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C O N F I D E N T I A L LA PAZ 001023 
 
SIPDIS 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/03/2018 
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS MARR EAID ECON OPDC OPRC ADPM
BL 
SUBJECT: WORKING RELATIONS: DEATH BY A THOUSAND PAPER CUTS 
 
REF: A. LA PAZ 899 
     ¶B. LA PAZ 711 
     ¶C. LA PAZ 695 
     ¶D. 07 LA PAZ 2960 
     ¶E. 07 LA PAZ 2634 
 
Classified By: EcoPol Chief Mike Hammer for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary.  Despite a constant barrage of anti-U.S. 
vitriol and baseless accusations of U.S. conspiracies against 
the Morales government, there are also many examples of 
continuing good relations among working-level and even 
senior-level contacts.  However, there is clearly a campaign 
underway since mid-2007 to "distance" the Bolivian Government 
from the United States backed by a number of concrete 
actions, including new restrictions, demands, and calls to 
renegotiate, reject, or freeze long-standing agreements. 
Many government officials have cut off contact with the 
mission, either at their own behest or through the orders of 
superiors.  Due to an influx of new political appointees 
government-wide, it is sometimes difficult to determine 
whether actions are intended to be slights or simply 
incompetence.  We have also observed a new fear of 
association with the Embassy among some working-level 
contacts.  Constant high-level government accusations of U.S. 
conspiracies inherently make it more difficult to engage at 
the working level.  We will continue to reach out to the 
Bolivian government at all levels (ref a), but we do not 
expect to escape scapegoat status any time soon.  Many 
high-ranking government officials are simply not ready to 
accept any reality that does not fit into their paranoid view 
of the United States.  End Summary. 
 
Fear of the Empire: Paranoid Political Backdrop 
--------------------------------------------- -- 
 
¶2. (C) Although the government has spewed anti-U.S. rhetoric 
since Morales took power in January 2006, consistent with 
Morales' positions before he became president, we had not 
seen concrete steps taken to follow through on the rhetoric 
until October, 2007 with the release of the presidential 
foreign assistance decree (ref d).  Before then, veteran 
officers dismissed the rhetoric as bluster, consistent with 
the assurances of working-level contacts and political 
contacts that such outbursts were simply part of the 
government's ongoing campaign to rally its base around 
symbolic, but ultimately hallow, anti-imperialist vitriol. 
 
¶3. (C) However, since the decree was issued, we have 
witnessed a steady ratcheting up of concrete measures 
detrimental to our working-level cooperation.  Vice Foreign 
Minister Hugo Fernandez confirmed this intentional 
"distancing" in our bilateral relationship back in September. 
 Much of this "distancing" is reflected in actions that are 
not entirely attributed to us, but that nevertheless are 
clearly aimed in our direction, for example opening 
diplomatic relations with Iran, suggesting the UN be moved 
from New York, and blaming the "empire" (read U.S.) for 
global climate change. 
 
¶4. (C) These actions to distance us are compounded by and 
consistent with an increase in the quantity and scope of 
government attacks against the U.S. in general, and the 
Embassy and the Ambassador in particular.  Government and 
ruling MAS Party contacts confirm that these attacks are not 
just political gamesmanship, but sincere fears we are trying 
to undermine their rule and orchestrate their ouster. 
Whatever the case, these accusations are scaring some of our 
contacts away from us. 
 
New Assistance Rules: Bark, Bite, or Both? 
------------------------------------------ 
 
¶5. (C) Ever since the government passed a decree requiring 
closer international assistance coordination with public 
institutions in October, 2007, we have waited to see how the 
government would apply the vaguely-worded, potentially 
far-reaching decree (ref d).  Although we are still waiting 
for implementing regulations, it is clear the government 
wishes to exert more control over our assistance budget ($124 
million in FY07). 
 
--Following months of allegations that USAID programs were 
undermining the government, the government finally requested 
a comprehensive review of USAID programs (ref c).  While the 
government has labeled this a technical exercise, the signals 
are clear that there is a strong political element to the 
review, including efforts to control U.S. funds and secure 
patronage for the MAS party faithful.  While we are concerned 
that the government may be using the review to stop at least 
parts of USAID's programs (democracy in particular), we also 
note that the government is disorganized and plagued by 
infighting. 
 
--This review has been much more in)depth and lengthy than 
past reviews.  Normally a host country government review 
would take a few days, not the 30 days the government 
requested.  The review has already passed its 30 day deadline 
and there is much more work to be done.  At the current pace, 
the entire review could last as long as six months.  While 
the process may be necessary to show we are transparent and 
focused on development, it is a drain on staff time and 
resources. 
 
--One point of contention are the numerous and evolving 
information requests made by the government to USAID. We 
suspect they are after information to build a case against 
us. As much of what they seek is protected by U.S. law or 
part of diplomatic archives, we have pushed back on these 
requests. 
 
--So far, a welcome irony of the review has been the very 
positive reception USAID and government staff has received 
from community members when we have traveled to the field to 
visit projects.  The government reviewers see how valuable 
this work is and what little capacity they have to carry out 
these programs without USAID and its project partners. 
Furthermore, farmers and mayors have given the government 
reviewers an earful on the need to thaw certain projects 
frozen by the government. 
 
USAID: Continued Scrutiny 
------------------------- 
 
¶6. (C) The government has not put its criticisms of USAID on 
hold pending the results of the review (ref b).  In the weeks 
prior to the May 4 Autonomy Referendum in the Department 
(state) of Santa Cruz, President Morales has been falsely 
accusing USAID of going door-to-door offering people money to 
oppose the government.  On April 19, the President reportedly 
levied this attack on USAID. "Our patience can end.  If they 
want to work, they can work; if they want to help, they can 
help, and if they do not want to do it, get out of Bolivia." 
 
--This latest round is fueled for the first time by so-called 
"evidence" of USAID conspiracy: a letter from an 
Assistant-Mayor to Morales asking him to suspend USAID 
activities in Potosi Department (state) because USAID is 
"offering money to leaders that are provoking conflicts and 
divisions in our communities."  (Note: We have not seen the 
letter.  End Note.) 
 
--In a highly-publicized rejection of U.S. support, 
Agriculture Minister Susana Rivero refused to accept 19,000 
tons of wheat flour because she considered the donation an 
affront to national dignity.  The Ambassador noted that it is 
Bolivia's sovereign right to refuse assistance.  The refusal 
has been a public relations disaster for the government amid 
soaring inflation and rising bread prices." 
 
--By and large, the criticisms come from the President and 
the Minister of the Presidency, and don't seem to be shared 
widely within the cabinet.  However, the President's public 
criticisms prompt some ministers and vice ministers to avoid 
dealing with USAID, at least for the time being. 
 
Cutting Off Uncle Sam: The "Distancing" Begins 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶7. (C) Some government officials have threatened to or 
actually stopped meeting with us, have refused to continue 
cooperation or with our programs, or have failed to renew 
agreements for no other reason than we are the U.S. Embassy. 
 
--The government has suspended a routine annual exchange of 
diplomatic notes granting our military in Bolivia on 
temporary assignment rights and protections consistent with a 
Status of Forces Agreement.  The government has made clear 
the freeze is based on political reasons and will not be 
lifted until the "atmosphere" improves.  The Vice Foreign 
Minister readily suggested that the USG repackage the SOFA 
exchange of notes as a "new" agreement to get past resistance 
to renewal.  Suspension of the exchange has already cost 
Bolivia more than a million dollars in medical assistance 
benefits for 2008 and threatens 2009 humanitarian assistance 
projects. 
 
--The government suspended military participation in the 
Western Hemisphere Institution for Security Cooperation 
(WHINSEC), alleging the training facility is teaching 
Bolivian students to oppress their own people.  Although 
Government Minister Alfredo Rada said the police would 
likewise be banned from attending the facility, no official 
order has followed and police continue to attend.  The 
Bolivian Navy has interpreted the WHINSEC ban to include any 
training that discusses strategy, which sometimes requires 
them to stretch the definition of "technical" training. 
 
--The Vice Ministry of Culture refused to work with our book 
donation program in 2008, ostensibly because they were too 
busy.  We are now simply working directly with libraries and 
local authorities.  The snub has had no impact on the 
program, as Ministry participation was confined to taking 
credit for the donations at public events. 
 
--The government's export promotion office (Ceprobol) has 
been instructed to stop supporting programs if USAID or the 
U.S. Embassy is involved.  This automatically bans USAID or 
Embassy from funding commercial diplomacy projects.  The ban 
includes staff members attending Bolivian Institute of 
Foreign Trade (IBCE) seminars funded by USAID. 
 
--The Morales Administration cut funding for all U.S.-funded 
Bolivian personnel in the administrative unit of the Bolivian 
Food and Animal Health Safety Agency (SENASAG) in 2008. 
Without this administrative control, some $4 million in USDA 
funds targeting problems such as hoof and mouth disease and 
fruit fly control, have been frozen. 
 
--Vice Minister of Coca Geronimo Meneses told our Narcotics 
Affairs Sections (NAS) he had been specifically instructed by 
the Agriculture Minister Susana Rivero not to meet with U.S. 
officials.  He followed these orders from December to 
February, when Minister Rivero announced her resignation 
(which later was rejected by President Morales). 
 
Fear Factor: Guilt by "Imperial" Association 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
¶8. (C) In additional to officials that have stopped 
associating with us altogether, many of our contacts have 
confided they are under pressure not to work or meet with us. 
 Other government contacts have reduced their contact with us 
and will only meet in neutral locations out of sight or under 
the most official of circumstances.  Clearly, it is not 
career enhancing to appear too close to the Embassy if you 
are a government official.  Presidency Minister Juan Ramon 
Quintana has likewise attempted to frighten our own Bolivian 
employees by publicly questioning their patriotism. 
 
--One of our MFA contacts asked PolOff to arrange meetings 
via his anonymous private e-mail account, to not talk 
publicly about friendly MFA officials, and to not call him on 
his business phone or e-mail.  He also says the fear factor 
has infected every career diplomat at the MFA, to the point 
that everyone uses cell phones at work and assumes their 
phones are tapped and e-mails monitored. 
 
--Our Regional Security Office (RSO) police contacts' are 
being pressured to minimize association with the Embassy and 
fear meeting anywhere outside of police headquarters.  On 
rare occasion, some will still meet informally in discrete 
restaurants, but only on condition that they arrive and leave 
separately.  Embassy Force Protection Detachment reports 
contacts in Trinidad and Tarija Departments (states) are 
being told to sever all contact except when absolutely 
necessary. 
 
--Army Commander Gen. Freddy Mackay commented to us that ever 
since we identified him as a graduate of WHINSEC courses, he 
has had "to watch his back."  This despite the fact that 
Minister of the Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana is also a 
graduate and has never reconciled his fiery attacks on the 
institution with his presence there. 
 
--Contacts may have good reason to fear government 
retaliation.  Returning diplomats from overseas postings are 
routinely placed on leave without pay if they are not deemed 
sufficiently pro-government.  A MAS political appointee, who 
had worked well with the Embassy in issuing courtesy visas to 
U.S. Fulbright scholars, was sacked earlier in April. While 
the courtesy visa procedure was never "legal" under Bolivian 
law, it had been in use for many years (see below).  The 
Director of the Bolivian Agency for Development of 
Information Society (ADSIB; a quasi-government organization 
supported by the Vice President's Office) was fired in March 
following his public involvement in a computer donation 
sponsored by Intel.  Apparently, association with a U.S. 
multi-national company is sufficient grounds for removal in 
the Morales administration. 
 
--In an attack on our Bolivian national employees in August, 
2007, Presidency Minister Juan Ramon Quintana said Bolivian 
"traitors" working with the United States would be "judged" 
by history. 
 
Passive Aggressive Procedures: Show us Your Papers 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶9. (C) Post notes working level contacts are increasingly 
requiring us to present information we have not had to 
present in the past and routing us through new or newly 
enforced procedures.  Government requests for itemized 
project and expenditure lists has become the norm throughout 
the Embassy and a result of the government's efforts to 
ensure "transparency." 
 
--Fulbright scholars and exchange fellows initially enter 
Bolivia on tourist visas, which are later expanded by the MFA 
as courtesy visas for the duration of their programs.  The 
MFA broke with this long-standing policy in March and refused 
to grant our scholars courtesy visas.  Because the Bolivian 
Mission in the United States has limited capacity to produce 
any visa type other than the 90-day tourist visa, we are 
stuck in a Catch-22.  Of the three Amcits the change 
immediately impacts, one will exit Bolivia and re-enter with 
a new 90-day tourist visa, one will convert to a missionary 
visa in accordance with her work with a Catholic university, 
and the third still has more than 60 days before her visa 
expires.  The MFA has indicated a willingness to negotiate a 
new bilateral cultural agreement with the USG.  Our 
correspondence with the MFA cites a 1960s agreement on 
cultural exchanges; however, neither the Bolivians nor we can 
find a copy of the agreement.  Absent the agreement, the MFA 
has "determined" that it cannot legally issue courtesy visas. 
 
--The Ministry of Housing submitted a list of training 
competencies to our Public Affairs Section that it suggested 
we target through our Fulbright and exchange programs.  We 
have received similar letters in the past, for which we send 
a letter back explaining how the programs work and that many 
of the programs will overlap with the Ministry's very 
extensive and broad list of suggested training.  This year, 
however, the Housing Ministry responded to our reply by 
requesting a comprehensive list of all Bolivian exchange 
program participants and their biographical information 
through the inception of the program in Bolivia. 
 
--The government agency responsible for regulating radio 
frequencies turned the normally routine process of renewing 
Embassy satellite telecommunications back-up links into a 
long and arduous process.  We were required to provide over 
100 legal/technical documents, half of which had to be 
certified by a notary public. 
 
Government Double Whammy: Hostility and Incompetence 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶10. (C) At times it is difficult to distinguish whether the 
government's actions are intended to spite us, are simply the 
product of ineptitude, or some combination of both. 
 
--The government announced a new, politically motivated "visa 
fee" for U.S. citizen tourists visiting Bolivia (ref e).  In 
the process, the U.S. was moved from the highest to the 
lowest tier of countries under Bolivian immigration law -- we 
are now lumped in with Angola, Somalia and Yemen.  Insult was 
added to injury when the MFA put new and incompetent 
political appointees in charge of the change.  Our officers 
had to explain basic consular terms and principles, and even 
had to correct their math at the many painful meetings 
leading up to the much-delayed, often-revised, and never 
fully-explained policy.  Following the clumsy implementation, 
the Consular Section has heard reports of American Citizens 
who have been unable to obtain a visa at Bolivian consulates 
abroad, as the consulates simply ran out of the visa stickers 
or were unclear about the requirements.  Overall, however, 
the new visa system has not/not proven overly onerous for 
U.S. citizens. 
 
--Although there are theoretically seven requirements in 
order to obtain a tourist visa at a Bolivian port of entry, 
Bolivian immigration officers have told ConOffs that in 
practice, due to time and personnel constraints, they only 
enforce three (the passport, application, and fee).  This 
inconsistency has led airlines to refuse boarding passengers 
in Miami because they lacked one of the seven requirements 
(such as the yellow fever certificate), when this is not an 
actual requirement at the port of entry. 
 
--The MFA also failed to notify us of the formal sentencing 
of an American Citizen on terrorism charges in a very 
high-profile case.  When an Embassy official tried to call 
the judge to inquire about the status of the case, he 
pretended that he was someone else when the judge realized he 
was talking to an Embassy staffer.  "The judge is out," he 
said, before abruptly hanging up the phone. 
 
--Cooperation from the MFA and Bolivian courts as we attempt 
to ramp-up adoption services for U.S. citizens following U.S. 
ratification of the Hague Convention has been similarly 
lacking.  Interlocutors have privately observed that given 
the political climate, it is unlikely that this process will 
move forward. 
 
"Misunderstandings," Reversals, and Half-Baked Apologies 
--------------------------------------------- ----------- 
 
¶11. (C) Government officials have reversed some actions we 
found to be part of U.S. "distancing."  We may never know 
whether these examples were honest mistakes by overly 
cautious and possibly new officials or politically motivated 
slights overruled by internal Bolivian government pushback. 
 
--Although the Bolivian military has been slow to fill 
(non-WHINSEC) U.S.-sponsored training slots in 2008 and 
initially refused our requests for vehicle access passes 
(until recently routine), these issues have since been 
improved upon significantly or resolved, respectively.  These 
delays could have been intended as an intentional effort to 
slight us, or could be explained by the yearly change in the 
high command, or could be a little of both. 
 
--The Foreign Ministry denied one of our MILGP candidates a 
dipnote necessary to receive a U.S. visa.  He was told all 
such dipnotes were on hold for U.S. training.  The matter was 
resolved and has not been repeated, but we do not know if a 
policy change occurred and was reversed or if a Bolivian 
consular officer simply did not understand procedure. 
 
--Technology and Information Advisor for the Ministry of the 
Presidency Jeol Flores de Carpio told the Bolivian Telecom 
Chamber (CTIC) that his office would support any program as 
long the U.S. Embassy and USAID are not involved.  Once 
EcoPol officer reminded him that USAID and Commerce 
established the chamber and also support the ExpoTeleInfo 
annual fair, Flores revised his earlier ban on our help to 
accepting assistance that is conducted "in a transparent 
manner." 
 
--Production Minister Javier Hurtado told EconOff that the 
unilateral Bolivian naming of a new PL-480 Board President in 
violation of bilateral agreements was a mistake, not 
hostility.  He urged patience for the learning curve of many 
new government employees.  On the other hand, Hurtado 
asserted that the U.S. owed Bolivia something for its 
"blatantly political" freezing of the MCC compact process. 
He went on to claim that attacks against the Embassy and the 
Ambassador by President Morales were merely responses to U.S. 
aggression and hostile actions, such as holding up the MCC 
process. 
 
--U.S. military delegations visiting Bolivian bases used to 
be required only to obtain the approval of a service 
commander or the Armed Forces Commander.  Now, the Ministry 
of Defense must approve a formal request.  However, this is 
not being universally enforced, leading us to suspect the new 
requirement may have more to do with new military officials 
misunderstanding requirements than intentionally complicating 
the process. 
 
--A few high-ranking military officers have backed out of 
U.S.-sponsored military conferences with dubious excuses. 
 
Not All Bad News 
---------------- 
 
¶12. (SBU) We note that these examples are not reflective of 
the whole of our working-level relationships, which remain 
cordial and, in some cases, better than we expected.  Some 
examples: 
 
--Although we did have problems with an airport manager, 
including denial of tarmac access for Embassy staff assisting 
in diplomatic pouch runs and denial of VIP lounge access to 
the Ambassador's bodyguards, his behavior was rectified after 
we complained to his superior.  Otherwise, GSO and Human 
Resources offices report no politically-motivated changes at 
the working level. 
 
--At a recent inauguration of USAID-funded social 
infrastructure projects and with press present, community 
members, the mayor and municipal council members, and the 
representative of the government's Vice Ministry of Coca and 
Integrated Development, roundly praised the USG for its 
support. 
 
--Access to senior military and Ministry of Defense officials 
remains better than most posts and cooperation with both our 
military and anti-narcotics interlocutors is enthusiastic. 
 
Comment: 
-------- 
 
¶13. (C) We have been going the extra mile to explain our 
assistance programs, basic concepts of international 
agreements and diplomatic protocol, and our interest in 
working with the Morales administration from the outset, but 
have little to show for it.  Despite two years of patiently 
dealing with government paranoia and suspicion, the U.S. 
government and, in particular, the U.S. Embassy continues to 
be assaulted with an almost constant barrage of accusations 
that we are conspiring against the Morales administration. 
We understand the political value of scapegoating the United 
States in Bolivia, but this has gone on for so long and such 
a high pitch that it has begun to affect our ability to carry 
out our work.  There is no amount of rational explanation 
that is likely to change this dynamic as it is becoming 
increasingly evident that there are some leaders in the 
government's inner circle (Quintana and Rada particularly) 
that do not want these "misunderstandings" to be resolved. 
 
¶14. (C) Optimistically, as critical elements of the 
government work to uncover evidence of our supposed nefarious 
activities, they are bound to learn their suspicions are 
baseless, how important our assistance is to the people of 
Bolivia, and pave the way for contacts to reengage.  This 
should be our goal.  End Comment. 
GOLDBERG