VZCZCXYZ0014
OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHUNV #0264/01 1291532
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
O 081532Z MAY 08
FM USMISSION UNVIE VIENNA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7892
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY 0699
RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 0631
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 0056
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0944
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY 0693
RUEHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY 0791
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 0236
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV PRIORITY 0199
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 0544

S E C R E T UNVIE VIENNA 000264 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/09/2018 
TAGS: IAEA AROC ENRG KNNP MNUC TRGY SY IS
SUBJECT: IAEA/SYRIA:  THE CASE OF THE MISSING REACTOR 
 
Classified By: CDA, GEOFFREY R. PYATT FOR REASONS 1.4 (h) 
 
Summary, Guidance Request and Recommendation 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶1.  (S) The Syria Al-Kibar nuclear-reactor storm passed 
quickly over Vienna the week of April 21 when the USG made 
public information about the reactor and the Israeli attack, 
and briefed the IAEA Secretariat on our information.  Syria 
immediately circulated a letter to Arab Group members denying 
there was a nuclear reactor and reminding them of U.S. 
intelligence failures in Iraq.  In a press release, DG 
ElBaradei expressed his unhappiness about both the Israeli 
attack and the delay in informing the Secretariat.  However, 
he took the allegations on Syria seriously, cited a potential 
safeguards violation, and promised an investigation.  The 
press quickly lost interest in a story they had initially 
reported last September and like-minded Vienna missions are 
now wondering what action, if any, the Board should take. 
 
¶2.  (S) The next Board of Governor's meeting will be held in 
Vienna June 2-6.  Even if the Secretariat does not formally 
add Syria to the meeting agenda, we expect the DG to address 
the issue and Board members to comment under "Any Other 
Business."  While the U.S. could place Syria on the agenda 
based on our own publicly released information, such a move 
would be extremely controversial given Syria's denials to the 
Arab Group and the neuralgia occasioned by the Israeli 
attack.  Absent a strong report from the DG, it is unlikely 
that we would achieve an acceptable Board decision either 
condemning Syria or demanding an investigation, particularly 
if the DG has already informed the Board that the Secretariat 
is investigating.  Furthermore, our principal focus for the 
June Board will be Iran's ongoing safeguards violations and 
current proliferation threat.  There is a potential tradeoff 
between aggressively pursuing the Syrian case and building 
Board consensus for a resolution on Iran in the June Board. 
 
¶3.  (S) Therefore, Mission recommends that we let the 
Secretariat's inspection play out, at least in the short 
term.  We are confident that Safeguards DDG Heinonen's 
inspectors will do what they can to get to the bottom of 
Syria's nuclear program, and we will help them, even if our 
confidence in the DG's handling of Syrian non-compliance is 
less absolute.  When inspectors reach a point at which they 
determine there has been a safeguards failure and/or raise 
major unanswered questions about Syria's nuclear activities, 
the Board will be informed and can act.  Depending on the 
level of Syrian cooperation, this could take some time.  In 
the meantime, we recommend that the U.S. provide a more 
detailed briefing to Board members in Vienna prior to the 
June Board, and that we make a strong national statement on 
Syria for the record under "Any Other Business" in the June 
Board meeting.  End Summary, Guidance Request, and 
Recommendation. 
 
State of Play in Vienna 
----------------------- 
 
¶4.  (S) After a flurry of excitement following the April 23 
press stories confirming the existence of the Al-Kibar 
reactor and the Israeli attack, and the subsequent release of 
the video, the issue has quieted down in Vienna.  The Arabs 
did not make any of the expected protestations following the 
April 23 revelations principally because, we were told, Syria 
immediately circulated a letter to them denying there was a 
nuclear reactor and reminding them of U.S. intelligence 
failures in Iraq.  We have also heard, unsurprisingly, that 
the Arab Group has not discussed the Syrian issue. 
 
¶5.  (S) The DG issued a press release April 25 (e-mailed to 
Washington offices) noting the Secretariat had received the 
information we provided and that it will investigate its 
veracity.  (Note: Mission is in contact DDG Heinonen and 
stands ready to assist on any IAEA investigations in Syria. 
We are encouraged by the steps the Secretariat has taken to 
date, which demonstrate that it is taking the matter 
seriously.  Heinonen advised Acting U/S Rood on May 6 
(reported septel) that he hoped to have something to report 
to the June Board, contingent on Syrian cooperation.  End 
note.)  The DG's April 25 press release made clear that Syria 
has an obligation to report the planning and construction of 
any nuclear facility.  ElBaradei also took the opportunity to 
deplore the delay in providing the information and to point 
out that Israel's attack undermined the IAEA's verification 
efforts. 
 
¶6.  (S) Like-minded counterparts in Vienna wonder about the 
timing of the release of the information.  Mission has 
provided all the public information available.  For our 
closest allies, we have also provided much of the background 
information available to the press.  We have furthermore 
pointed to the IAEA investigation, explaining that this is 
now a matter for the Secretariat to investigate and report to 
the Board in due course. 
 
¶7.  (S) To keep Syria on the front burner, we may want to 
consider a U.S. briefing to Board members, similar to what 
was provided in capitals.  Many of the Vienna Missions, 
including Arab states, lack a clear understanding of the 
Syrian case or have not been briefed by capitals.  A 
Secretariat technical briefing would be optimal, but it may 
take some time before the Safeguards Department is prepared 
to present its conclusions on the Syrian information.  In the 
meantime, Mission will continue to draw from public domain 
information to explain the facts to Vienna missions. 
 
Israel's Point of View 
---------------------- 
 
¶8.  (S) Unlike Iran, Syria does not appear to pose an urgent 
proliferation problem.  In effect, Israel has solved the 
proliferation problem for the international community. 
Israeli Ambassador Michaeli shared his personal assessment 
with Ambassador Schulte on May 2 that unless there was 
something he was not aware of, the matter could now be left 
to the Secretariat as "there was no horse to kill."  He 
believed the Secretariat should conduct any technical 
briefing since there was "no benefit to us doing it." 
Michaeli further explained that Israel handled Syria in the 
way that it did because of the DG's unsatisfactory handling 
of Iran's nuclear program.  He also noted that Israel had not 
breached any legal or safety obligations under the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, as some may 
allege, because no nuclear material had been introduced in 
the Syrian reactor. 
 
A Safeguards Violation 
---------------------- 
 
¶9.  (S) Information about a clear safeguards violation 
(failure to provide early design information about a nuclear 
facility) is now in the public domain and in the hands of the 
safeguards inspectors.  The DG has said as much, pending 
verification, in his press release.  Beyond the 
design-information violation, the public information points 
to the possibility of unsafeguarded nuclear material.  Since 
a safeguards investigation is already underway, the Board 
does not need to call for one.  Per the IAEA Statute (12C), 
the Board can only make a finding of non-compliance based on 
a report from the DG.  The DG will, therefore, report to the 
Board on the basis of the safeguards investigation at some 
juncture.  At the very least, for the June Board, he is 
likely to note in his opening remarks the receipt of 
information that has prompted the investigation.  If Syria 
stonewalls in the next few weeks, the DG may note that as 
well.  If Syria does not cooperate with the Secretariat in 
due course, the DG may demand a special inspection (although 
the Secretariat has historically been allergic to invoking 
its special inspection authority); if Syria refuses, the DG 
may bring that refusal to the Board.  The Board could call on 
Syria to cooperate and resolve outstanding issues, but it 
would do so only based on a DG report. 
 
June Board Deliberations on Syria 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶10.  (S) The June 2-6 Board of Governor's meeting has a heavy 
agenda.  The June meeting traditionally focuses on the annual 
Safeguards Implementation Report (SIR) which describes in 
general the Secretariat's safeguards conclusions for Calendar 
year 2008.  This report is a comprehensive evaluation of the 
safeguards system and contains the safeguards "conclusions" 
about declared nuclear material remaining in peaceful use for 
all countries with safeguards agreements.  The 2007 report 
only singled out Iran as a potential problem.  We have been 
told that the report will not mention Syria by name.  The SIR 
 agenda sub-item is an opportunity for Member States to 
comment on the safeguards system in general. 
 
¶11.  (S) Iran also is a sub-item under the verification 
agenda item.  Apart from consideration of the DG's latest 
report required by the UNSC, Mission is discussing the 
possibility of a long-overdue Iran resolution with 
like-minded and P5 1 counterparts.  The June meeting could 
also debate major US policy initiatives, including Reliable 
Access to Nuclear Fuel, and the India Safeguards Agreement, 
although these are not yet on the agenda and may not be ready 
for decision at that time.  In the mix, Syria will definitely 
be discussed, but it is unlikely that the Board will be in a 
position to make any decisions. 
 
¶12.  (S) If Syria were to be discussed under a specific 
agenda item, it would have to be placed as another sub-item 
under the verification item, along with the SIR, DPRK and 
Iran.  In accordance with the Rules of Procedure for the 
Board of Governors, an item may be added to the agenda at the 
request of the Director General or by any Member of the 
Agency.  In practice, however, the Board would look to and 
expect the Director General to request an agenda item on 
Syria.  There is no recent precedent of a Member State having 
placed such a Safeguards item on the agenda.  Some of our EU 
counterparts have informally discussed the idea of a Syria 
agenda item, and Australia has expressed particular 
irritation with the DG's press statement on Syria, but it is 
unlikely that any of them would step forward to propose a 
formal agenda item.  UK and French Mission counterparts are 
inclined to leave Syria to "Any Other Business."  An official 
in the office of Policy-Making Organs advised that there are 
no plans for the Direct 
or General to add Syria to the agenda, "for the time being." 
 
¶13.  (S) Absent a separate agenda item, the best options for 
coordinating statements on Syria would be under either the 
existing SIR item, or under the final "Any Other Business" 
discussion.  While the latter is the traditional place for 
Member States to comment on the issues in the DG's opening 
statement which are not on the agenda, the SIR would be a 
possible place to focus on the Syria's safeguards failures, 
in the context of the Safeguards system.  (In the Iran case, 
several Board members and the EU made statements under "Any 
Other Business" following the DG's remarks in the March 2003 
Board.)  Either way, we and others would certainly want to 
support a robust investigation.  Highlighting the continuing 
problem of undeclared nuclear facilities, we would also want 
to call for universalization of the additional protocol. 
Mission recommends approaching like-minded counterparts to 
coordinate such a discussion on Syria. 
 
Potential Pitfalls:  Another Osirak? 
------------------------------------- 
 
¶14.  (S) As the DG's press statement demonstrates, any 
discussion of Syria will risk some blowback against Israel 
and the United States.  The DG's statement views Israel's 
unilateral use of force "as undermining the due process of 
verification that is at the heart of the non-proliferation 
regime."  In a preview of what we will hear at the Board, 
during a P5 1 discussion with Acting U/S Rood May 6 Russian 
Ambassador Zmeyevsky refused to admit there was a reactor. 
"If we are going to discuss this issue," he added, "we have 
other dimensions to address since Israel violated 
international law both by bombing a sovereign state and by 
bombing a nuclear facility under the terms of the Convention 
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material.  He refused 
to agree with U/S Rood's point that Syria is the culprit as 
the result of its noncompliance.  Also the Chair of the Arab 
group in Vienna, Algerian Ambassador Feroukhi, cautioned 
Ambassador Schulte on May 2 about Arab sensitivities on the 
U.S. singling out Syria giv 
en the "double standard" with Israel. 
 
¶15.  (S) Although Syria's continued denials that the facility 
in question was a nuclear reactor make it difficult to 
condemn Israel, Arab countries and others will seek to 
denounce Israel's unilateral actions and draw inevitable 
parallels to the 1981 Israeli bombing of the Osirak reactor 
in Iraq.  Israeli Ambassador Michali also believes that 
Syrian denials would not stop Arab states from condemning 
Israel.  Michaeli told Ambassador Schulte May 2 that Israel 
will be prepared to respond to any such comments on the part 
of Board members or the DG.  If the Board eventually 
considers a resolution on Syrian non-compliance, the Arab 
group would likely insist on language denouncing Israel's 
unilateral action and the failure to provide the information 
to the IAEA sooner. 
 
¶16.  (S) Clearly, the Syrian and Iraqi cases are not 
commensurate.  Osirak was a declared IAEA-safeguarded 
reactor, destruction of which prompted the Board's immediate 
condemnation.  Times have also changed.  Suspicions about 
Iraq's nuclear program were ultimately proven true a decade 
later after the Gulf War, and other cases of undeclared 
nuclear facilities have since surfaced in South Africa, Iran, 
Libya and the DPRK.  The Additional Protocol, which Syria has 
not signed, is now available to deter undeclared facilities. 
 
¶17.  (S) The United States will not be spared in any Board 
discussion of the Syrian case.  The DG's statement deplores 
the fact that the information was not provided to the Agency 
in a timely matter so that it may fulfill its NPT 
responsibilities.  We can expect more of the same from the DG 
in any remarks to the Board and those of NAM and Arab group 
members.  While the U.S. can argue that the information was 
not ours to disclose, doing so further exposes Israel to 
criticism.  Citing U.S. concerns at the time about a 
disclosure prompting a Syrian counterattack, may help dampen 
some criticism. However, Arab states will continue to argue 
that Israel's "unprovoked" aggression, and by extension, U.S. 
"complicity", violated the UN Charter. 
 
¶18.  (S) In sum, we believe based on our extensive 
discussions with the IAEA Secretariat that the agency has 
taken our information seriously and recognized the challenge 
to the safeguards system that Syria represents.  Given this, 
and of the likelihood of a trade off with other objectives 
for the June BOG, we advise remaining in the background, 
rather than pushing for a Syrian agenda item and resolution 
at this stage. 
PYATT