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ARAB LEAGUE COLLECTIVE IMMEDIATE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 057532 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/29/2017 
TAGS: OVIP RICE CONDOLEEZZA PREL PHSA SP LE IR GG
CU, KV 
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 5/19 MEETING WITH SPANISH FM 
MORATINOS 
 
¶1. (U) CLASSIFIED BY: EUR A/S DANIEL FRIED, REASONS; 1.4 
(B) AND (D). 
 
¶2.  (U) MAY 19, 2008, 3:00 P.M., SECRETARY'S OFFICE 
 
¶3.  (U) PARTICIPANTS: 
 
UNITED STATES 
------------- 
THE SECRETARY 
EUR A/S DANIEL FRIED 
PA A/S SEAN MCCORMACK 
S EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT STEVE BEECROFT 
EUR ELAINE SAMSON (NOTETAKER) 
 
SPAIN 
----- 
FOREIGN MINISTER MIGUEL ANGEL MORATINOS 
AMBASSADOR CARLOS WESTENDORP 
CHIEF OF STAFF JAVIER SANCHO 
DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER ANGEL LOSSADA 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EUROPE AND NORTH AMERICA JOSE PONS 
DIRECTOR GENERAL FOR EXTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS MANUEL CACHO 
DCM JOSE PASCUAL MARCO 
 
¶4.  (C) SUMMARY:  SPANISH FOREIGN MINISTER MORATINOS MET 
WITH SECRETARY RICE MAY 19 TO DISCUSS ISSUES WHERE THE 
UNITED STATES AND SPAIN MIGHT BE ABLE TO COOPERATE MORE 
CLOSELY, TO START A "NEW CHAPTER" IN BILATERAL RELATIONS 
WITH A SECOND ZAPATERO TERM.  THEY DISCUSSED CURRENT 
LEBANESE DEVELOPMENTS, INCLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF SPAIN 
DESIGNATING HIZBALLAH AS A TERRORIST ORGANIZATION. 
MORATINOS SAID SPAIN WOULD HAVE TO THINK ABOUT WHAT EFFECT 
A DESIGNATION MIGHT HAVE ON SPANISH TROOPS IN UNIFIL. 
MORATINOS AGREED WITH THE SECRETARY THAT HIZBALLAH HAD GONE 
TOO FAR, ADDING THAT IT MIGHT SUFFER REAL FALL-OUT FROM ITS 
EXTREME ACTIONS.  MORATINOS SAID THE UNITED STATES COULD 
COUNT ON SPAIN IN ITS EFFORTS WITH THE ISRAELIS AND 
PALESTINIANS, SAYING THEY TRUSTED HIM AND HE KNEW THE 
PALESTINIANS WOULD "MAKE THE DEAL."  ON CUBA, MORATINOS 
SAID THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN MUST TRUST EACH OTHER THAT 
ALTHOUGH OUR POLICIES DIFFERED, THEY WERE NOT MEANT TO 
OPPOSE THE OTHER.  HE ASSERTED THAT SPAIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS 
DIALOGUE WITH CUBA HAD RESULTED IN THE RELEASE OF POLITICAL 
PRISONERS AND THAT SPAIN CONTINUED TO SUPPORT DISSIDENTS. 
MORATINOS THANKED THE USG FOR ITS ASSISTANCE AFTER THE 
ATTACK BY PIRATES ON A SPANISH FISHING VESSEL OFF SOMALIA. 
HE DELIVERED A NON-PAPER DETAILING SPAIN?S EFFORTS ON 
PIRACY AND RELAYED SPAIN'S STRONG SUPPORT OF A U.S. ANTI- 
PIRACY RESOLUTION IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL.  THEY ALSO 
DISCUSSED SERBIA AND KOSOVO, GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA, AND SPAIN'S 
CANDIDACY FOR THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL.  END SUMMARY. 
 
LEBANON 
------- 
 
¶5.  (C) FM MORATINOS TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT HE HAD 
RECEIVED A GOOD REPORT ON THE ARAB LEAGUE TALKS IN DOHA ON 
THE SITUATION IN LEBANON.  THE SECRETARY SAID SHE WAS 
ENCOURAGED BY THE SERIOUSNESS WITH WHICH THE PARTIES SEEMED 
TO BE TAKING THE TALKS AND THE FACT THAT THEY WERE NOT 
TALKING PUBLICLY TRYING TO SEEK ADVANTAGE BY EXERTING 
PUBLIC PRESSURE.  THE GOAL FOR LEBANON WAS TO KEEP BUILDING 
AN ARMY AND ELECT A PRESIDENT.  THE SECRETARY ASKED WHY 
SPAIN WOULD NOT DESIGNATE HIZBALLAH A TERRORIST 
ORGANIZATION NOW.  IT WAS TIME TO SEND A STRONG SIGNAL TO 
SYRIA AND IRAN THAT SUPPORT OF HIZBALLAH AND MEDDLING IN 
LEBANON HAD GONE TOO FAR.  THE SECRETARY STRESSED THAT IRAN 
AND SYRIA WERE TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE INDECISION AND 
DISORGANIZATION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO STRIKE IN 
LEBANON.  MORATINOS SAID HE WAS CONCERNED IF SPAIN 
DESIGNATED HIZBALLAH, IT MIGHT START A WAR IN LEBANON.  HE 
CITED SPAIN'S 1,100 TROOPS IN UNIFIL AND NOTED SPAIN HAD TO 
 
STATE 00057532  002 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 5/19 MEETING WITH SPANISH FM 
MORATIN 
THINK ABOUT THE IMPACT A DESIGNATION COULD HAVE ON ITS 
TROOPS.  MORATINOS AGREED THAT HIZBALLAH HAD GONE FAR 
OVERBOARD THIS TIME, AND SPECULATED THAT THOSE ACTIONS 
COULD REBOUND ON HIZBALLAH.  CLOSING THE AIRPORT AND 
MAINTAINING A PRIVATE COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK WERE 
COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE, AND MORATINOS BLAMED IRAN FOR 
SUPPORTING HIZBALLAH'S ACTIONS.  THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT 
WE DID NOT HAVE MANY TOOLS TO USE IN DEALING WITH IRAN. 
MORATINOS ASKED IF THE SANCTION PACKAGE ON IRAN IN THE UN 
SECURITY COUNCIL WAS THE SAME AS PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED.  THE 
SECRETARY CONFIRMED IT WAS THE SAME AND SAID THE TIMING FOR 
SUBMITTING IT FOR A VOTE WAS NOT YET DECIDED.  SHE TOLD 
MORATINOS THAT FRIENDLY COUNTRIES IN THE MIDDLE EAST WERE 
VERY CONCERNED ABOUT IRAN.  MORATINOS SAID THAT SPAIN WOULD 
LOOK SERIOUSLY AT DESIGNATING HIZBALLAH. 
 
ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN NEGOTIATIONS 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶6.  (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT PRESIDENT BUSH, DURING HIS 
RECENT TRIP TO THE MIDDLE EAST, HAD SPENT EXTENSIVE TIME 
WITH ISRAELI AND PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY LEADERS ENCOURAGING 
PROGRESS TOWARD AN AGREEMENT.  THE SECRETARY SAID THAT 
ALTHOUGH AN AGREEMENT WAS NOT YET AT HAND, IT WAS CLOSER. 
THE ISRAELIS REALLY WANTED AN AGREEMENT, BUT THE PROBLEM 
MIGHT BE ON THE PALESTINIAN SIDE, WHERE ABU MAZEN HAD SOME 
HARD DECISIONS TO MAKE, ESPECIALLY ON THE REFUGEE ISSUE. 
 
¶7.  (C) MORATINOS TOLD THE SECRETARY THAT THE U.S. COULD 
COUNT ON SPAIN IN ITS EFFORTS, AND NOTED HIS RELATIONS OF 
TRUST WITH ISRAELIS AND PALESTINIANS.  HE ASSURED THE 
SECRETARY THAT HE KNEW FROM HIS CLOSE CONTACTS WITH THE 
PARTIES THAT THEY WERE MAKING PROGRESS ON ALL MATTERS.  HE 
SAID HE COULD NOT GO INTO DETAILS, BUT PALESTINIANS "WILL 
MAKE THE DEAL."  MORATINOS ASSESSED THAT WHEN IT WAS CLEAR 
THERE WOULD BE AN AGREEMENT, ABU MAZEN WOULD HAVE TO TAKE 
IT AND PRESENT IT TO THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE FOR APPROVAL IN 
A REFERENDUM.  HE CONCLUDED THAT ABU MAZEN DID NOT WANT TO 
BE SEEN AS AN OBSTRUCTIONIST LIKE ARAFAT.  SPAIN WAS 
WILLING TO TELL THE PALESTINIANS THAT THEY COULD NOT DELAY, 
AND MORATINOS SAID HE FELT VERY POSITIVE THAT NEGOTIATIONS 
WOULD PROCEED. 
 
¶8.  (C) THE SECRETARY NOTED THAT THE PALESTINIAN AUTHORITY 
WAS FACING BUDGET SHORTFALLS AGAIN, AND EXPRESSED 
FRUSTRATION THAT THE SAUDIS HAD PLEDGED OVER $700 MILLION, 
BUT DISBURSED ONLY $64 MILLION SO FAR.  MORATINOS POINTED 
OUT THAT SPAIN DISBURSED $20 MILLION IN JANUARY AND WOULD 
DISBURSE ANOTHER $15 MILLION SOON.  MORATINOS REPORTED THAT 
KING JUAN CARLOS WAS TRAVELING TO UAE, KUWAIT, AND SAUDI 
ARABIA THE LAST WEEK OF MAY, AND THE KING "HAD A WAY OF 
TALKING TO" KING ABDULLAH THAT HE FELT WOULD CONVINCE 
SAUDIA ARABIA TO RELEASE ADDITIONAL FUNDS TO THE PA. 
 
 
CUBA 
---- 
 
¶9.  (SBU) MORATINOS BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HE KNEW THE UNITED 
STATES WAS NOT CONVINCED BY SOME OF THE POST-FIDEL CASTRO 
CHANGES IN CUBA, BUT THAT SPAIN SAW SOME POSITIVE SIGNS AND 
MOVEMENT.  HE SAID THE TWO COUNTRIES HAD TO TRUST EACH 
OTHER ON THIS ISSUE.  THE UNITED STATES NEEDS TO TRUST THAT 
SPAIN DID NOT HAVE A CUBA POLICY THAT WAS DANGEROUS TO THE 
INTERESTS OF THE UNITED STATES OR THE CUBAN PEOPLE, AND 
U.S. POLICY ON CUBA IS NOT ANTI-SPAIN.  MORATINOS SAID THAT 
SPAIN'S HUMAN RIGHTS DIALOGUE WITH CUBA HAD BORNE RESULTS. 
MANY POLITICAL PRISONERS HAVE BEEN RELEASED, INCLUDING A 
NUMBER WHO ARE NOW LIVING IN SPAIN, AND THE GOS UNDERSTOOD 
THAT TWO OR THREE MORE CUBAN POLITICAL PRISONERS WOULD BE 
ALLOWED TO GO TO SPAIN SOON FOR MEDICAL TREATMENT.  SPAIN 
BELIEVED THAT THROUGH DIALOGUE AND ENGAGEMENT CHANGES IN 
CUBA WOULD COME MORE QUICKLY.  MORATINOS NOTED THAT SPAIN 
WAS MEETING WITH DISSIDENTS IN CUBA AND SUPPORTING THEM. 
THE SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THE UNITED STATES DID NOT 
DISMISS THE CHANGES IN CUBA, BUT THEY WERE SMALL CHANGES. 
WE NEEDED TO PRESS THE REGIME TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF THE 
POTENTIAL OF THESE CHANGES, AND TO MAKE THEM A REALITY FOR 
ALL CUBANS IN THEIR EVERYDAY LIVES.  FOR EXAMPLE, CUBANS 
 
STATE 00057532  003 OF 003 
 
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S 5/19 MEETING WITH SPANISH FM 
MORATIN 
WERE NOW ALLOWED TO OWN CELL PHONES, BUT MOST COULD NOT 
AFFORD THEM.  THE GOC NEEDS TO ALLOW CUBANS TO RECEIVE 
MONEY FROM RELATIVES ABROAD, SO THEY HAVE THE MONEY TO BUY 
CELL PHONES.  THE SECRETARY ADVISED MORATINOS THAT 
PRESIDENT BUSH WOULD BE MAKING A MAJOR SPEECH ON CUBA ON 
MAY 21, AND WOULD STRESS THESE POINTS. 
 
SERBIA AND KOSOVO 
----------------- 
 
¶10.  (C) MORATINOS REPORTED THAT SPAIN WAS WORKING WITH THE 
EUROPEAN SOCIALISTS TO CONVINCE THE SERBIAN SOCIALIST PARTY 
TO MOVE TO A MORE MODERATE POSITION AND TO COOPERATE WITH 
PRESIDENT TADIC IN FORMING A PRO-EUROPE COALITION 
GOVERNMENT.  IN RETURN, THE EUROPEANS WOULD WORK TO BRING 
THE SERBIAN SOCIALIST PARTY INTO THE EUROPEAN SOCIALIST 
INTERNATIONAL AND BRING SERBIA INTO EUROPE.  MORATINOS 
REITERATED THAT SPAIN NEEDED TIME ON KOSOVO RECOGNITION, 
BUT SPAIN WOULD REMAIN IN KFOR.  MORATINOS RELATED THAT 
KING JUAN CARLOS "GETS VERY EMOTIONAL" ON KOSOVO. 
MORATINOS SAID THAT IT SEEMED UN SECRETARY GENERAL BAN KI- 
MOON WAS MAKING PROGRESS ON FACILITATING THE TRANSITION 
BETWEEN UNMIK AND EULEX.  MORATINOS SAID THAT SPAIN WOULD 
BACK THE UNITED STATES ON THE NEEDED STEPS IN KOSOVO.  THE 
SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE TONE IN THE UNSC ON KOSOVO SEEMED 
TO HAVE IMPROVED RECENTLY, AND THAT THE LAST TIME SHE SAW 
RUSSIAN FM LAVROV, HIS ATTITUDE HAD SEEMED MORE OPEN ON 
KOSOVO. 
 
 
GEORGIA-ABKHAZIA 
---------------- 
 
¶11.  (C) MORATINOS NOTED THAT A/S FRIED REMAINED CONCERNED 
WITH UKRAINE'S AND GEORGIA'S RELATIONS WITH NATO.  THE 
SECRETARY RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A CONCERN FOR ALL OF US. 
NATO NEEDED TO MAKE A FAVORABLE DECISION ON A NATO 
MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) FOR BOTH COUNTRIES AT ITS 
DECEMBER MINISTERIAL; IT WAS IMPORTANT TO SHOW RUSSIA THAT 
ITS PRESSURE ON GEORGIA WOULD NOT BE REWARDED.  AT THE SAME 
TIME, THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE NEEDED TO PURSUE A 
DIPLOMATIC STRATEGY TO LOWER TENSIONS AND EVEN RESOLVE THE 
ABKHAZ CONFLICT.  TO THIS END, SHE ADDED, THE UNITED STATES 
WAS EXPLORING WITH THE GEORGIANS AND RUSSIANS CREATING SOME 
KIND OF INTERNATIONAL FORUM UNDER WHICH GEORGIAN AND ABKHAZ 
LEADERS COULD MEET AND TALK DIRECTLY.  THE GEORGIANS AND 
THE RUSSIANS DID NOT WANT A WAR OVER ABKHAZIA BUT 
MISCALCULATIONS COULD SET OFF A CONFLICT.  MORATINOS 
REPLIED THAT SPAIN FELT ITS EXPERIENCE WITH AUTONOMY FOR 
ITS VARIOUS REGIONS WOULD BE USEFUL FOR GEORGIA.  HE 
RECOMMENDED TO GEORGIA THAT IT TAKE THE INITIATIVE AND MAKE 
AN AUTONOMY PROPOSAL FOR ABKHAZIA (WHICH GEORGIA HAS DONE). 
 
PIRACY 
------ 
 
¶12.  (SBU) FM MORATINOS DELIVERED TO THE SECRETARY A NON- 
PAPER ON THE PIRACY PROBLEM IN THE WATERS OFF SOMALIA 
(COPIES PASSED TO EUR, AF, IO, OES AND L).  MORATINOS 
THANKED THE UNITED STATES FOR THE INTELLIGENCE AND MILITARY 
SUPPORT IT PROVIDED IN THE RESCUE OF SPANISH SAILORS AFTER 
THE APRIL ATTACK ON A SPANISH FISHING VESSEL WITH 26 ON 
BOARD.  MORATINOS STRESSED CONTINUED SPANISH CONCERN WITH 
PIRATE ACTIVITY OFF SOMALIA BECAUSE SPAIN HAD 30-50 VESSELS 
IN THE AREA AND NO WAY TO PROTECT THEM.  MORATINOS SAID 
SPAIN STRONGLY SUPPORTED U.S. EFFORTS TO GET AN ANTI-PIRACY 
RESOLUTION ADOPTED IN THE UNSC. 
 
HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL CANDIDACY 
------------------------------ 
 
¶13.  (C) MORATINOS RAISED SPAIN'S CANDIDACY FOR THE 
UPCOMING ELECTION FOR A SEAT ON THE UN HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL 
(HRC).  HE NOTED THAT WITH THE UK AND FRANCE ALSO RUNNING 
FOR THE TWO AVAILABLE SEATS, THE UNITED STATES WAS IN A 
DIFFICULT POSITION, BUT THAT HE WANTED TO MENTION IT.  THE 
SECRETARY QUIPPED THAT IT WAS NOT CERTAIN IF THE UNITED 
STATES WOULD VOTE AT ALL, SINCE THE HRC WAS SUCH A 
DISASTER.  MORATINOS JOKED IN RETURN, "THAT'S SPAIN'S 
ARGUMENT FOR RUNNING.  THE HRC IS SUCH A DISASTER, SPAIN 
WILL MAKE IT BETTER." 
RICE