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C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 001668 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: ENGAGING IRAQ'S NEIGHBORS ON GOI EFFORTS TO 
CONFRONT IRAN AND RECONCILE WITH SUNNIS 
 
REF: A. STATE 35471 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 1007 
 
Classified By: Political Counselor Matt Tueller for reasons 1.4 (b) and 
 (d) 
 
¶1.  (U) Para 11 contains talking points that addressees may 
wish to use in updating the engagement approach laid out in 
Refs A and B. 
 
¶2.  (C)  Summary:  The government of Iraqi PM Nouri al-Maliki 
has undertaken significant steps to confront militias and 
criminal groups supported by Iran and to reconcile with Sunni 
elements.  The importance of these actions should not be lost 
on key regional governments, particularly those withholding 
support for the Iraqi government due to fears of Iranian 
influence or the marginalization of Sunnis.  This message 
provides background and points for use in discussions with 
senior-level host country interlocutors on these positive 
steps, building upon information provided in reftels.  The 
aim is to establish an ongoing dialogue with key regional 
governments that fills the continuing information gap and 
supports USG efforts to gain greater regional acceptance of 
and support for the Iraqi government.  Embassy Baghdad will 
periodically update these messages for posts' use in ongoing 
engagements.  We would welcome feedback on host government 
information gaps we could usefully address.   End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) Recent Iraqi Security Force (ISF) operations in Basra, 
Mosul and Sadr City ordered by Iraqi PM Maliki mark a turning 
point in Iraqi politics worth explaining to key regional 
governments concerned about Iranian influence in Iraq.  The 
Basra and Sadr City operations, which targeted Jaysh al-Mahdi 
(JAM) militia elements, JAM Special Groups and criminal gangs 
associated with, trained and/or financed by Iran, forced PM 
Maliki (and much of the Iraqi public) to acknowledge Iran's 
negative influence.  While Iran remains a key influencer in 
Iraq, in particular through its ongoing role as intermediary 
between warring Shia elements, the extent of Iran's material 
and financial support to groups operating well outside the 
mainstream was a shock to PM Maliki and many of his key 
advisors.  We have seen a noticeable shift in the PM's views 
on Iran's role in the aftermath of the Basra and Sadr City 
operations. 
 
¶4.  (C) Building on these gains, the PM ordered the ISF into 
Mosul in a major operation to confront insurgent activity, 
including cross-border AQI infiltration.  ISF units involved 
in these operations are working closely with Sunni tribal 
groups, demonstrating growing cooperation in support of 
central government authority throughout Iraq.  Weak central 
government and lack of capacity among Iraqi security forces 
are among the factors that enabled a strong Iranian position 
in Iraq.  Both appear to be changing as a result of the 
recent aggressive ISF operations across the country. 
 
¶5. (C)  This is not to suggest that no problems remain.  The 
GOI was faced with disastrous performance of certain Iraqi 
police units in Basra.  Criminal and militia infiltration of 
the police has been a serious problem that the GOI is 
currently  addressing through reform within the Ministry of 
Interior.  Over the past 12 months, the PM has replaced every 
police divisional commander throughout Iraq and has dismissed 
those police officers who sided with Sadrist militias in the 
Basra fighting. 
 
¶6. (C) The GOI is taking meaningful steps toward 
reconciliation with Sunni elements, including through 
integration of individuals associated with the Awakening 
Councils (AKA "Sahwat" or "Sons of Iraq") into the ISF and 
Iraqi Police (IP); discussions with former officers of the 
Iraqi Army to address key concerns regarding pay, legal 
status and even eventual reinstatement; and establishment of 
the Implementation and Follow Up Committee for National 
Reconciliation (IFCNR), a body reporting directly to the 
office of the Prime Minister to address reconciliation issues 
more broadly.  These initiatives have the direct support of 
PM Maliki who is simultaneously negotiating a return to his 
government of the Tawafuq coalition of Sunni political 
parties.  Vice President Tariq Hashemi (Sunni IIP) has just 
begun a tour of neighboring capitals and we expect him to 
describe in relatively positive terms a Prime Minister who is 
increasingly acting in a national capacity. 
 
 
¶7. (U) The Ministry of Migration (MoM) recently submitted to 
the Council of Ministers (CoM) a request for additional 
resources totaling $195 million to support the return of 
refugees from neighboring countries, the return of Internally 
Displaced Persons (IDPs) to their area of origin inside Iraq, 
as well as assist those IDPs unable to make their way home. 
Furthermore, the MoM finalized a National Policy on 
Displacement in May, which has been approved in principle by 
the CoM.  The development of the national policy marks a 
significant step forward in Iraq's efforts to manage its 
displacement crisis.  The GoI plans to launch its policy on 
displacement at a National Conference on Displacement (which 
the MoM and UN are working to schedule in mid July). 
Planning is underway to implement a comprehensive survey on 
refugees, IDPs and communities in Iraq that will receive 
returnees in order to better plan for and support eventual 
returns of refugees and IDPs. 
 
¶8.  (C)  Beyond this, Iraq is preparing for provisional 
elections in late 2008 that will, in many areas, redress the 
political imbalance caused by the widespread Sunni boycott of 
the 2005 elections.  While new political movements and 
coalitions (among them groups of the Sunni Awakening 
Councils) are only now forming, provincial elections are 
clearly an opportunity for independents and nationalists to 
demonstrate their relevance to the political process.  Many 
Iraqi voters appear to be growing disenchanted with religious 
parties, a sentiment that may impact the results of the 
provincial elections as well as national elections in 2009. 
The fact that the PM and his political allies are pushing 
forward on elections planning despite the distinct 
possibility that the results will diminish their share of 
power indicates an understanding of the need to broaden 
political participation via nation-wide local elections as 
part of the national reconciliation process. 
 
¶9. (C) Finally, it is also worth noting the benefits for 
neighboring states of expanded trade relations with a growing 
Iraq.  In 2008, Iraq's economy is on pace to reach 7 to 8 
percent growth.  Improved budget formulation and execution 
should result in more effective delivery of basic government 
services, key to the GOI's commitment to follow its security 
operations with economic and social deliverables.  The 
process of reintegrating Iraq into the regional and 
international communities will also contribute to national 
reconciliation efforts by breaking through current political 
distrust.  Neighbors should look at the economic 
opportunities Iraq provides while evaluating overall national 
interests here, just as Iran and Turkey have already done. 
 
¶10. (C) These positive initiatives should resonate with key 
regional governments that have expressed concern with regard 
to both Iranian influence and the marginalization of Iraq's 
Sunnis.  S/I Senior Advisor Satterfield's recent visits to 
Arab capitals revealed a willingness to acknowledge this 
progress but also the persistence of an information gap 
regarding the true situation in Iraq.  As noted in ref A, the 
USG is pushing individual Arab governments to engage Iraq in 
a number of diplomatic fora to demonstrate support for the 
Iraqi government.  Continuing to emphasize these positive 
steps with appropriate high-level interlocutors may bring us 
closer to realizing those important objectives.  We are not 
seeking a single conversation with a single recipient but 
rather an ongoing dialogue with addressee governments and 
opinion-leaders to shape views positively toward increased 
engagement with the GOI.   Embassy Baghdad will update these 
messages periodically with relevant information. 
 
¶11. (U) Begin Talking Points: 
 
-- Iraqi PM Maliki's actions to confront militias and 
criminal gangs linked to Iran mark a significant turn in the 
GOI's effort to impose effective control throughout Iraq. 
Iran's direct involvement on the wrong side of these 
confrontations resulted in widespread anger at this role, not 
least with PM Maliki and many of his senior advisors. 
 
-- Building on the success of missions in Basra and Sadr City 
against Iranian-backed Jaysh Al-Mahdi (JAM) Special Groups 
and criminal gangs, the PM launched new security operations 
in Mosul to confront insurgent activity, including 
cross-border AQI infiltration.  Iraqi Security Force (ISF) 
 
units involved in these engagements have worked alongside 
Sunni tribal groups in a demonstration of growing cooperation 
across communal lines in support of strong central government 
control. 
 
-- The Iraqi Army (IA) now numbers over 170,000 and is 
growing in professionalism, capability and confidence as a 
result of successful operations in the South, Center and 
North of Iraq.  This competent and increasingly well-led 
force is enabling the central government to extend its 
authority throughout the country, thereby limiting the 
opportunities for armed groups such as those supported by 
Iran to operate. 
 
-- These operations are being followed by the provision of 
government programs and assistance to reduce the appeal of 
militia groups that held sway in those areas.  The GOI 
committed $100 million to Basra reconstruction; $150 million 
to Sadr City; and $100 million to Mosul, and is implementing 
government service programs aimed at luring individuals away 
from militias and insurgent activities. 
 
-- Serious challenges remain.  The GOI was forced to address 
criminal and militia infiltration of the Iraqi police and 
responded with major reform within the Ministry of Interior. 
Police division commanders have been replaced throughout the 
country and units that sided with Sadrist militias in the 
Basra fighting have been dismissed.  The effectiveness of the 
Iraqi Police during the recent Mosul operations was much 
improved from Basra, with IP units working very closely and 
successfully with the Iraqi Army. 
 
-- The GOI is taking concrete measures to reconcile with 
Sunni elements, including the integration of Sunni Awakening 
Councils to Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and the Iraqi Police 
(IP).  To date, some 20,000 "Sons of Iraq" have transferred 
either to the ISF or IP.  In addition, the GOI is holding 
discussions with Sunni former military officers towards 
possible reintegration of some of these elements.  It 
established the Implementation and Follow Up Committee for 
National Reconciliation (IFCNR) to address reconciliation 
issues more broadly.  PM Maliki is also negotiating a return 
to the Cabinet of ministers representing the Tawafuq 
coalition of Arab Sunni political parties. 
 
--The GOI plans to dedicate greater financial resources to 
assist returning refugees and IDPs.  The Ministry of 
Migration requested an additional $195 million to support 
returns.  The United Nations and various NGOs are stepping up 
their operations in Iraq to support the return of refugees 
and IDPs as well as to assist displaced populations unable to 
return to their areas of origin. 
 
-- Provincial elections scheduled for late 2008 should 
provide gains for Sunni groups that boycotted the 2005 
elections process.   The GOI is committed to these elections, 
despite the prospect that the results could weaken the 
standing of parties that are currently part of the ruling 
coalition.  This indicates an awareness of the importance of 
these elections in expanding political participation in Iraq 
and thereby advancing the process of national reconciliation. 
 
 
-- As security improves, the opportunity arises for expanded 
trade ties with Iraq.  Iraq's economy is on pace to achieve 
between 7 and 8 percent growth.  Development of Iraq's 
natural resources will draw in considerable foreign 
investment and expand the economy even further.  The process 
of reintegrating Iraq into the regional and international 
communities will also contribute to national reconciliation 
efforts. 
 
-- Governments concerned about Iran's role in Iraq and the 
situation of Iraq's Sunni community should take note of and 
express support for these actions directly to the GOI.  Doing 
so will demonstrate the diplomatic gains that might be 
achieved by continuing these policies.  The absence of such 
support, on the other hand, reinforces the view that 
irrespective of the GOI's actions, regional support to 
counterbalance Iran will not be forthcoming. 
 
End talking points. 
BUTENIS