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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USOSCE 000132 
 
NOFORN 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2018 
TAGS: PREL OSCE GG RU
SUBJECT: GEORGIA/OSCE/RUSSIA: COMPREHENSIVE OSCE TOOLBOX TO 
ENCOURAGE PEACE AND RECONCILIATION IN ABKHAZIA 
 
REF: A. TBILISI 802 (EXDIS) 
     ¶B. MOSCOW 1298 
 
USOSCE 00000132  001.2 OF 003 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Julie Finley for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary:  With the increase in tensions between 
Georgia and Russia over Abkhazia, we understand that 
Washington is developing new proposals aimed at stabilizing 
the situation and eventually resolve the conflict (See Ref 
A).  In this context, we believe that the OSCE has a number 
of tools with security, economic, and human dimension 
elements that could contribute to the overall effort of 
encouraging peace and reconciliation between Russia and 
Georgia in Abkhazia.  This cable provides for Washington 
policy makers a menu of ideas for OSCE contributions to this 
effort.  If Washington concurs with any of the suggestions 
below, USOSCE is prepared to begin to discuss these issues in 
greater detail with interested delegations in an effort to 
seek positive measures toward a settlement while maintaining 
firm political pressure on Russia to prevent further 
infringements on Georgia's sovereignty. End Summary. 
 
OSCE as Mediator 
---------------- 
 
¶2. (C) The OSCE could assist U.S. efforts to help reduce 
tensions between Georgia and Russia in Abkhazia by setting up 
a political mechanism that serves as mediator to help 
decrease tensions and resolve the conflict.  This could be 
either a number of countries grouped around a donor effort to 
fund the GoG's peace proposals, eminent persons selected by 
the Chairman in Office, or a high visibility personality 
working under OSCE auspices to facilitate peace talks.  It 
could work alongside or instead of the Friends of the 
Secretary General.  Russia may well oppose such ideas, but 
the Chairmanship has the authority to sponsor such a process 
and include key participating States (pS) with or without 
Russian concurrence. 
 
Tools to Keep Pressure on Russia and Help Defuse Tensions 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶3. (C) The OSCE forum is ideal for keeping the pressure on 
Russia to prevent further escalation.  Permanent Council (PC) 
and Forum for Security Cooperation (FSC) briefings have 
already been used to inform pS of facts on the ground 
regarding the August missile incident or the more recent 
downing of the Georgian UAV.  We should continue to bring our 
concerns before such public forums, including by briefings 
from military experts who reviewed the Georgian UAV and radar 
data, or reports from UNOMIG on troop buildups.  To the 
extent that we can use unclassified sources or declassify 
other intelligence-derived products, we can help debunk 
Russian disinformation, and ratchet up the pressure on Russia 
by letting them know that the world is watching closely. 
 
¶4. (SBU) In addition, OSCE procedures allow for several 
measures that could be used for transparency, 
confidence-building, and conflict prevention.  These include: 
 
-- Extraordinary Exchange of Information under procedures 
adopted by the FSC in 1993.  Georgia, Abkhazia and Russia 
could agree to provide current information on forces and 
their locations in writing or in the form of briefings to the 
FSC.  (Note:  This cannot be compelled, but a Georgian offer 
would require Russia to refuse to reciprocate.) 
 
-- Use the 1999 Vienna Document to Request: 
 
a) Consultation and Cooperation Regarding Unusual Military 
Activities.  Georgia can trigger this mechanism by a request 
for an explanation of such activities.  Reply to the request 
is to be made within 48 hours.  Both the request and the 
reply are sent over the OSCE network with copies to all pS. 
It can be followed up by a call for a meeting chaired by the 
CiO. 
 
b)  Voluntary Hosting of Visits:  A State whose military 
activities concern one or more other pS may invite those pS 
and others to visit(s) in an effort to help dispel the 
concerns.  Georgia could show its openness by offering to 
host a visit to the Kodori Valley or Patriot Camp to prove 
that they are not engaged in a destabilizing buildup of 
forces, and challenge Russia to do the same at its facilities 
in Abkhazia inside and outside the UNOMIG zone. 
 
USOSCE 00000132  002.2 OF 003 
 
 
 
c)  Inspections and Evaluations: Unfortunately, the 2008 
quota for inspections and evaluations for Georgian territory 
has already been exhausted. 
 
d)  Chapter X - Regional Measures: States may undertake 
additional "voluntary" measures above and beyond their normal 
commitments under the Vienna Document.  Georgia could, for 
instance, arrange a non-quota multinational inspection, led 
by another pS, of its territory.  Such an inspection could 
include portions of Abkhazia under Georgian control (e.g., 
Kodori Valley) and could highlight Georgia's (and if they 
agreed Russia's and Abkhazia's) willingness to be 
transparent. 
 
--  (C)  PC to authorize mission monitoring officers (MMOs) 
for Abkhazia, in a mandate expansion:  The OSCE already has 
MMOs in South Ossetia.  These would be organized along the 
same lines, concentrating foremost on territory not within 
UNOMIG's zone of operations. 
 
-- (C) Encourage and support joint police training and 
community policing in the entire region, including a civilian 
police force in the Gali district as called for in the 
Ministerial Statement of 2005.  OSCE experience in Kosovo 
with Community Policing is directly relevant. 
 
-- (C) NATO Radar:  Use the NATO Caucus at the OSCE to raise 
the sense of urgency to allow NATO activation of the ASDE 
radar, linking Georgia's defense radar to NATO in real time. 
 
-- (C) Aerial Monitoring of the Zone of Conflict (or a 
greater area) by a third party, with results (either 
real-time or delayed) available to both parties.  This 
previously has been proposed by UNOMIG, and would be a 
regional parallel to the basic premises of the Open Skies 
agreement overseen by FSC delegates at the OSCE. 
 
Economic Tools 
-------------- 
 
¶5. (C) The OSCE could also resort to economic levers, 
specifically by working to: 
 
--  (C)  Establish an Economic Reconstruction Program for 
Abkhazia modeled on the ERP in South Ossetia.  The CiO could 
convene a donors conference before the next OSCE Ministerial, 
just as Belgium did for South Ossetia in 2006. 
 
--  (C)  Urge OSCE support for the Georgia plan for a 
free-trade zone for Abkhazia and support access to foreign 
markets for Abkhaz goods shipped through Tbilisi/Georgia 
proper (similar to the EUBAM effort on Moldova's borders). 
 
Human Dimension Tools 
--------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C)  Focus greater attention on the plight of refugees 
from Abkhazia:  One of the key OSCE mandates elsewhere 
(especially in the Balkans) is reporting on and facilitating 
return and resettlement of refugees.  IDPs and refugees from 
Abkhazia are part of the UNOMIG mandate, so this would be a 
coordinated undertaking. This would require a change in 
mandate for the OSCE Mission in Georgia, with Russian 
acquiescence. 
 
-- (C)  Open the long-discussed joint UN/OSCE human rights 
office in Gali district, as called for in the Ministerial 
Statement of 2005. 
 
Public Diplomacy Tools Through the OSCE 
--------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) CiO visit:  A visit by Finnish FM and OSCE Chairman in 
Office (CiO) Stubb to the area could help mobilize European 
public opinion to the problems.  Itinerary could include a 
high-visibility tour of one or more newsworthy sites (e.g., 
border control area, Georgian radar facility, UNOMIG 
checkpoint), with press and TV invited to accompany.  Press 
conference at the end of visit to present impressions and 
findings.  Follow-up visit(s) should also incorporate 
opportunities for press to accompany and report on group 
activity.  The U.S. could support CiO efforts by bilateral PD 
efforts, including wider distribution in the public domain of 
U.S. Permanent Council and FSC statements, op eds in national 
 
USOSCE 00000132  003.2 OF 003 
 
 
and European media outlets by leading USG figures, 
publication of a State Department Fact Sheet with updated 
information about the history of the Abkhaz conflict and 
Georgia's relations with Russia, and even a tour for 
journalists -- patterned after NATO journalist tours -- of 
Georgia, including entry into Abkhazi 
a, and briefings in Vienna by OSCE officials on 
conflict-resolution efforts and by U.S. and allies' experts 
on the existing technical evidence from recent 
tension-generating military incidents. 
FINLEY