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FM AMEMBASSY AMMAN
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INFO RUEHXK/ARAB ISRAELI COLLECTIVE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 05 AMMAN 001753 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/03/2018 
TAGS: PGOV ECON KPAL KISL KREF JO
SUBJECT: PALESTINIAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN JORDAN, PART 4: 
ISLAMISTS AND THE PULL OF EXTREMISM 
 
REF: A. 07 AMMAN 4733 
     ¶B. AMMAN 1466 
     ¶C. AMMAN 391 
     ¶D. 07 AMMAN 4430 
     ¶E. AMMAN 1724 
     ¶F. AMMAN 1725 
     ¶G. AMMAN 1744 
 
Classified By: Ambassador David Hale 
for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Note: This is the fourth cable of a four-part 
series examining the world of Jordan's Palestinian refugee 
camps.  Part one focused on the different categories of 
refugees, and the basic structure of the camp system as it 
exists in Jordan.  Part two examined the isolation of the 
camps - how they are largely cut off from Jordanian society, 
politics, and economics.  Part three looked at the economic 
situation of the camps and their inhabitants, particularly in 
light of recent strains on Jordan's economy.  Part four 
examines Islamist politics and extremism in the camps.  These 
cables are the result of focus group meetings with diverse 
residents of nine camps in Jordan.  End Note. 
 
¶2.  (C) Summary: The political and social position of 
Islamists in Palestinian refugee camps is nuanced and 
complicated.  Despite recent electoral setbacks, Islamists 
dominate the political life of the camps.  The appeal of the 
Islamists is due in large part to their integration into the 
social network of the camps rather than the influence of 
charities run by the Muslim Brotherhood.  Even so, economics 
is a factor that cannot be ignored when assessing the roots 
of political and social support for Islamist groups. 
Islamists have also filled a political void in the camps by 
championing the Palestinian cause.  Theories about the 
decline of political Islam in the camps are ill-founded and 
little more than wishful thinking, although there are some 
long-term trends that may allow for a political shift. 
People in the camps see support for terrorism as a social 
problem with multiple causes.  End Summary. 
 
The IAF's Base 
-------------- 
 
¶3.  (C) Despite recent electoral setbacks and public displays 
of disunity (Ref A), the Muslim Brotherhood is still the 
primary political force in the camps.  The Brotherhood's 
political arm, the Islamic Action Front (IAF), is the party 
that most contacts in the camps look to represent their 
interests.  Note:  Not all camp residents can vote.  The 
gradations of Jordanian citizenship are described in Ref B. 
End Note.  Jordanian elites have a series of theories about 
why this is the case - they assume that residents of the 
camps support the IAF out of ignorance, lack of other 
political options, or because they are heavily influenced by 
power brokers.  Yet our contacts in the camps paint a picture 
that is more nuanced and complex. 
 
¶4.  (C) Ahmad Awad, the UNRWA camp services officer in Baqa'a 
Camp, maintains that the IAF genuinely represents the 
political preferences of camp residents.  Discussions with 
residents of the camps bear this out - they talk freely about 
the solidarity they feel with the IAF's view of the world, 
both in their canned diatribes and in franker private 
conversations.  Our contacts particularly stress that Islam 
is a critical pillar of daily life, not just in the mosque 
but in the community and in the relationship with the state. 
It is clear that religion is a core element of their 
worldview - one that informs their political beliefs just as 
much as it informs their social lives.  Said Ajawi, a 
resident of Irbid camp, put it simply:  "No country, no 
people, no land...God is all we have left." 
 
¶5.  (C) Part of the natural appeal of the IAF in the camps is 
that some of its main proponents, the imams and clerics, hold 
positions of social and cultural authority and are considered 
pillars of the community.  "They are in a place of trust," 
says Abu Ra'ed Darash, a resident of Zarqa camp.  "Those who 
believe in Islam must be good people."   Government contacts 
frequently note that it is hard for them to compete with 
Islamists who can reach their target audience five times 
every day.  Note:  For example, Royal Court Chief Bassem 
Awadallah recently made such an argument to a visiting 
delegation, adding that the "mosque was more important than 
media outlets."  End Note.  Contacts in the camps essentially 
confirm this - even though contact with religious authorities 
is more often than not an interaction that has little to do 
with politics or economics.  Yet for those who are interested 
in those topics, there is ample opportunity to engage with 
the Islamist point of view. 
 
An Emotional Bond 
 
AMMAN 00001753  002 OF 005 
 
 
----------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) Equal to, if not more important than, the social 
position of IAF members is the fact that the party is an 
integral part of the social and economic network of the camp. 
 "The IAF follows the minute daily details of our society. 
They know when people get married.  They know when people 
have children.  They are involved in all of this.  They are 
experts," Awad notes.  Residents of the Jebel Hussein camp 
talk about Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities helping out 
with funeral expenses, and creating an "adopt an orphan" 
program that assists the camp's most vulnerable children to 
attend school. 
 
¶7.  (C) The IAF's use of Muslim Brotherhood-linked charitable 
organizations is frequently cited in the Jordanian and 
international media as the hook that is used to create 
electoral leverage with residents of the camps.  In talking 
to residents of the camps, it is certainly the case that the 
charities create an emotional bond in addition to any 
economic one.  The camps are tightly knit communities that 
are largely isolated from the rest of Jordanian society.  In 
this context, person-to-person contact is what drives the 
social (and therefore political) preferences of people in the 
camps.  "It is important to look at the closeness people feel 
with the (IAF) candidates," says Suzan Ladhabit of Jebel 
Hussein camp.  On the other side, residents of the camps talk 
about alienation from the Jordanian government.  Awad 
asserts:  "The government is not part of the social network 
of the camps.  They deal with the residents of the camps only 
through rigid procedures, not on a human level." 
 
Manufacturing Consent 
--------------------- 
 
¶8.  (C) This is not to say that economic considerations are 
not part of the equation.  Awad says that monetary and other 
aid funneled through Muslim Brotherhood-oriented charities is 
more than that given by the so-called "safety net" of UNRWA 
and the Jordanian government combined.  People from the Jebel 
Hussein camp talk about the restrictive, paperwork-heavy 
process of obtaining assistance from the Jordanian government 
and UNRWA, comparing it unfavorably with the targeted, 
immediate, and relatively bureaucracy-free assistance they 
receive from Islamist charities. 
 
¶9.  (C) A prime example of the perceived inflexibility of 
international aid to people in the camps is a rule (recently 
eliminated by the Jordanian government for its own 
assistance, but still in place for UNRWA) that families 
cannot receive economic assistance if even one of their male 
children is over nineteen years old and not studying, serving 
in the military, or in jail.  It was originally assumed that 
this "breadwinner" status would allow older children to begin 
work, thereby sharing the proceeds of their labor with their 
families and pushing the family towards self-sufficiency. 
Yet for families with many children, the reaching of that 
majority age by the eldest son or daughter can have a 
disastrous impact on family finances.  "If a family of seven 
kids has even one nineteen-year-old, they're sunk," says 
Salam Hamdan.  Contacts indicate that Islamist charities then 
rush in to fill this gap, propping up families who would 
otherwise fall through the cracks. 
 
¶10.  (C) Residents of the camps realize that there are 
ideological strings attached to aid flows from Islamist 
charities.  "In principle, humanitarian aid is the goal, but 
ideology also comes with it," says Afaf Mejdelawi of Zarqa 
camp.  Still, economic desperation leads people in the camps 
to take whatever they can get, regardless of what is said in 
their names as a result.  "There is simply no other way," 
says Abu Ra'ed Darash, also from Zarqa camp.  In addition, 
recipients of economic assistance from Islamist charities 
have little knowledge about where it originates.  Since the 
Muslim Brotherhood's charities receive funding primarily as 
anonymously donated zakat (alms for the poor which are 
required of all Muslims), there is rarely a connection 
between benefactor and recipient.  "We don't know exactly 
where the money (from Islamist charities) comes from," says 
Ibrahim Natour of Baqa'a camp.  "We assume that it comes from 
outside the camp, since people here are too poor to donate 
that kind of money." 
 
¶11.  (C) Residents of the camps are grateful for any kind of 
economic assistance, and have a keen sense of what money can 
be squeezed from what source.  While they bash American 
policy freely and openly, contacts in the camps are always 
careful to note that America "helps them" economically 
through its contributions to UNRWA.  They are very aware of 
the health centers and schools that American money 
constructs, and are not shy about asking for funds for future 
projects.  ("Tell Congress..." is a constant refrain.)  Note: 
 
AMMAN 00001753  003 OF 005 
 
 
One resident of Souf camp wondered why American funding 
flowed indirectly through UNRWA for refugees, but through 
direct, publicized projects for the remainder of Jordan's 
population.  "UNRWA is no USAID," he complained.  End Note. 
 
A Palestinian Champion 
---------------------- 
 
¶12.  (C) Meetings with any political contact in Jordan, 
regardless of origin or political persuasion, are likely to 
descend at some point into a fervent criticism of U.S. policy 
towards the Palestinians.  In meetings with camp residents, 
however, these speeches are based on personal experience. 
More often than not, the people of the camps use the hawkish 
talking points of the IAF when they talk about normalization 
of relations with Israel, the peace process, and a solution 
to the conflict.  While it is unclear whether the IAF mirrors 
refugee opinion or vice versa, there is clearly wide support 
in the camps for what the IAF is saying about the political 
situation of Palestinians in Jordan and the region. 
 
¶13.  (C) Contacts in several different camps realized that 
the IAF's public support for Hamas was unpopular in Jordanian 
society as a whole, but claimed that it has cost them little 
among the Palestinians in the camps.  In a discussion with 
refugees in Souf camp, it was clear that support for 
extremists played a role in their political choices - one 
contact admitted that he considered the suicide bombers who 
attacked two hotels in Amman in 2005 "martyrs," although he 
qualified his statement (likely for our benefit) by saying 
that "there are degrees of martyrdom." 
 
¶14.  (C) Oraib Rantawi, a prominent commentator of 
Palestinian origin, believes that the Jordanian government 
has essentially ceded the camps to the Islamists, while at 
the same time denying them sanctuary elsewhere in Jordan. 
"It's easy to demonstrate for the Palestinian cause in Wahdat 
camp.  But it's impossible to organize such a demonstration 
in (the East Banker stronghold of) Salt," he says.  Rantawi 
thinks that Islamists have capitalized on this strategy, 
creating a deep cultural and political division between the 
camps and the rest of Jordanian society.  In the end, Rantawi 
wonders why "members of the Muslim Brotherhood have the 
chance to contact every resident of the camps five times 
every day," yet the government has no operational 
person-to-person contact that can compete. 
 
¶15.  (C) Mohammed Al-Masri, a researcher at the Center for 
Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan who frequently 
conducts focus groups in the camps, believes that as a result 
of limiting political space for Palestinians, the IAF has 
become essentially the only option for the people of the 
camps (Ref C).  "The IAF represents Palestinians more than 
any other organization in Jordan.  There are very few 
Palestinians in parliament.  There is no 
'Jordanian-Palestinian Friendship Organization' which can 
advocate for their rights in society.  The only organization 
that is actively pushing the agenda of the Palestinian 
community is the IAF," Masri asserts. 
 
Support on the Decline? 
----------------------- 
 
¶16.  (C) The IAF performed poorly across the board in the 
November 2007 parliamentary elections, but it did especially 
poorly among its traditional supporters in the camps. 
Several theories surfaced about why this was the case - a 
split in the party, the unpopularity of the IAF's pro-Hamas 
rhetoric, or the decline of Muslim Brotherhood-linked parties 
throughout the Arab world were all put forth as theories for 
the IAF's loss (Ref A).  Yet our contacts in the camps 
attribute the IAF's declining support to one factor only - 
its inability to deliver services. 
 
¶17.  (C) Said Ajawi, a resident of Irbid camp, told us that 
residents of the camps are looking for members of parliament 
who can deliver essential government services that would 
otherwise fall through the cracks between UNRWA and the 
government of Jordan.  "People want to elect someone who will 
be able to do something.  The residents of the camps used to 
see the IAF members as good men who could accomplish 
something.  Yet when they got into parliament, they didn't do 
anything."  Mohammed Akel, a resident of Souf camp, agrees, 
saying: "Do they represent me?  No, they do not.  Their 
economic program has been a disaster." 
 
¶18.  (C) It is clear in talking to the people of the camps 
that while the assistance of Muslim Brotherhood-linked 
charities is appreciated and needed, it is no substitute for 
concrete action on the part of the Jordanian government.  Abu 
Ra'ed Darash, a sheikh from Zarqa camp, points out that 
Islamists have the ability to provide short-term aid to the 
 
AMMAN 00001753  004 OF 005 
 
 
camps, but are essentially unable to deliver long-term 
support in the form of jobs, training, and infrastructure. 
"We are looking for government action," he says. 
 
¶19.  (C) Contacts in some camps also mentioned that 
assistance from Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities is 
beginning to take on the unseemly qualities that were 
previously used by Islamists to characterize the Jordanian 
government - nepotism, inefficiency, and corruption.  "It's 
not an open door," says Afaf Mejdelawi, a resident of Zarqa 
camp.  "They prefer to support their relatives and those who 
have 'wasta' (connections) within the organization." 
Suleyman Abu Takhayneh, a resident of Sukhna camp, asserts: 
"If they come here, we'll cut off their beards."  He claims 
that the Muslim Brotherhood-linked charities selectively 
distribute zakat to blood or ideological allies.  Note: Just 
a few minutes later, however, Abu Takhayneh remarked, 
"whoever gives me more money, I'll vote for him."  End Note. 
 
¶20.  (C) Regardless of its ability or inability to deliver 
services, contacts in the camps talk about the IAF as a much 
needed check on state power.  Bajis Hueitah, a community 
leader in the Baqa'a camp, told us that people voted for IAF 
member Mohammed Akel "just to vote against the government - 
they know that he won't do anything."  Ibrahim Natour, 
another Baqa'a resident, insists that people in the camps 
"don't like decisions to be imposed on them from above" and 
see the IAF as a grassroots voice that those in the camps can 
rely upon to reflect their interests. 
 
¶21.  (C) Throughout Jordan, our contacts noted a sharp 
increase in the amount of money spent during the November 
2007 parliamentary election cycle (Ref D).  The advent of the 
businessman-turned-politician meant an uptick in the amount 
of "walking around money" disbursed by candidates of all 
stripes.  Residents of the Souf camp talked about a bidding 
war of sorts between these candidates and the IAF.  Realizing 
that the IAF candidates were politically vulnerable on the 
service front, independent candidates (who were largely East 
Bankers) stepped into the void to assert their ability to 
deliver where the IAF could not.  As a consequence, several 
residents of Souf camp noted that the IAF candidate won a 
much closer contest than usual, with the majority of his 
support coming from outside the camp. 
 
¶22.  (C) Despite the decreased numbers of IAF representatives 
in parliament, it is clear that the IAF still casts a long 
shadow in the camps, both as a result of its grassroots 
machine and as a function of its policy preferences.  Many in 
the camps chalk up the popular theories on the IAF's decline 
as nothing more than wishful thinking.  Said Ajawi says that 
contrary to popular opinion, the IAF is "not as Islamic as 
most people in the camps would like" and that residents of 
the camps are "becoming more conservative" over time. 
 
The Roots of Extremism 
---------------------- 
 
¶23.  (C) There is a clear divide in the minds of camp 
residents with whom we spoke between support for political 
Islam and support for terrorism.  Discussions with camp 
residents on the subject often produce vocal condemnation of 
Islamist terrorists and their actions.  Yet the line between 
support for "legitimate Palestinian resistance" and support 
for terrorism is less clear cut, especially when talking 
about the situation in Palestine proper rather than in 
Jordan.  Regardless of the ideology behind it, contacts in 
the camps realize that some of their friends and neighbors 
are among the "misguided".  When asked about what the 
community is doing about extremists in their midst, the 
people in the camps that we talked to were divided. 
 
¶24.  (C) The relatively closed social network of the camps 
can help to stigmatize extremism among friends and relatives, 
but residents of the camps are careful to point out that 
self-policing only goes so far.  Ibrahim Natour, a resident 
of Baqa'a camp, acknowledges that while there are distinct 
advantages of the "tight relations" between members of the 
camp community, that community is often remiss in bringing 
those tilting towards extremism back into the fold.  He 
believes that fear of retribution is behind the lack of 
self-policing within the camps - people know who the 
extremists are, but the extremists are part of the same 
social networks and are likely to know their accusers as well. 
 
¶25.  (C) Camp residents are cognizant of the internal factors 
that allow extremists to find sanctuary in their communities, 
but also realize that the problem is far bigger than that. 
Lack of employment opportunity and social despair are 
frequently cited as reasons that extremism persists in the 
camps, but the analysis sometimes goes beyond these factors. 
Contacts in the Jebel Hussein camp drew a direct connection 
 
AMMAN 00001753  005 OF 005 
 
 
between extremism and the "brain drain" from the camps. 
Salam Hamdan talks about the proliferation of geographically 
single mothers in the camps.  These women have husbands that 
work in the gulf or elsewhere, and rely on remittances to 
feed themselves and their children.  Yet in the absence of a 
strong (and present) father figure, Hamdan argues that many 
of the youth in the camps are easily led astray by the 
prospect of belonging to a social network.  Note:  Even those 
remittances may not be enough.  A 2006 study of UNRWA's 
special hardship program showed that of the families who 
receive extra financial assistance, forty-five percent had a 
female as their effective head of household - four times more 
than the refugee population as a whole.  Eighty-four percent 
of special hardship cases were dependent primarily on 
remittance income.  End Note. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶26.  (C) Diverting support away from political Islam in the 
camps will not be easy.  It will require a concentrated 
effort that deals with the economic, political, and social 
problems in the camps while creating a workable compromise 
between liberal ideals and a conservative, religious 
ideology.  Yet perhaps most importantly, it will take a 
Jordanian government that can connect to the people of the 
camps on an emotional level.  Since the 1971 expulsion of 
Fatah from Jordan, successive, resource-strapped governments 
have left the provision of services to UNRWA, while the GID 
was used to stifle any threatening revival of Palestinian 
political parties.  That left the field fertile and open to 
exploitation by the Jordanian Muslim Brothers.  With issues 
of identity still dividing Jordan, the fate of the refugees 
still subject to Israeli-Palestinian negotiation, and a 
strapped budget, the Jordanian government is unlikely to be 
motivated to take on controversy by better meeting the needs 
of its refugee population.  In the context of a two-state 
resolution, however, Jordan will have to face squarely the 
question of the identity and loyalty of Palestinians who will 
remain in Jordan, and the obligations of the state toward 
them.  International support and assistance will be essential 
for Jordan to face successfully what Adnan Abu Odeh called 
"the moment of truth."  Meanwhile, many of the refugees will 
remain on the margins, drifting further into despair, and 
possibly seeking more radical solutions. 
 
Visit Embassy Amman's Classified Website at 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/amman 
Hale