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DE RUEHTH #0896/01 1761209
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O 241209Z JUN 08
FM AMEMBASSY ATHENS
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2048
INFO RUEHZG/NATO EU COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/CJCS WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/NAVSUPPACT SOUDA BAY GR PRIORITY
RHMFISS/COMUSNAVEUR NAPLES IT PRIORITY
RHEHAAA/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/EUCOM POLAD VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 0342

S E C R E T ATHENS 000896 
 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D C O P Y - CLASSIFICATION UPGRADED 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2018 
TAGS: MASS MOPS MARR PREL PGOV GR
SUBJECT: U.S./GREECE MIL-TO-MIL COOPERATION:  THE GOOD, THE 
BAD, AND THE NECESSARY 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Tom Countryman. 
REASONS 1.4 (B)  AND (D). 
 
------------------------ 
SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
------------------------ 
 
¶1. (C)  The U.S.-Greece bilateral relationship is facing a 
particularly difficult time, as Washington and Athens have 
differing views on issues such as the Macedonian name, the 
independence of Kosovo, and relations with Russia.  However, 
the U.S./Greek military-to-military relationship and the work 
between our law enforcement and security officials has, thus 
far, remained strong.  Given more difficult bilateral 
relations, there is a danger that the mil-to-mil relationship 
could become a casualty.  We believe our strong mil-to-mil 
relationship pays important dividends, and our goal is to 
support and strengthen it.  Thi message is designed to lay 
out the current sate of the mil-to-mil relationship 
--listing oth positives and the "irritants" we face.  It 
also lays out our recommendations for further mil-to-mil 
engagement, to try to ensure that this fundamental aspect of 
our relationship is undamaged.  END SUMMARY AND INTRODUCTION 
 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
THE GOOD - POSITIVES IN THE MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- ------ 
 
¶2.  (C)  The United States and Greece have a long, shared 
history in defense cooperation, rooted in the Marshall Plan, 
the Truman Doctrine, and the Cold War when our assistance 
helped keep Greece in the West and away from the yoke of 
communism.  The Greeks currently tend to overstate both their 
contributions and their importance to the United States, and 
there is no need to accept the Greek hyperbole. But some of 
the facts of this cooperation speak for themselves. 
 
¶3.  (S) Some of Greece's key contributions are: 
 
--Souda Bay: Souda Bay is the U.S. Navy's most important 
strategic location in the Eastern Mediterranean. A wide 
variety of U.S. and NATO operations in the Middle East and 
the Mediterranean depend on this facility in Crete. The GOG 
has proven to be a very cooperative partner at Souda Bay, 
though it does not advertise this for domestic political 
reasons.  We are not aware of any Greek restrictions at any 
time on access, overflight, or deployment of even the most 
sensitive military assets at Souda Bay. 
 
--Blanket overflight clearances:  In the aftermath of 9/11, 
the Greek Ministry of Defense has granted blanket overflight 
clearances for all U.S. military aircraft that pass through 
Greek airspace in support of operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq.  Over the last two years the total number of overflight 
clearances has averaged 28,000 per year. 
 
--U.S.-Greece Joint Commission:  The bilateral committee that 
deals with political-military issues, including relations 
between Souda Bay and the GOG, holds professional and 
business-like meetings every six months and is co-chaired by 
a MFA representative and the Deputy Chief of Mission. 
 
--KFOR:  Greek military forces are important contributors to 
KFOR; we understand they have volunteered to help patrol in 
the North to assuage ethnic Serb community concerns. 
According to the latest SHAPE statistics, Greece currently 
has 655 personnel deployed in Kosovo. 
 
--OAE:  Greece is the one of the top three NATO countries 
with troops supporting Operation Active Endeavor (OAE) -- 
NATO's only Article 5 operation that is patrolling the 
Mediterranean to combat terrorism.  Greece provides 110 out 
of a total 652 deployed on OAE.  The Greeks have provided two 
frigates, one fast-attack craft, extensive P-3 air support 
and significant logistic and staff support at every command 
level. 
 
--Lebanon:  In 2006, the Greek military was among the first 
on the scene with aircraft and ships to help evacuate 
expatriates, including Americans, several days before the 
U.S. was able to react.  In 2007, Greece donated a 
significant amount of artillery ammunition to Lebanon valued 
at USD 1.2M, in response to an urgent U.S. and Lebanese 
request.  They have also provided two ships as part of the 
 
 
UNIFIL Maritime Component. 
 
--ISAF:  Besides the 144 servicemen deployed in Afghanistan, 
Greece has contributed USD 64M to Afghanistan with another 
USD 7.5M allocated. 
 
--Iraq: Though Greece does not have any troops in Iraq, in 
2005 and 2006 they donated 100 former East German Qit 
program allowing 284 
 
 
 
U.S. naval vessels to 
visit 12 Greek ports over the last two years. 
 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
The BAD - IRRITANTS IN THE MIL-TO-MIL RELATIONSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶4. (S) Despite the long history between the U.S. and Greece, 
there have been several issues which have been a source of 
friction: 
 
-- Aegean Issues: The Turks and the Greeks have long 
disagreed about the demilitarized status of certain islands 
in the Aegean, and both sides use the disputes to seek to 
"score points" against the other.  In many cases, there are 
legitimate legal disputes between Greece and Turkey about a 
given island's status, and NATO has rightly taken the 
position that it cannot adjudicate a dispute between Allies, 
and therefore will not provide NATO support to any planned 
exercises in those areas. 
 
More recently, however, Greece has sought to challenge recent 
and specious Turkish claims that the island of Agios 
Efstratios (AE) is also demilitarized by seeking NATO support 
for an exercise including overflight of AE.  Septel will 
provide additional detail on this issue, but the Greeks 
believe the United States' recommendation, when asked for 
advice by the NATO SG, not/not to support a planned May 2008 
exercise due to Turkish threats to intercept Greek aircraft 
fying under NATO command and control -- was the decisive 
factor in withdrawal of NATO air support. 
 
-- Macedonia Name:  Greeks consider the unmodified use of 
"Macedonia" by their neighbor to the north as a usurpation of 
their heritage and warn that it could encourage irredentism 
towards Greece's northern province of the same name.  The 
popular perception, including in the government and 
throughout the Greek military, is that Skopje has been 
"intransigent" in negotiations, as a direct result of 
"unquestioned support from Washington."  At the NATO Summit 
in Bucharest in April, Greece blocked the invitation of 
Macedonia into the Alliance.  Both the United States and 
Greece were left with a disappointment, which has clouded the 
general relationship.  The common Greek perception is to see 
any unwelcome decision from Washington as "punishment" for 
the veto, which tends to make MFA and MOD less responsive to 
our requests, large and small.  To cite one important 
example, we suspect PM Karamanlis may defer any decision on 
procurement of American military equipment because he would 
likely find it difficult to defend such a decision with the 
Greek public at this time. 
 
-- Afghanistan:  Greece is underperforming in Afghanistan. 
Greece's regional caveat, limiting Greek military forces to a 
60-kilometer radius from Kabul, is high on SHAPE's list of 
impediments to effective NATO operations in Afghanistan.  At 
every opportunity and level, we have encouraged the Greeks to 
contribute more (particularly OMLTs, and helicopters) to the 
war effort and to remove the regional caveat.  In response, 
the Greeks offered an OMLT (limited to Kabul); are 
considering how they might support a Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams (PRT); have offered to redeploy a 
military medical unit; and have expressed willingness to take 
over operations of Kabul Airport.  These are all positive 
steps -- but it is not nearly enough. 
 
-- Russia:  Over the last several months, PM Karamanlis has 
accelerated his long-term project of developing closer ties 
with Moscow.  This is evident in recent deals on energy 
 
pipelines, but also in stepped-up high-level visits, 
increasing cultural ties, and Greek purchases of Russian 
military equipment.  The latter includes, most notably, 
signature on a deal for Greek purchase of several hundred 
Russian armored personnel carriers (BMPs).  The BMP purchase 
neither advances Greece's NATO interoperability, nor improves 
Greek defense capabilities, and was not recommended by the 
Hellenic military.  The Greek political leadership has often 
made procurement decisions on political criteria, so the 
purchase of Russian BMPs for criteria other than military 
necessity is not unprecedented, but it is disturbing.  In 
addition to our concerns about NATO interoperability, 
however, we are also concerned that GOG moves toward Russia 
may draw Greece into a relationship that it is ill-equipped 
to manage. 
 
--IMET:  The Greeks are disappointed that U.S. International 
Military Education and Training (IMET) funds for Greece have 
been drastically reduced from USD 540,000 in 2008 to USD 
100,000 in 2009.  U.S. military training is a highly valued 
commodity with Hellenic armed forces personnel and is 
probably the most effective of our defense cooperation 
activities.  We expect Greece to send more military personnel 
to other countries for training, with a probable concomitant 
increase in those nations' influence with the Greek armed 
forces. 
 
---------------------------------- 
THE NECESSARY - FURTHER ENGAGEMENT 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (C)  From our perspective, our mil-to-mil relationship -- 
although imperfect -- does yield results.  Our goal is to 
support it and strengthen it.  In a Greek context, this means 
increased engagement, preferably on a personal level.  In 
many fields, our cooperation with the Greeks depends more on 
personal relationships than any institutional ties we might 
develop.  Getting the Greek3 to "yes" on difficult issues 
generally requires a good argument coupled with cajoling and 
schmoozing.  The Greeks are susceptible to flattery and quick 
to be offended by a perceived slight.  As a result, we 
recommend further engagement in a few key areas: 
 
--High-Level Consultative Committee (HLCC):  Under the terms 
of the Mutual Defense Cooperation Agreement -- the 
U.S.-Greece Agreement defining the terms of our military 
presence in Greece -- we should hold an HLCC annually to 
conduct a comprehensive, political-level review of our 
defense relationship and address any issues that have been 
unresolved by the working-levels.  The last HLCC was held in 
Greece in 2006.  It is our turn to host, and the Greeks have 
made clear their interest in this political-level meeting. 
Although we are skeptical that the next HLCC will result in 
any major breakthroughs in any of our outstanding issues, it 
can set the stage for progress and will provide great benefit 
by demonstrating to the Greeks that we do value our 
partnership with them -- something that they seek and that we 
can provide at little cost.  Furthermore, there is a real 
opportunity to resolve outstanding operational issues (such 
as obtaining the permits to allow construction of an updated 
jet fuel pipeline at Souda Bay). 
 
--Joint Staff and Other Mil-to-Mil Talks: The Greek military 
is probably the most pro-American institution in Greece, due 
to our shared history and extensive ties.  Greek military 
officers relish encounters with U.S. counterparts and often 
want to have "deliverables" for such encounters.  We 
understand that the Joint Staff has proposed talks with Greek 
counterparts.  We want to commend his initiative and 
encourage additional simila contacts.  We understand that 
Greek CHOD Genral Grapsas also seeks to visit Washington in 
the Fall.  How he is received could go a very long way in 
advancing our mil-to-mil relatioship and agenda with the 
Greeks. 
 
SPECKHARDBT