VZCZCXRO5091
RR RUEHBW RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHROV RUEHSR
DE RUEHNC #0306/01 1361150
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 151150Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY NICOSIA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 8768
INFO RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 1132
RUEHBS/USEU BRUSSELS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 NICOSIA 000306 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE, EUR/ERA, IO/UNP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/12/2023 
TAGS: PREL PGOV UNFICYP CY TU
SUBJECT: G/C NEGOTIATOR TROUBLED BY TURKISH SIDE'S REFUSAL 
TO DEAL 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Ronald Schlicher, Reasons 1.4 (b), (d) 
 
¶1.  (C) SUMMARY:  "They're not empowered to think or even 
speculate, much less negotiate," complained Greek Cypriot 
negotiator George Iacovou in a May 12 meeting with the 
Ambassador, referring to the Turkish Cypriots staffing the 
working groups and technical committees currently conducting 
preparatory discussions under the UN-brokered March 21 
agreement.  The T/C side's lack of autonomy and practice of 
consulting superiors over even the smallest points was 
costing the groups and committees precious time, Iacovou 
warned, and put into doubt whether full-fledged negotiations 
could commence on June 21, as stipulated in the March accord. 
 Regardless of the paucity of progress in most bodies, T/C 
leader Mehmet Ali Talat appeared insistent on demanding 
formal negotiations, which Republic of Cyprus President 
Demetris Christofias politically could never accept in the 
absence of a modicum of progress in the current process.  Not 
all the news was gloomy, however.  Iacovou revealed that 
working groups tackling the economy and European Union 
affairs had made great strides, an opinion shared by the 
Embassy's T/C contacts.  Much more characteristic of the 
broader process, however, was the friction plaguing the 
territory, property, governance, and security/guarantees 
working groups, which Iacovou attributed to Turkey's 
indifference or outright opposition to reaching a solution. 
At the upcoming (May 23) leaders' meeting, Christofias would 
deliver a tough message to Talat:  either engage fully to 
ensure that the committees and working group delivered 
measurable progress in the remaining six weeks, or risk 
another negotiations impasse of his own (Talat's) making. 
The international community should press the Turkish Cypriot 
leader along similar lines, Iacovou concluded.  In response, 
the Ambassador lamented that media in both communities were 
preparing for a failed process and attempting to assign blame 
to the other.  It was vital to preserve the positive momentum 
that had arisen with Christofias's February election, he 
added; as such, Iacovou should consider potential 
repercussions before demanding a delay and/or blaming the 
other side.  The Ambassador ended the call by questioning 
whether the "Straw Rule" was still in play -- the RoC 
prohibition on visiting foreign dignitaries seeing 
Christofias if they also intended to visit Talat at the "TRNC 
Presidential Palace."  Iacovou, seemingly pained by the 
inquiry, promised to provide guidance soon.  END SUMMARY. 
 
-------------------------------------- 
G/Cs "Already" Sensitized to T/C Needs 
-------------------------------------- 
 
¶2.  (C) Iacovou began the 90-minute discussion by noting a 
major concession Greek Cypriots had made to ensure the 
leaders would reach agreement on March 21.  "They didn't want 
specific mention of the July 8 (2006) Agreement, so we took 
it out.  But implicit was the understanding that we would 
follow July 8's basic outline -- committees and working 
groups preparing the ground for full-fledged negotiations." 
At that time, he believed the 90-day preparatory period 
stipulated on March 21 would allow the sides sufficient time 
to make measurable progress.  "I never thought it would take 
a full month just to determine the slate of committees and 
working groups and give them mutually-acceptable names," 
Iacovou lamented. 
 
¶3.  (C) He had clear expectations for the March 21 talks. 
Iacovou had understood from the outset that the sides would 
remain far apart on "core" Cyprus Problem components such as 
property restitution, territorial adjustments and 
security/guarantees.  He only hoped to narrow these gaps 
slightly, and prepare the leaders with clear outlines of each 
community's positions in advance of full-fledged 
negotiations.  For the "easier" issues, however, he hoped to 
bring the sides close to a deal.  Once he and Nami and had 
finalized the working group slate, Iacovou assigned highest 
priority to economic affairs and EU matters, since these 
seemingly presented the greatest prospect for success. 
 
¶4.  (C) Even during the month-long delay, the G/C negotiator 
had attempted to put a positive spin on the process.  "I 
don't see the other side as my adversary, but as my partner," 
Iacovou maintained; he had instructed his teams to think and 
act similarly.  Early on, however, he began to temper his 
optimism.  Continued Turkish "intransigence" was resulting in 
a Turkish Cypriot side leery of engagement and incapable of 
making quick decisions.  Iacovou, in comments that track with 
UNFICYP's, claimed that the April 3 inauguration of 
much-anticipated Ledra Street Buffer Zone crossing remained 
in doubt until hours before its scheduled opening, owing to 
 
NICOSIA 00000306  002 OF 003 
 
 
Turkish military opposition to crossing modalities.  "It took 
Talat two hours to get the simplest of answers from the 
(Turkish) generals," Iacovou explained. 
 
------------------ 
Slow-Going in Most 
------------------ 
 
¶5.  (C) Ankara exercised similar control over the working 
groups and technical committees, he alleged.  "I have an 
excellent working relationship with (Turkish Cypriot 
counterpart) Ozdil Nami.  And there are some qualified, 
knowledgeable staff on the T/C side.  But these people are 
not allowed to think, to brainstorm, to ponder our 
suggestions, which are many."  Rather, Iacovou continued, the 
Turkish Cypriot experts read opening positions from prepared 
texts, take note of our positions, and engage only to inform 
that they must seek guidance from their superiors.  One 
exception -- the T/C leader of the economic technical 
committee, who readily exchanged thoughts with his G/C other 
-- lasted only two meetings before he suddenly resigned from 
team.  Iacovou attributed the Turkish Cypriot go-slow tactics 
to two factors.  First, most team members were active "civil 
servants," meaning they were obligated by chain-of-command 
considerations to seek guidance (the G/C side, on the other 
hand, is populated by former politicians, retired diplomats, 
and academics.)  And then there was the hand of Ankara. 
Iacovou asserted that Turkish MFA Under Secretary Ertugrul 
Apakan had recently paid a one-week visit to the island, 
during which he had given specific negotiating instructions 
to the Turkish Cypriot negotiators, and posted extra 
diplomats in the Turkish "Embassy" to "help" the T/C side. 
 
¶6. (C) The half-way point of the 90-day process already had 
passed, yet significant progress had occurred only in two of 
six working groups, Iacovou reckoned.  And even in the EU and 
economy groups, the T/Cs were sticking to unrealistic 
positions, such as a demand for permanent Acquis derogations 
over competition -- "the heart of the European Union 
project," he blasted.  Turkish Cypriots' lines were even 
harder and their tactics more robotic in the territory group, 
where they insisted only on "a better deal than Annan gave 
us" and refused even to consider Greek Cypriot suggestions. 
In the governance group, T/Cs continued to demand a place for 
foreign judges on the Cypriot Supreme Court.  "Can you 
imagine?  In a EU state in 2008?" Iacovou chided. 
 
--------------------------- 
Righting the Ship on May 23 
--------------------------- 
 
¶7.  (C) Christofias and Talat will meet under UN auspices May 
23, their first formal gathering since hammering out the 
March 21 arrangement.  "Worried" barely describes the Greek 
Cypriot leader over the state of the current process, Iacovou 
related.  Christofias was convinced that full-fledged 
negotiations would quickly stall were they to commence 
without sufficient preparation.  Further, the President 
questioned why Talat did not feel the same.  Instead, Iacovou 
continued, Talat seems set on demanding formal negotiations 
regardless of the prospects for progress, and if he does not 
get them, he will blame the G/C side.  It appeared as if the 
T/C leader was convinced he had the international community's 
support for his position.  The Ambassador quickly 
interjected, noting that neither he nor anyone from the 
Embassy had taken that stance.  What we have said is that we 
look forward to the two sides' agreement to resume 
full-fledged negotiations.  Apparently satisfied with the 
response, Iacovou argued that the local P-5 should focus 
their efforts where truly needed:  on convincing Turkey to 
allow Talat to engage. 
 
¶8.  (C) Iacovou considered the May 23 meeting an opportunity 
for the leaders to take stock of the ongoing process.  "If 
your side won't engage in the working groups," Christofias 
would question, "why should I believe you'll do more in 
face-to-face talks?"  Both men knew they were incapable of 
resolving differences on complex themes outside their areas 
of expertise, whether economics, EU matters, or the 
environment, Iacovou insisted.  As such, the working groups 
and technical committees had real roles, and they must be 
allowed to carry out substantive discussions.  Iacovou 
favored increasing the frequency of their meetings, from the 
current twice-per-week to a M-W-F arrangement.  "With more 
time to meet and more progress, we'll serve the leaders 
better," he contended. 
 
------------------------------------ 
 
NICOSIA 00000306  003 OF 003 
 
 
Maintain the Momentum is our Message 
------------------------------------ 
 
¶9.  (C) The Ambassador praised Iacovou and Christofias's 
efforts to re-energized Cyprus Problem negotiations after a 
near-four year impasse.  Like the G/C side, the U.S. hoped 
Turkey would give Talat free rein for give-and-take, and 
understood Nicosia's need for a modicum of progress in the 
preparatory process.  Media on both sides of the island 
weren't exactly helping, he fretted.  Outlets like leading 
daily "Phileleftheros" were poisoning the climate with 
repeated warnings that failure was imminent.  A 
self-fulfilling prophecy must be avoided, the Ambassador 
reckoned. 
 
¶10.  (C) He counseled Iacovou to exercise caution when 
considering the G/C approach toward the coming deadline. 
"There is an international aspect to the talks," the 
Ambassador noted, "and you're best served by keeping the (UN) 
Secretary General focused and contributing to the process." 
Implicit in his message was that, should the sides fail to 
agree either to call for full-fledged negotiations or request 
a short extension of the preparatory period, the SYG might 
determine that the communities' political will was 
insufficient to merit continued, high-level UN attention. 
 
 
¶11. (C) On the U.S. side, however, there was growing interest 
in Cyprus, the Ambassador confided.  While he still could not 
offer dates, a high-level DoS official planned to visit the 
island by mid-June.  He would want to call on both 
Christofias and Talat to encourage progress in the process. 
Was the "Straw Rule" governing high-level visitors' access to 
the President still in force? the Ambassador queried. 
Iacovou responded by revealing he had asked the Foreign 
Ministry for a formal opinion.  Pressed, he clarified that, 
were the Secretary of State to visit Cyprus, the prohibition 
would remain in force.  (Note:  we inferred that the Cypriots 
would in fact waive the rule for lower-level officials, as 
they had two weeks ago for Deputy Russian FM Vladimir Titov. 
We will continue to follow up, however.) 
 
------- 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶12.  (C) It comes as no surprise that this latest "era of 
good feelings" on Cyprus is petering out somewhat -- despite 
good personal relations between Christofias and Talat, and 
between Iacovou and Nami, the sides remain miles apart on 
most core CyProb elements, and engagement on substance was 
bound to cause friction and name-calling.  Nor are we 
surprised that the Greek Cypriot negotiator -- like President 
Christofias, in a days-earlier meeting with local P-5 
representatives -- laid blame squarely on the Turkish 
Cypriots for the working groups/technical committees' 
perceived lack of progress.  Yet we're not prepared to 
swallow Iacovou's story whole.  In the past ten days, Embassy 
staff have engaged four different UNFICYP facilitators with 
first-hand knowledge of the groups' workings and activities. 
Their observations differ on details, but in general support 
Iacovou's claim that G/C participants are more experienced 
and have a "deeper bench," while T/C staff request guidance 
from their superiors more than their Greek-origin 
counterparts do.  But by no means do Turkish Cypriots alone 
deserve the title of "intransigent party," our UN colleagues 
argue -- the sides have alternated being stubborn and 
accommodating.  Further, when the Ambassador sees Ozdil Nami 
on May 20, we expect to hear an exact-opposite account from 
the T/C negotiator.  In such a scenario, maintaining momentum 
entails urging both sides to remain engaged while refraining 
from visceral blame-game urges.  We will continue to look for 
opportunities to pass this message both publicly and 
privately. 
SCHLICHER