At the very least, the Turkish 
government would likely press this subject with whatever new 
government took office.  This created the sense that Syria's 
opening to Israel would continue to have positive effects for 
Damascus in the coming months, he said. 
 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
Consultations With the Qataris, A Call From Sarkozy 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶5.  (C)  Adding to Bashar's sense of growing strength is the 
continuing close cooperation he enjoys with Qataris.  Emir 
Sheikh Hamad bin-Khalifa visited Damascus in mid-May to 
consult Bashar on the crisis in Lebanon.  Early last week, 
Qatari PM/FM Hamad bin-Jasim (HBJ) (along with Arab League 
Secretary General Amre Moussa) visited Damascus May 25 to 
recognize Syria's contributions to reaching a deal in Doha 
and to coordinate on follow-up steps in Lebanon.  HBJ also 
pledged to use Qatar's improving relationship with Saudi 
Arabia to find ways of improving Saudi-Syrian relations. 
¶6.  (C) A May 29 phone call from French President Sarkozy to 
Bashar signaled Paris' interest in engaging, according to 
Embassy contacts.  French Embassy sources here told us that 
Sarkozy formally invited Bashar to attend the July 13 heads 
of state meeting of the Mediterranean Political Union in 
Paris and "acknowledged Syria's positive role" in brokering 
the Doha accord.  (Note:  The Syrian press portrayed 
Sarkozy's remarks regarding Syria's contribution to the Doha 
accord in a far more flattering light.)  French Embassy 
sources disavowed press reports that Sarkozy had expressed 
interest in visiting Syria, perhaps on the heels of an 
upcoming June 7 trip to Beirut. 
 
¶7.  (C) On May 30, Sheikh Hamad returned to Damascus for a 
visit organized at the last minute, according to al-Taqi. 
Sheikh Hamad's central message was that Syria needed to 
demonstrate an active commitment to pursuing diplomatic 
relations with Lebanon.  Sheikh Hamad also reported on 
Qatar's lack of progress in brokering an opening with the 
Saudis.  According to al-Taqi, Sheikh Hamad argued that 
continued progress in Lebanon would reduce strained 
Saudi-Syrian relations.  After meetings with the Qatari Emir, 
Bashar gave an unscheduled TV appearance in which he 
announced that a Lebanese-Israeli peace track would be a 
welcome addition to ongoing peace discussions on the Golan 
and Palestine tracks.  Having assured the Qatari leader of 
Syria's willingness to establish diplomatic relations, Bashar 
and other SARG officials also hinted in off-the-record 
remarks that Bashar would be willing to travel to Beirut 
and/or receive Lebanese President Sleiman in Damascus, 
according to al-Taqi and press contacts. 
 
 
------------------------------------ 
Bending Backwards to Reassure Tehran 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8.  (C)  Against the backdrop of positive news generated by 
the May 21 announcement of Turkish-brokered Syrian-Israeli 
talks on the Golan and the Lebanon agreement in Doha, 
Damascus has sought to calm Iranian worries about the future 
of their relations. Most of these contacts and statements 
were done without much planning and came in response to a 
flurry of Iranian requests for signs of support. 
 
-- On May 23, Syrian Speaker of Parliament Mahmoud Abrash 
received Iranian parliamentarians in Damascus and issued a 
statement expressing appreciation for "Iranian support to 
Syria's firm national and nationalist stances, including the 
restoration of the Golan and the occupied Arab territories." 
 
-- On May 24, Hamas Politburo leader Khaled Meshal flew to 
Tehran for a highly publicized May 25 meeting with Iranian FM 
Mottaki and said in a joint press conference afterward "there 
 
DAMASCUS 00000388  003 OF 004 
 
 
is great skepticism concerning Israel's seriousness to return 
the Golan.  It's maneuvering and playing all the tracks, this 
is a well known game and besides, Olmert's weakness will not 
allow him to take this step." 
 
-- At the same press conference, Mottaki stated "The Zionist 
regime must withdraw from the Golan, and we support Syrian 
efforts to repossess the Heights." 
 
-- On May 25, Syrian Minister of Defense Hasan al-Turkmani 
arrived in Tehran for discussions with his counterpart and 
President Ahmedinejad on defense cooperation.  On May 26, 
Iranian Minister of Defense Mustafa Mohamad Najjar praised 
Iranian-Syrian relations and said their "ties are strategic 
ties founded on the national interests of the two countries 
and the world of Islam.  Turkmani said at the same press 
conference that their ties "neutralize and weaken threats 
against the line of resistance." 
 
-- President Ahmadinejad, after his May 26 meeting with MOD 
Turkmani, congratulated Syria for its role in ending 
Lebanon's political crisis and said "I am sure that the 
Syrian leadership will cleverly handle the situation and will 
not leave the front line until the complete elimination of 
the Zionist regime's threat." 
 
-- On May 27, in a meeting with a group of British MPs in 
Damascus, President Asad reaffirmed Syria's desire for peace 
with Israel.  At the same time, he reportedly said Syria had 
normal relations with Iran and that any suggestion to drop 
them "was not a reasonable request." 
 
-- The same day, Iranian and Syrian Ministers of Defense 
initialed a new memorandum on defense cooperation which 
emphasized the territorial integrity of the two countries, 
boosted technical cooperation, called for more exchanges of 
military delegations, and stressed the need for stronger 
Syrian-Iranian cooperation "at a time when the occupation and 
foreign forces are the main cause of instability in Iraq, 
Palestine, Afghanistan, and the Gulf Waters."  Hizballah's 
al-Manar dedicated significant coverage to the event. 
Regarding Syrian talks with Israel, Syrian MOD Turkmani said 
Israeli FM Livni "can say whatever she wants.  However, we do 
what we deem appropriate for us and what achieves our 
interests in accordance with our own strategy." 
 
 
----------------------------------------- 
But Bashar Fed Up with "Iran's Neediness" 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶9.  (C)  Behind the scenes, Embassy contacts portray a hectic 
scene of back-and-forth demands by frantic Iranian 
interlocutors seemingly desperate to counter public 
suggestions that Syria's indirect talks with Israel would 
come at the expense of Iranian-Syrian relations.  According 
to al-Hayat Bureau Chief Ibrahim Hamidi, Syrian FM Muallim 
began fielding phone calls from FM Mottaki and other Iranian 
officials immediately following the May 21 announcement of 
discussion on the Golan.  "The Iranians were in full panic 
mode.  They wanted Bashar to come, Muallim to come, Meshal to 
come, anyone who might be available," claimed Hamidi. 
Muallim arranged to see Mottaki in Beirut at the May 25 
swearing-in of new Lebanese President Sleiman.  In the 
meantime, the SARG assented to Hamas leader Meshal's travel 
to Tehran for a public meeting with Mottaki.  The Syrian MOD 
was directed to travel to Tehran over the weekend. 
 
¶10.  (C)  MFA Advisor Samir al-Taqi, who had gone to Tehran 
May 23 as well, told us Iranians with whom he had met were 
"crazed" by the idea of a peace deal between Syria and Israel 
and demanded guarantees that the deal would not harm Syria's 
support of Hizballah.  Al-Taqi assessed Ahmedinejad's 
internal political position as weakening, which added to 
Tehran's sense of panic.  Al-Taqi suggested that his meetings 
with Iranian parliamentarians revealed a deep sense of 
discontent with the Iranian regime and belief that Iran 
should seek more accommodation with the West on the issue of 
its nuclear program.  He described Iranian contacts as 
 
DAMASCUS 00000388  004 OF 004 
 
 
"depressed" by the Doha agreement, primarily because the 
prevailing view from Tehran focused on unified Arab action to 
contain Hizballah's military threat and to force the Lebanese 
opposition to reach an agreement that would constrain the 
resistance movement. 
 
¶11.  (C) Both al-Taqi and Hamidi agreed that the SARG had 
sought to reassure the Iranian regime that bilateral 
relations would continue.  Al-Taqi stipulated, however, FM 
Muallem had demanded and received assurances from Mottaki 
that Iranian officials would refrain from condemning Syria's 
indirect talks with Israel.  Moreover, al-Taqi added, Bashar 
and other SARG officials were becoming increasingly fed up 
the high level of "Iran's neediness." 
 
¶12.  (C)  Comment:  While basking in the positive reactions 
generated by the May 21 Doha agreement, public acknowledgment 
by Syria, Israel, and Turkey of a Golan track, and the 
election of a Lebanese President and appointment of a PM, the 
SARG remains seized with the unrealized goal of improving 
relations with the Saudis and lessening its international 
isolation.  Since the Arab League Summit, Bashar has avoided 
confrontational rhetoric and has sought to appear more 
moderate, and he will use his foreign trips, including to the 
UAE, Kuwait, and India, to demonstrate that he is able to 
travel beyond Iran and Turkey.  Al-Taqi's extremely 
optimistic portrayal of strains in Iranian-Syrian relations 
completely avoids the important SARG security interests that 
gird Syria's relations with Iran and Hizballah. 
CORBIN