VZCZCXRO2630
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHC #5889/01 1450158
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P R 240150Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHRL/AMEMBASSY BERLIN PRIORITY 4644
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 7521
RUEHGP/AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE PRIORITY 8492
RUEHKO/AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY 4418
RHMFISS/JOINT STAFF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/HQ USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USCENTCOM MACDILL AFB FL PRIORITY
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RHMFISS/CDR USPACOM HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
INFO IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 4463
RUEHGB/AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD 8309

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 STATE 055889 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/21/2018 
TAGS: GM IZ JA KS KTIA MARR PGOV PREL SN SOFA
SUBJECT: IRAQI SOFA NEGOTIATOR VISIT - BACKGROUND 
INFORMATION 
 
REF: A. STATE 53211 
     ¶B. BAGHDAD 739 
     ¶C. BAGHDAD 1037 
     ¶D. BAGHDAD 1536 
 
Classified By: NEA DAS Lawrence E. Butler for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
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SUMMARY 
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¶1. (U) This is a joint Department of State-Department of 
Defense cable. 
 
¶2. (S) The Status of Forces Agreement being negotiated with 
Iraq is intended to be an enduring document similar to SOFAs 
the United States has with other countries:  setting the 
"rules of the road" whenever U.S. forces are present in the 
host country, and covering such issues as jurisdiction over 
personnel, access to facilities, import/export of materiel, 
freedom of movement within the country, taxation, etc. 
However, because of the current situation in Iraq, the SOFA 
text under negotiation includes three "Attachments" of 
limited duration that would provide combat and detention 
authorities, as well as exclusive U.S. jurisdiction over 
certain DOD contractors for incidents occurring during the 
performance of their contracts.  This cable provides 
background information only to further prepare posts to 
support the fact-finding visit of the Iraqi SOFA negotiating 
team (reftel A).  This visit is entirely an Iraqi initiative. 
 U.S. interlocutors should limit their discussions to the 
workings of the bilateral SOFA with your host country and, in 
particular, should not discuss the progress or potential 
results of the U.S.-Iraqi SOFA negotiations.  End summary. 
 
---------------------------- 
SOFA AND STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK 
---------------------------- 
 
¶3. (S) Bilateral SOFA negotiations with Iraq began on March 
11, 2008, in Baghdad.  Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Mohammed 
Haj Hamoud leads the Iraqi negotiating team while Ambassador 
Robert Loftis leads the U.S. team.  (NOTE:  The Government of 
Iraq has emphatically asked that, for security reasons, no 
members of its negotiating team, including the lead, be 
identified publicly under any circumstances. End note).  The 
United States and Iraq are also engaged in parallel 
negotiations of a Strategic Framework that encompasses the 
full range of political, economic, diplomatic, cultural, and 
security relationships between the two countries.  The two 
documents will be brought together in a single "package," but 
the exact way in which that will be done is yet to be 
determined. 
 
----------------- 
SOFA NEGOTIATIONS 
----------------- 
 
¶4. (S) The discussion of the draft SOFA has been a serious 
and workman-like affair.  The Iraqis prepared for the 
negotiations by examining other U.S. SOFAs, and were familiar 
with most of the concepts.  There have been no particular 
surprises in the Iraqis' questions and comments, which 
mirrored in many ways other recent SOFA negotiations: 
jurisdiction over U.S. forces and civilian personnel, 
property ownership, respect for local laws and customs, host 
nation rental charges for use of facilities, etc.  Discussion 
of the three unique attachments has focused primarily on the 
authority to conduct combat operations and security 
detentions, with less time on the question of U.S. vice Iraqi 
jurisdiction over those DOD contractors required to carry 
weapons to perform their duties (e.g., security contractors). 
 The U.S. delegation has also provided the Iraqis with the 
separate draft agreement to address similar non-DOD 
contractors in the same manner as DOD contractors. 
 
¶5. (S) The two sides have made substantial progress in 
 
STATE 00055889  002 OF 003 
 
 
negotiating the text, coming to agreement on a number of 
provisions (see ref D).  Key differences remain, including on 
jurisdiction over personnel (military and DOD civilian 
employees, but not dependents), rent, authorities for combat 
and detention operations, jurisdiction over certain 
contractors, and taxation. The teams plan to reconvene in 
early June, possibly in Washington after the GOI SOFA 
negotiating team visits Turkey, Germany, Japan, Korea, and 
Singapore to discuss with those governments the 
implementation of their SOFAs with the United States. 
 
------------------- 
BRIEFING THE IRAQIS 
------------------- 
 
¶6. (S) Posts should be aware that the travel of the Iraqi 
SOFA negotiating team is entirely an Iraqi initiative, 
intended to demonstrate to Iraq's Council of Representatives 
and the Iraqi public that the negotiating team is conducting 
due diligence in their discussions with the United States. 
Neither precise trip itineraries, delegation lists, nor 
objectives have been shared with the USG.  Ref A requested 
Embassies discuss the Iraqi visit with host governments and 
facilitate any requests from the Iraqis for briefings from 
local U.S. officials.  We now understand the Iraqi team may 
request permission to visit military facilities used by the 
U.S. in at least some of the countries they are visiting. 
Washington asks posts and commands to accommodate these 
requests to the extent feasible without impacting operations. 
 Briefings should focus on SOFA implementation issues and be 
kept at the SBU/FOUO level.  Posts may coordinate with local 
commands to obtain, if available, a knowledgeable military 
judge advocate for embassy meetings.  The above background on 
the SOFA negotiation process with Iraq is provided only for 
background information to assist embassies and commands in 
preparing for possible Iraqi questions and inform discussions 
with the Iraqi delegation.  Posts and commands are requested 
to avoid discussing or commenting on the bilateral SOFA 
negotiations with Iraq, even if asked directly to do so. 
 
¶7. (C) For Singapore:  We understand that the Iraqis have 
added Singapore to the list of countries to be visited 
because of the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement (SFA) 
between the United States and Singapore.  In discussions with 
host government, Post is requested to emphasize Iraqi 
interest in the SFA.  If host government raises the issue of 
the SOFA and requests USG consent to discuss the classified 
1990 MOU regarding U.S. use of facilities in Singapore, and 
associated 2005 Protocol, Post should reply that it is 
awaiting instructions from Washington on authority to 
disclose the contents of these documents to the Iraqi 
delegation.  (NOTE:  DOD's internal suspense for a decision 
on disclosure of these documents to the Iraqis is May 28.) 
 
¶8. (C) The Iraqis are likely to focus on a few key questions 
such as jurisdiction over U.S. DOD personnel and payment for 
access to facilities.  To the extent that these issues arise, 
posts and commands are requested to make the following points 
in the context of our bilateral relationship with the host 
nation: 
 
-- Emphasize, to the extent applicable in the given country, 
that even where there is concurrent jurisdiction, the host 
nation often waives its rights to prosecute and relies on 
U.S. DOD authorities to take appropriate action (disciplinary 
action, prosecution under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ), referral for prosecution under the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (MEJA), etc.); 
 
-- U.S. exemption as a sovereign from any taxes, fees, or 
other charges that are akin to taxes; 
 
-- Note, where applicable, that not only does the host nation 
not charge the United States for access to its facilities, 
the host nation contributes significant amounts in 
non-personnel stationing costs; 
 
-- Explain the process for settling claims for damage to 
non-government property of host nation citizens, including 
cost-sharing aspects; 
 
-- Procedures for import and export of official items without 
 
STATE 00055889  003 OF 003 
 
 
customs charge or inspection; 
 
-- Explain how the SOFA is implemented through joint 
commissions or other mechanisms with the host nation. 
RICE