VZCZCXRO9886
OO RUEHCHI RUEHDT RUEHFK RUEHHM RUEHKSO RUEHPB
DE RUEHC #4231/01 1421540
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 211531Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING IMMEDIATE 0433
INFO ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
ASIAN PACIFIC ECONOMIC COOPERATION
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHINGTON DC 0552

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 STATE 054231 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2018 
TAGS: PREL CH ASEAN ARF APEC XB
SUBJECT: US-CHINA DISCUSSIONS ON COOPERATION IN ASIAN REGIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 
 
REF: A. STATE 34771   B. BEIJING 900 
 
CLASSIFIED BY EAP/RSP BLAIR HALL FOR REASONS 1.4(B)&(D) 
 
¶1. (C) SUMMARY: On April 1 in Washington, China MFA Asia Department 
Deputy Director-General (DDG) Yang Yanyi participated in 
broad-ranging discussions with U.S. officials on U.S.-China 
cooperation in Asian regional organizations.  China sees the ASEAN 
Regional Forum (ARF) as useful, particularly in the area of 
non-traditional security cooperation.  While needed, efforts to 
strengthen ARF must occur under ASEAN's continued, albeit 
"distracted" leadership.  Following a briefing by the U.S., DDG Yang 
provided few details on China's comprehensive program of cooperation 
with ASEAN.  The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to 
rationalizing security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of 
Taiwan's membership in APEC.  The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case 
approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the 
more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving some security issues 
wholesale from APEC to ARF.  On broader regional architecture issues, 
DDG Yang described East Asia Community-building and the priority 
China places on regional integration under ASEAN Plus 3.  China sees 
a growing need for new arrangements perhaps more reflective of 
existing regional power arrangements, including recent notions of an 
Asian G-8.  Overall, U.S. and Chinese views on regional organizations 
were somewhat similar, but core disagreements toward Taiwan and the 
role of ASEAN limited further agreement.  END SUMMARY. 
 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
STRENGTHENING ARF, BUT UNDER ASEAN'S LEADERSHIP 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2.  (C) EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall and DDG Yang discussed ARF's 
strengths, its weaknesses, and the merits of ASEAN leadership.  Both 
sides see ARF as useful, particularly in the area of non-traditional 
security cooperation.  China sees non-traditional security as a 
potential substitute for preventive diplomacy (ARF's original 
mandate).  For Yang, Asia's focus on the strict avoidance of 
intervention in another country's internal affairs makes traditional 
preventive diplomacy efforts in ARF difficult.  On the other hand, 
both sides stated that ARF needs to improve its institutional 
procedures and produce a clear track record of concrete cooperation. 
For Yang, institutional reform should reflect ASEAN norms and 
practices like consensus and gradualism.  While also critical of 
ASEAN's leadership role, China resolutely supports continuing ASEAN's 
institutional status in ARF.  According to DDG Yang, "internal 
distractions reduce ASEAN's capacity to lead ARF." Despite this, 
ASEAN "for certain should remain in the driver's seat and the only 
acceptable leader of ARF is ASEAN." 
 
¶3. (C) Giving specifics on Chinese views on ARF's agenda, Yang 
referenced China's openness to increasing the roles of defense 
officials in ARF, including an eventual ARF Defense Ministers' 
Meeting.  South China Sea developments should not be on ARF's agenda. 
 China increasingly supports the role of Track Two organizations such 
as the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) 
and other international organizations in ARF's processes. 
 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
CHINA-ASEAN RELATIONS: MUCH HAPPENING, BUT FEW DETAILS 
--------------------------------------------- --------- 
 
¶4.  (C) Hall briefed Yang at length on U.S. efforts to further 
integrate ASEAN under the ASEAN-US Enhanced Partnership.  This 
includes facilitating ASEAN economic integration, political and 
security cooperation, and socio-cultural cooperation such as disaster 
management, public health, and human resources development.  However, 
DDG Yang provided few details on China's programs of cooperation with 
ASEAN.  On the China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, chapters on goods 
and services have been concluded and China plans to conclude a 
chapter on investment in August.  China has opened an ASEAN Center in 
Beijing to coordinate its relations with ASEAN.  Notable is China's 
offer of 8,000 professional training slots over the next five years 
and a draft MOU being developed on media cooperation. 
 
--------------------------------------------- - 
APPROACHES TO SECURITY IN ARF AND APEC AT ODDS 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶5. (C) The U.S. and China hold differing approaches to rationalizing 
the overlap of security cooperation in APEC and ARF in light of 
Taiwan's membership in APEC.  The U.S. prefers a more case-by-case 
approach based on the suitability of each institution rather than the 
more comprehensive Chinese approach to moving certain security issues 
wholesale from APEC to ARF.  U.S. APEC Senior Official Ambassador 
Patricia Haslach pointed out APEC's structural advantages, such as 
 
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its multi-sectoral focus and strong relationship with the region's 
private sector, when developing approaches to trade-related security 
threats.  On the other hand, ARF may be better suited than APEC for 
some initiatives such as military matters.  China concurred that APEC 
will always play some role in some security issues, citing such 
activities such as aviation security, food defense, and energy 
security. However, Huang Yiyang, Department of International 
Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director, stated that security or 
political issues deemed to be the "rightful authority of sovereign 
states" should not be discussed in APEC due to Taiwan's membership. 
China began to list certain agenda items such as nonproliferation 
that they deemed "not suitable" for APEC.  Following that, the U.S. 
side cautioned against assigning general labels to any specific issue 
as "appropriate" or "not appropriate" for either ARF or APEC.  Rather 
a case-by-case examination of proposals should be sought based on the 
institutional structures of each institution.  Both sides agreed to 
continue the dialogue on future counter terrorism cooperation in 
APEC. 
 
¶6. (C) Huang also referenced past dialogue between the U.S. and China 
on a non-paper that outlined several models to allow for work on 
security issues in APEC while taking into account China's concerns 
regarding Taiwan.  He noted with disappointment that the last round 
of comments from the U.S. had deleted all mention of these models. 
(Note: China has agreed to political commitments on certain topics in 
the past, but has subsequently resisted or watered down all attempts 
to develop concrete, capacity building activities.  There have been 
no recent discussions on the non-paper.) 
 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
REGIONAL ARCHITECTURE: INTEGRATION AND NEW DIRECTIONS 
--------------------------------------------- -------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Joined by EAP DAS Scot Marciel and NSC and S/P officials for 
lunch, U.S. officials probed DDG Yang on China's views on regional 
integration and new regional arrangements, particularly among major 
powers.  Yang described "East Asia Community-building as progressing 
along four wheels:" EAS, ASEAN Plus 3, ASEAN's Plus One 
relationships, and various trilateral groupings.  China sees ASEAN 
Plus 3 as the main vehicle for regional integration.  However, ASEAN 
remains preoccupied with its own internal integration, sometimes to 
the distraction of broader, pan-Asian efforts.  Speaking personally, 
Yang did not observe great value in EAS.  EAS shares no agenda or 
common objectives among its members.  Trilateral cooperation among 
China, Japan, and the ROK has increased as Sino-Japanese ties have 
warmed.  Yang also sought U.S. views on a proposed a U.S.-China-Japan 
trilateral forum.  Yang said China senses the need for a platform for 
major power cooperation such as recent notions of an Asian G-8 among 
the major Asia-Pacific powers (ref B). USG interlocutors observed 
that Asian regional architecture will continue to evolve, and that 
China and the United States do have many similar strategic interests. 
 They agreed to continue discussions about cooperation in regional 
institutions. 
 
¶8.  COMMENT: The U.S. and Chinese sides seemed to agree far more than 
they disagreed on substantive views towards these regional 
organizations.  However, core Chinese interests such as isolating 
Taiwan internationally and maintaining strong China-ASEAN ties still 
provide a ceiling to the level of synergy between U.S. and Chinese 
views toward existing institutions.  Similar views on new 
arrangements among major powers could provide opportunities for 
greater collaboration.  These discussions are part of recent efforts 
to increase U.S.-China coordination within Asian regional 
organizations. 
 
¶9.  (U) Chinese Participants (all MFA): 
--Asia Department DDG Yang Yanyi 
--International Organizations APEC Office Deputy Director Huang Yiyang 
--Asia Department Office of Policy Planning Deputy Director Zheng 
Zhenhua 
--Asia Department Office of Regional Security Third Secretary Yang 
Shichao 
--Chinese Embassy Staff PolMinCouns Cai Run, Pol/C Hu Zhaoming, Third 
Secretary Zheng Tao 
 
U.S. Participants: 
--EAP DAS Scot Marciel 
--EAP Ambassador-for-APEC Pat Haslach 
--EAP/RSP Director Blair Hall 
--EAP/CM Director John Norris 
--S/P James Green 
--NSC/Asia Kurt Tong 
--EAP/EP Amit Mathur 
--EAP/RSP Kevin Sheives 
--EAP/RSP Jack Andre 
--ISN/RA Charles Mahaffey 
--OES/IHA Natalia Commella 
RICE