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O 071604Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5783
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0620
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY 1354
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LUSAKA 000500 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/06/2018 
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC ZA ZI
SUBJECT: UNOFFICIAL PING "ENVOY" MEETS WITH MUGABE; PING 
VISITS ZAMBIA TO DISCUSS SADC-AU EFFORTS ON ZIMBABWE 
 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  According to Vernon Mwaanga, a veteran 
Zambian diplomat and politician who met with Mugabe on the 
week of April 14 at the behest of AU Commission Chairperson 
Jean Ping, much of the blame for the current electoral crisis 
in Zimbabwe lies with the incompetence (rather than 
fraudulence) of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission.  Mugabe 
allegedly told Mwaanga that he intends to accept defeat if he 
loses the run-off election.  In the event of his victory, 
Mugabe claims that he will step down within one year, handing 
over the party leadership and calling for a new presidential 
race.  Mwaanga suggested that the best way forward would be 
for SADC to strengthen its election observer team and 
increase its dialogue with MDC and ZANU-PF representatives. 
Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma told the 
Ambassador that Jean Ping was in Lusaka on May 2 to discuss 
ways in which the AU could become more supportive of SADC 
efforts on Zimbabwe.  End Summary. 
 
¶2. (C) On May 6, Vernon Mwaanga met with the Ambassador at 
her request to share information about his recent visit to 
Harare, which he claims was undertaken at the behest of AU 
Commission Chair Jean Ping.  The shrewd, veteran Zambian 
diplomat and politician explained that his friendship to 
Mugabe dates back to the early 1970s when Mwaanga served as 
Zambia's foreign minister and the GRZ provided significant 
support to Zimbawe's freedom struggle.  Mwaanga said that 
during his week-long visit to Harare in mid-April he had met 
with Mugabe several times, as well as representatives from 
the MDC and the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission (ZEC). 
 
¶3. (C) Mwaanga described Mugabe as "completely shocked" at 
not having won the presidential election.  He said Mugabe was 
also tremendously upset with Mwanawasa for hosting the SADC 
emergency summit.  Mwaanga said Mugabe would not accept a 
government of national unity as this would entail departing 
from the constitutionally-defined electoral process. 
Allegedly, Mugabe told Mwaanga that he will accept the 
election results if he loses the run-off.  In the event that 
he wins the run-off, Mugabe explained his intention to remain 
in office for less than a year.  According to Mwaanga, Mugabe 
means to turn over the ZANU-PF party leadership, perhaps to 
Emmerson Mnangagwa, and prepare the way for a ZANU-PF victory 
in an ensuing presidential race. 
 
¶4. (C) In response to the Ambassador's repeated emphasis on 
human rights abuse and voter intimidation, Mwaanga 
acknowledged that Mugabe is aware of--and perhaps even 
behind--some of this violence.  He posited that Mugabe's 
security apparatus is, on its own initiative, perpetuating 
most of these acts.  Mwaanga said Mugabe's supporters in the 
military are "extremely passionate about maintaining the 
status quo," lest they find themselves being held accountable 
before a new government.  When the Ambassador insisted that 
human rights violence was taking place with Mugabe's consent 
if not direction, Mwaanga conceded the point.  Mwaanga said 
that in his view, despite allegations otherwise, Mugabe has 
retained his control and is not being guided by his 
"securocrats." 
 
¶5. (C) Mwaanga said that he had spoken with Tsvangirai, Biti, 
and other senior MDC leaders, although he had less to say 
about these meetings.  He said MDC was still divided 
internally as to whether or not to participate in run-off 
elections.  Mwaanga said that he had relayed to MDC the 
substance of his discussions with Mugabe and that MDC 
representatives had said, in response, that they would be 
prepared to come to terms with Mnangagwa.  According to 
Mwaanga, the MDC leaders said that their contention was only 
with Mugabe and not with the ZANU-PF party. 
 
¶6. (C) Mwaanga implied that most of the blame for the 
electoral crisis belongs with the ZEC, which he described as 
entirely incompetent and inexperienced.  Mwaanga said the ZEC 
Commissioners had been unable to answer even his simplest 
questions.  In a private meeting, the ZEC Chair complained to 
Mwaanga saying (in reference to the ZEC Commissioners) "You 
see what I have to work with."  Mwaanga shared his view that 
the ZEC made an imprudent mistake by not releasing the 
election results immediately, but did so in order to verify 
the outcomes in various districts rather than tamper with or 
alter the results.  Mwaanga said that he had seen the 
preliminary ZEC results and that these did not differ from 
those that the ZEC announced on May 2. 
 
¶7. (C) Regarding a way forward, Mwaanga (who said he had 
debriefed Mwanawasa on his activities in Zimbabwe) suggested 
that a second SADC emergency summit would not be useful, 
 
LUSAKA 00000500  002 OF 002 
 
 
given the divisions within SADC between liberation movement 
alumni in Angola, Namibia, and South Africa, and other SADC 
leaders.  He recommended that SADC strengthen its election 
observer team during the run-off elections, and work closely 
with MDC and ZANU-PF to improve understanding. 
 
¶8. (C) On May 7, Ambassador spoke with Foreign Ministry 
Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma, who had just participated in 
a troika meeting of the SADC Organ for Politics, Defense, and 
Security.  He said the meeting had been "inconclusive" on the 
issue of Zimbabwe.  Kapoma, however, told the Ambassador that 
AU Commission Chairman Jean Ping had visited Lusaka for three 
hours on May 2 to discuss with President Mwanawasa ways in 
which the AU could become more involved and supportive of 
SADC efforts with regard to Zimbabwe.  Kapoma said that there 
were no concrete plans to call for another emergency summit. 
 
¶9. (C) Comment:  Mwaanga is a slippery character with some 
shadows in his past, but he may still retain the confidence 
of both Mwanawasa and Mugabe.  He also gave the impression 
that he is maintaining contact with both the MDC and ZANU-PF. 
 Post will report on any developments, in the event that 
Mwaanga visits Harare again under alleged AU direction, or 
makes additional contacts with Mugabe.  Although Mwaanga's 
accounts must be taken with some degree of caution, given his 
apparently warm relationship with Mugabe, they cannot be 
entirely dismissed either. 
MARTINEZ