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INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 BRUSSELS 000943 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/20/2018 
TAGS: PREL EUN CFSP PGOV BE
SUBJECT: GETTING THE MOST OUT OF FOREIGN POLICY COOPERATION 
WITH THE EU 
 
Classified By: USEU PolMinCouns Larry Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
(d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:   The EU's Common and Foreign Security 
Policy (CFSP) increasingly drives Europe's foreign policy 
agenda.  Practically, the monthly GAERC meetings set the 
timetable for foreign policy decision-making; theologically, 
"EU unity" is a compelling political message that no member 
state can ignore.  When it works well, CFSP is a positive 
force for advancing USG objectives.  Frequently, however, the 
EU's consensus-based foreign policy process veers off either 
into policy paralysis or distorted policy outcomes dictated 
by individual member states.  Moreover, CFSP has enhanced the 
influence of the mid-tier states at the expense of Germany, 
the UK and France.  The "EU-3" are increasingly unable to 
drive policy even when they are united.  For the US, 
achieving foreign policy objectives in this environment 
requires a fresh approach.   The most effective member states 
have found ways around the paralysis of the official process. 
 They work the system (both member states and the 
institutions) early, informally, and systematically.  They do 
not limit their discussions to a few member states or select 
Brussels officials.  The US can profit from this example. 
Many member states are eager to work with us and we have much 
to offer in terms of global vision and policy expertise.  By 
reaching out early, we can fashion operational strategies 
that leverage member state differences and that can better 
coordinate Washington and field efforts. (Note: Because the 
EU decision-making operates differently in the economic 
sphere, this message will focus only on CFSP.) End Summary 
 
CFSP increasingly drives the European foreign policy agenda 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶2.  (U) Senior European officials meet far more often in an 
EU context than any other.  Foreign ministers alone meet 
monthly at the GAERC (General Affairs and External Relations 
Council). As a result, no sooner do MFAs finish one GAERC 
than they begin preparing for the next.  But the GAERC is 
only the most visible element of an extensive web of EU 
foreign policy working groups that meet frequently and funnel 
conclusions into the EU Political and Security Committee 
(PSC) in Brussels.  The very regularity of these meetings 
makes them agenda forcing events:  the 27 are under pressure 
to adopt common positions because the simple act of meeting 
requires outcomes. 
 
¶3.  (C) Politically, too, foreign ministers are increasingly 
reluctant to take any action without considering how they 
will explain it at the next GAERC.  For example: diplomats of 
the EU participants in the 2006 UN deployment in Lebanon all 
assured us that their countries would not have joined the 
deployment without the blessing of the rest of the EU-27, 
even though the EU had no formal role in the deployment. 
This does not imply, however, the emergence of an EU 
political "bloc", as many feared might emerge at NATO.  On 
the contrary, we continually encounter evidence of 
disagreements, differing priorities, jealousies, and -- most 
importantly -- shifting coalitions.  Many member states are 
eager to share information and strategies with us, looking 
for US support of their positions in internal debates.   In 
short, CFSP determines the pace, timing, and context of 
European foreign policy decision-making, but has not resulted 
in a European monolith. 
 
A common strategic perspective... 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶4.  (SBU) CFSP is frequently a positive force for advancing 
US objectives.  First it provides a structure for European 
actions abroad, including missions in Bosnia, Kosovo, Moldova 
and Gaza, which neither we nor the Europeans could easily 
replicate otherwise.  Without CFSP it would also be 
impossible to get Europe to work together on complex issues 
like Iran and Burma sanctions (where, given European economic 
integration, a common policy approach is essential). 
Finally, when the EU speaks with one voice, the political 
power and moral stature of Europe's message to authoritarian 
regimes (Zimbabwe, Belarus and Burma) is greatly enhanced. 
 
But policy paralysis and least-common denominator results 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶5.  (C) Unfortunately, the CFSP process all too often results 
in policy paralysis.  The wide divergence of interests among 
the 27 is certainly one reason (how could they ever agree on 
a common energy policy toward Russia?).  However, the more 
fundamental problem is that the requirement for unanimity 
skews both the process and its outcomes.  Even on critical 
 
BRUSSELS 00000943  002 OF 005 
 
 
priority issues, such as the EULEX deployment in Kosovo, 
unanimity bogs down the process and forces the 27 into 
agenda-consuming deliberations.  On issues of less import, or 
more controversy - ranging from policy toward Georgia, Turkey 
and ESDP, the Greeks on Macedonia, the Russian Partnership 
and Cooperation negotiations etc -- the process either ends 
without consensus or results in a decision too watered down 
to be useful.   Unanimity means that individual states can 
and do insist on outrageous "red-lines" (the Cypriots are the 
leading but hardly the only practitioners of one issue 
diplomacy). 
 
The rising influence of the 2nd tier member states 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶6.  (C) A key result of the CFSP process is the diminishing 
dominance of the majors (Britain, Germany, and France). 
Partly this is a function of the present political 
weakness/lack of strategic unity of the EU-3.  Partly too, it 
is because the EU has become too big and its foreign policy 
too complex for the majors to maintain strategic dominance. 
Instead, we are seeing a rise in influence of the mid- tier 
member states.  In recent weeks, for example, Spain's 
orchestration of a change in EU Cuba policy has clearly 
demonstrated how a committed member can utilize the dynamics 
of CFSP to build momentum for change despite significant 
opposition. 
 
¶7.  (C/NF) Spain has done this systematically:  orchestrating 
its proposal with sympathetic officials in the Council 
Secretariat and Commission (who can often help drive agendas 
by writing initial policy drafts), building a coalition of 
states, and applying considerable pressure on smaller states. 
  Moreover, one of the evolving dynamics of CFSP is that 
smaller states are frequently reluctant to challenge a 
committed state on a given issue, knowing that the unanimity 
process means that they might need that state's support (or 
acquiescence) on a different issue in the future.  The 
implicit threat of such retaliation (and indeed the Spanish 
have made it explicit at times) is clearly one reason why, 
with the exception of the Czechs, most eastern European 
states have quietly acquiesced to Spain's Cuba policy, even 
though they generally do not share Spain's romanticized view 
of Castro's Cuba. 
 
¶8.  (C/NF) There are many other examples of the growing 
ability of the mid-tier states to orchestrate coalitions. 
For example, a group led by Spain, Austria, Cyprus, and 
Luxembourg has been instrumental in preventing the EU-3 from 
strengthening sanctions against Iran.  Sanctions against 
Burma have languished for similar reasons.   Mid-tier states 
were also successful in slowing down the Kosovo recognition 
process.  Of course the EU-3 are still influential - a 
general rule of thumb is that any major initiative requires 
the support of at least one of them.  But they alone are not 
sufficient to drive CFSP decision-making. 
 
Making CFSP work for us: Lessons from the Euros 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶9.  (SBU) It would be tempting to suggest that the solution 
to the EU's CFSP weaknesses is to shift our policy engagement 
with Europe to other venues, be it NATO, OSCE, or 
bilaterally.  That, however, is not a viable option.  As 
noted earlier, it is the EU agenda that drives Europe's clock 
and policy thinking, and any foreign minister will have to 
defend his actions around an EU table in Brussels. 
Furthermore, the theology of a common EU foreign policy 
approach has become politically unassailable.  No other 
institution, including NATO, has a similar degree of 
political legitimacy in European eyes, or can serve as a 
platform for the broad range of foreign policy discussions 
that we have with Europe. 
 
¶10.  (C/NF) More instructive, therefore, is to look at how 
the European member states themselves make the system work to 
their advantage.  Understanding that the CFSP is essentially 
a multi-lateral system, they have adapted their policy 
approaches appropriately.  Based on conversations and 
observations in Brussels, here are some suggested "do's and 
don'ts" for getting the most out of CFSP: 
 
--Don't spend scarce time and resources on trying to achieve 
actionable outcomes from official meetings (troikas), 
conclusions or statements.   The EU is at its worst when it 
meets with us "officially".  Troika meetings can be useful 
exchanges of information but rarely result in true policy 
dialogue.  This is both because the right people are not in 
the room and because the presidency is usually constrained by 
 
BRUSSELS 00000943  003 OF 005 
 
 
27-agreed talking points.  Out of the box thinking or 
brainstorming is difficult in this environment.  Similarly, 
the drafting of EU conclusions or US-EU declarations can be 
interminable exercises in lowest-common denominator language. 
 Member states insist on specific redlines, then avoid 
accountability by hiding behind the opaqueness of the 
process. 
 
--Don't rely on select EU officials to "deliver" EU policy. 
In an EU context, Council officials are organizationally only 
the "hired help" in a system that above all protects member 
state prerogatives.  EU High Rep Solana and Council DG Robert 
Cooper have in no sense the power of their equivalents in a 
traditional government.  They certainly have various means to 
influence operational decisions, but the decisions themselves 
are taken by the GAERC or Political and Security Committee. 
The Commission has somewhat more independence to do projects 
and spend money, but even it looks to member states for 
political guidance.  Bottom line, this is a multi-lateral 
process. 
 
--Don't assume that a Quint, Quartet, or P-5 can substitute 
for talking to the rest of the EU.  These groupings have 
their role to play, but they also breed resentment among the 
rest of the 27.  Aware of that resentment, the EU-3 are 
sometimes reluctant to aggressively promote policies they've 
agreed to outside the EU (UK contacts have told us that it is 
counterproductive for them to lead EU internal debates when 
they were perceived as "water carriers" for the U.S.)  On the 
other han, we have had success in engaging less obvious 
like-minded member states (Ireland, Denmark) to help advance 
our goals on certain issues (Burma, Cuba, Georgia, Belarus.) 
Every issue has a different, often unpredicatble, set of 
potential allies, and we frequently note that the degree of 
support can depend as much on personal factors as obvious 
national interest. 
 
--Do follow the example of successful EU members by talking 
early and informally to member states.  The dysfunctionality 
of the formal process has led the Europeans themselves to 
rely on early, informal coordination.  Although we are 
handicapped as an outsider, a number of member states respect 
our expertise, value our global perspective, and usually see 
it as a plus to have the US on their side.  By engaging early 
and widely, we are better positioned to understand particular 
member state needs and seek compromise solutions, before 
lines are drawn.   In the EULEX participation negotiations, 
for instance, early discussions have helped us accurately 
target our efforts and not waste capital fighting for things 
we're never going to get, as well as to determine what we 
could achieve if we only pushed harder. 
 
--Do engage future presidencies earlier and more deeply in 
establishing joint objectives.  Presidency countries not only 
help shape the EU agenda, they also invariably seek to have a 
successful US relationship.  However, they are usually 
overwhelmed with responsibilities well before the presidency 
even starts.  Working with them at least a year before their 
presidency will help us define a few key common objectives. 
 
--Do engage the EU at 27 in informal policy discussions.  PSC 
ambassadors have told us that one of the great values of EUR 
A/S Dan Fried's presentations is that he talks openly about 
issues that are often shunted aside in official EU meetings 
because one or another member state objects.  The very fact 
that we raise those issues will put them back on the EU's 
internal agenda.  Such discussions not only are a venue for 
the policy brainstorming not possible in an official troika; 
they also help grow the kind of long-lasting "roots and 
branches" in our relationship with the EU that are already 
well-established and pay dividends in the NATO context. 
Regular discussions stabilize and deepen the interactions 
with our EU partners (who aren't always on the same page as 
their NATO delegations just a few miles away).  Similarly, 
the EU Council's desire for a wide-ranging policy planning 
dialogue may be a useful hook to engage not only the Council 
but the permreps in Brussels in a discussion of horizontal 
issues (such as the security aspects of climate change). 
 
Practical thoughts 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) The EU's complicated decision-making structure does 
not lend itself easily to effective advocacy.  A successful 
approach to working with the EU requires systematically 
exchanging information and coordinating strategy between 
Washington, USEU and embassies in capitals.  Here are a few 
concrete suggestions: 
 
 
BRUSSELS 00000943  004 OF 005 
 
 
--Shift some of the senior official time and resources we 
currently spend on the formal EU consultation process 
(taskforces, troikas, weekly PDAS calls to the presidency 
DCM, etc) to structures that permit us, via our embassies in 
the field, to directly reach out to member states.  The 
current web of US-EU meetings were developed based on the 
EU's structures.  The EU institutions are keen to serve as 
the information gate-keeper to the member states, but the 
process does not serve our interests well.  For example, 
information from the PDAS/presidency weekly phone call does 
not appear to circulate widely outside the presidency, the 
taskforce DVCs are handicapped by the fact that real EU 
decision-makers are not in the room (and allow 
mischief-making member states to hide behind the opaque 
process), while the effectiveness of troika meetings are 
often cicumscribed by the fact the EU representatives are 
constrained by 27-approved talking points and not able to 
engage in open-ended policy discussions.  Of course, this 
structure of meetings is too deeply embedded to do away with 
entirely (and it does serve a useful role in tracking our 
official relationship).  But the current emphasis on this 
formal structure diverts limited resources from the more 
useful informal process.  There are several ways we could 
improve this situation: 
 
--Instead of having the EUR PDAS speak weekly with the 
presidency country DCM in Washington, a more effective 
approach might be to hold that call with DCMs/Pol Counselors 
at our missions in the 27, who could then turn around and 
personally brief their MFA political director.  This will arm 
our posts with context they can use to build stronger ties 
directly with capitals MFAs.  As other posts have noted to 
us, such an approach would force our embassies into the 
discussion, make them more useful to host governments, and 
give them greater opportunity to identify future-oriented 
action items in the US-EU dialogue. 
 
--Hold "troikas" at the DAS or office director level; seek 
meetings at 27 for higher level visitors that focus on the 
larger strategic picture.  One possibility would be to 
arrange a mid-presidency meeting between the PSC and the EUR 
A/S.   This would provide a follow-up to the beginning of the 
presidency US-EU political directors meeting.  By keeping it 
"informal", hosted by either the presidency country or the US 
Mission, and by planning for it in advance, it could be an 
excellent strategy session.  Similar sessions could be 
considered for other regional A/S, while at the DAS level we 
should look to meetings with the MFA regional working groups. 
 At a more tactical level, we might also consider enhancing 
our dialogue with the EU Council Situation Center.  We have 
begun to improved this relationship (made possibly by the 
US-EU security agreement last year), but real exchange is 
growing slowly.  Here again, an informal dialogue may be the 
way to go until we build up a greater habit of dialogue and 
the critical person-to-person credibility. 
 
--Hold an annual strategy session between USEU, ERA and each 
non-EUR bureau that deals with the EU:  Internal USG 
coordination is particularly cumbersome on issues for which 
the substantive lead is another bureau.  Those bureaus may 
have established individual EU contacts, but rarely have the 
time and expertise to work the 27 effectively.  A regular 
strategy session would help us better understand their 
priorities and also integrate their contacts into our efforts. 
 
--Recraft the monthly GAERC cables into a future-oriented 
solicitation of views and strategy.  EU member states do want 
to hear our views, but the monthly GAERC cable is an 
ineffective vehicle.  Our contacts agree that it comes much 
too late to really affect member state positions, is not an 
invitation to dialogue, and therefore cannot help but be 
perceived as patronizing.  There are a number of potential 
substitutes.  One might be for posts to demarche just after 
the GAERC: this would simultaneously be useful as readout 
while also serving to solicit views on how the US and that 
member state could cooperate on preparing for the next one. 
 
--Last but perhaps most important, develop 
information/coordination hubs (i.e. a point person/persons) 
for priority US-EU issues.  There are already several ad hoc 
efforts on specific issues to pull together all of the 
commuication strands between Washington, Brussels and 
capitals:  the Iran Sanctions distribution list that USEU 
recently established is one; others include email chains that 
ERA established on Cuba and SCE on Kosovo.  These efforts are 
crucial to giving posts credibility as policy advocates, 
because few have the staffing to follow all issues in the 
necessary depth (nor access to the key email chains that 
contain critical context).  But the utility of these efforts 
 
BRUSSELS 00000943  005 OF 005 
 
 
is limited by their ad hoc nature. The value of formalizing 
such distribution lists is that they would offer a repository 
of info (especially Washington-EU direct contacts that are 
mostly uncataloged now), a go-to person for a complex issue, 
and a vehicle for coordinating approaches to member states 
(essential in this multi-lateral environment).  By doing so, 
we would make it possible for each post to make a substantive 
contribution to a Department-wide effort. 
 
¶12.  (U) These are a few suggestions, but undoubtedly there 
are many more possibilities. In the future, we plan to look 
at other aspects of the US-EU relationship, particularly on 
ESDP, which is too complex to be included in this message. 
In the meantime, USEU would be interested in other posts' 
thoughts. 
 
MURRAY 
.