VZCZCXRO3352
RR RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHRL #0811/01 1711504
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 191504Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY BERLIN
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1490
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BERLIN 000811 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/19/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV NATO MARR EUN RS ZJ GG
SUBJECT: JUNE 12 MEETING IN BERLIN OF THE WESTERN FRIENDS 
OF GEORGIA 
 
Classified By: POLITICAL MINISTER-COUNSELOR JEFFREY RATHKE FOR REASON 1 
.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The June 12 meeting of the Western Friends of 
Georgia focused mainly on a German-drafted non-paper, which 
proposes a three-stage plan for the peaceful settlement of 
the conflict in Abkhazia, beginning with security and 
confidence building measures (CBMs), including declarations 
of non-use of force by both sides.  EUR DAS Bryza emphasized 
that it would not be helpful to get "bogged down" discussing 
CBMs that neither party particularly cared about in the first 
phase of the talks.  Bryza also suggested making the 
non-paper less detailed and less prescriptive, noting that 
the Friends should not dictate to the two parties what they 
should discuss and in what sequence.  German Special Envoy 
Lucas admitted that SRSG Arnault had similarly criticized the 
non-paper's top-down approach.  Lucas' counterpart at the 
Chancellery agreed that the non-paper was "a bit heavy" and 
rigid, but said the MFA had been very stubborn about changing 
it.  In the context of avoiding a Georgian demand for the 
withdrawal of CIS peacekeepers, Bryza emphasized the 
importance of offering the Georgians something concrete to 
challenge the current Russian monopoly on security in 
Abkhazia, such as an international police presence.  However, 
no one was optimistic about the EU or any other international 
organization taking up the task.  The June 12 meeting was 
supposed to be followed on June 13 by a full-fledged Friends 
of Georgia meeting, but the Russians pulled out at the last 
minute, much to the irritation of Chancellor Merkel, who 
personally solicited and received a commitment from President 
Medvedev during his June 5 visit to Berlin to send Russian 
representatives.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Only the Western Friends 
------------------------ 
 
¶2. (C) Germany hosted a Western Friends of Georgia meeting in 
Berlin June 12.  Plans for a full Friends of Georgia meeting 
on June 13 did not come to pass after the Russians decided to 
pull out, ostensibly to wait for the results of the June 16 
Georgia/Abkhaz meeting in Stockholm.  The June 12 Friends of 
Georgia meeting was chaired by German Special Envoy for 
Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia Hans-Dieter Lucas. 
Also attending on the German side were MFA Office Director 
for Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus Johannes 
Regenbrecht, Deputy Office Director Christoph Reztlaff, and 
UN Security Council desk officer Mirko Schilbach.  Attending 
on behalf of France were Veronique Bujon-Barre and Jay 
Dharmadhikari and from the UK, Sir Brian Fall and Louise 
Saville.  Representing the U.S. were EUR DAS Matt Bryza and 
EUR CARC Conflicts Advisor Michael Carpenter. 
 
German Non-Paper 
---------------- 
 
¶3. (C) Discussion focused mostly on a German MFA non-paper, 
which outlines a three-staged approach for the peaceful 
settlement of the conflict in Abkhazia, Georgia.  Hans-Dieter 
Lucas reviewed the paper, emphasizing his view that it was 
important to put off the status question until the end of the 
process (stage three) and to begin instead with security and 
confidence building measures, particularly declarations of 
non-use of force by both sides.   While the German paper 
calls for adapting the format of the CIS peacekeeping mission 
from "peacekeeping" to "peacemaking," it does not address the 
critical Georgian concern of Russia's military posture in the 
region. 
 
¶4. (C) Bryza told Lucas it would not be helpful to get 
"bogged down" discussing CBMs that neither side particularly 
cared about in the first phase of the talks, since this is 
exactly why the UN Friends process had made so little 
progress during the last few years.  He noted that it would 
make the Georgians nervous if the core issues -- i.e., IDP 
returns and political settlement -- were put off.  Pointing 
out that the Georgians and Abkhaz are already talking 
directly with each other on the basis of a March 28 Georgian 
peace plan (and were concretely discussing a Georgian 
non-use-of-force pledge in return for an Abkhaz agreement on 
Georgian IDP returns), Bryza said the Friends should not 
dictate to the two parties what they should discuss and in 
what sequence.   Bryza argued that having a firm conception 
of a political settlement that elaborates the future status 
of Abkhazia and spells out the constitutional guarantees for 
military, political, economic, and cultural security for the 
Abkhaz is critical to getting the sides to the table in the 
first place. 
 
¶5. (C) Lucas said he had shared the paper with UN Special 
Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) for Abkhazia, 
Jean Arnault, who had criticized the paper for its top-down 
approach, in which the Friends seemed to be dictating a 
 
BERLIN 00000811  002 OF 003 
 
 
solution to the sides.  Lucas in turn criticized Arnault for 
being in a "pessimistic mood" and for not fully supporting 
the German plan.  He said he would discuss it with him in 
greater detail during Arnault's trip to Berlin on June 16. 
 
Putting the Permanent Steering Committee on "Steroids" 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶6. (C) The German non-paper calls for the establishment of a 
permanent steering committee to "restart and to 
institutionalize a framework for direct political dialogue 
between the parties."  There was agreement that the committee 
should be composed of representatives from capitals rather 
than local ambassadors to ensure that it had enough influence 
to facilitate dialogue.  Bryza called for putting the 
committee on "steroids," and suggested the creation of 
several working groups to focus on different aspects of the 
peace settlement: security, political, and economic. 
 
Sharing the Non-Paper 
--------------------- 
 
¶7. (C) There was some back-and-forth over how the German 
non-paper should be shared with the Georgians and Russians. 
Bryza pushed for at least orally briefing the Georgians on 
the paper before giving it to the Russians, otherwise it 
would be "dead on arrival."  Lucas countered that if the 
Russians thought the paper had been coordinated with the 
Georgians before being shared with them, it would also be 
DOA.   Lucas agreed to have the German Ambassador in Tbilisi, 
Patricia Flor, brief the Georgians on the non-paper before 
sharing it with the Russians. 
 
Avoiding a Demand for Withdrawal of CIS Peacekeepers 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶8. (C) There was agreement that the main goal at this point 
was to avoid a Georgian declaration demanding a withdrawal of 
the CIS peacekeepers.  There was also agreement that the key 
to keeping the Georgians from issuing such a declaration was 
to show the Georgians solidarity by protesting the Russian 
deployment of additional peacekeeping forces and railway 
troops as unacceptable.  Bryza pressed further steps on this 
issue, saying a Georgian declaration was inevitable unless 
the Georgians could be offered something concrete to 
challenge the current Russian monopoly on security in 
Abkhazia, such as an international police presence from the 
UN, EU or some other international organization.  The French 
rep almost completely ruled out an EU police presence, saying 
this should not even be suggested to the Georgians.  In a 
pre-meeting bilateral, Lucas objected to letting Georgia 
"blackmail" the Friends into meeting its demands by holding 
the threat of a declaration over their heads.   He seemed 
more concerned that Russia had not come to the Group of 
Friends meeting in Berlin, however, than with Russian combat 
troop deployments to Abkhazia. 
 
Chancellery Views on Abkhazia 
----------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) After the Friends of Georgia meeting, Byrza met with 
both Chancellery Director for Eastern Europe, Central Asia 
and the Caucasus Norman Walter and Deputy National Security 
Advisor Rolf Nikel in succession, emphasizing that President 
Bush was personally engaged on the Abkhazia issue and that it 
was one of the top priorities in the U.S. bilateral 
relationship with Russia.  Walter reported that the Georgian 
ambassador had just been at the Chancellery to get a read-out 
on the Bush-Merkel discussions at Meseberg.  The ambassador 
had claimed that a Georgian decision on canceling the 
peacekeeping agreement in Abkhazia had already been taken -- 
it was only a matter of when, not if, it would be announced. 
Walter said that Heusgen had called the Georgian FM the day 
before, pleading that the Georgians not do "anything foolish" 
and pointing out that the international community was coming 
up with some ideas on how to address Georgian concerns. 
 
¶10. (C) Bryza emphasized that the Georgians had been very 
restrained up to now.  Two weeks ago, they had offered to 
issue a non-use-of-force declaration if the Russians agreed 
to withdraw the paratroopers and to consult with Georgia on 
implementation of the April 16 Russian presidential 
instructions on relations with Abkhazia.  The Russians had 
reacted by deploying the railroad troops.  Bryza noted that 
he himself had just been talking to the Georgian FM before 
the meeting.  He noted that she had claimed to be under 
instructions to make the declaration no later than June 16 
and did not leave much hope that this could be delayed. Bryza 
stressed, as he had during the Friends of Georgia meeting, 
that it was important to offer the Georgians something 
concrete to challenge the Russian monopoly on security in 
Abkhazia, such as an international police force.  Walter 
 
BERLIN 00000811  003 OF 003 
 
 
responded that no one in Europe was on board for an EU 
mission.  Even if there was the political will to deploy such 
a force, it would take six months to implement.  Nikel was 
equally dismissive of getting any organization to do a police 
mission in Abkhazia, arguing that what was needed there were 
peacekeeping forces. 
 
Chancellery Distances Itself from German Non-Paper 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶11. (C) Bryza said that without some kind of concrete 
gesture, it was unrealistic to expect the Georgians to simply 
announce the non-use of force, as proposed in the German MFA 
non-paper.  Walter agreed that the paper was "a bit heavy" 
and that it was perhaps unrealistic to begin with CBMs.  Why 
not begin with some of the elements in phase two (IDPs, 
economic development, etc.)?  Walter noted that he had not 
seen the German MFA paper himself until two days before and 
that the MFA was very "stubborn" about changing it.  He said 
that Lucas had reported to him that the paper had been 
essentially endorsed as is by the Western Friends that 
morning.  Bryza countered that this was, in fact, not the 
case, reiterating his concerns about the paper being too 
detailed and not sensitive enough to the fact that this had 
to be a Georgia-Abkhaz process and not imposed from the 
outside.  Both agreed that it would be helpful if Bryza 
called Lucas to reinforce the U.S. points on the paper, 
without making reference to his conversation with Walter. 
 
Chancellor Unhappy with Russian Absence 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Walter recounted how the Chancellor, during 
Medvedev's June 5 visit to Berlin, had spent 15 minutes 
making the case for Russia to participate in the June 12 
Friends of Georgia meeting in Berlin.  Medvedev had been 
dubious, but in the end, had agreed to send representatives 
to a meeting on June 13 "if this is so important to you." 
Walter said the fact that the Russians had been no-shows 
really grated the Chancellor.  In stark contrast to his MFA 
counterpart (Lucas), Walter was notably dismissive of the 
Russians' excuses for not attending. 
TIMKEN JR