VZCZCXRO0485
OO RUEHLH RUEHPW
DE RUEHLH #0209/01 1430559
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
O P 220559Z MAY 08
FM AMCONSUL LAHORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3700
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 4426
RUEHBUL/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 0251
RUEHLO/AMEMBASSY LONDON PRIORITY 0074
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI PRIORITY 0621
RUEHKP/AMCONSUL KARACHI PRIORITY 1852
RUEHPW/AMCONSUL PESHAWAR PRIORITY 1535
RUMICEA/USCENTCOM INTEL CEN MACDILL AFB FL
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/JCS NMCC WASHINGTON DC
RUEHLH/AMCONSUL LAHORE 4825

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 LAHORE 000209 
 
SIPDIS 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL:  5/22/2018 
TAGS: MARR MASS MOPS PGOV PREL PK
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BRIEFS NAWAZ SHARIF ON USG ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS 
 
CLASSIFIED BY: Antone C. Greubel, A/PO, US Consulate Lahore, 
Department of State. 
REASON: 1.4 (b), (d) 
¶1. (C) Summary: Ambassador and members of the country team 
briefed former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and his closest 
advisors on USG assistance programs and the terrorist threat on 
May 15.  This was similar to the briefing provided to Ambassador 
Durrani and ANP leader Wali Khan at CIA headquarters.  The 
Ambassador and others were clear about US criteria for 
unilateral action in the FATA and the rules of engagement of 
ISAF troops on the Afghan-Pak border, and ODRP chief explained 
clearly the recent incidents along the border and the fact that 
ISAF troops would defend themselves against cross-border 
attacks.   Nawaz and his ministers seemed surprised by the 
diversity of terrorist threats that have originated from the 
FATA and the presence of the entire Al-Qaeda (AQ) leadership 
inside Pakistan. 
 
¶2. (C) Summary Continued: Nawaz expressed appreciation for the 
briefing, stressed that a strong U.S.-Pakistan relationship is 
critical to the continued development of Pakistan and criticized 
the previous government for not doing more to sway public 
opinion more favorably toward the United States.  Nawaz asked 
why the USG was having so many high level meetings with the 
leadership of the Karachi-based Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) 
and cautioned that his own past efforts to woo MQM into the 
political mainstream had failed.  Ambassador stressed that MQM 
was important to the stability of the fourth largest city of the 
world and one that was key to Pakistan's economy.  End Summary. 
 
¶3. (C) On May 15, Ambassador led a Mission delegation to Lahore 
to brief former Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on U.S. Mission 
Pakistan's goal to strengthen the long-term, multi-dimensional 
bilateral relationship.  Accompanying the Ambassador were DCM 
Peter Bodde, Chief of Office of the Defense Representative to 
Pakistan (ODRP) Major General James Helmly, U.S. Agency for 
International Development Program Officer Robert Wuertz, 
Regional Affairs Officer Greg Lane and Lahore A/PO Antone 
Greubel (note taker).  The group spent over three and half hours 
with Nawaz.   (Embassy has also briefed Pakistan People's Party 
(PPP) leadership, Pakistan Muslim League-Q (PML-Q) leadership 
and this week will be briefing the Senate Defense Committee.) 
Present with Nawaz were his closest Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz 
(PML-N) advisors -- his brother and former Punjab Chief Minister 
Shahbaz Sharif, former Senior Minister Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, 
Senator and former Finance Minister Ishaq Dar, former Punjab 
Governor Sardar Zulfikar Khosa and Punjab Chief Minister Dost 
Muhammad Khan Khosa. 
 
¶4. (C) The DCM gave an overview of multiple programs that 
included: 
-- USD 26 million provided to support free and fair elections; 
-- the USD 2.3 billion in USAID development assistance provided 
from 2002-2007; 
-- an overview of various economic, commercial and agricultural 
programs; 
-- USG initiatives and assistance to mitigate the energy crisis; 
-- educational exchanges and cultural programs; 
-- initiatives to improve human rights, tolerance and Afghan 
refugee assistance; 
-- law enforcement training and assistance; 
-- counternarcotics programs and financial assistance to improve 
border security and frontier law enforcement. 
 
¶5. (C) ODRP Chief then briefed the PML-N delegation on foreign 
military sales, foreign military financing, military education 
and training, coalition support funds and military assistance 
for the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  He 
described clearly the rules of engagement for ISAF troops along 
the border, walking Nawaz and his team through recent incidents. 
 The DCM then led the section on the FATA Development Strategy 
and Reconstruction Opportunity Zones.  The briefing concluded 
with RAO discussing intelligence issues and Pakistan's critical 
role in the Global War on Terror (GWOT). 
 
¶6. (C) The Nawaz team focused in on the security issues.  The 
briefing by RAO described the terrorist threat emanating from 
the tribal areas, including plotting against the UK, other 
allies, and plans by terrorists to disrupt the Beijing Olympics. 
 RAO briefer stressed that the entire AQ leadership was in 
Pakistan.  He also described the linkages among and between 
terrorist groups which threaten Pakistan and which have been 
responsible for attacks inside Pakistan. 
 
¶7. (C) After the briefings, Nawaz hosted participants for lunch 
at his Raiwind residence on the outskirts of Lahore.  Nawaz and 
 
LAHORE 00000209  002 OF 002 
 
 
his advisors expressed gratitude to the Ambassador and the 
traveling party for making the time to come to Lahore to brief 
them and discussions continued on a number of topics. 
 
¶8. (C) Nawaz pointed out that when he was Prime Minister he was 
fully cognizant of the importance of the U.S.-Pakistan 
relationship and was willing to take political hits by defending 
unpopular U.S. foreign policy actions.  As an example, he 
mentioned that in 1990 he had publicly criticized Saddam Hussein 
for invading Kuwait and supported the U.S.-led Operation Desert 
Storm.  He added that other mainstream party leaders (read the 
Pakistan People's Party) in contrast were publicly condemning 
the United States at that time. 
 
¶9. (C) Nawaz emphasized that he is cognizant of the threat 
extremism poses to Pakistan and it deeply concerns him.  He also 
stressed that no part of Pakistan should be allowed to harbor 
terrorists or become a base of operations to plot and organize 
international terrorist operations.  Nisar even commented that 
the latest peace agreement with tribal leaders is "half-baked" 
and no one really owns it.  Nawaz and his advisors raised no 
objections or concerns over Pakistan's role in the GWOT and 
clearly stated cross border attacks from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan should be stopped. 
 
¶10. (C) Nawaz criticized President Musharraf and the previous 
government for not doing more to sway public opinion toward the 
U.S.  He said that if the Pakistani people were more informed on 
USG assistance programs and aware of the threat that 
Pakistan-based terrorists posed, not only to the world, but to 
Pakistan itself, the public would have a more favorable view of 
the U.S.  Nawaz even floated an idea that Pakistan's role in the 
GWOT should be debated and approved in Parliament so that it 
would have the full support and backing of the Pakistani 
government. 
 
¶11. (C) Turning to politics, Nawaz told Ambassador that recent 
high level meetings between the Ambassador and other high level 
USG officials with MQM officials sent strange signals.  He said 
MQM is not a mainstream party and should be publicly condemned 
for its regular use of "thuggery."  Dar went on to relay a story 
about how in 1993 and in 1997 PML-N tried to bring MQM into the 
political mainstream by forming a coalition with them.  The MQM 
leadership, however, demanded exorbitant bribes and set other 
unrealistic conditions. 
 
¶12. (C) The Ambassador replied that MQM is in charge of the 
fourth largest city in the world and the key to Pakistan's 
economy.  While she was very mindful of the history of the party 
and of its leaders, MQM had some promising new leaders, was 
anxious for international respectability, is a secular party, 
and most importantly has the ability to keep the lid on Karachi 
during these tumultuous times.  We should, therefore, continue 
efforts to bring it into the mainstream. 
GREUBEL