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Viewing cable 08UNVIEVIENNA274, IAEA/IRAN: BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY

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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin
08UNVIEVIENNA274 2008-05-13 14:29 2011-08-30 01:44 SECRET UNVIE
VZCZCXYZ0008
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0274/01 1341429
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 131429Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7923
S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000274 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023 
TAGS: ENRG KNNP IAEA USOSCE UNVIE RS IR
SUBJECT: IAEA/IRAN:  BUSHEHR SAFETY ISSUES; POSSIBLE DELAY 
IN STARTUP; NORWAY WANTS TO PROVIDE SAFETY TRAINING 
 
Classified By: Charge d'Affairs Geoffrey R. Pyatt for reasons 
1.4 b and d 
 
1. (U)  This cable contains recommendations and guidance 
requests. See paras 15 and 16. 
 
------- 
Summary 
------- 
 
2.  (S) IAEA safety officials have been reviewing the 
Russian-drafted Safety Analysis Report (SAR) on Iran's 
Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP).  Although they are being 
very tight-lipped about the results, indications are that the 
SAR and potentially the safety of the facility are 
problematic.  IAEA safety and technical cooperation staff 
will continue to work with Iran and Russia on safety issues 
and will hold a meeting in Vienna in September.  Iran has not 
accepted overtures by DDG Safety Taniguichi to join the 
Convention on Nuclear Safety.  Iran has agreed to a 
pre-Operational Safety Review Team (OSART) review before fuel 
is loaded in the reactor.  Safety officials have stated that 
this pre-OSART will not occur until spring of 2009 indicating 
fuel will not be loaded this year. 
 
3.  (S) Norwegian Security Policy Director Aas told 
Ambassador Schulte on May 1 that Norway is developing a 
project to train Iranian regulators and BNPP operators in 
safety and asked for U.S. views.  Mission recommends 
supporting Norway's proposal.   We also recommend supporting 
their efforts by discreetly making our concerns about BNPP 
safety known to Russia, Czech Republic, China, and Finland. 
End Summary. 
 
---------------------- 
Flawed Safety Analysis 
---------------------- 
 
4.  (S) The Bushehr Safety Analysis Report (SAR) was written 
by the Russians and has been reviewed and commented on 
previously by both IAEA officials and the Iranian nuclear 
safety regulator.  The Department of Nuclear Safety and 
Security (NSS) has been providing the technical experts to 
perform the review, while the Department of Technical 
Cooperation (TC) is the lead for the assistance project.  The 
revised SAR is currently being re-reviewed by IAEA officials. 
 This initial finding is that neither the IAEA nor the 
Iranian regulator recommendations were addressed. 
 
5.  (S) IAEA safety staff indicated to Msnoff that they were 
frustrated with the lack of quality of the report but would 
not be specific about their concerns.  A meeting is planned 
for September, possibly in Vienna, with IAEA, Iran, and 
Russia to discuss IAEA's concerns and the next steps. 
 
---------------------------------- 
No to Convention on Nuclear Safety 
---------------------------------- 
 
6.  (S) Deputy Director General (DDG) Safety Taniguchi had 
planned to travel to Iran earlier this year to push Iran to 
join the Convention on Nuclear Safety.  The Convention 
stresses the importance of nuclear safety and requires 
signatories to come to Vienna every three years to discuss 
their safety programs in a peer-review forum.  Sources in the 
Secretariat say that Iranian officials, although not 
objecting out right, are uncomfortable with the push to join 
the Convention on the grounds that it is just another 
non-proliferation tool.  IAEA Director of the Nuclear 
Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet, told Msnoff he believes 
that Iran is not separating safety from safeguards because 
the world is not separating the two and that sanctions are 
preventing Iran from getting the safety support it needs 
(because it could be misused).  (Comment: while UNSCR 1737 
exempts safety from sanctions, the IAEA has refused TC 
projects related to more general nuclear power programs.) 
This makes the Iranians suspicious of any purely safety 
centered argument, according to Jamet.  The DDG's trip has 
been postponed several times and is not currently scheduled. 
 
---------------------- 
Start-up in Summer 09? 
---------------------- 
 
7.  (S) Msnoff inquired about the status of possible start-up 
date for the BNPP.  IAEA officials indicated that Iran was 
eager to start-up the facility this summer.  However, TC 
staff recently visited the facility to outline their concerns 
with the SAR and found little progress in the completion of 
the facility in the last few months.  The pre-OSART mission 
which had been scheduled for September has been delayed until 
spring 2009.  Pre-OSARTs are typically scheduled 3-6 months 
before the fuel is to be loaded, indicating that fuel would 
 
not be loaded until summer 2009.   One IAEA safety official 
believes that even if the facility is not ready to start, 
Iran could feel pressure to go ahead and load the fuel; 
however, Iran's agreement to a pre-OSART next spring is a 
reasonable indication that fuel loading will not happen until 
after that point. 
 
8.  (S) When asked about the quality of the staff running the 
BNPP, the general impression among Nuclear Installation 
Safety staff reviewing the SAR is that the Iranian workers 
are knowledgeable and understand the concepts.  However, they 
are disorganized and are heavily reliant on Russian support. 
The NSS officials continue to be concerned about the quality 
of Iranian staff (at the regulator and at BNPP) and DDG 
Taniguchi and several members of his staff stated to Msnoff 
that training is the most valuable support that can be 
provided. 
 
------------------------------ 
Norway Safety Training Project 
------------------------------ 
 
9.  (S) Kare Aas, Director General for Security Policy at the 
Norwegian MFA told Ambassador Schulte May 1 that Norway has 
been working on an Iranian safety project with the IAEA. 
(Note: Msnoffs discussed this project with NSS staff and 
verified the specifics of the proposal.)   Norway has been 
providing funds to the Department of Safety and Security for 
the past several years to support safety projects in various 
countries.   Norway has now approached the Secretariat to 
develop a project for Iran using a Norwegian risk management 
company, Det Norske Veritas (DNV), see http://www.dnv.com. 
According to Christer Viktorsson from the Division of Nuclear 
Installation Safety, DNV has offices all over the world 
including Iran.  The project would involve IAEA safety staff 
working with DNV to train Iranian regulators and BNPP 
operators in safety.  Viktorsson also indicated that it is 
difficult to find experts that are willing to travel to Iran 
and this is a way to provide local experts year round. 
 
10.  (S) The Norwegian MFA and DNV have put together a 
concept for a three-year project.  A "fact finding" mission 
to Iran organized by the Division of Nuclear Installation 
Safety to discuss this project with the Iranians is planned 
for late May or early June to determine the areas in which 
Iran needs the most assistance and the best scope of the 
project.  The visit would include IAEA safety staff, and DNV 
and Norwegian experts and would be led by Christer Viktorsson 
who stated he will also use the opportunity to encourage Iran 
to join the CNS since DDG Taniguchi's trips have been 
postponed. 
 
11.  (S) The Director of Installation Safety, Philippe Jamet, 
stated that it is important for the Iranians to receive 
training from other regulatory bodies that have experience 
with these types of reactors.  Therefore, they are also 
enlisting the help of the Czech Republic, China and Finland. 
 
12.  (S) Aas asked for U.S. comments on this proposed 
project.  He said Norway is likely to also ask France for 
comments.  Aas also asked the Ambassador to provide him U.S. 
views directly or through Norway's mission here in Vienna. 
That said, both  Aas and the Nuclear Installation Safety 
officials indicated that this is a very sensitive topic.  Aas 
asked that Mission not discuss the project with other 
Vienna-based missions.  He also indicated that this is a 
safety issue for Norway, not a political one.  However, DDG 
Taniguchi and his staff  have indicated that the U.S. can 
help by having discrete discussions with Russia, Czech 
Republic, China, Finland and Norway highlighting our concerns 
with BNPP safety (without discussing safeguards) and the need 
for these countries to work to create a strong safety 
regulator, a strong safety culture, and ensure the facility 
is safe before it is allowed to operate. 
 
13.  (S) Installation Safety informed Msnoff that this 
project is not being run by the Technical Cooperation (TC) 
Department.  Instead, the Norwegians are giving the money 
directly to the Department of Safety and Security; therefore, 
it is a safety project and not a TC project.  (Comment: 
considering safety staff's reticence about the review of the 
SAR, it is not clear if DDG Taniguchi will inform the Board 
of his concerns about safety in Iran.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
14.  (S) The Department of Safety and Security is clearly 
concerned about the safety of BNPP, and is working with 
several countries, including Russia, Czech Republic, Finland 
and Norway to find ways to help increase the safety of the 
facility and train the regulating and operating staff. 
 
Mission agrees with IAEA safety staff, that it is vitally 
important for BNPP to be operated safety because "an accident 
anywhere is an accident everywhere." We also understand their 
concern that providing information to the U.S., could 
politicize the safety work and somehow connected to 
non-proliferation concerns.  Mission agrees with need to 
maintain our distance from the safety aspects of Bushehr in 
order to avoid further politicizing the issue.  Working 
through neutral entities like the IAEA and Norway we can 
engage in some delicate diplomacy to prevent a premature 
start-up of Bushehr. 
 
------------------------------------ 
Recommendation and Guidance Requests 
------------------------------------ 
 
15.  (S) Mission recommends that the U.S. support the 
Norwegian proposal. Mission requests guidance on 
responding to Mr. Aas' request for U.S. views on the 
Norwegian project. 
 
16. (S) Mission also recommends that the U.S. discreetly 
discuss U.S. safety concerns with the BNPP with Russia, Czech 
Republic, China, Finland, and encourage to work with Iran to 
improve safety at the reactor.  These discussions should not 
take place in Vienna. 
PYATT