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S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 RIYADH 000767 
 
SIPDIS 
 
WHITE HOUSE FOR OVP, DEPARTMENT FOR NEA/ARP AND S/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/13/2018 
TAGS: IR IZ LE MASS MCAP OVP PGOV PINR PREL PTER
SA 
SUBJECT: S/I SATTERFIELD BRIEF TO SAUDIS ON IRAQ 
DEVELOPMENTS 
 
REF: RIYADH 708 
 
RIYADH 00000767  001.2 OF 004 
 
 
Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission Michael Gfoeller for reasons 
1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (S) SUMMARY.  S/I Ambassador David Satterfield, along 
with MNF-I and Embassy Baghdad representatives, and 
Washington analysts, briefed three senior Saudi Arabian 
Governemnet (SAG) officials on May 6 and 10: Assistant 
Interior Minister for Security Affairs Prince Mohammed Bin 
Naif (MBN), Chief of General Intelligence Prince Muqrin Bin 
Abdulaziz Al Saud, and Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal. 
Satterfield and team reviewed in detail developments in 
Iraq, focusing on positive measures taken by Iraqi PM Maliki 
and the GOI on Sunni outreach and reconciliation and on the 
significance of the Basrah security operation.  The team 
underscored the critical importance for the region of GOI 
efforts to push back on Iranian-backed violent groups and 
the growing upset within the Shia political leadership and 
on the Shia street with how Iran was acting inside Iraq. 
Now was a moment of opportunity, especially important given 
the dramatic events in Beirut, for Iraq,s Arab neighbors 
to step forward with meaningful support and engagement. 
Muqrin and MBN were very receptive to the briefing, inviting 
further and more detailed discussion.  Muqrin said that 
Iraqi National Security Advisor Rubaie would be invited to 
attend the next meeting of GCC plus Two intelligence chiefs; 
FM Saud, while still expressing skepticism regarding the 
strategic vice tactical quality of steps undertaken by 
Maliki (and dismissing ISCI head Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim as an 
Iranian stooge), acknowledged that progress appeared to be 
taking place and that it was in the strategic interest of 
the Arab states to respond.  No Saudi Ambassador, however, 
would be sent at this time to Baghdad.  END SUMMARY. 
 
Prince MBN: "Our Goal (in Iraq) is the Same" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶2. (S) MBN stated repeatedly the need for a "unified Iraq," 
noting this represents both a political and a security 
challenge.  He identified Iranian-backed groups such as 
Hizballah as the main threat to Iraq and the region. 
MBN acknowledged that Iraqi PM Maliki had begun to move 
against these groups, particularly in Basra, questioning 
"why it had taken so long" for Maliki to act.  The 
delegation explained that the US had been urging action in 
Basrah for the past year, but only now had Maliki become 
persuaded that he had no alternative but to act to restore 
GOI control.  When the PM was confronted in Basrah by open 
opposition from the JAM and grasped the extent of Iranian 
IRGC-QF support being provided, "he changed."  More 
importantly, the appearance of the GOI and Iraqi Army 
actually working to halt the depredations of violent groups 
that had acted with impunity produced a dramatic response 
on the Iraqi street.  All of Iraq,s political leaders, 
including Vice President Tariq al-Hashimi, had expressed 
support for the PM and his actions.  However,  the 
positive momentum established and the backing the PM now 
enjoyed needed to be translated into further tangible 
progress on reconciliation and security.  MBN agreed 
that the U.S. and Iraq needed the support of Iraq,s 
neighbors at this critical moment.  MBN asked pointedly, 
"what is your goal?" to which Satterfield replied, 
"a unified, stable, secure Iraq not open to hostile 
foreign influence," at which point MBN stated, "Our 
goal is the same." 
 
¶3. (S) MBN concluded by restating the problem of foreign 
 
RIYADH 00000767  002.2 OF 004 
 
 
fighters, noting that such "youth" are not going to 
Syria via Saudi Arabia but through states such as 
Bahrain with GCC cards.  He stated that the Ulema and 
individual families need to become more involved on this 
issue.  Finalizing the discussion on Iran, MBN said 
strongly that Iran has stated "Saudi Arabia is the 
number one enemy."  MBN concluded the briefing by 
stating his desire to know who his counterpart in Iraq 
is, so that they may open security channels and exchange 
information.  Satterfield promised a response from 
Embassy Baghdad on this point. 
 
Prince Muqrin: A "Government for All Iraqis" 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶4. (S) Prince Muqrin was the most engaged of all S/I,s 
interlocutors, highly and positively receptive to 
information on recent developments in Iraq.  In 
response to Satterfield,s appreciation for Saudi 
efforts to provide assistance/humanitarian aid to Iraq 
 as discussed with Ambassador Ries (Reftel), Muqrin 
said Saudi Arabia "does not seek a political benefit" 
from its actions, but questioned the use of Baghdad 
airport as the landing point for Saudi aid - as "local 
Iraqis don,t see the Saudi side of humanitarian aid." 
Muqrin,s suggestion was to send Saudi C-130s so that 
upon landing in more remote areas the Iraq people 
can see Saudi aid directly. 
 
¶5. (S) During discussion of Muqtada Al-Sadr, Muqrin 
questioned whether or not Al-Sadr will "give up his arms," 
to which the delegation responded that while Sadr was 
negotiating turn over of medium and heavy arms, full 
disarmament was not likely in the immediate future. 
Satterfield made clear that the ultimate goal is 
disarmament of all/all illegal armed groups in Iraq, but 
in the short-term disarmament of armed elements engaged 
in violence is the priority.  Muqrin was positive on both 
a SAG diplomatic presence in Baghdad as well as an Arab 
League Foreign Ministers meeting in Baghdad in June, but 
stated his apprehension regarding the safety of any future 
SAG Ambassador to Iraq.  Muqrin expressed concern for the 
Sunnis of Baghdad who are "the majority of refugees" in 
Jordan and Syria but made clear that he did not look at 
Iraq from a sectarian standpoint..  He noted that "Arab 
Shiites" of Iraq were "neglected" by Iran and were loyal 
to the Iraqi state; "there should be a government for all 
Iraqis: Christians, Sabians, Sunnis, and Shia." 
 
¶6. (S) In a positive step, (and consistent with agreement 
reached in Bahrain during the April 21 GCC plus Two 
Ministerial attended by Secretary Rice that Iraq be made 
a permanent "plus Three"), Muqrin said that there would be 
a GCC plus Two intelligence chiefs meeting in Jeddah June 
7-9 to which Mouaffaq Rubaie would be invited.  Satterfield 
welcomed this as a positive signal of Arab engagement. 
Muqrin closed the meeting by inviting S/I to return 
for a longer review of Iraq developments following the 
Jeddah meeting. 
 
FM Saud Al-Faisal:  Skeptical But Progress Acknowledged 
--------------------------------------------- ---------- 
 
¶7. (S) FM Saud did not repeat his customary flat dismissal 
of PM Maliki as sectarian or responsive to Iranian command, 
acknowledging "albeit cautiously" that "real progress 
appears to have been made by Maliki" on Sunni outreach and 
on confronting Iranian-backed violent groups.   To the 
 
RIYADH 00000767  003.2 OF 004 
 
 
extent that this represented a strategic vice tactical shift 
by Maliki, especially regarding Iran,s behavior and 
influence, 
this was a very significant development.  Saud suggested more 
time was needed to determine the answer.   Satterfield 
responded that the changes taking place in Iraq needed to 
become "strategic" and irreversible, but that "waiting to 
see the outcome" would not contribute to that goal.   Now 
was the moment to engage and Saudi Arabia had a critical 
role to play among the Arab states.  The U.S. could not 
and should not be alone in Iraq challenging Iran and AQI; 
we needed the active support of our key allies and partners 
in the GCC plus Two.   Such support could take many forms, 
and we welcomed Saudi work with us on providing assistance 
resources.  But more direct engagement by the SAG and the 
other Arab states in Baghdad was also needed.  Saud 
acknowledged that it would be important to back the 
"apparent positive steps" being undertaken by Maliki and 
the GOI. 
 
¶8. (S) Queried by Amb Satterfield as to the meaning of 
Saudi King Abdullah,s statement to Ambassador Crocker 
and General Petraeus during their recent visit to Riyadh 
(Reftel) that it was imperative for the SAG that the 
upcoming provincial elections, as well as future national 
elections, be "fair," Saud said that the King meant that 
elections had to be open only to Iraqis, not "Persians." 
He stated that in the past Iran has sent agents to Iraq 
on election day to thwart both the process and hence the 
unity of Iraq.   Saud suggested that the U.S. consider 
requiring a language test at the door to each voting 
station, where a prospective voter would have to show 
fluency in Arabic in order to vote.  Saud continued that 
the key to security in Iraq is distinguishing those who are 
for and those who are against unity.  However, ascertaining 
such loyalties in a place like Iraq is like "trying to hold 
a handful of sand; the grains always fall through."  Saud 
stressed, as he has done before, that Grand Ayatollah Ali 
Sistani needs to come "out of hiding" into the political 
arena and forcefully argue for Iraqi unity; America cannot 
"leave him on the periphery." 
 
¶9. (S) Like many of his GCC plus Two colleagues (with the 
notable exception of Egyptian General Intelligence Service 
Chief Soleiman (Septel), Saud assessed Muqtada al-Sadr and 
the Sadrist Movement as "Arab nationalist," and urged that 
the U.S. ensure the ability of the Sadrists to participate 
in the national and provincial political process. 
Satterfield 
assured that the U.S. was making clear to Maliki, ISCI leader 
Abd al-Aziz Hakim (whom Saud bluntly characterized as "purely 
Iranian") and all of Iraq,s political leaders that the door 
had to be open to such participation by the Sadr Movement 
"on the basis of their acceptance of a peaceful political 
process and abandonment of violence. 
 
¶10. (S) Saud noted that PM Maliki "can not do everything," 
and thus needed a "popular general" who could mobilize all 
Iraqis who "support unity."  Iraq needs new policies for 
the sake of national unity, and Maliki is "not a man of 
new ideas."  Saud concluded by noting that he was strongly 
supportive of a meeting of Arab League FMs in Baghdad in 
June.  There would be no/no Saudi Ambassador in Baghdad in 
the near future, for security reasons.  While he showed 
interest in a lower level SAG permanent diplomatic 
presence in Baghdad, Saud made clear that even this might 
not come about soon.  He then quoted an old proverb to 
the effect that, "a ship sails to the wishes of the wind, 
 
RIYADH 00000767  004.2 OF 004 
 
 
not its captain." 
 
¶11. (U) Ambassador Satterfield has cleared this cable. 
FRAKER