VZCZCXRO1192
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHBS #0918/01 1691103
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 171103Z JUN 08
FM USEU BRUSSELS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA
RUEHTH/AMEMBASSY ATHENS
RUEHBW/AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
RUEHVB/AMEMBASSY ZAGREB
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRUSSELS 000918 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL EUN TU CR CY
SUBJECT: U.S. AND EU DISCUSS TURKEY, CROATIA AT COELA 
TROIKA MEETING ON ENLARGEMENT 
 
Classified By: USEU POLMINCOUNS Laurence D. Wohlers, for reasons 1.4 (b 
) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  EUR/SE Director Kathleen Fitzpatrick and 
USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers met with 
counterparts from the Slovenian Presidency, incoming French 
Presidency, Commission, and Council Secretariat to discuss EU 
candidate countries Turkey and Croatia at a regularly 
scheduled COELA troika meeting June 4, 2008.  Fitzpatrick 
held side meetings with EU officials, member state 
representatives, and the Turkish Deputy Chief of Mission.  On 
Turkey, topics of discussion included accession negotiations, 
domestic politics, PKK, Cyprus, NATO-EU relations, Turkey's 
geopolitical role, and public diplomacy efforts.  On Croatia, 
EU officials described Croatia's solid progress in meeting 
accession benchmarks, but noted that the country will have to 
maintain a steady pace of still-needed reforms in order to be 
on track to conclude negotiations in late 2009.  The talks 
also provided a glimpse into the upcoming French EU 
presidency's intended course of action on Turkey and Croatia. 
 End Summary. 
 
Turkish Accession Negotiations 
------------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Ms. Alenka Jerak, the Slovenian MFA's Deputy Head of 
the EU Department, opened the COELA meeting by stressing the 
Slovenian Presidency's commitment to the EU enlargement 
process.  On Turkey, Jerak noted that only six accession 
chapters total had been opened and one provisionally closed 
thus far, with no new chapters yet opened under the Slovenian 
presidency.  However, Jerak expressed hope that the 
presidency could open up two more chapters -- chapters six 
and seven on company law and intellectual property law -- at 
the EU accession conference June 17.  (Note: the chapters 
were opened, as planned, June 17.)  Jerak noted that Turkey 
had made concrete progress during the Slovenian presidency, 
amending Article 301 and adopting the law on foundations and 
the southeast development plan.  On the flip side, Riccardo 
Serri of the Commission's Directorate General for Enlargement 
observed that Turkey's progress on reforms had slowed since 
¶2005.  He and several other EU interlocutors noted that the 
real test for Turkey would be how it implemented the amended 
Article 301. 
 
¶3. (C) EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick stressed the importance of 
continuing the process of EU accession negotiations with 
Turkey. She underscored that while the United States was not 
a member of the EU, it is clear that the United States and 
the EU share a broad strategic interest in having a 
democratic Turkey fully integrated into Euro-Atlantic 
structures, including the EU.  The EU process itself gives 
shape, substance, and direction to Turkey's reform efforts 
and should continue.  While Turkey is undergoing some 
political challenges, such as the closure case, it has 
weathered some difficult crises over the past year, and the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP) was able to form a new 
government and elect a new President after receiving 47 per 
cent of the vote.  Turkey has strengthened its democracy over 
the past several years; while this year efforts have slowed, 
Turkey did amend Article 301 (though not perfect, this was a 
positive development) and passed a new Foundations Law.  The 
United States continued to press Turkey to re-open the Halki 
Seminary and recognize the Ecumenical Patriarch, in addition 
to expressing full support for EU-related reforms. 
Fitzpatrick urged a broad view of Turkey's progress and said 
that the EU accession process move forward. 
 
¶4. (C) Separately, Commission and Council Secretariat 
contacts told EUR/SE Director Fitzpatrick they were concerned 
that preoccupation with domestic political issues had put the 
EU accession negotiation process on the back burner in the 
minds of Turkish decision makers, with all of their energy 
focused on domestic concerns.  Additionally, contacts said 
that while Turkey had good, competent people dealing with EU 
matters, Foreign Minister Babacan was over-burdened with 
other responsibilities.  They noted that it would be helpful 
for Babacan to appoint a deputy coordinator for EU 
negotiations. 
 
¶5. (C/NF) Commission and UK Perm Rep contacts told 
Fitzpatrick in separate meetings that Cyprus was as 
obstructionist as ever in the EU's enlargement working group, 
with no improvement since the election of President 
Christofias.  They surmised that this was due to the fact the 
 
BRUSSELS 00000918  002 OF 004 
 
 
Cypriot MFA was a bastion of the DIKO party, which was taking 
a hard line on negotiations.  The result was that a total of 
about 18 out of 35 Turkish accession chapters were 
effectively "blocked" by either Cyprus or France.  Commission 
contacts said it would be useful for the USG to question 
Greek Cypriot interlocutors on why they continued to take 
such a tough line on Turkish accession negotiations in 
Brussels in light of the improved atmosphere on the island. 
 
AK Party Closure Case 
--------------------- 
 
¶6. (C/NF) Serri said that the Commission was monitoring the 
AKP closure case as it pertained to EU standards for human 
rights and the rule of law.  Separately and privately, other 
Commission contacts told Fitzpatrick the Commission was still 
"brainstorming" regarding how it would react to closure of 
the AKP.  They noted that the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECHR) case law and the Venice Commission were the principle 
references the EU would draw on in reacting to a closure. 
 
¶7. (C/NF) UK Perm Rep contacts told Fitzpatrick they were in 
the process of gauging member states' views on the closure 
case to get a handle on how the EU might collectively respond 
in the event AKP is closed.  While hopeful no member states 
would push for suspension of Turkish accession negotiations, 
UK contacts conveyed concern that some member states might 
push to "sanction" Turkey in some way.  The ideal EU response 
to a closure of the party, in the UK's view, would stress 
that accession talks should continue, as these negotiations 
were between the EU and Turkey, not between the EU and a 
particular party. 
 
The Fight Against PKK 
--------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) Jerak said the EU had held its first troika with 
Turkey on terrorism, and that the EU recognized Turkey's 
difficult situation and right to defend itself against the 
PKK terrorist threat.  In a separate meeting, Commission 
contacts noted that the apparent ability of the Turkish 
civilian government to control the military's actions had 
helped the EU to not "overreact" to Turkish military action 
in Iraq.  Fitzpatrick said that the United States, the EU, 
Turkey and Iraq all agreed that the PKK is a terrorist 
organization.  President Bush had decided to support Turkey's 
efforts against the PKK in Northern Iraq, and our efforts to 
encourage cooperation between Turkey and the Iraqi government 
and Turkey and the Kurdistan Regional Government - both 
essential to combating the PKK - were bearing fruit.  The USG 
also encouraged Turkey to pursue a comprehensive approach 
including outreach to the Turkish Kurdish population in the 
southeast, by starting broadcasts in the Kurdish language and 
other educational efforts.  Jerak noted concerns that Turkish 
attacks against the PKK could be destabilizing, and asked 
whether they had achieved any significant results. 
Fitzpatrick said that Turkish cross-border operations had 
been limited in scope and duration and had successfully 
focused on PKK targets, minimizing civilian casualties and 
damage.  The operations had helped disrupt PKK networks and 
logistics.  Fitzpatrick also encouraged EU members to take 
steps to end PKK financing and propaganda efforts in Europe. 
 
 
 
Cyprus 
------ 
 
¶9. (C) On Cyprus, Fitzpatrick and Jerak agreed that the EU 
should support the positive momentum resulting from recent 
developments on the island, although the framework for 
negotiations should fall under the UN.  Fitzpatrick 
underscored that we should not allow negative "static" that 
inevitably surrounds these discussions to diminish positive 
momentum, and that we should continue to support the efforts 
of Talat and Christofias to move toward full-fledged 
negotiations.  She praised their March 21 and May 23 
statements and the leadership the two have shown.  Jerak 
added that under the Slovenian presidency the EU had managed 
to secure technical amendments to the green line regulations 
in order to increase trade between the two communities.  All 
of Fitzpatrick's interlocutors in side meetings were hopeful 
for progress in Cyprus and agreed that the recent meeting 
between the two leaders on the island had been positive. 
Commission interlocutors, however, expressed concern that the 
 
BRUSSELS 00000918  003 OF 004 
 
 
army and other "hard-liners" in Ankara remain quiet and said 
that any messages the USG could pass Ankara to that end would 
be helpful.  Fitzpatrick assured them the USG was encouraging 
all sides to be flexible and urged EU members to do the same. 
 Commission contacts added that Commissioner Rehn would 
likely visit the island if full-fledged negotiations were 
launched.  They noted the Commissioner had previously 
traveled to Cyprus with an EU presidency representative, 
during the Luxembourg presidency.  When questioned if the 
incoming French presidency might accompany Rehn, contacts 
said that was possible. 
 
NATO-EU Relations 
----------------- 
 
¶10. (C/NF) Jerak emphasized that the EU not only welcomed, 
but needed Turkey's participation in its European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP) missions.  Accordingly, she 
stressed that a mutually acceptable solution to the obstacles 
related to NATO-EU relations must be found.  Fitzpatrick 
stressed the importance of resolving these issues so that 
essential planning could go forward in Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
and in any future NATO-EU operations.  Separately, Commission 
contacts told Fitzpatrick that the Commission was "sitting 
on" the screening report for the Turkish accession chapter 
that dealt with NATO-EU relations -- chapter 31 -- because 
they were not getting encouraging signals from the Turks or 
Cypriots that they would show flexibility on this issue 
absent significant movement on the larger Cyprus problem. 
USEU Political Minister Counselor Laurence Wohlers told 
Commission interlocutors that Cypriot Perm Rep contacts had 
indicated to him that with Malta now in PfP, Cyprus felt more 
isolated.  Wohlers suggested this might mean Cyprus would be 
more flexible.  Commission contacts replied that if momentum 
on Cyprus negotiations increased, the French presidency might 
try to build on that momentum to improve NATO-EU relations. 
 
Turkey's Geopolitical Role 
-------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) In the COELA meeting, Fitzpatrick said that the 
strategic role Turkey played throughout the world was useful 
for the EU as well as the United States.  She noted the 
United States maintained strong relations with Turkey on a 
wide range of issues, including Afghanistan, Iraq, the Middle 
East (noting Turkey's mediation effort between Syria and 
Israel), the Balkans, Caucasus, and energy security.  The USG 
urged Turkey and Armenia to repair relations and open the 
border, and noted recent expressions by Turkish and Armenian 
leaders to this end.  Jerak agreed with both points and 
highlighted the value to the EU of Turkey's leadership, 
including its mediation in talks between Israel and Syria, 
its presence in Lebanon, and its active role at the Annapolis 
Conference.  Jerak added that Slovenia had played an advisory 
role with regard to Turkey and Armenia, based on Slovenia's 
experience with Italy, and noted the importance of easing 
tensions between Turkey and Armenia for reasons of regional 
stability as well as oil and gas resources.  Fitzpatrick 
noted that Slovenia's efforts demonstrated the value of the 
EU's experience in reconciliation. 
 
Turkish and EU Public Opinion 
----------------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) Wohlers asked the Commission what it was doing to 
improve Turkish public opinion toward the EU and vice versa. 
In response, Serri described the Commission's Civil Society 
Dialogue with Turkey, noting the Commission had spent 
approximately 20 million EUR in 2007 and would spend more in 
2008, with a focus on cultural programs for Istanbul as the 
European Capital of Culture in 2010.  Serri explained that 
the program was managed out of Commission DG Enlargement 
together with Turkish authorities, but said that Turkey had 
not done as much as it could with the program. 
 
What to Expect from the French Presidency 
----------------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (C) French MFA Deputy Director for European Affairs Joel 
Meyer told Fitzpatrick that the incoming French presidency 
would work on the basis of the EU's December 2007 Council 
Conclusions on Turkey.  He stressed that France hoped to open 
additional chapters during its presidency, but only chapters 
that were compatible with "both visions for Turkey" - that of 
accession and that of an alternative option, more in line 
 
BRUSSELS 00000918  004 OF 004 
 
 
with President Sarkozy's personal views.   Meyer said France 
agreed with the Slovenian presidency on the importance of 
resolving the Cyprus problem and that France would like to 
help both parties move toward resolution.  He stressed that 
France was waiting for the UN and the communities themselves 
to move first, but that Paris stood ready to help and had 
begun making contacts with all of the parties involved. 
Again, Fitzpatrick stressed the importance for Turkey's 
reform process of continuing the accession process under the 
French Presidency, as Turkey's readiness for EU membership 
will evolve over time. 
 
Croatia's Accession Negotiations 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶14. (C) In contrast to Turkey, Presidency and Commission 
officials commented that Croatia has made significant 
progress in its EU accession negotiations.  EC enlargement 
official Allan Jones explained that Croatia has opened 18 of 
33 accession chapters, with two provisionally closed, adding 
that the numbers do not necessarily reflect the amount of 
work Croatia has done to meet the required benchmarks.  He 
expressed hope that Croatia will open a few more chapters by 
the end of the year.   French official Mathilde Grammont 
added that the incoming presidency would do its best to help 
Croatia make progress on opening and closing chapters.  The 
EU will continue to encourage Croatia to be a positive model 
for its neighbors in the Balkans, according to the European 
officials.  In response to Wohlers' question about the timing 
of Croatia's accession, Presidency and Commission officials 
noted President Barroso's view that, pending continued 
efforts by Croatia, negotiations could technically be closed 
by the end of 2009.  Accession would take at least an 
additional year.  Jones admitted that the schedule is 
"extremely tight" for both sides. 
 
¶15. (C) Despite Croatia's good progress, shortcomings remain 
in key areas including judicial reform, public 
administration, corruption, minority rights, refugee returns, 
war crimes, cooperation with the ICTY, property restitution 
and regional cooperation.   Jones explained that in order to 
move forward, Croatia will need to provide not only plans, 
but also evidence of implementation of measures to 
demonstrate commitment before new chapters can be opened. 
Three specific chapters that will prove difficult for Croatia 
relate to public procurement, competition policy (state aid 
to shipbuilding) and political reform.  Jones also noted the 
need for Croatia to focus on meeting economic criteria 
including improvements in the general business environment 
and greater accountability for the 140 million Euros Croatia 
receives each year in pre-accession funding. 
 
¶16. (C) Wohlers emphasized U.S. support for Croatia's EU 
accession and agreed with the EU's assessment that Croatia is 
an important success story and model for the region.  He also 
noted Croatia's progress on NATO membership and U.S. 
expectations for accession in 2009.  He mentioned ICTY 
concerns about Croatian cooperation on war crimes, and asked 
for the EU's assessment on the Ademi-Norac trial.  Jones 
allowed that there were "hiccups" at the beginning of the 
case, including technical difficulties protecting witness 
identities, but said that the trial ran fairly well after 
that.  He added, however, that the Croatians had a big 
incentive to run the case well, as this was the only case 
transferred from ICTY, and they would be under international 
scrutiny.  He added that the EC will be watching Croatia's 
cooperation on local cases where there will less 
international attention and less pressure.  These less 
publicized cases will provide the real test for how Croatia 
deals with witness protection, informants and the 
confidentiality of proceedings. 
 
¶17. (U) This cable has been cleared by EUR/SE Director 
Kathleen Fitzpatrick. 
 
MURRAY 
 
.