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OO RUEHWEB

DE RUEHSF #0345/01 1511230
ZNR UUUUU ZZH (CCY AD9AEA70 MSI8756-695)
O 301230Z MAY 08 ZDS
FM AMEMBASSY SOFIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5087
RHMCSUU/FBI WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE 0221
RUEAWJA/DEPT OF JUSTICE WASHINGTON DC IMMEDIATE

UNCLAS SOFIA 000345 
 
SENSITIVE 
SIPDIS 
 
C O R R E C T E D COPY - (CAPTION ADDED) 
 
E.O. 12958: N/A 
TAGS: PGOV PREL KCOR KCRCM BU
SUBJECT: MOI REFORM UPDATE: INITIAL CONSULTATIONS WITH SENIOR GOB 
OFFICIALS 
 
REF:  A. SOFIA 00303 
  ¶B. SOFIA 00301 
  ¶C. SOFIA 00293 
  ¶D. SOFIA 00248 
  ¶E. SOFIA 00229 
 
¶1.  (SBU) Summary.  In response to Prime Minister Stanishev's 
request for expert advice to reform the Ministry of Interior, 
International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program 
(ICITAP) Senior Law Enforcement Advisor in Belgrade Gary Bennett 
consulted with lead Bulgarian officials May 21-23 in Sofia.  The 
Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to begin reforms 
immediately (within two weeks) to regain the public's trust, 
following the ouster of the former Interior Minister amidst a series 
of scandals.  Operational staff disagreed about the nature of the 
problems (e.g., politically motivated vs. incompetence) and feared 
radical change, which might hinder the Ministry's operation.  At the 
Embassy's request, Bennett outlined high-level recommendations to 
address the most pressing priorities the officials raised: organized 
crime, corruption, special investigative techniques and internal 
control.  Bennett also stressed the need to undertake long-term 
reforms to improve both the internal culture within the Ministry and 
its external image.  End Summary. 
 
METHODOLOGY 
 
¶2. (U) Bennett arrived in Sofia May 20 for internal consultations 
within the Embassy.  The purpose of the visit was to provide 
strategic level perspective on the challenges facing the Interior 
Ministry.  Over the next two-days, Bennett met with senior Bulgarian 
officials, including: 
 
- Dr. Vassil Kirov, Head of Financial Intelligence Directorate, 
State Agency for National Security (DANS) 
- Mincho Spassov, Chairman, Parliament Committee on Domestic 
Security and Public Order 
- Mihail Mikov, Minister of Interior 
- Petko Sertov, Head of State Agency for National Security (DANS) 
- Petar Vladmirov, Head of the General Directorate for Combating 
Organized Crime (GDBOP) 
- Sonya Yankulova, Deputy Interior Minister 
- Pavlin Dimitrov, Secretary General, Ministry of Interior 
 
POLITICAL LEADERSHIP 
 
¶3.  (SBU) The Bulgarian political leadership stressed the need to 
implement reforms immediately (within two weeks) in order to regain 
the public's trust, following a series of crippling scandals, which 
ultimately led to ouster of the former Interior Minister.  The 
pending European Commission report, which is expected to be sharply 
critical of Bulgaria's progress in addressing rule of law, only adds 
to the pressure. 
 
¶4.  (SBU) Confident in Interior Minister Mikov's character, senior 
Bulgarian leadership in the Parliament and DANS expressed 
willingness to help him build a ministry that he is comfortable 
managing.  Mikov wants the reformed ministry's new structure to 
align with its main functions, including security, criminal 
investigations, border police, and fire emergency services.  The 
placement of the specialized intelligence units (DOI, which is in 
charge of physical surveillance and DOTI, which executes wiretapping 
requests) remains unresolved, with the Interior Ministry favoring 
maintaining the structures under its jurisdiction and 
parliamentarians leaning towards establishing a separate agency 
directly subordinate to the Prime Minister.  Mikov said that 
physically removing the units from the Interior Ministry would be 
almost impossible for technical and logistical reasons.  Regardless 
of the structure, use of specialized investigative techniques, or 
rather overuse of such, has been highlighted as an acute problem for 
the system where more than 90 percent of the data collected is not 
used in court.  To discipline law enforcement, Parliamentarians are 
considering, as an interim measure, placing a limit on the number of 
wiretapping requests per annum. 
 
¶5. (SBU) Other reform priorities for senior leadership include 
discipline, establishing and enforcing ethical standards, and hiring 
and retaining good employees.  Mikov intends to strengthen the role 
of the Ministry's internal inspectorate by promoting it to a 
directorate under his supervision.  Anti-corruption efforts are also 
high on the Parliamentarians' agenda which, in addition to top-down 
house cleaning in the ministry, suggest what they view as exotic 
measures like introducing a pocket-money limit for police officers. 
Acknowledging the lack of incentive for hard work, politicians 
recommend raising the police investigators' salaries, which may be 
two-three times below those offered by DANS.  Streamlining 
cooperation between DANS and MOI, and clearly delineating their 
investigative authority is another area for improvement.  While 
Mikov enjoys a strong personal relationship with DANS Head Sertov, 
the exact relationship between DANS and MOI still needs to be 
formalized in a statutorily mandated instruction. 
OFFICIALS 
 
 
OPERATIONAL STAFF 
 
¶6.  (U) Operational staff feared that radical reform could undermine 
the ministry's operations and hinder the resolution of specific 
problems.  They perceived that the current crisis in the ministry 
involving some political figures had discredited the entire 
organization and professional staff.  Other specific concerns 
included the expedited mechanisms for disciplining and transferring 
staff that compromise the MOI's investigative work, as well as 
communication and distribution of case information.  The handling of 
special investigative data by the requesters, who actually leaked 
information setting off the recent MOI scandals, is also a problem. 
 
 
¶7.  (U) The operational level would also like to see police without 
legal training (detectives) to have more investigative powers for 
lower level crimes.  This would multiply the investigative workforce 
and allow those investigators with legal training to concentrate on 
more complex cases.  The politicians oppose the idea of giving more 
investigative power to detectives and prefer attracting more lawyers 
and paying higher salaries. 
 
SHORT-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
¶8.  (SBU) Acknowledging that many of the ministry's problems could 
only be addressed in the long-term, Bulgarian officials expressed a 
political imperative to take immediate action.  In response, Bennett 
provided the following short-term recommendations: 
 
Organized Crime/Corruption 
 
- Thoroughly vet the existing investigative/management cadres within 
GDBOP and high levels within the Ministry of Interior (e.g. 
financial disclosure; telephone records; unexplained wealth; case 
performance); make additional personnel changes where deemed 
appropriate 
- Assign all the regional Directorate-level representatives of GDBOP 
as direct-reports to the agency director 
- Clearly define, differentiate, and publish (policy and media) the 
investigative mandates of GDBOP and DANS (e.g. define the "high 
profile" and "national security" priority for DANS; how will cases 
be assigned and what will be the filtering template?) 
- Create a standing coordinating working group--- with high-level 
GOB leadership--- to bring together all enforcement, criminal 
intelligence and prosecutorial entities working on organized crime 
and corruption 
- Using the model created at the working group level, create 
vetted/secure operational task forces with the mission to dismantle 
the top organized crime organizations in Bulgaria and to 
successfully bring to justice those responsible for the unsolved 
murders 
- Institute a regular "Report to the People" on case achievements 
and challenges 
 
Special Investigative Techniques 
 
- Assess the use and overuse of "wire tapping"--- the original 
request, its use in the pre-investigative stages, the communication 
to and use by responsible investigative agencies, its relative value 
as evidence, its secure storage and ultimate purging. 
- In order to ensure more legal consistency to the requests for and 
the application of wiretapping: 
¶1. Reduce the number of approving authorities (currently all 28 of 
the regional District Court Chairs; appellate level regions?); 
provide specialized training and oversight for these authorities 
¶2. Create and implement a mandatory "check list" (from existing law) 
to be completed by the requesting agency, reviewed and approved by 
the agency chain of command and then by the approving authority; 
include in case file 
- Institutionally separate the technical process (collection of 
information) from the investigative process ("exploiters" of 
information collected) 
- Create or reinforce regular oversight report to parliament on 
basic statistics (e.g. number initiated and in-progress, % of use as 
evidence, amount destroyed) 
- Maintain detailed internal analysis for day-to-day management 
 
Internal Control 
 
- Consolidate all inspection/security assets and place directly 
under the Minister of Interior 
- Suggest re-naming for public visibility (e.g. Inspector General) 
- Staff already deployed at 28 Regional Directorates should have all 
necessary material resources (e.g. vehicles, secure office space, 
etc) so as to eliminate reliance on local chain of command 
 
LONG-TERM RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
¶9.  (SBU) Beyond the need to urgently respond to calls for MOI 
reform, Bennett discussed evolutionary changes needed to address the 
OFFICIALS 
 
MOI's systemic problems. 
 
Organized Crime/Corruption 
 
- Following the vetting and satisfactory performance reviews, 
examine the need to gradually return to salary/scales parity between 
GDBOP and DANS (a morale, recruitment and retention issue) 
- Review and amend appropriate penal and procedural codes to 
facilitate stronger prosecutions based upon 1) conspiracies, 2) 
criminal enterprises (ala RICO) and 3) negotiated pleas for 
cooperating, lesser associates 
- To free up staff for a continuous and concerted assault on 
high-profile organized crime and corruption cases, consider the 
expansion of the investigative mandate to allow appropriately 
trained regular police officers (non-Academy graduates) to 
investigate minor crimes to conclusion 
- Institutionalize Practical Criminal Investigative and Enterprise 
Theory Investigative training for all organized crime and corruption 
personnel 
- Develop positive working relationships with Non-Governmental 
Organizations and investigative journalists that specialize in 
organized crime and corruption 
 
Special Investigative Techniques 
 
- Ensure that the entire range of special investigative techniques 
be strengthened through 1) legal/policy amendments and 2) training 
of operatives and unit management. In particular, this 
recommendation applies to the use of undercover agents and the 
development of informants. 
 
Internal Control 
 
- Consider the expansion of purpose to include professional 
inspections and auditing 
- Design and implement practices at the Directorate level that will 
engage the local chain of command in the issue of accountability 
- Develop a database that maintains disciplinary histories of 
employees (ideally as part of a larger human resources database 
including all noteworthy personnel actions) 
- Expand to become a part of a more comprehensive system of 
discipline including a circular "learning" model that evaluates 
individual & organizational performance for lessons to be learned; 
feed back into mission, training and policy development 
 
COMMENT 
 
¶10.   (SBU) The urgency to engage with the Bulgarian authorities as 
they began drafting legislation did not allow for a comprehensive, 
in-depth analysis of a whole range of cross-impacting reform issues. 
 Further evaluation will be needed to identify discrete areas for 
potential engagement of U.S. law enforcement and assistance 
resources.  The recommendations provide feasible practical solutions 
from experience for the Ministry's new political leadership, which, 
beyond its immediate goal to meet the concerns of the EU before the 
July report, appears sincere in its efforts to resurrect public 
confidence in police.  We will continue to engage the Bulgarians on 
suggested structural and legislative changes, particularly with 
respect to use of specialized investigative techniques and authority 
to investigate organized crime. 
 
KARAGIANNIS 
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