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RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 1949

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 RABAT 000493 
 
SIPDIS 
 
STATE FOR NEA/PPD, NEA/MAG, NEA/PI, AND DRL/NESCA 
LONDON FOR MOC 
DUBAI FOR PELLETIER 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/28/2018 
TAGS: PHUM PGOV KPAO SCUL OIIP KIRC MO
SUBJECT: AL-JAZEERA BUREAU CHIEF EXPECTS RABAT OFFICE TO 
CLOSE PERMANENTLY 
 
REF: RABAT 0416 
 
Classified By: DCM Robert P. Jackson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1.  (C) Summary:  Al-Jazeera's Rabat bureau chief dismissed 
Government of Morocco (GOM) claims that the suspension of 
Al-Jazeera's broadcast license was technical.  Given that no 
one in the GOM would claim responsibility for the decision, 
he believed it came directly from the King.  He criticized 
Moroccans for having "no clue" how news agencies make 
editorial and reporting decisions, and for thus having 
unreasonable and petty expectations about Al-Jazeera's 
coverage of local events.  He held out little hope that the 
problem would be resolved, and reported that Doha would 
likely move the North Africa bureau to Madrid or Paris.  End 
summary. 
 
¶2.  (C) Information Officer David Ranz and Information 
Specialist Salwa Jaafari met on May 21 with Rabat Bureau 
Chief Hassan Rachidi in Al-Jazeera's eerily dark and empty 
Rabat office, to discuss the GOM decision to suspend 
Al-Jazeera's broadcast license (reftel).  When asked about 
prospects for re-opening the bureau, Rachidi stated "two days 
ago, I was hoping the Moroccans would change their mind, but 
now I don't have any hope." 
 
¶3.  (C) Following weeks of pleading for a meeting, Rachidi 
had finally been received on May 20 by Communications 
Minister Khaled Naciri, who stated flatly that he had nothing 
to add to the notification letter provided by the National 
Agency for Telecommunications Regulation (ANRT) suspending 
the license.  Rachidi had been unable to get an appointment 
with anyone at the Higher Audiovisual Communications 
Authority (HACA), the agency ostensibly responsible for 
providing broadcast licenses.  Sources in HACA had told him 
informally that they had been handed the portfolio suspending 
Al-Jazeera's license without prior consultation and were in 
no position to overturn the decision. 
 
¶4.  (C) Rachidi dismissed the official GOM line that the 
suspension was technical.  Indeed, according to Rachidi, the 
ball had long been in HACA's court.  Al-Jazeera had 
incorporated locally, as required by the Moroccan broadcast 
law.  Al-Jazeera had submitted a license request in 2006, and 
had repeatedly followed up with HACA in writing asking to 
formalize its presence in Morocco.  HACA was responsible for 
proposing a draft "cahier des charges" (terms of reference) 
for Al-Jazeera's consideration, but had repeatedly declined 
to do so.  Every attempt on Rachidi's part to approach HACA 
had been rebuffed, he stated.  Thus the fact that Al-Jazeera 
had been operating on a series of temporary three-month 
licenses was as a result of HACA's inaction, not 
Al-Jazeera's, Rachidi asserted. 
 
¶5.  (C) Rachidi stated that Al-Jazeera's opponents in the GOM 
had been carefully developing a file documenting reporting 
perceived to reflect anti-Moroccan bias ever since the bureau 
began broadcasting in 2006.  He acknowledged that the slight 
against Fouad Ali El-Himma's followers cited reftel might 
have been the precipitating factor in the decision, but he 
believed Moroccan concerns about Al-Jazeera ran much deeper. 
He cited, for example, criticism he had received that 
Al-Jazeera had insufficiently trumpeted USG support for UNSYG 
Personal Envoy Peter Van Walsum's recent statements that 
 
RABAT 00000493  002 OF 003 
 
 
autonomy was not a realistic option for Western Sahara. 
Moroccan critics would not accept his explanation that this 
was a UN and USG matter, which could only be covered by 
Al-Jazeera's U.S. bureaus, over which he exerted no control. 
He had also received complaints that Al-Jazeera had not 
covered the recent visit of the King to the village of 
Afengou to launch a series of socioeconomic projects, while 
Al-Jazeera had been the first television station to report 
that a number of the town's residents had frozen to death 
during the winter of 2006-7. 
 
¶6.  (C) Rachidi concluded that the ultimate decision to close 
Al-Jazeera's bureau had come from the King himself.  He based 
this on the fact that no other individual or agency in the 
GOM would take responsibility for the decision, or even 
discuss it with him.  For example, he related that a 
parliamentarian had been scheduled to pose a question about 
the closure, but the question had been withdrawn at the last 
moment.  Prime Minister Abbas El-Fassi had not known about 
the decision until after it had been formally announced, he 
claimed.  He found this surprising, as El-Himma had made no 
effort to hide his disdain for Al-Jazeera due largely to its 
coverage during the 2007 elections of a major scandal in 
El-Himma's past. 
 
¶7.  (C) Rachidi confirmed press reports that Al-Jazeera was 
considering moving its North African headquarters to Paris or 
Madrid.  Unless the GOM changed its stance, which he judged 
very unlikely, Al-Jazeera headquarters in Doha would likely 
make the decision to move within a few weeks. 
 
¶8.  (C) As for himself, Rachidi stated he would leave Rabat 
shortly and return to Doha, where his family lives, 
regardless the outcome.  A Dutch citizen of Moroccan descent, 
Rachidi had expected "when I accepted the job with Al-Jazeera 
to come back to my country as a hero."  Instead, he said 
ruefully, he had lost many of his friends.  Moroccans did not 
appreciate that most editorial decisions came from Doha; they 
treated Rachidi as a traitor for covering Morocco in a 
negative light.  By way of example, he cited an instance in 
which Doha had ordered him to produce a story about a 
Moroccan whose permanent residence was a public toilet (it 
even said so on his ID card), a story his friends lambasted 
him for covering. 
 
¶9.  (C) Comment:  The GOM decision, whoever made it, would 
seem to be spectacularly short-sighted.  Whatever the 
criticism of Al-Jazeera's coverage ) and some of the 
examples cited by Rachidi seem awfully petty ) Al-Jazeera 
was very careful to temper its coverage of Moroccan affairs 
for fear of running afoul of local authorities.  Al-Jazeera 
will feel no such restraint now, and indeed may sharpen its 
criticism of Morocco in retaliation for the office closing. 
Such was certainly the case in the immediate aftermath of the 
decision, when Al-Jazeera ran nightly reports for several 
days, including many man-on-the-street interviews (including 
from Morocco) critical of the GOM. 
 
¶10.  (C) We note as well that Al-Jazeera is not the only 
foreign news organization facing such problems; several 
Spanish journalists (the largest contingent of foreign 
journalists in Morocco) have recently been grappling with 
their own conflicts with the GOM.  We are following up on 
reports that a Spanish television channel is considering 
 
RABAT 00000493  003 OF 003 
 
 
leaving Morocco over licensing problems similar to those 
faced by Al-Jazeera, and senior Spanish journalists told us 
that a recent dispute over the accreditation of two Spanish 
print journalists in Morocco was resolved only after the 
Spanish Government was pressured by a local Spanish 
journalism association to intervene with the GOM.  End 
comment. 
 
 
***************************************** 
Visit Embassy Rabat's Classified Website; 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/rabat 
***************************************** 
 
Riley