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O 271542Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2076
INFO RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHXD/MOSCOW POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000925 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/27/2018 
TAGS: PREL PGOV GR IR IS
SUBJECT: JOINT EXERISE HIGHLIGHTS DIFFERENT GREEK, ISRAELI 
MOTIVES IN CLOSER TIES 
 
Classified By: DCM THOMAS COUNTRYMAN.  REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). 
 
¶1. (S) In a June 25 conversation with DCM, PM Karamanlis' 
diplomatic advisor Constantinos Bitsios confirmed that the 
military exercise that took place in the eastern 
Mediterranean over Greek airspace in early June and reported 
in the NY Times June 20 was a joint Israeli-Greek exercise. 
Bitsios expressed concern, however, about the leak of 
information to the press on the exercise because public focus 
on the issue would make closer Greek-Israeli relations more 
difficult.  (NOTE: The exercise, which apparently was 
entitled "Glorious Spartan," has indeed received widespread 
critical press in Greece following publication of the NY 
Times article.  END NOTE.)  Bitsios said he wanted to move PM 
Karamanlis closer to Israel, which Bitsios viewed as a 
modern, stable democracy and potential partner for Greece. 
There were many domestic political hurdles to strengthening 
the relationship, however, and negative press complicated the 
process.  Bitsios also informed DCM of the upcoming visit of 
Israeli DefMin Ehud Barak. 
 
¶2. (S) On June 27, Israeli DCM Joseph Moustaki provided 
DepPolCouns further details on the exercise and Israel's 
strategic interests in Greece, particularly in regards to 
Iran.  Moustaki said his embassy was not heavily involved in 
the planning for the exercise, which was coordinated by the 
Israeli DATT who is stationed in Rome, and was informed only 
a few days before the exercise began.  (NOTE: This seems 
unlikely, however, given official statements by the Hellenic 
Air Force General Staff (HAFGS), which described several 
advance planning meetings between the HAFGS and Israeli 
military officials.  END NOTE.)   Moustaki said a similar 
exercise, though on a somewhat smaller scale, had taken place 
last year, but that time the Israelis had not informed the 
Greeks, who were caught "completely off-guard."  Last year's 
exercise had also been preceded two weeks prior by Israeli 
test firing of a sophisticated missile near Cyprus.  These 
two events had spooked the Greeks, led to several delegations 
exchanging visits, and, ultimately, an apology by Israel. 
The outcome of the incidents and discussions, however, was 
better Israeli-Greek relations and a promise to coordinate 
and cooperate on such exercises in the future. 
 
¶3. (S) Moustaki confirmed that the exercise this June, which 
involved 100-150 planes, indeed enjoyed better coordination 
and cooperation.  While officially a joint exercise, the 
Greeks were interested primarily in practicing in-flight 
refueling because they did not have their own tanker 
aircraft.  The exercise was not confined to the southern 
Aegean but went "all over Greece" as far north as Larissa. 
Greece was practically Israeli's only venue for such an 
exercise because they could not fly to the south or east. 
Moustaki claimed not to know the precise motivation behind 
conducting the exercise now, but speculated that the Israeli 
and, perhaps, U.S. governments had learned that Iran had 
recently made some technical advance in its nuclear 
production activities and the exercise was a way to signal 
that we knew what they had done and were watching. 
Alternatively, Israel perhaps simply wanted to show Iran that 
it had the capability to strike Iran, if necessary. 
 
¶4. (S) On the July 1 visit to Greece by Israeli DefMin Barak, 
Moustaki noted that Palestinian Authority President Abu Mazen 
was also scheduled to visit Greece June 30.  Barak officially 
was coming to attend a meeting of the Socialist International 
(of which Greek opposition party PASOK Chairman Papandreou is 
currently president), but he would also meet with PM 
Karamanlis, FM Bakoyannis, and DefMin Meimarakis.  Moustaki 
said he was recommending few statements to the press on 
Barak's meetings.  This would foster ambiguity and suspicion 
on the part of the Iranians, as well as the Arabs.  "We want 
to nourish Iranian suspiciousness of the Greeks," he noted, 
making the point that Israel did not trust Greece in its 
stated attempts to serve as a "bridge" between East and West. 
 The Arabs did not trust Greece either, he argued.  "They 
talk about being a bridge, but they never seem to deliver 
anything."  Finally, Moustaki noted Israel's wariness of 
selling weapons systems to the Greeks.  The Greeks were very 
interested in sophisticated Israeli weaponry, but Israel was 
concerned that what it could provide the Greeks -- given 
their growing closeness to Moscow -- might leak to the 
Russians, who would in turn provide it to the Iranians. 
 
¶5. (S) COMMENT: Israel and Greece each has its own motives in 
strengthening ties, but there are also tough obstacles to 
improved relations.  Israel opened its embassy in Athens in 
2001 and conducting joint military exercises now is a good 
indication that Israel's relations with this old EU-15 
member-state are maturing.  By strengthening ties with Greece 
and conducting joint exercises, Israel might also help create 
 
ATHENS 00000925  002.2 OF 002 
 
 
the ambiguity in Iranian minds it craves.  At the same time, 
Greece's oft-stated desire to be a "bridge" between the 
Iranians (and Arabs) and the West, as well as its recent 
moves toward Russia coupled with endemic corruption in arms 
deals, lessens Greece's attractiveness as a partner for 
Israel.  From the Greek perspective, closer ties with Israel 
help strengthen their credentials as a go-between in the 
region and might help deflect criticism for Greece's 
footdragging on Iran sanctions.  But there is long-standing 
opposition to improving ties with Israel in large segments of 
the traditionally pro-Palestinian Greek population.  It would 
be particularly difficult for the GOG to weather the storm 
created by an Israeli attack on Iran, which the Karamanlis 
government could (justifiably) be seen as having aided with 
the latest joint military exercise. 
SPECKHARD