O 061236Z MAY 08
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY ABU DHABI IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK IMMEDIATE
AMCONSUL DUBAI IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 047627 
 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2033 
TAGS: KNNP PARM PREL MNUC TH KS TC XB XC XE
 
SUBJECT: S) SHIPMENT OF ANHYDROUS HYDROGEN FLUORIDE, 
POSSIBLY OF SOUTH KOREAN ORIGIN, FROM THAILAND TO IRAN 
 
REF: A. STATE 3743 
     ¶B. ABU DHABI 52 
     ¶C. ABU DHABI 70 
     ¶D. ABU DHABI 178 
     ¶E. HINES-SIDLER E-MAIL 4/01/2008 
     ¶F. HINES-FELIPE E-MAIL 4/28/2008 
 
Classified By: ISN PDAS Patricia A. McNerney, 
Reasons 1.4 (b), (c), and (d) 
 
-------------- 
ACTION REQUEST 
-------------- 
 
¶1.  (S//REL ROK) FOR SEOUL ONLY:  Post is requested to 
approach appropriate-level ROKG officials regarding a 
shipment of possibly South Korean-origin anhydrous hydrogen 
fluoride from Thailand to Iran and request that the shipment 
be recalled.  Post may draw from background, objectives, and 
talking points below as appropriate. 
 
¶2.  (S//REL UAE) FOR ABU DHABI ONLY:  Post is requested to 
inform appropriate-level UAEG officials of the involvement of 
a South Korean firm in the transfer of AHF from Thailand to 
Iran and inform UAEG that we will ask the ROKG to have the 
shipment recalled. 
 
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BACKGROUND 
---------- 
 
¶3.  (S) In January 2008, Thai firm Power Marine Company, 
Ltd., attempted to ship a very large cargo of anhydrous 
hydrogen fluoride (AHF) from Laem Chabang, Thailand for 
delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran.  The AHF was loaded aboard 
the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
(IRISL)-controlled Liberian-flagged M/V Anne E on IRISL 
Persian Container Line (PCL) voyage 8237.  The vessel was 
scheduled to call at Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE) on 14 
January 2008 for final delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran on 15 
January 2008. 
 
¶4.  (S) AHF is an Australia Group-controlled chemical weapons 
precursor and is included in the U.S. gas centrifuge and 
reprocessing watchlists distributed to the NSG.  These items 
would, in our view, be subject to &catch-all8 controls for 
nuclear purposes.  AHF is also used in the uranium conversion 
process to make uranium tetrafluoride (UF4) which is a 
precursor to making uranium hexafluoride (UF6), the feed 
stock for a gas centrifuge. It also has applications in the 
refining of uranium, the production of fluorine and aluminum 
fluoride, and as an additive in liquid rocket propellants. 
 
¶5.  (S) On 14 January 2008, Emirati officials detained the 
cargo, and have been holding it ever since (Refs B, C).  The 
UAE does not wish to allow the shipment to continue onward to 
Iran and as expressed a desire to have the shipment recalled. 
 (Ref D). 
 
¶6.  (S) We have received information that the supplier of the 
AHF is a South Korean firm, the Foo Sung Corporation.  We do 
not know the identity of the Chinese manufacturer of the 
chemicals or have information on any other Chinese parties 
involved in this transaction. 
 
 
---------- 
OBJECTIVES 
---------- 
 
¶7.  (S//REL ROK) FOR SEOUL ONLY:  Post should seek to achieve 
the following: 
 
--  Request that the ROKG investigate this transfer and 
recall the cargo of AHF. 
 
-- Emphasize that United Arab Emirates (UAE) officials are 
anxious to have the shipment recalled and disposed of as soon 
as possible, and that ROKG cooperation in this matter will 
facilitate this effort. 
 
-- Request an ROKG point of contact to share with the UAEG in 
order to facilitate direct ROKG-UAEG communication. 
 
-- Note our concern that these items could be used in Iran's 
nuclear program or liquid-fuelled ballistic missile program. 
 
-- Also note that these items could be used in Iran's 
chemical weapons program, and that this transfer is therefore 
inconsistent with Australia Group Guidelines. 
 
¶8.  (S//REL UAE) FOR ABU DHABI ONLY:  Post should seek to 
achieve the following: 
 
-- Inform UAEG of the involvement of the South Korean firm 
Foo Sung Corporation in this transfer, and inform the UAEG 
that we will ask the ROKG to have the shipment recalled. 
 
 
--------------------- 
REPORTING REQUIREMENT 
--------------------- 
 
¶9.  (U) Please report delivery of points/non-paper and any 
immediate response by 7 May 2008. 
 
------------------------ 
TALKING POINTS/NON-PAPER 
------------------------ 
 
¶10.  (S/REL ROK) FOR SEOUL ONLY:  Begin 
talking-points/non-paper: 
 
-- We have received information that the Islamic Republic of 
Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL)-controlled Liberian-flagged M/V 
ANNA E loaded Chinese-origin anhydrous hydrogen fluoride 
(AHF) at Laem Chabang, Thailand for delivery to Bandar Abbas, 
Iran.  The vessel, traveling on Persian Container Lines (PCL) 
voyage number 8237, called at Dubai, United Arab Emirates on 
14 January 2008.  Final delivery to Bandar Abbas, Iran was 
scheduled on 15 January 2008. 
 
-- The Thailand-based firm Power Marine Company, Ltd., 
shipped four 20-foot containers with 56 cylinders of AHF 
destined for Bandar Abbas, Iran. 
 
-- Emirati authorities detained the shipment in Dubai on 14 
January, and are requesting that the shipment be recalled. 
 
-- We have received information indicating the involvement of 
South Korean firm Foo Sung Corporation in this transfer.  The 
Thai-based firm Power Marine, according to our information, 
obtained the AHF from the Foo Sung Corporation. 
 
-- Relevant information regarding the Foo Sung Corporation, 
including the address of its main office and plant, is as 
follows: 
 
                  3rd Floor, Seoksoo Building 
                  113-8 Samsung-dong 
                  Kagnam-gu Seoul, Korea 
                  Web site:  http://www.fsc.co.kr 
                  Telephone:  02-555-8196 
 
-- Foo Sung Corporation's contacts for inorganic fluorine 
compounds, including AHF, are: 
      D.H. Hah; dkutc90@foosung.com 
      K.Y. Oh; penny520@foosung.com 
 
-- The AHF is controlled under the Australia Group and is 
included in a reprocessing watchlist that the U.S. has shared 
with Nuclear Suppliers Group participating governments.  AHF 
is a fluorinating agent in organic and inorganic reactions, 
and a catalyst in alkylation, isomerization, condensation, 
dehydration, and polymerization reactions. 
 
-- It also has applications in the refining of uranium, the 
production of fluorine and aluminum fluoride, and as an 
additive in liquid rocket propellants. 
 
-- Given Iran's long history of proliferation and the 
diversion of items to support those activities, the United 
States believes that the ROK should determine that this 
material would contribute to Iran's proliferation sensitive 
nuclear activities.  Consequently, its transfer to Iran would 
be prohibited under UNSCR 1737. 
 
 
-- In light of this information, we request that the Republic 
of Korea investigate this transfer and take steps to work 
with the United Arab Emirates to recall this shipment. 
 
-- We would appreciate the ROKG's identification of a point 
of contact on this case.  We would like to share this POC's 
contact information with the UAEG so that the ROKG and UAEG 
may begin to communicate directly on this case. 
 
-- We look forward to hearing the results of your 
investigation. 
 
END POINTS. 
 
¶11.  (U) Washington point of contact for follow-up 
information is Mark Felipe, (202) 647-5376. Please slug all 
responses for ISN, T, EAP, and NEA.  Washington appreciates 
Post's assistance. 
RICE 
 
 
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