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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0290/01 1411809
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 201809Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7962
INFO RUEHII/VIENNA IAEA POSTS COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0166
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR PRIORITY 0068
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0245
RUEHWL/AMEMBASSY WELLINGTON PRIORITY 0120

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000290 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR ISN/RA AND IO/T 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/19/2018 
TAGS: PARM MNUC AORC KNPP SY IS
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA: SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE JUNE BOARD 
 
REF: A) STATE 43817 B) UNVIE 264 
 
Classified By: Charge d'affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 1.4 b, d, 
h 
 
 Summary and Comment 
------------------- 
 
¶1. (S) During a series of technical briefings on Syria May 16 
and 19, following up on discussions during his Washington 
consultations, Ambassador Schulte canvassed Board member 
views on discussion of Syria in the June Board.  Ambassador 
Schulte outlined U.S. objectives for the Board: to spotlight 
Syria's clandestine nuclear activities in violation of its 
safeguards agreement; to encourage and enable an IAEA 
investigation; and to strengthen the safeguards system 
through universal application of the Additional Protocol. 
Drawing on ref a, Ambassador Schulte explained the timing of 
U.S. disclosures on Syria, which was a key issue for many 
Board members.  Almost all Board members (31 of 35) 
participated in these briefings, in addition to NAM troika 
members Egypt and Malaysia. 
 
¶2. (S) The core like-minded group (EU3, Canada, Australia, 
Japan, New Zealand and Korea), will look to the DG's 
characterization of the Syrian case in his opening remarks to 
the June Board and favor discussion of Syria under "Any Other 
Business."  The like-minded do not want to detract attention 
from Iran in the June Board and anticipate more substantive 
discussion of Syria in September, following a report from the 
Secretariat.  Like-minded members also raised concern about 
potential blow back against Israel, and Syrian reactions in 
the Board.  In a separate briefing, other EU and GRULAC 
members agreed with the premise of supporting the IAEA's 
investigation and calling for Syrian cooperation but awaited 
the independent assessment of the Secretariat on Syria. 
Several Board members, not limited to the Arab group/NAM, 
questioned whether the Secretariat's investigation would 
yield anything if Syria continued to stonewall.  Board 
members also asked about the DPRK's reaction to the Syrian 
revelations. 
 
¶3. (S) Arab group/NAM members were predictably critical of 
Israel and questioned whether the Syrian case would be on the 
Board/UNSC agenda at some juncture.  Meeting privately with 
Ambassador Schulte, Russia was by far the most skeptical, 
arguing that the U.S. disclosures had unleashed a "dangerous 
process" that would backfire against Israel, which had 
violated international law, and the U.S.  Overall, few 
technical questions were asked at the three briefings.  No 
one directly contested the credibility of the information 
presented, including the April video presentation, which many 
had not seen. 
 
¶4. (S) Based on these consultations, and without prejudice to 
forthcoming guidance, Mission does not see much room for 
maneuver on Syria in the June Board.  We will continue to 
encourage supportive statements under "Any Other Buisness" to 
turn up pressure on Syria and to deflect Arab/NAM criticism. 
As compelling as U.S. technical presentations may be, the 
majority of the Board will look to the Secretariat's 
investigation and assessment for corroboration and political 
cover.  Absent a report from the Secretariat, there would be 
little support for a special inspection or a Board resolution 
at this juncture.  Even our closest allies do not anticipate 
Board action before September and seek to keep the focus on 
Iran in the June Board. 
 
¶5. (S) In order to build momentum for eventual Board action 
on Syria, Mission will draw on existing public information to 
conduct a public diplomacy and outreach campaign to media and 
opinion leaders in key Board member countries.  The objective 
is to put the spotlight on Syria's non-compliance and 
pressure Syria to cooperate with the IAEA.  Among those most 
susceptible to such a message, Mission will focus on European 
fence-sitters (Ireland, Switzerland), influential GRULAC 
(Brazil, Mexico) and supportive NAM such as the Philippines. 
Mission will also consider approaches for outreach to more 
recalcitrant countries such as Russia and Egypt.  End Summary 
and Comment. 
 
Like-minded Supportive but Cautious 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Following his Washington consultations, Ambassador 
Schulte outlined U.S. objectives in the June Board on Syria 
in a May 16 briefing for like-minded counterparts (UK, 
Germany, Canada, Australia, Japan, New Zealand and Korea): 
to spotlight Syria's clandestine nuclear activities and 
violation of its Safeguards agreement; to encourage and 
enable an IAEA investigation; and to strengthen the 
safeguards system through universal application of the 
Additional Protocol (AP).  On the last point, he noted that 
Syria was a textbook case of a clandestine nuclear program 
having gone undetected without an AP in place.  Ambassador 
Schulte told the like-minded that he expected the DG to 
address Syria in his opening remarks to the Board but, in all 
likelihood, not under a separate agenda item.  He hoped that 
the DG would focus on the Secretariat's investigation rather 
than on complaints about Israel and the U.S., as was the case 
with his April press statement.  That statement, he noted, 
"got it wrong" as the obligation was on Syria under its 
Safeguards agreement, not the U.S. or Israel, to provide 
information to the Agency.  He added that the Agency's role 
under the NPT was not "due process," as the DG's statement 
implied, but verification.  Ambassador Schulte also explained 
the delay and timing of the release of this information to 
the IAEA, including initial concern about a Syrian reaction 
to the Israeli air strike and concerns related to the DPRK. 
 
¶7. (S) Ambassador Schulte related next steps in the Board to 
U.S. objectives; he encouraged the like-minded to make 
statements of concern and support for the IAEA investigation, 
perhaps  under "Any Other Business", to press Syria for an 
AP, and call for a DG report by the September Board. He also 
flagged concerns, shared by the like-minded, about a Syrian 
Board candidacy and asked them to consider alternatives. 
Australian Ambassador Shannon agreed that it was important to 
say something in the Board but the legal parameters of Syrian 
non-compliance, i.e. whether this was a breach of the 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) or the Subsidiary 
Arrangements, and expectation of Syria need to be clearly set 
forth.  He contemplated whether or not to call for a special 
inspection, and argued that we need to set the bar high on 
Syria, lest the Secretariat set it too low.  (Note:  Meeting 
separately, like-minded experts, including Australia, 
discounted any chance of getting a special inspection without 
a negative DG report on Syria. End note). 
 
¶8. (S) UK Msnoff said London legal advisors saw Syria's 
activities as a prima face breach of its CSA, arguably worse 
than that of Iran which had unilaterally reverted to an 
earlier version of Code 3.1.  He noted some anxiety about 
whether the Agency would find anything in Syria, given its 
current approach, and broader concern in London that the 
Agency follow up on information provided by a Member State. 
Australia shared this anxiety about the investigation and 
encouraged a rigorous approach, even if it meant digging up 
the site.  Ambassador Schulte observed that the U.S. sought 
to support IAEA experts, and thereby disabuse any 
misrepresentations on the DG's part.  He stressed that the 
immediate non-proliferation problem may have been "solved" 
but there was still a need to investigate this case of 
non-compliance. 
¶9. (S) Canadian Ambassador Gervais-Vidricaire favored making 
Syrian statements at the end of the Board under "Any Other 
Business" so as to not detract from Iran, which should be the 
primary focus of the June Board.  Ambassador Schulte agreed 
noting that the only other option would be under the 
"Safeguards Implementation Report" item, which would come up 
before the Iran agenda item.  He also discouraged discussion 
of Syria under the DPRK agenda item and explained that the 
DPRK had not denied connections to Syria and pledged to cease 
proliferation activities, though vigilance would be needed. 
 
¶10. (S) Japan advised that the Board discussion would depend 
on the DG's oral remarks and expressed concern about G-77 
reaction and accusations against Israel.  Ambassador Schulte 
observed that the objective would be to set a high standard 
for investigation and Syrian cooperation but not to provoke 
an Arab reaction.  He reported that Israeli Ambassador 
Michaeli did not plan to engage on Syria in the Board. 
Citing the Syrian statement in the NPT Prepcom, Germany 
cautioned that we should be prepared for similar vitriol in 
the Board.  German Charge Kemmerling agreed that much depends 
on the DG's presentation and favored deferring any 
interventions to AOB so that Board members had more time to 
analyze, coordinate and prepare statements. 
 
¶11. (S) On technical issues, Germany asked for the distance 
the piping travels from the river to the reactor building, 
because the distance appeared far for such a critical 
component of the reactor.  Msnoff replied that this is in 
keeping with Syria's efforts to conceal the reactor but did 
not have information on the exact distance.  Australia 
privately asked why the briefing did not include details from 
David Albright's May 12 ISIS report on Syria.  Australian 
Counselor noted specifically that plans for the ventilations 
system and the piping with reported electrical wiring from 
the water treatment plant to the reactor site were 
particularly compelling.  Msnoff could not confirm these 
details in Albright's report. 
 
UK and Russian Perspectives 
--------------------------- 
 
¶12. (S) Separately on May 16, Ambassador Schulte previewed 
with UK Ambassador Smith, U.S. efforts to shine a spotlight 
on Syria in the Board and to seek a September report from the 
Secretariat.  Smith hoped that the UK would be able to make a 
supportive statement in the Board to encourage the 
Secretariat's investigation.  Some in London had considered 
calling for a special inspection, he advised, but doing so 
would entail greater risk if the DG was perceived as 
reluctant.  Smith complained of laziness and complacency on 
ElBaradei's part.  A reported comment by the DG to HMG 
advisor Baroness Williams in a May 9 meeting that he was 
unsure if there had been a reactor on the site, raised 
London's ire.  He further noted Russia's unhelpful position 
on Syria in a May 6 lunch with Acting U/S Rood and the 
silence of the Arab group on the subject during the NPT 
Prepcom (despite the fact that Syria delivered the Arab 
statement).  The UK also shared U.S. concerns about a Syrian 
Board candidacy and offered to intervene with the UAE, if it 
would help.  Smith agreed that Kazakhstan would be a good 
fallback, though the Kazak Mission in Vienna is a bit 
overstretched with OSCE responsibilities. 
 
¶13. (C) Russian Ambassador Zmeyevsky was equally circumspect 
in a one-on-one meeting with Ambassador Schulte May 19.  He 
noted the absence of international comment on the Israeli air 
strike in September 2007, including from his own government. 
Now, however,"through its disclosures, the U.S. has launched 
a dangerous process," one which could lead to more criticism 
of the U.S. and Israel than of Syria, he cautioned, recalling 
the 1981 Board resolution on the destruction of the Osirak 
reactor in Iraq.  Zmeyevsky observed that Syria had not 
broken any international rules whereas the U.S. failed to 
report information to the IAEA and Israel violated 
international law by bombing a sovereign state in 
circumstances difficult to justify as self-defense. 
Ambassador Schulte pushed back, citing Syria's violation of 
Code 3.1 and explained the timing of the U.S. disclosure, 
referring to the IAEA Statute's provision on sharing 
information (VIII.A) that "Each member should make available 
such information as would, in the judgment of the member, be 
helpful to the Agency." Zmeyevsky argued that the Secretariat 
should bring the issue of Syria to the Board and that the 
discussion would be all the more difficult if there is 
nothing significant to report. 
 
Arab Board Members and NAM 
--------------------------- 
 
¶14. (S) A second briefing was held on May 19 for Arab/NAM 
Board members (Algeria, Morocco, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi 
Arabia, Ethiopia, Nigeria and South Africa were in 
attendance) as well as NAM troika members Egypt and Malaysia. 
 Ambassador Schulte underscored the need to encourage Syrian 
cooperation with the IAEA investigation and to ascertain 
there are no other undeclared nuclear activities in Syria. 
He noted that the Secretariat had found the U.S. information 
credible and also explained the reasons for delay in briefing 
the IAEA.  He anticipated that the Secretariat would put 
Syria on the Board agenda at some point. 
 
¶15. (S) Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi appreciated Ambassador 
Schulte's explanation of the delay in briefing this 
information to the IAEA.  She questioned whether the issue 
could be included as an agenda item for the September Board 
if Syria did not provide access, and the Secretariat thus had 
nothing to report. (Note: During the briefing, she took 
particular note of the fact that Syria had denied the IAEA 
access in September 2007.)  Feroukhi also stressed that if 
the reactor had not been destroyed, the IAEA would have more 
evidence that it was for military purposes.  Pakistan 
likewise observed that instead of letting things go that far, 
allowing a country to go around bombing others, the IAEA 
could have been informed earlier.  Ambassador Schulte 
reiterated the reasons for delay in briefing the IAEA, and 
stressed that the U.S. understood but did not endorse 
Israel's decision to bomb the facility. 
 
¶16. (S) Egypt asked about the status of IAEA discussions with 
Syria and the potential for an agenda item at a future Board. 
 Ambassador Schulte did not expect the Secretariat to include 
an item on Syria in the June Board, but said that we would 
want one by September.  Morocco asked about the potential for 
referral of Syria to the UN Security Council.  Nuclear 
Counselor noted that the Board would be obligated to report 
Syria if there were a finding of non-compliance.  Morocco and 
Pakistan also questioned whether the DPRK had admitted 
assistance to Syria.  Ambassador Schulte clarified that the 
DPRK had been silent after the April disclosures of their 
involvement on Syria. 
 
¶17. (S) Egypt raised technical issues as to whether 
additional information was presented to the IAEA and whether 
the U.S. has information on the existence of other elements 
of Syria's nuclear program, such as plutonium separation and 
fuel fabrication or acquisition.  Ambassador Schulte 
responded that an IAEA investigation would seek to ensure 
there are no undeclared nuclear activities in Syria.  He 
noted that we fully expect the IAEA to draw on parallels with 
North Korea's nuclear complex when examining Syria's 
undeclared nuclear activities. 
 
EU, GRULAC and Other Board Members 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶18. (S) A final briefing was presented on May 19 to EU Board 
members (France, Finland, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania), 
Croatia, Albania, GRULAC Board members (Chile, Argentina, 
Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador), and Thailand and Philippines. 
Ambassador Schulte stressed the importance of supporting and 
enabling the Secretariat's investigation.  He noted that the 
Secretariat had taken the U.S. information seriously and 
explained concerns that had affected the timing of its 
release.  As with the core like-minded group, Ambassador 
Schulte encouraged statements under AOB on the need for 
Syrian cooperation and, in the longer term, implementation of 
an AP.  He advised that the U.S. expected a DG report and 
agenda item by September. 
 
¶19. (S) Finland acknowledged the Ambassador's explanation of 
the necessary delay in briefing the IAEA, calling it a "key 
issue," and stressed the importance of unconditional support 
for the Secretariat to preserve the Agency's professionalism 
and integrity.  Although she did not have instructions, 
Finnish Ambassador Kauppi agreed on the need for Syrian 
cooperation and supported the AP as the verification 
standard.  Brazil could also agree to support the 
Secretariat's investigation and underlined that it was 
crucial to get the inspectors' assessment.  Brazil asked 
about the possibility of continued Syrian stonewalling and 
focused on the violation of Code 3.1.  Philippines also 
questioned that if Syria refused access, what kind of report 
could the Secretariat provide to the Board?  Ambassador 
Schulte acknowledged that without Syrian cooperation, it 
would be more difficult, though the Board could call for a 
special inspection as it had done in the case of DPRK. 
Mexico questioned whether Syria-DPRK cooperation had been es 
tablished and its impact on the Six Party talks. 
 
¶20. (S) Switzerland argued that Board members not privy to 
intelligence must wait for the Secretariat before becoming 
active on the Syrian dossier, which would take some time. 
Ambassador Schulte anticipated that Syria would be addressed 
in the DG's oral remarks; under AOB, Board members could 
press for Syrian cooperation with the Agency and the AP.  He 
encouraged other states to provide the Secretariat any 
information they may have on Syria.  DCM further cited the 
DG's April press statement which makes it clear that the 
Secretariat sees this as a serious matter, requiring 
investigation.  Switzerland questioned what sort of 
explanation Syria could conceivably provide and whether it 
would be along the lines of Iran's "baseless fabrications." 
 
¶21. (S) France, which had been unable to attend the core 
like-minded meeting, confirmed that the Secretariat was 
committed to a full, on-the-ground investigation.  French 
Ambassador Deniau underlined that the key issue was the 
proliferation problem.  The Secretariat had expressed its 
intention to investigate, he noted, and it was essential for 
the Agency process to work.  Deniau expected that following 
the DG's oral report to the June Board, the Syrian issue 
would be addressed in substance in September.  He highlighted 
Syria's violation of Code 3.1, and noted the precedent in the 
Iranian case.  Brazil also underlined the importance of Code 
3.1. 
 
¶22. (S) Ireland shared concerns about any military nuclear 
activities in the Middle East and agreed on the need to 
support investigation of these "alleged" activities.  Irish 
Ambassador Cogan asked to what extent the United States 
verified information from Israel and whether anything more 
was known about the existence of nuclear material. 
Ambassador Schulte replied that the U.S. went to great 
lengths to corroborate all the information obtained, 
including through observations of the facility after its 
destruction, and that the IAEA investigation would yield more 
answers on the existence of nuclear material and other 
questions.  French DCM Gross also asked a number of technical 
questions: What incriminating equipment was removed after the 
site's destruction?  What is the depth of the reactor vessel 
underground?  Was the DPRK procuring equipment for a second 
site other than Al-Kibar?  Msnoff pointed to the video that 
shows specific equipment being removed from the reactor 
debris prior to the Syrian controlled demolition on October 
10, 2007, but did not have additional details.  Msnoff did 
not have measurements on the depth of the reactor and did not 
have additional information on sites other than Al-Kibar for 
which North Korea was assisting with procurements of 
equipment. 
PYATT