VZCZCXYZ0000
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSL #0290/01 1701506
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 181506Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BRATISLAVA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1796
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0687
RUEHPS/AMEMBASSY PRISTINA PRIORITY 0101
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BRATISLAVA 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR EUR/NCE 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/18/2018 
TAGS: PREL NATO KVIR EU LO
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR OBSITNIK'S MEETING WITH FOREIGN 
MINISTER KUBIS 
 
REF: BRATISLAVA 276 BRATISLAVA 266 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Vincent Obsitnik, for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  In a one-on-one meeting on June 18, 
Ambassador Obsitnik and Foreign Minister Kubis had a 
wide-ranging discussion that touched on Kosovo, Afghanistan, 
Slovak-Hungarian relations, the Lisbon Treaty, energy issues 
and the Foreign Minister's role and future.  Kubis noted GOS 
support for the UNSYG's "reconfiguration" plan, but said 
there had been "no change" in Slovakia's stance regarding 
Kosovo recognition.  On Afghanistan, Kubis echoed DefMin 
Baska's assessment that the GOS would not likely lift caveats 
until after the 2010 elections.  Asked about the current 
state of Slovak-Hungarian relations, Kubis expressed serious 
concern about the "Hungarian Guard" and suggested that the 
response to the Guard's continued existence from both the 
U.S. and the EU had been inadequate.  Regarding Slovak plans 
for the Transpetrol oil pipeline, Kubis stressed that the GOS 
priority was to regain a majority stake and management 
control of the pipeline and that he had no knowledge of any 
changes to that plan.  That said, he could see the 
possibility of a sale of a minority stake to Russia because 
it could bring revenue and perhaps Russian commitment to 
maintain oil flows.  Kubis thought that the Polish and Czech 
positions on the Lisbon Treaty could be decisive, and 
expressed particular concern that Polish President Kaczynski 
might "kill" the Treaty. FM Kubis asked for an update on the 
potential visit to the U.S. by President Gasparovic, 
stressing that he will be "an important ally" of the U.S., 
and shared his decision to nominate Slovak UN PermRep Burian 
to succeed Ambassador Kacer in Washington. Regarding the 
security of his own position, Kubis appeared relaxed.  He 
acknowledged "heated discussions" within the government on 
foreign policy issues, but defended his foreign policy 
approach as balanced and rational.  End Summary. 
 
Kosovo -- No Movement 
--------------------- 
 
¶2. (C) Kubis stressed GOS support for UN Secretary General 
Ban Ki Moon's plan to "reconfigure" UNMIK, adding that during 
a recent meeting with Ban, he had urged him to move ahead 
with his plans without seeking agreement from any parties. 
The GOS also supports implementation of the Ahtisaari plan, 
though Kubis prefers not to refer to it as such.Kubis told 
the Ambassador that there has been no change in GOS policy on 
Kosovo.  He noted (incorrectly) that only 41 countries have 
recognized Kosovo.  When the number is much higher, according 
to Kubis -- perhaps over half of UN members -- Slovakia might 
start the process (of recognition).  The Ambassador noted 
that the likely pro-European composition of the new Serbian 
government was more positive than Kubis had predicted.  Kubis 
agreed, but speculated that even if Tadic is able to form a 
coalition government, he will still be openly negative toward 
Kosovo. 
 
Afghanistan 
----------- 
 
3, (C) The Ambassador conveyed appreciation for the recent 
GOS approval (ref a) of higher troop levels for Afghanistan 
and asked when national caveats could be lifted.  Kubis said 
he did not expect any significant changes with respect to 
caveats prior to the 2010 elections.  In the meantime, he 
acknowledged the need to expand the government's existing 
efforts to build public support for the mission and regretted 
the fact that his schedule allowed little time for domestic 
speaking engagements. 
 
 
Slovak-Hungarian Relations 
-------------------------- 
 
¶4. (C) Relations between Slovaks and Hungarians, and between 
the Slovak majority and ethnic Hungarian minority, are 
generally good, Kubis said.  Unfortunately, a few 
politicians, including Jan Slota (whom he characterized as 
under "major control") created problems. (Comment: Kubis' s 
characterization of Slota on a short leash was somewhat 
surprising, given that the MFA had to issue a public apology 
only a week ago for insulting comments Slota made about 
Hungarian FM Goncz. It may be coincidental, but we have noted 
more -- not less -- negative rhetoric from Slota since the 
European Socialists' decision to readmit Smer to the group. 
 
End comment.)  Kubis confirmed what we have heard from other 
Slovak diplomats, i.e., that Gyurscany's weak domestic 
position was an impediment to a summit meeting.  Kubis 
claimed Gyurscany would need "something big" in order to make 
a meeting with PM Fico worthwhile.  The Foreign Minister 
expressed frustration that the Hungarian side continued to 
place new pre-conditions for a meeting. 
 
¶5. (C) Kubis expressed genuine concern about the unchecked 
rise of the "Hungarian Guards."  He claimed that neither the 
U.S., nor the EU had spoken out about the threat.  The 
Slovaks also worry that Hungarian politicians are promoting 
rhetoric about a "greater Hungary" and autonomy of Hungarian 
populations in Slovakia, Romania and Serbia.  It is not only 
rhetoric: it is now possible, according to Kubis, for ethnic 
Hungarian politicians from other countries to gain membership 
in the Hungarian Parliament. (Comment: it is post's 
understanding that membership privileges are not available to 
foreign parliamentarians of ethnic origin.) Kubis described 
the trends as worrisome, and expressed concern that they 
would escalate if former Hungarian PM Orban succeeds 
Gyurscany. 
 
Lisbon Treaty 
------------- 
 
¶6. (C) FM Kubis predicted that there was unlikely to be any 
movement soon on Lisbon.  The EU is looking to Ireland for 
recommendations on next steps. With respect to further 
ratifications, Kubis cited major risks in both Poland and the 
Czech Republic.  Kubis described Polish President Kaczyinski 
as "calling the shots" on the Treaty, and speculated that he 
could "kill it."  Given Czech President Klaus's outspoken 
opposition, Kubis thought that PM Topolanek would need 
encouragement to proceed.  Observing that U.S. interests were 
served by a united, effective Europe, Kubis suggested that 
perhaps the U.S. could also weigh in with the Czechs and 
Poles. 
 
Energy Issues 
------------- 
 
¶7. (C) FM Kubis said he is looking forward to discussing 
energy issues with EUR DAS Bryza during his upcoming visit, 
and also suggested that it would be useful for DAS Bryza to 
meet with PM Fico, as well.  Ambassador Obsitnik inquired 
about rumors (first reported in the Russian press) that 
Slovakia intended to buy back its 49% share of the 
Transpetrol pipeline and then sell it to the Russians.  Kubis 
responded that the GOS goal remains to regain a majority 
stake and management control of the pipeline.  After that, it 
might be possible for the Russians to acquire a minority 
state, according to Kubis, who added that he was not aware of 
such plans at present. Ambassador highlighted the risk that 
the Russian supply for the pipeline could run out within 15 
years.  Kubis countered that a Russian interest might 
strengthen Russian commitment to keep oil flowing. 
 
Visit of President Gasparovic 
----------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) FM Kubis sought an update on the status of the Slovak 
request for a White House visit by President Gasparovic. 
Kubis emphasized the importance of such a visit, noting that 
Gasparovic would most likely win reelection and would be a 
"important ally" of the U.S.  Ambassador Obsitnik responded 
that the visit is in the process of being scheduled, and if 
it is, would not likely take place before September.  FM 
Kubis also informed the Ambassador of his nomination of 
Slovak UN PermRep Peter Burian, a career diplomat with broad 
U.S. experience, to succeed outgoing Slovak Ambassador Rasto 
Kacer. Pending President Gasparovic's approval, the GOS will 
request agrement. 
 
 
Whither Kubis? 
-------------- 
 
¶9. (C)  Ambassador Obsitnik alluded to recent reported 
tensions between FM Kubis and PM Fico (ref b). Kubis 
responded by stated emphatically that he was not a party 
member and did not take the job just to be a "messenger."  He 
acknowledged that there are often "heated conversations" 
within the government on foreign policy issues, e.g., 
Afghanistan and missile defense, but added that he believed 
that he had been able to maintain a balanced and rational 
 
approach. The Prime Minister would continue to express his 
personal views, of course.  Kubis indicated that he would 
move on "at some point," depending on the opportunity.  Kubis 
encouraged the Ambassador to engage PM Fico in a larger 
discussion regarding bilateral relations and Fico's attitudes 
about the U.S.  Ambassador noted that a meeting request had 
been pending for several weeks.  Comment: Kubis appeared 
relaxed and confident in the meeting, betraying none of the 
pressure that our contacts say he is feeling due to frayed 
relations with the Prime Minister and criticism from the PM's 
party. Although we believe that Kubis is not as sanguine as 
his demeanor may have suggested, we also don't see any signs 
of imminent change in MFA leadership -- if for no other 
reason than the paucity of acceptable replacements. 
 
 
 
OBSITNIK