VZCZCXRO1767
PP RUEHAST RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHLA RUEHMRE RUEHPOD RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHVEN #0136/01 1441015
ZNR UUUUU ZZH
P 231015Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION USOSCE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5739
INFO RUCNOSC/ORG FOR SECURITY CO OP IN EUR COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0515
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEHUNV/USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA 1071
RUEKJCS/DIA WASHDC
RUEHGV/USMISSION GENEVA 1016
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RHMFIUU/HQ USAFE RAMSTEIN AB GE//POLAD/XPXC//
RHMFISS/CDRUSAREUR HEIDELBERG GE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE//ECJ5-T/ECPLAD/ECCS//
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL
RUEASWA/DTRA ALEX WASHINGTON DC//OSAE
RUESDT/DTRA-OSES DARMSTADT GE
RUEKJCS/JOINT STAFF WASHDC//J5-DDPMA-E/DDPMA-IN/CAC//
RUEADWD/DA WASHINGTON DC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 USOSCE 000136 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR VCI/CCA, VCI/NRRC, EUR/RPM, EUR/PRA, SCA/CEN, 
SCA/RA, PM/WRA, EUR/CARC 
JCS FOR J5 
OSD FOR ISA (PERENYI) 
NSC FOR DOWLEY 
USUN FOR LEGAL, POL 
CENTCOM FOR CCJ5-C, POLAD 
UNVIE FOR AC 
GENEVA FOR CD 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: MOPS PARM PREL OSCE KCFE GG RS XG
SUBJECT: FSC MAY 21: GEORGIA WILL WAIT FOR UNOMIG REPORT OF 
UAV INCIDENT 
 
 
¶1. (SBU) Summary: Georgia told the FSC on May 21 it would 
defer release of the findings of the independent group of 
investigators of the April 20 UAV incident until the UNOMIG 
fact-finding team reports.  Georgia did announce that the 
independent experts--from the three Baltic states and the 
U.S.--corroborated the reliability of the Georgian radar and 
video depicting the UAV downing.  Russia replied that 
Georgia's UAVs continue to over-fly Abkhazia, which has 
"destroyed seven of the drones."  The UK reported that its 
experts believe the Georgian video to be reliable and depicts 
a Su-27 attacking the UAV.  The U.S. again urged restraint by 
all parties and asked Russia to explain its deployments of 
additional arms and combat forces to support a nominal 
peacekeeping operation.  Russia objected to the U.S. 
suggesting Russia was a party to a dispute that was solely 
between Georgia and Abkhazia. 
 
¶2. (SBU) Russia continues to push for stricter enforcement of 
the Vienna Document timelines for requesting inspections, 
although several participating States have supported U.S. 
position that a chair's statement requiring the refusal of 
untimely requests is inappropriate.  Canada does not support 
the revised Russian proposal to define the "specified area" 
for Vienna Document inspections.  Canada and Ukraine support 
the revised Franco-Belgian draft proposal for an information 
exchange and Best Practice Guide on illicit trafficking by 
air of small arms and light weapons.  The draft decision on 
the publication of Best Practice Guides moves to the Plenary 
on May 28.  A revised version of the proposed update of the 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire has been distributed. 
Washington, see para 18.  End summary. 
 
Georgian UAV Incident 
--------------------- 
 
¶3. (SBU) Georgia announced it would defer release of the 
findings of the independent group of international experts 
investigating the April 20 UAV incident until the UNOMIG 
fat-finding team had reported.  Georgia added that the 
experts, from the three Baltic states and the U.S., had 
verified the reliability of the evidence it had submitted. 
This includes Georgian radar plots and the video taken by a 
camera on the UAV in the moments before it was destroyed. 
Georgia has shared the international experts' report with 
NATO and EU countries.  Georgia has completed it s own 
investigation that leaves "no unanswered questions." 
 
¶4. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) commended Georgia for respecting 
the role of the UN, but noted that Georgia and Abkhazia had 
declined to participate in the UNOMIG fact-finding team. 
Meanwhile, Ulyanov added, Georgia continues without 
authorization to over-fly Abkhazia with UAVs.  Abkhazia has 
"shot down seven of the drones." 
 
¶5. (SBU) The UK (Hartnell) reported that its experts had 
examined the evidence assembled by Georgia, which appeared 
genuine.  The British experts believed the aircraft attacking 
the UAV was an Su-27.  The UK welcomed the UNOMIG 
investigation and urged all sides to cooperate with it. 
 
¶6. (SBU) The U.S. (KScott) confirmed that it had participated 
in the first group on international experts and that it had 
found no reason to doubt the reliability of the evidence 
presented by Georgia.  The video and radar data indicated 
that the attacking aircraft had made a high-speed passage 
 
USOSCE 00000136  002 OF 004 
 
 
from north to south before shooting down the UAV and then 
returned along the same route in the opposite direction.  The 
evidence, including radar plots and the video, indicated the 
speed of the aircraft exceeded anything in the Abkhaz 
inventory and had a twin-tail, similar to the MiG-29 or 
Su-27. 
 
¶7. (SBU) Scott said the parties and the OSCE should focus on 
the growing tensions in the region.  He noted U.S. efforts to 
urge restraint on all sides, and referred to previous U.S. 
statements in the FSC and PC on the concerns of one of the 
parties about the "creeping annexation of its territory." 
Scott recommended that the parties use the methods and 
resources of the OSCE to defuse the situation.  He noted a 
destabilizing accumulation of weapons in the region and the 
recent Russian deployments of "high readiness" combat troops 
to support a nominal peacekeeping force.  He called on Russia 
to withdraw these forces and for Georgia to avoid military 
activities that contributed to the tension.  Scott said it 
would be useful to the OSCE and the parties to know the 
details of Russian and Georgian military deployments in the 
region. 
 
¶8. (SBU) Scott noted that some claims suggested the attacking 
aircraft took off from the Gudauta military base.  He called 
on Russia to voluntarily open the base to an international 
military inspection.  He asked Russia to present any evidence 
that would refute the video to the UNOMIG investigation, if 
it in fact existed.  He urged the pursuit of a peaceful 
solution to the Abkhaz situation within the internationally 
recognized borders of Georgia. 
 
¶9. (SBU) Ulyanov objected to the U.S. reference to increasing 
tensions "between Russia and Georgia": the tensions were 
rather between Georgia and Abkhazia.  Ulyanov noted the U.S. 
had failed, despite assertions about the speed and design of 
the attacking aircraft, to identify its nationality.  He 
asked why the U.S. would challenge the provision of military 
forces to a peacekeeping operation.  On Gudauta, Ulyanov said 
the Russian Federation has objected in the past to  "military 
tourism," noting there had been two inspections recently of 
the base "shut down in 2001."  In any case, if the U.S. 
wanted to visit, the request should be directed to the 
Sukhumi authorities, not Russia. 
 
MANPADS 
------- 
 
¶10. (SBU) The Plenary chair (Estonia), noting one delegation 
still lacked instructions, announced the draft decision on 
amending the MANPADS export controls principles would be 
placed under the silence procedure until May 26 at 1200. 
(Note: Belarus is apparently still without instructions.  End 
note.) 
 
Vienna Document Inspection Requests 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (SBU) Canada and the UK supported the U.S. version of a 
chair's statement calling for compliance with the timelines 
for requesting inspections and evaluations under paras 85 and 
112 of the Vienna Document (FSC.DEL/93/08/Rev.1).  The UK 
added that it would prefer no statement, as the Vienna 
Document does not require amplification.  The U.S. 
(Silberberg) concurred that even its proposal was 
 
USOSCE 00000136  003 OF 004 
 
 
unnecessary, but recommended it as preferable to the Russian 
version (FSC.DEL/75/08/Rev.1), which would tie the hands of 
receiving states. 
 
¶12. (SBU) Russia (Ulyanov) complained that the U.S. approach 
was inadequate to address the "massive" violations of the 
timelines.  Even Russia, Ulyanov admitted, had been guilty of 
violating the standards.  Ulyanov asked if it was fair to 
penalize states making timely requests by preferring early 
but untimely requesters.  This was, he concluded, tantamount 
to "legal nihilism." 
 
¶13. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) agreed with Russia that there 
was a need for stricter compliance.  Schweizer proposed a 
modified version of the Russian request: deleting the words 
"it is understood that" from the first sentence and deleting 
the entire second sentence that requires preference to timely 
requests.  If compliance does not improve, Schweizer added, 
the issue could be addressed at the Annual Implementation 
Assessment Meeting (AIAM).  At that point, something more 
than a chair's statement might be needed, he warned.  Ulyanov 
replied waiting until March 2009 for the next AIAM was too 
long. 
 
¶14. (SBU) The UK noted the related problem of inspection 
requests not being shared with all participating States. 
Belarus (Pavlov) wondered if a requesting state that made a 
timely request could demand that it receive preference over 
states making too early requests.  Canada replied that the 
decision remained with the receiving state.  The U.S. 
suggested there may be some confusion over how to count days 
when determining of a request was timely: were pS counting 
work days or calendar days?  Also, was it possible that 
receiving states preferred early requests because they 
allowed more time for preparation? 
 
"Specified Area" for Vienna Document Inspections 
--------------------------------------------- --- 
 
¶15. (SBU) Turkey it was analyzing the Russian proposal to 
define the "specified area" for Vienna Document inspections 
at 25,000 square kilometers.  Ukraine announced its support. 
Canada (Gosal) rejected the proposal as unnecessary, citing 
the time restraints in the Document as adequate to define the 
scope of an investigation.  Ulyanov said he might feel the 
same way if his country, like Canada, were outside the "zone 
of application."  As it was, Russia believed the proposal 
would enhance implementation of the Vienna Document. 
Separately, Denmark told the U.S. it preferred an earlier 
version of the Russian proposal that included a "diagonal" 
distance minimum that defined the geometry of the specified 
area.  However, if the U.S. opposed the latest version, 
Denmark would probably not support Russia. 
 
Illicit Air Trafficking of SALW 
------------------------------- 
 
¶16. (SBU) Canada and Ukraine support the revised version of 
the French and Belgian proposal for an information exchange 
and a Best Practice Guide on the illicit trafficking by air 
of small arms and light weapons.  Russia said it was still 
studying the paper. 
 
UNSCR 1540 
---------- 
 
USOSCE 00000136  004 OF 004 
 
 
 
¶17. (SBU) Spain (Mor Sola) reported on the May 13-14 
Organization of American States meeting in Buenos Aires on UN 
Security Council Resolution 1540.  Mor Sola attended as the 
OSCE representative.  He noted much interest in OSCE 
activities to enhance implementation of UNSCR 1540, including 
the Best Practice Guide now under preparation (FSC.DEL/99/08). 
 
Best Practice Guides on Conventional Ammunition 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶18. (SBU) The draft decision approving the publication of the 
Best Practice Guides on Conventional Ammunition will be 
considered in the FSC Plenary on May 28.  Mission intends to 
join consensus unless instructed otherwise. 
 
Ukraine Melange 
--------------- 
 
¶19. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) demanded an update on the OSCE 
melange disposition project in Ukraine.  Schweizer said it 
had been two months since the MOU between the OSCE and the 
government of Ukraine had been signed.  The CPC agreed to 
brief developments at the working group meeting on May 28. 
 
Code of Conduct Questionnaire 
----------------------------- 
 
¶20. (SBU) The FSC coordinator for the Code of Conduct 
(Eischer, Austria) announced a revised version of the 
proposals to update the Code Questionnaire.  He explained 
that plain text represented the existing Questionnaire and 
new language was bracketed.  The manual of model answers was 
removed from the draft decision but would be retained as a 
technical paper for future use.  Eischer proposed an informal 
drafting meeting if there was sufficient interest expressed 
at the next working group meeting on May 28. 
 
¶21. (SBU) Germany (Schweizer) confirmed it did not favor 
reopening the Code itself, but did want to see an 
acknowledgment of contemporary reality with increased 
reference in the Questionnaire to the role of private 
security firms.  Finland and Turkey said they were studying 
the latest version of the update. 
 
Next Meeting 
------------ 
 
¶22. (U) The FSC will meet next on May 28. 
FINLEY