VZCZCXRO3967
OO RUEHDU RUEHMR RUEHRN
DE RUEHLS #0486/01 1231216
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O 021216Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY LUSAKA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5767
INFO RUCNSAD/SOUTHERN AF DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDS/AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY 0617
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO PRIORITY 0036
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 LUSAKA 000486 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2018 
TAGS: PREL PHUM SADC AU ZI ZA
SUBJECT: ZAMBIA:  NEXT STEPS ON ZIMBABWE CRISIS 
 
REF: A. LUSAKA 477 
 
     ¶B. LUSAKA 463 
     ¶C. LUSAKA 453 
     ¶D. LUSAKA 448 
     ¶E. LUSAKA 429 
     ¶F. LUSAKA 427 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Carmen Martinez for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  President Mwanawasa remains committed to 
addressing the crisis in Zimbabwe, but lacks wide support 
from other SADC leaders.  He has expressed an intent to send 
a small delegation of SADC leaders to meet with Mugabe as 
well as an interest in helping mediate a solution involving a 
government of national unity.  President Mwanawasa remains 
sensitive to the perception that he is acting in response to 
pressure from Western governments.  Press coverage in Zambia 
has reported on post-election violence and human rights abuse 
and editorials have begun to reflect increasing public 
perception that it is time for Mugabe to step down.  Post 
will continue it coordination with the GRZ and will broaden 
its engagement with the media and civil society (see 
recommendations in paras 9-13).  End Summary. 
 
----------------------- 
Mwanawasa Still Engaged 
----------------------- 
 
¶2. (SBU) As Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
Chair, President Mwanawasa has shown considerable leadership 
by placing Zimbabwe more prominently on the SADC agenda and 
introducing increased candor to the discussion of Zimbabwe's 
problems.  Subsequent to the April 12 SADC emergency summit 
(Ref F), President Mwanawasa has been in contact with 
opposition candidate Tsvangirai and other SADC leaders 
seeking ways to move the issue forward.  He also publicly 
praised South Africa and Mozambique for refusing to offload a 
Chinese arms shipment headed to Zimbabwe and called on other 
countries to do likewise. 
 
¶3. (C) In an April 26 meeting with A/S Frazer (Ref B), 
President Mwanawasa expressed his intention to send a 
delegation of SADC heads of state to meet with Mugabe.  This, 
he explained, would require the cooperation and endorsement 
of President Dos Santos, as Chair of the SADC Organ on 
Politics, Defense, and Security.  President Mwanawasa also 
indicated that he would be willing to play a mediation role 
to further prospects of a government of national unity. 
(Comment:  Mwanawasa cannot be a facilitator, never mind an 
honest broker, when Mugabe will not take his calls and Mbeki 
confronts him.)  Lastly, he referred to a possible mission 
comprised of former SADC heads of state to entreat Mugabe. 
 
¶4. (C) President Mwanawasa has identified former President 
Kaunda, as a possible member of the delegation of senior 
statesmen (Refs A, D).  In many respects, Kaunda, who stepped 
down from office peacefully following an electoral defeat 
after 27 years in office, and who belongs to the first 
generation of African liberation leaders, may have the 
credentials to appeal to Mugabe.  Hover, his comments to A/S 
Frazer during her recent visit to Zambia (Ref A), and an 
April 29 press statement in which he insisted that the 
British Government is responsible for the problems in 
Zimbabwe, suggest that he may not be suitable for convincing 
Mugabe to step down. 
 
¶5. (C) The Ambassador discussed recent developments with 
Foreign Ministry Permanent Secretary Tens Kapoma on May 2. 
Kapoma said that on May 3, the SADC Politics, Defense, and 
Security Organ troika, comprised of Angola, Swaziland, and 
Tanzania, will meet in Luanda, hosted by President Dos 
Santos.  When asked whether President Mwanawasa would 
consider hosting a follow-up SADC emergency summit, Kapoma 
said that it would depend on the outcome of the troika 
meeting.  Kapoma added that the possibility of another summit 
"has not been ruled out." 
 
¶6. (C) Kapoma also told the Ambassador that, in his view, the 
level of violence and human rights abuse in Zimbabwe would 
not lend themselves to a free and fair run-off election.  He 
indicated that he had been in touch with Zimbabwe opposition 
leaders who, he conveyed, believed a run-off would be subject 
to rigging and would lead to a situation "worse than before." 
 Kapoma acknowledged that President Mwanawasa had still not 
succeeded in speaking with President Mugabe, despite repeated 
attempts, beginning in early April, in advance of the 
emergency summit. 
 
------------------------- 
Paradigm Shift in Zambia? 
 
LUSAKA 00000486  002 OF 003 
 
 
------------------------- 
 
¶7. (SBU) Zambian newspapers and electronic media have in the 
last week increased the number of stories reporting on the 
post-election crisis in Zimbabwe.  Media widely reported on 
A/S Frazer's statements about violence and human rights 
abuses in Zimbabwe that seems to have coincided with (or 
perhaps helped steer) a shift in tone in media coverage. 
Editorials in Zambia's daily independent newspaper, "The 
Post," point to a change in the way Zambians are reporting 
on--and viewing--the situation in Zimbabwe.  On April 14, the 
Post's editor, Fred M'membe, drawing on pro-Mugabe vitriol, 
published an editorial entitled "Let the imperialists choke 
on their frustration."  However, responding to international 
attention on violence in Zimbabwe, The Post increased its own 
coverage of human rights abuse.  An April 26, M'membe changed 
his tune with an editorial that called upon ZANU-PF and 
Mugabe to "accept defeat and step down." 
 
¶8. (SBU) This invigorated local media response is 
contributing to a change in public perception, with its 
well-placed focus on human rights abuse.  Much of this credit 
also goes to President Mwanawasa who, through his leadership 
in SADC, has helped open the discussion on Zimbabwe, 
demonstrating by his own example that Zimbabwe's crisis is an 
internal African problem and no longer "taboo."  Many 
Zambians seem to have reframed their perspective on 
Zimbabwe's problems, looking beyond its economic woes (and 
land reform issues), to broader issues of human right abuse, 
poor governance, and disregard for democracy. 
 
--------------------------------- 
Embassy Lusaka Broadens Its Scope 
--------------------------------- 
 
¶9. (C) In addition to coordinating closely with State House 
and the Foreign Ministry on GRZ next steps, particularly with 
regard to SADC, the Ambassador will discuss the issue with 
outgoing Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa 
(COMESA) Secretary General Erastus Mwencha.  Ambassador will 
emphasize to Mwencha, the newly appointed African Union 
Commission Deputy Chairperson, the problems that Zimbabwe 
poses to regional stability and economic integration and 
suggest that the AU might have a role to play.  Post's Public 
Affairs Section will reach out to local journalists to 
provide resource material, including releases from Human 
Rights Watch and Zimbabwe Peace Project, as well as web 
resources that will help them monitor the situation in 
Zimbabwe.  Post's Political Section will meet with 
influential human rights and governance NGO representatives 
in Lusaka to increase civil society's awareness and 
engagement, and hopefully will spur them to speak out on 
Zimbabwe. 
 
--------------- 
Recommendations 
--------------- 
 
¶10. (C) Despite Mwanawasa's commitment to moving the issue 
forward, he remains particularly concerned that this remain a 
SADC-led initiative.  During the emergency summit, he told 
other SADC leaders that SADC "must solve, and be seen to be 
solving," the problem because "by doing nothing, we are 
inviting outside intervention" (Ref E).  He remains sensitive 
to the perception that he is acting in response to pressure 
from Western governments.  Post will continue to respect 
these concerns by maintaining a strong dialogue that is 
matched with public discretion. 
 
¶11. (C) Some, including former President Kaunda, continue to 
share the view that the crisis in Zimbabwe can be ascribed to 
the UK and United States (Ref A).  They have framed 
Zimbabwe's problems in terms of a conflict between Mugabe and 
Western countries.  There is the danger that highly vocal 
U.S. statements against Mugabe will play into their hands. 
U.S. positions might be most effectively advanced in Zambia 
and throughout the region by utilizing the voices of local 
and African journalist and NGO representatives. 
 
¶12. (C) President Mwanawasa also pointed to the difficulty 
gaining consensus among SADC heads of state due to leaders 
who continue to sympathize with Mugabe.  Although Mwanawasa 
is prepared to call for SADC sanctions, he believes that 
other SADC leaders would oppose them.  A great deal of 
diplomatic work in other SADC capitals remains to be done to 
enlarge the camp of like-minded SADC leaders. 
 
¶13. (C) As the Department engages with SADC, it may want to 
double-track these efforts through the African Union. 
President Kikwete, for instance, may side with President 
 
LUSAKA 00000486  003 OF 003 
 
 
Mwanawasa within SADC, but may be best positioned to address 
the situation through Tanzania's Chair of the AU.  Egypt may 
also be concerned about resolving the problem before it takes 
on the AU Chair, as it will likely not want the issue on the 
agenda at Sharm El-Sheikh in July. 
MARTINEZ