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DE RUEHUNV #0309/01 1501646
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 291646Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8006
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L UNVIE VIENNA 000309 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA, IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 
TAGS: AORC PARM KNPP IAEA IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN: GETTING TO CONSENSUS ON A CHAIRMAN,S 
STATEMENT 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte for reasons 
1.4 b, d, h 
 
Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (C) P5 1 Deputies/Counselors meeting May 29 agreed to seek 
instructions on a Canadian draft Chairman's Statement (para 
13) by Friday May 30.  Russia did not have any readout from 
the PolDir phone conference.  China said it had instructions 
to "explore" the possibility of a Chairman's Statement.  The 
EU-3 clearly preferred a resolution, which Russia and China 
have ruled out, but Germany and France also see value in a 
Chairman's Statement.  The UK and France insisted that any 
statement be "tough" and "substantial."  Canada transformed 
and updated its draft resolution into a draft Chairman's 
Statement for the P5 1's consideration.  In presenting the 
draft, Canada stressed a balance between a "tough" statement 
and something that could command consensus. 
 
¶2. (C) The Canadian draft is not ideal, and could be 
toughened further, but this would come at the expense of 
Board consensus.  Tactically, however, we can propose 
stronger language to thwart efforts to dilute the Statement 
further.  In negotiating a Chairman's Statement, we would 
also need to use the threat of a Board resolution as leverage 
to secure consensus.  In many ways, a Chairman's Summary is 
more difficult to negotiate, given that any one country on 
the 35-memebr Board can break consensus.  Having P5 1 agreed 
language and support from the Board Chair and, if possible, 
the DG, would help build consensus.  The Board Chair must be 
consulted as soon as possible, though he is supportive in 
principle.  None of the NAM members currently on the Board 
are likely to raise a priori objections, but we will need to 
enlist support from South Africa, India and Brazil at the 
earliest opportunity. South Africa and India's Governors have 
both expressed concern to us about the polarizing impact of a 
resolution.  End Summary and Comment. 
 
 
EU-3 Could Back a Strong Statement 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶3. (C) P5 1 Deputies/Counselors and Canada met informally May 
29 on the margins of the Secretariat's technical briefing on 
Iran to discuss the possibility of Chairman's Statement at 
the June Board.  Based on the readout of the May 28 PolDir 
call, Nuclear Counselor noted that the U.S. had not 
necessarily ruled out a resolution but had agreed to explore 
the German proposal of a Chairman's Statement.  The objective 
would be for the Board to speak with one voice, something it 
had not done since referring Iran to the Security Council in 
February 2006.  He reminded the P5 1 that in accordance with 
the Statute, the Board, not just the Secretariat, speaks on 
behalf of the Agency.   While the Canadian draft resolution 
was a bit weak, he said the U.S. was open to a formulation 
that would support the Secretariat's efforts. 
 
¶4. (C) German DCM Kimmerling explained that Germany likewise 
preferred a resolution, if it were possible, and underlined 
that Board consensus would signal strong support for the 
Secretariat's verification efforts.  A statement would be 
another option to send a common, clear message, he observed. 
The Canadian draft was a good starting point in communicating 
the fact that outstanding issues had not been resolved, and 
urging Iran to clarify these legitimate concerns.  Based on 
the 2003 precedent of a "Chairman's Conclusion," any 
negotiation of a statement must involve the Chairman, he 
noted, and the need for Board consensus further limited this 
option.  Nuclear Counselor reported that the DG had told 
Ambassador Schulte that though he was concerned about 
divisions on the Board, a unified Board message would help 
the Secretariat's efforts. 
 
¶5. (C) France understood that the suggestion of a Chairman's 
Statement was an attempt to address Russia and China's 
reservations about a Board resolution.  French DCM Gross saw 
value in a unified Board message, and agreed that the 
Canadian draft resolution could provide the basis for a 
statement.  Since this would be the first message by the 
Board in a long time, he cautioned that it should be a 
substantial and updated reflection of the Secretariat's 
concerns as expressed in the DG report and technical brief. 
UK Msnoff said he could see value in a "tough statement" that 
all six of the P5 1 could support and promote on the Board, 
but would not accept a Board statement that had been "watered 
down to irrelevance" under pressure from the NAM.  Msnoff 
reported that the NAM is divided, with many members 
expressing frustration. 
 
Russia and China Non-Committal 
 
------------------------------ 
 
¶6. (C) Russian DCM Sergeev said he had not received a readout 
of the PolDirs call but had heard broadly that his PolDir 
agreed to the concept of sending a supportive "signal" to the 
DG.  Sergeev did not have instructions to support a 
Chairman's Statement and reiterated that Russia was not in 
favor of a resolution, which it viewed as counterproductive. 
He noted there remained nuances among the P5 1 in their 
assessments and approaches, but did not rule out a Chairman's 
Statement. 
 
¶7. (C) China emphasized the need to re-start negotiations 
with Iran on the P5 1 package, and noted that anything we did 
in the Board should be conducive to a peaceful resolution of 
the Iran issue.  Chinese DCM Liu had also heard that the 
PolDirs touched on the idea of a Chairman's Statement.  China 
had no formal position but he had instructions to explore 
this possibility consistent with PolDir discussions. 
 
¶8. (C) Nuclear Counselor expressed support for the diplomatic 
process and hoped negotiations with Iran would be 
constructive.  However, he reminded P5 1 counterparts that 
our job in Vienna was safeguards and he underlined the need 
for the Board to support the Secretariat's verification 
process.  A Chairman's Statement that was agreeable to the 
P5 1 would likely garner broad support on the Board, he 
observed.  If there were P5 1 unity, he did not expect any a 
priori objections from Board members, given that those likely 
to object were not currently on the Board. 
 
Canada Presents Draft Statement 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) Canadian DCM Wood explained that Canada's initiative 
on a Board resolution had been intended to be helpful to the 
P5 1.  In light of the P5 1 PolDir's telcon, Canada turned 
its draft resolution into a proposed Chairman's Statement 
(full text in para 13).  Canada wholly agreed that the 
language should be tough but able to achieve consensus, and 
wished it could be tougher than the current draft.  Para 4 of 
the Statement was updated to reflect the strong language of 
the DG report on the need for substantive explanations on 
information related to "possible military dimensions."  Any 
reference to "alleged studies" had been dropped.  The 
bracketed language in Para 6 on Code 3.1 was not in the 
initial Canadian draft resolution shared with the P5 1, but 
Canada supports its inclusion as the DG report referred to 
potential new violations of Code 3.1. (Note: This language 
was a U.S. suggestion. End note.) 
 
¶10. (C) Nuclear Counselor asked P5 1 counterparts to seek 
instructions by Friday, May 30 and suggested that Ambassadors 
meet that day to allow time to approach the Board Chair and 
engage other Board members as soon as possible. 
 
Reaching Out to Other Board Members 
---------------------------------- 
 
¶11. (C) During pre-Board consultations with Ambassador 
Schulte May 28, Board members, including Italy, Switzerland, 
Argentina, India, Brazil, Philippines, Mexico, and Nigeria 
agreed that the May 26 DG report was tough on Iran and sought 
to support the Director General.  Board members were aware of 
the prospect of a resolution and asked to be consulted early 
to allow time for instructions (Note: This was prior to the 
PolDir call the same day.  End note).  Italy was most 
supportive of a resolution while India, Brazil and 
Switzerland questioned the utility of pursuing one.  However, 
much depended on the content; Brazil and India (privately) 
could countenance a non-controversial, simple resolution 
making the basic point that Iran's nuclear file is not 
closed.  Separately, even the Egyptian DCM thought that a 
Board resolution was unavoidable given the tenor of the DG's 
report. 
 
¶12. (C) Meanwhile, the NAM is divided.  We were told that 
during NAM Working Group deliberations on May 28, Iran and 
Cuba pushed through a weak draft statement over several 
objections.  India managed to delete a reference to Iran's 
"excellent" cooperation but Iran fought back any effort to 
refer to the need for "continued" cooperation on the "alleged 
studies."  South Africa beat back language from Iran 
insisting that weaponization is not within the IAEA's 
mandate, though the draft statement retains a reference to 
the fact that no nuclear material has been detected in this 
connection.  Singapore had a "swath" of deletions but was 
unable to press its case as it lacks a mission in Vienna. 
Indian Ambassador Kumar expressed frustration with the NAM to 
Ambassador Schulte and gave up on reasoning with them.   The 
 
NAM statement will be finalized at a Plenary on June 2 before 
the Board.  Based on these reports, we expect that national 
statements by NAM members to be much stronger.  Mission will 
continue to work on South Africa, India and Brazil (not a NAM 
member), in particular, to build support for a Chairman's 
Statement.  South African Governor Minty advised us May 29 
not to risk a potentially divisive resolution, even as he 
endorsed the frank tone of DDG Heinonen's technical brief 
(septel). 
 
Canadian Draft Chairman's Statement 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶13. (SBU) Begin text of Canadian draft Chairman's Statement: 
 
The Board reaffirms its continuing resolve to support a 
diplomatic solution to the Iranian nuclear issue and 
commends, in this context, the diplomatic efforts by China, 
France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States, with the support of the European 
Union's High Representative. 
 
The Board welcomes the latest report by the Director General 
on the Iranian nuclear issue, contained in GOV/2008/15, and 
recalls previous reports by the Director General and 
resolutions of the Board, including the resolution adopted on 
4 February 2006 (GOV/2006/14).  The Board also recalls United 
Nations Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 
(2006), 1747 (2007), and 1803 (2008). 
 
The Board expresses its appreciation to the Director General 
and the Secretariat for their professional and impartial 
efforts to implement the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran and 
 
in relevant provisions of United Nations Security Council 
resolutions, and acknowledges the progress made in clarifying 
many outstanding issues in the context of the work plan 
agreed between Iran and the Secretariat in August 2007 
(INFCIRC/711); 
 
The Board stresses the need for Iran to provide without 
further delay all information, clarifications and access 
outlined in GOV/2008/15 and previous reports and resolutions, 
including substantive explanations regarding information 
related to possible military dimensions which remain a matter 
of serious concern.  The Board emphasizes that such 
cooperation of Iran is critical to the Agency's verification 
that Iran's declarations are both complete and correct. 
 
The Board underscores the need for Iran to take the 
confidence-building measures required of it by the Board and 
Security Council, including the suspension of all uranium 
enrichment-related, reprocessing, and heavy water research 
reactor-related activities, and calls on Iran to ratify 
without delay and implement fully the additional protocol and 
to provide the additional transparency and access measures as 
requested by the Director General. 
 
(The Board asserts the Agency's continuing right to early 
access to design information for new and modified nuclear 
facilities, as specified in Iran's NPT Safeguards Agreement 
and in the Subsidiary Arrangements which were agreed between 
Iran and the Agency pursuant to the Board Decision of 1992 
contained in GOV/2554/Attachment2/Rev.2.) 
 
The Board requests the Director General to continue to report 
on his verification efforts in Iran until such time as the 
Board deems that confidence in the exclusively peaceful 
nature of Iran's nuclear program has been established, and 
remains seized of the matter. 
 
End Text. 
 
SCHULTE