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PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHKUK RUEHROV
DE RUEHEG #1113/01 1541035
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 021035Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY CAIRO
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 9414
INFO RUEHEE/ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 CAIRO 001113 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ LE IS EG
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL WITH AMRE MOUSSA 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Margaret Scobey 
Reasons: 1.4 (B) and (D) 
 
¶1. (C)  The Ambassador and Arab League Secretary General Amre 
Moussa discussed Iraq, Lebanon, the Israeli-Palestinian 
situation, and the USG's regional democracy strategy in her 
May 31 introductory call.  Moussa said that the Arab League 
continues to see "eye to eye" with the USG on the need for a 
prosperous and stable Iraq.  He expects the "Doha agreement" 
will allow for calm in Lebanon at least through the summer. 
He expressed pessimism on the Israeli-Palestinian front, 
citing continuing Israeli settlement growth as the primary 
obstacle.  He said that the Arab League intended to issue a 
report later this year assessing post-Annapolis progress; if 
the appraisal was poor, the League might consider "other 
options."  Moussa said that "democracy should not be a dirty 
word," and asked about the state of the USG's democracy 
dialogue in the region.  The Ambassador said that our push 
for democracy was driven by intrinsic American values and, as 
such, would undoubtedly continue.  End summary. 
 
IRAQ 
---- 
 
¶2. (C)  Moussa, who had returned the previous day from 
International Iraq Compact conference in Stockholm, told the 
Ambassador that "we are all on the same side" with respect to 
Iraq.  Everyone will "pay the price" if Iraq comes to be 
dominated by a single group (i.e. Sunnis, Shiaa or Kurds). 
He was keenly aware that Iran has its own agenda.  Moussa 
said that the path forward must include Iraqi conciliation; a 
USG-Iraqi bilateral relationship and agreement on withdrawal 
of U.S. forces that is supported by all Iraqis, not just PM 
Maliki; and improved and effective Iraqi governance. 
 
¶3. (C)  The Ambassador asked Moussa if there is room for 
moderate Arabs to increase engagement in areas such as 
security, the economy and culture.  Moussa said he thought 
that Arab activity would increase in parallel with the 
reconciliation progress.  He identified security, the 
performance of PM Maliki's government, the presence of 
sufficient coalition forces, and the U.S.-Iraq bilteral 
relationship as key variables that would govern the level of 
Arab activity. 
 
¶4. (C) The Ambassador said that the reconciliation process 
has evolved, and that, step by step, factions are negotiating 
substantive issues.  Tawafuk is back in the government. 
Gradually practical solutions are being worked out.  Anbar 
has turned into one of the safest places in Iraq.  The 
reintegration of some Baathi military officers is taking 
place, and those who are not returning are expected to begin 
receiving pensions.  Moussa agreed that there are signs of 
progress, but opined that the process needs to accelerate. 
He urged that there be an "honorable solution" for all former 
Iraqi military officers.  Moussa said that PM Maliki is 
improving but he must talk to those who do not recognize him, 
and they must talk to him.  He asked if there was a timetable 
for development of the U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationship; he 
had heard rumors in Stockholm that the USG was "in a hurry" 
and warned against this.  "Misplaying this issue will put you 
on the defensive in a serious way."  The Ambassador responded 
that we need to conclude agreements before the expiration of 
the UNSCR at the end of the year, and that the focus is on 
getting it right with our Iraqi counterparts.  We understand 
the importance of getting broad political support for the 
agreement. 
 
LEBANON 
------- 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador congratulated Moussa on his role in 
bringing the Lebanese parties back from a very dangerous 
situation.  Moussa said that he expects the "Doha agreement" 
to preserve calm into the fall.  It is critical that Lebanon 
enjoy a strong summer tourist season.  He said the election 
of President Sleiman was a major feat, and expected the 
cabinet to be formed "within 7 to 10 days."  Moussa expressed 
reluctance at the prospect of returning to Beirut in order to 
mediate, calling cabinet assignments an "exclusively internal 
affair."  The focus in Lebanon is quickly shifting now to the 
2009 parliamentary elections, and Moussa assessed that there 
is a "good chance" for the Doha deal to last.  In Moussa's 
analysis, the Syria-Israel talks could lead Hizballah to 
moderate, out of fear that it would eventually lose Syrian 
support.  "It is inconceivable that Hizballah would break 
from this (the Syrian) pattern," he said.  He conceded, 
however, that Iran was no doubt very nervous about the 
Syria-Israel dialogue, and also strongly influences Hizballah 
in Lebanon. 
 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN SITUATION 
----------------------------- 
 
CAIRO 00001113  002 OF 002 
 
 
 
¶6. (C) Moussa expressed pessimism on the Israeli-Palestinian 
track.  Failure would "wreck everything" in the region.  He 
opined that post-Annapolis progress had been minimal, and 
claimed that Palestinian contacts had told him that the 
negotiating teams had yet to put anything on paper.  He 
reiterated his view that continuing Israeli settlement 
activity was the main obstacle.  Moussa said that an Arab 
League committee would convene later this year (likely in the 
late summer) to review progress.  "This is not a threat," he 
said.  But, if the report was poor, the committee may 
recommend that the Arab League consider "other options" than 
the Annapolis process.  Moussa would then consult with the 
Palestinians and Syrians on next steps.  (Note:  In previous 
meetings, Moussa and Arab League Chief of Staff Hisham Yousef 
have claimed that the notion of "abandoning the two-state 
solution" has been gaining favor among Arab leaders during 
the past several months.  End note).  The Ambassador 
responded that we understand that the parties are, in fact, 
discussing sensitive, final status issues in some detail.  We 
are sober about the challenge ahead but we believe it is 
possible for the two sides to reach agreement by the end of 
the year. 
 
DEMOCRACY DIALOGUE 
------------------ 
 
¶7. (C) Moussa asked about the U.S. democracy strategy in the 
region.  His belief was that "democracy should not be a dirty 
word" in the Arab world.  How was the dialogue going and what 
could Arabs expect looking ahead?  The Ambassador answered 
that our commitment to democracy in the region -- in fact 
around the world -- is a manifestation of a long-standing 
American foreign policy goal that was rooted in American 
values.  As such, we fully expect our dialogue with Arabs on 
democracy to be a component of our policy for the foreseeable 
future. 
SCOBEY