VZCZCXRO7344
PP RUEHAST RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0145/01 1511508
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 301508Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5758
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0525
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1081
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1026
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000145 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, EUR/SCE, 
PM/WRA 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PARM PREL OSCE KCFE BK HR MW SR
SUBJECT: DAYTON ARTICLE IV - CONTACT GROUP BRAINSTORMS ON 
WAY AHEAD 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: On May 15, the Contact Group (CG),  absent 
Italy and UK, met in Vienna with the OSCE Personal 
Representative (PR) for Dayton Article IV at his request to 
informally exchange views on the future of the Dayton Article 
IV regime.  Most agreed with Periotto's assessment and there 
were no decisions taken.  The CG and PR were concerned about 
the potential impact of Kosovo and wanted to avoid any hasty 
decisions.  Washington, see para 10.  End summary. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Italian Brigadier General Periotto, the 
Chairman-in-Office's Personal Representative (PR) for Dayton 
Article IV caE*1cKA 
reement. 
 
Periotto's View 
--------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Periotto began with a presentation highlighting the 
many positive "technical" accomplishments of the Parties: 
lowered equipment holdings and manpower; increased 
transparency and confidence; a lack of significant inspection 
issues; and the Parties' willingness to accept more than the 
calculated minimum number of inspections.  He then moved on 
to the "slow but positive" trends of the "political" side of 
Dayton:  NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) for all Parties 
and invitation to Croatia, and the integration into EU 
structures including Croatia's candidate status.  He also 
noted that there still are negative trends, such as BiH's 
delayed police reform, Republika Srpska's nationalism and the 
potential impact of Kosovo's UDI. 
 
¶4. (SBU) Periotto outlined several potential scenarios for 
the future of Article IV, assessing that the Parties are 
somewhere between the first two listed below: 
 
-- Negative trends continue, requiring continued Article IV 
under strong PR supervision. 
 
-- Positive trends strengthen, allowing subsequent transfer 
of ownership to the Parties, closing of the PR office, and 
the Sub-Regional Consultative Commission (SRCC) becoming an 
OSCE-related body similar to the Joint Consultative Group. 
 
-- He also listed another scenario he considered unlikely: 
an "implosion" occurs because of the withdrawal of one of the 
Parties. 
 
Contact Group in General Agrees with PR 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶5. (SBU) Germany (Richter) agreed with the PR's views on 
technical issues, but commented that the Parties' equipment 
ceilings are very high compared to what they probably would 
receive under adapted CFE.  Regarding the political side, 
Richter generally concurred with the PR's assessment and 
conclusion, with some exceptions (see below).  U.S. rep 
(Claus), emphasizing that he had no specific guidance from 
Washington, agreed with Germany's assessment on the technical 
issues and most of the PR's assessment on political issues. 
Russia (Balakhin) shared most of Germany's assessments, but 
was less optimistic about political developments in BiH, 
which still lacks future vision and remains divided.  France 
(Meyer) agreed with Germany, adding that the situation in 
Kosovo can degrade rapidly. 
 
USOSCE 00000145  002 OF 003 
 
 
 
Potential Impact of Kosovo UDI 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (SBU) Richter emphasized that Articles I and X of the 
General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
impose territorial integrity on the Parties.  This binds 
Kosovo to the Article IV Area of Application (AoA) and means 
that BiH cannot recognize Kosovo, for fear of similar action 
by Republika Srpska.  Russia began by stating that if you 
want to maintain the Article IV regime, you must consider 
Kosovo part of Serbia.  Serbia has not yet agreed that Kosovo 
is not out of the Article IV AoA. Serbia is divided and 
Serbia and Montenegro are not speeding towards the EU.  There 
are two challenges to Article IV:  Kosovo UDI and the 
announcement by US of possibility of arms delivery to Kosovo. 
 PR advisor Gabrielle Defeo (Italy) and long-time German 
military advisor Helmut Kruse (Germany) also weighed in on 
Kosovo, with Kruse arguing that no Party will raise the issue 
at the upcoming Review Conference.  The recent inspection by 
Croatia in Serbia was conducted without incident because the 
issue is above the level of implementers.  Richter, however, 
disagreed, saying that it depends upon who is in power in 
Serbia in July. 
 
¶7. (SBU) During a social event hosted by the U.S. on May 28, 
Serbian Senior Military Advisor, Lt. Gen. Milan Zaric told 
U.S. rep (Hester) that Serbia wanted to maintain the status 
quo within Article IV and did not intend to raise the issue 
during the upcoming Review Conference.  This was an issue for 
higher level to work out, and it should not affect the 
operation level, which is working well. 
 
Transfer of Ownership to the Parties 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶8. (SBU) Germany, France and Russia believe it is too early 
for this proposal and warned against "hasty" decisions.  The 
U.S. also suggested that more "tactical" ownership (i.e., 
inspection quotas and schedules) be turned over to the 
Parties now, while allowing "strategic" ownership to continue 
to be maintained by the PR.  The U.S. also welcomed any 
specific proposals by the PR, to include downsizing of the PR 
office, for CG discussion.  Periotto clarified that a 
transfer of ownership does not mean that he or the CiO is 
advocating the downsizing of the PR office and confirmed that 
Italy is ready to send a replacement for him when his term of 
assignment is over. 
 
Adapted CFE 
----------- 
 
¶9. (SBU) Periotto believes that the Parties should transition 
to the Adapted CFE Treaty after its entry-into-force.  This 
is several years away because current NATO members probably 
would have priority for accession.  Regarding the potential 
for adapted CFE accession, Richter noted this is not a 
short-term solution because EIF is at least a year away and 
accession by the Parties will take even longer.  Russia 
repeated old arguments and that there probably would be no 
movement on CFE until after the US election.  (Comment: 
Richter raised this issue with U.S. rep after the meeting, 
stating that he is worried that official Russian policy is to 
stonewall until after the US election.  End comment.) 
 
 
USOSCE 00000145  003 OF 003 
 
 
Sixth Article IV Review Conference, July 2-4 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) Periotto reminded the Contact Group that it is 
usual practice for the CG to make a joint statement at Review 
Conferences and that the both the CG and PR statements should 
be aligned.  Germany offered to provide a draft for CG 
discussion and sent out a draft on May 29 (passed to 
VCI/CCA).  Request Washington's views on the contents of the 
letter.  The U.S. suggested that it might be beneficial for 
the Parties to make a public announcement at the July 2008 
Review Conference reaffirming their commitment to Article IV, 
with perhaps the CG noting this in its statement.  The 
Parties also could, as appropriate, state their national 
desire to join adapted CFE when possible. 
FINLEY