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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 BRASILIA 000851 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NSC FOR ELLIOTT ABRAMS AND GARY TOMASULO; DEPARTMENT FOR 
S/P, WHA, NEA, AND AF 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL MNUC IR XF ZU BR
SUBJECT: SENIOR BRAZILIAN DIPLOMAT TALKS MIDDLE EAST PEACE, 
IRAN, ZIMBABWE 
 
REF: A. STATE 55816 
     ¶B. BRASILIA 809 
     ¶C. BRASILIA 009 
     ¶D. BRASILIA 064 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Clifford M. Sobel, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
 ¶1. (C) In an office call June 9, the Ambassador discussed 
Brazil's policies in the Middle East and Africa with Ministry 
of External Relations (MRE) Under Secretary for Political 
Affairs (II), Ambassador Roberto Jaguaribe.  Jaguaribe 
described an intensifying series of reciprocal visits with 
Middle Eastern countries over the next six months, including 
a visit by President Lula to the region and visits to Brazil 
by the king of Jordan and president of Syria.  Jaguaribe 
reiterated Brazil's view that all players should be engaged 
in the Middle East peace process, and that Brazil's sees its 
ability to talk to all parties as a "useful role."  He 
reiterated Brazil's view that engagement is the right 
approach with Iran, expressing some frustration with the UNSC 
approach to addressing Iran's nuclear ambitions while 
acknowledging that Iran needed to abide by UNSC decisions. 
Jaguaribe informed the Ambassador that Brazil will send 
observers to the run-off elections in Zimbabwe.  He indicated 
that he is eager to engage the USG further in discussions on 
both the Middle East and Africa.  Post believes such 
engagement would prove useful to U.S. interests. 
 
--------------- 
Middle East: Reciprocal Visits to Intensify 
-------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The Ambassador, joined by PolCouns, called on 
Jaguaribe following the two meetings Brazilian Ambassador to 
the United States Antonio Patriota had with NEA A/S Welch and 
AF A/S Frazer.  Jaguaribe was joined by MRE Middle East 
Department head Ambassador Sarkis Karmirian and Levant 
Division chief Minister Rodrigo do Amaral Souza.  At the 
outset of the meeting, Jaguaribe commented that the Iraqi 
Trade Minister was in Brasilia, and would soon be followed by 
the Iraqi Planning Minister.  Jaguaribe confirmed reports 
that the king of Jordan would be visiting this year.  He 
later mentioned that Syrian President Assad had also accepted 
an invitation to visit Brazil for later in the year. 
 
¶3. (C) Jaguaribe told the Ambassador that he was planning to 
go to the Middle East in November or December, saying he had 
given less attention to it than the other regions he covers 
(Africa and Asia) because Brazil's special envoy for the 
Middle East, Amb. Affonso Celso de Ouro-Preto, travels there 
frequently.  He said that it is unlikely now that FM Celso 
Amorim would visit the region again "for specific bilateral 
purposes," but confirmed that President Lula had tentatively 
planned a trip for later in the year and that Amorim would 
accompany him.  According to Jaguaribe, Saudi Arabia, Israel, 
the Palestinian territories, and Jordan are on the tentative 
list of stops.  He said additional stops were unlikely, 
adding that Brazil's municipal elections in October, as well 
as the IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) summit in Delhi in 
October, the Africa-South America summit in Caracas in 
November, and the international renewable energy summit 
Brazil is hosting in November, will make for a busy second 
half of the year, and the Middle East trip might be pushed 
back to early 2009, when President Lula will likely travel to 
Doha for the ASSA (Arab States-South America) summit. 
 
----------- 
Middle East Peace: Solution Requires Engaging "All Players" 
----------- 
 
¶4. (C) Jaguaribe told the Ambassador that he was "still 
encouraged" regarding the Annapolis process, but that he is 
hearing from regional and other key actors who are in a 
"somber mood" because of a "lack of progress on issues of 
 
BRASILIA 00000851  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
importance to the Palestinians."  He cited the new 
construction by Israel, and the Ambassador noted that the 
Secretary had spoken out strongly on that.  In Jaguaribe's 
view, the Palestinian Authority was counting on the peace 
process to deliver and undermine Hamas.  This was not 
happening, and there is an "increasing perception that Abu 
Mazen is losing his grip."  Jaguaribe noted the "positive 
development" regarding Israel's negotiations with Syria, 
suggesting that this has now replaced Annapolis as the 
"defining issue" moving the peace process forward.  But he 
suggested that achieving results from these and the other 
negotiations Israel is undertaking would be difficult without 
leadership of the right "stature" there. 
 
¶5. (C) Jaguaribe described the Israeli-Palestinian peace 
process as the "core issue" of the region, one which touches 
every other issue in the Middle East.  For this reason, he 
suggested, a "more differentiated" approach will be necessary 
than in the past.  He said that Brazil does not see itself as 
having a major role to play in the peace process, but the GOB 
has been "called by some parties," and particularly "our 
Lebanese friends," to get more involved.  He said Brazil is 
"available" to help, and believes it presents a "credible 
face to all actors." 
 
¶6. (C) Jaguaribe stressed that without all relevant players, 
including Hamas, Hizballah, and Iran, there could be no 
lasting solution.  The Ambassador noted that we have been 
clear that it is not a question of whether to talk with the 
different parties, but under what conditions.  He noted that 
the issue of what dialogue to undertake in the Middle East is 
very sensitive and now the subject of public debate in the 
United States, including by our presidential candidates. 
Jaguaribe indicating he was following the U.S. debate on the 
issue, but reiterated that it was Brazil's view that it is 
important to talk with all the players.  "It is useful to 
everyone," he added, "that some countries can do that."  The 
Ambassador asked if Brazil still hoped to hold a meeting of 
Israeli and Palestinian civil society actors.  Jaguaribe said 
they believe it is a good idea to engage non-governmental 
actors as an additional channel for opening discussion, but 
indicated there are no specific plans to organize a meeting 
at this point. 
 
------------ 
Iran: Brazil Favors Frank Engagement 
------------ 
 
¶7. (C) The Ambassador raised the importance of pushing Iran 
in the right direction with regard to its nuclear ambitions 
and said that we hope Brazil will remain sensitive to the 
signals it is sending.  Jaguaribe said that Brazil's 
relations with Iran were, first, based on a "significant" 
trade relationship.  Brazil does not have the level of trade 
that Japan, Italy, Germany, and other EU countries have with 
Iran, he said, nor does it buy much in the way of Iranian 
imports, as EU countries do.  But Brazil does sell two 
billion dollars in exports to Iran per year.  He said that 
Petrobras is "very careful" in its dealings with Iran because 
it is listed on the New York Stock Exchange and Brazil is 
careful to comply with UNSC resolutions, "even when we 
disagree with them."  Brazil understands Iran's interest in 
developing "legitimate" nuclear capabilities, and shares 
concerns about the "corollary" capabilities Iran may be 
trying to develop.  However, Brazil is concerned that the 
current approach to Iran essentially "questions the NPT" by 
suggesting that the safeguards in it are not sufficient. 
Brazil is "a party to the NPT, but not a fan of it," he said, 
and the problem with Iran has pointed to one of the 
weaknesses in the NPT. 
 
¶8. (C) Jaguaribe said that they had had "a very frank 
discussion" with Iran recently.  They told the Iranians that 
Brazil's nuclear program was not an issue in South America 
 
BRASILIA 00000851  003 OF 004 
 
 
because Brazil has achieved a "level of confidence" in the 
region.  Iran needs to do the same before it can expect to 
proceed without problems.  The Iranians complained that they 
had been singled out by the UNSC when "Israel has an arsenal 
of bombs," and argued that these matters should be dealt with 
in the IAEA, not the UNSC.  According to Jaguaribe, they told 
the Iranians that Brazil agrees, but that "the Security 
Council decides what is a security issue and we must abide by 
its decisions." 
 
¶9. (C) Jaguaribe concluded that it is Brazil's view that 
engagement, not isolation, is the appropriate approach to 
Iran.  With the exception of Israel, he said, Iran is the 
"most democratic country in the Middle East"--restricted 
still, of course, but better than others in the region. 
Although Iranian President Ahmedinejad's rhetoric is clearly 
outrageous in some cases, Brazil sees this as domestic 
posturing, adding that Ahmedinejad's position is only helped 
by "creating conflict."  With thousands of years of history 
behind them, the Iranians are very self-conscious regarding 
their importance, Jaguaribe said, and it is important to pay 
attention to that.  The Ambassador stressed the importance of 
not providing positive reinforcement to Ahmedinejad's 
rhetoric and giving him the opportunity to say that he has 
Brazil's support.  He said that the EU has tried dialogue and 
not had much success, and noted that Iran has made a 
conscious decision to sacrifice full development of its oil 
wealth in the interest of pursuing its nuclear ambitions. 
Jaguaribe acknowledged an "enormous effort" by Iran to engage 
Brazil, but said Brazil has been clear with Iran that Iran 
must make a move if the current impasse is to be overcome. 
 
-------------------- 
Brazil Wants to Deepen Bilateral Discussion on Middle East 
-------------------- 
 
¶10. (C) In light of the meeting between Ambassador Patriota 
and NEA A/S Welch, Jaguaribe said that he hoped to be able to 
travel to Washington in September to continue the dialogue 
with us.  The Ambassador encouraged this, adding that he was 
hoping that we could bring a senior-level USG official to 
Brazil in the next few months to deepen the dialogue further 
on Middle East issues. 
 
------------------ 
Africa: Observers to Zimbabwe; Interest in Discussions 
------------------ 
 
¶11. (C) In a similar vein, Jaguaribe said he was pleased to 
hear from Ambassador Patriota that AF A/S Frazer would visit 
Brazil to talk about cooperation in Africa.  He informed the 
Ambassador that, at South Africa's insistence, Brazil had 
decided to send observers to Zimbabwe for the June 27 run-off 
election as part of the SADC delegation (refs A and B).  He 
added that the first-round elections had been "exceptionally 
good" by African standards. 
 
--------------------- 
Comment: More Evidence that Brazil is Stepping Out 
--------------------- 
 
¶12. (C) As with his discussion last fall with WHA A/S Shannon 
(ref C), Jaguaribe showed himself to be an open and 
informative interlocutor who is clearly on top of his brief. 
Post will continue to engage him and his staff, and believes 
that discussion between him and both NEA and AF would prove 
useful to U.S. interests. 
 
¶13. (C) Jaguaribe's comments confirm our impressions that 
Brazil is feeling increasingly confident engaging on the 
Middle East (septel) and Africa (ref D).  In our view, the 
sense of empowerment that Brazilians feel as a result of 
being included in the Annapolis process can be used, to a 
limited degree, to help keep them on track in their 
 
BRASILIA 00000851  004 OF 004 
 
 
pronouncements.  It is important for the GOB to understand 
clearly where our redlines lie as they increase their 
engagement. 
 
¶14. (C) It is also interesting that, according to Jaguaribe, 
it was South Africa's approach that was decisive in obtaining 
Brazil's agreement to send observers to Zimbabwe.  This 
suggests that approaches through Brazil's new 
developing-country partners may be valuable with regard to 
Brazilian participation in non-traditional areas such as 
peacekeeping in Darfur. 
SOBEL