VZCZCXRO7015
PP RUEHDE RUEHDIR
DE RUEHKU #0557/01 1391102
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
P 181102Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1471
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEATRS/DEPT OF TREASURY WASHDC PRIORITY
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC PRIORITY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 KUWAIT 000557 
 
SIPDIS 
 
NEA/ARP, NEA/I 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 2018 
TAGS: PTER PGOV KDRG PREL KTFN KU
SUBJECT: S/CT DAILEY OFFERS CT COOPERATION; KSS DESCRIBES 
CONSTRAINTS 
 
Classified By: Ambassador Deborah K. Jones for reasons 1.4 b and d 
 
Summary 
------------ 
 
¶1.  (S) In separate meetings May 12 with Kuwait State 
Security (KSS) and MFA officials, on May 12, S/CT Dailey 
briefed on the USG paradigm of counterterrorism (CT) efforts 
and urged speedy and transparent information and intelligence 
exchanges and tighter border controls.  S/CT Dailey also 
urged that the GOK not block a pending UNSCR 1267 designation 
of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS).  In 
response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into an historical 
overview of what he assessed made Kuwait unique in terms of 
CT, complaining of the lack of CT legislation and the media's 
role in promoting extremism.  "We don't see Al-Qaeda as 
Public Enemy Number One," asserted Muhaylan, listing instead 
Hizbollah, Iranians in Kuwait, and the potential spillover 
from Southern Iraq.  He further blamed Kuwait's judicial 
system and its noisy democracy as obstacles in effectively 
confronting extremists.  End Summary. 
 
USG CT Paradigm 
---------------------- 
 
¶2.  (S) In separate May 12 briefings with KSS and MFA, S/CT 
Dell Dailey, accompanied by AMB Jones, began by presenting 
the USG's approach to CT, describing a pyramid divided as 
follow:  'capture and kill' at the top 15 percent; disruption 
efforts the following 20 percent; and 65 percent focusing on 
1) social diversity 2) economic success 3) political 
integration 4) religious persecution 5) ideological 
extremism. 
Muhaylan's Historical Overview of 'Kuwait's Identity Crisis' 
--------------------------------------------- -------------- 
 
¶3.  (S) In response, KSS Director Muhaylan launched into a 
lengthy review of Kuwait's historical CT challenges. 
Highlighting Kuwait's international make-up, he noted that 
there are 127 nationalities represented in Kuwait, and that 
the population of expatriates has exceeded the number of 
Kuwaitis for over 35 years.  He explained that these large 
numbers of "outsiders" have had and maintain a high level 
influence on Kuwaiti society.  In particular, he discussed 
how the influx of a half million Palestinians after 1948 
"influenced the mentality" of Kuwaitis by introducing 
Ba'athism and Muslim Brotherhood ideologies.  He noted that 
Kuwait had always been subject to the influence emanating 
from Iraq, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, and that the growth of 
extremism, militarism and fanaticism in these three immediate 
neighbors had compelled the GOK to take a unique approach to 
terrorism. 
 
¶4.  (S) Muhaylan suggested that Kuwait suffers from a 
cultural/religious identity crisis; 70% of Kuwaitis of 
Arabian peninsula descent adhere or look to Saudi tribal or 
Wahhabi influence, while the nation's Arab Shi'a population 
looks to Marj'iyyah (religious reference points) in Najaf or 
Kerbala, Iraq, and its Persian Shi'a to Iranian institutions 
in Qom, Iran.  He added that Kuwaitis had been seduced by 
Gamal Abdel-Nasser's Pan-Arabism, only to feel betrayed by 
Arabs, particularly Iraqis and Palestinians, when Saddam 
Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990.  Now, he concluded, Kuwaitis 
are struggling to define themselves in terms of the ongoing 
discussions of clashing civilizations. 
 
Al-Qaeda not Public Enemy Number One 
--------------------------------------------- ----- 
 
¶5.  (S) As a result of this history, Muhaylan said "We don't 
see Al-Qaeda as Public Enemy Number One."  Instead, he listed 
chief threats to Kuwaiti security as Hizbollah, Iranians in 
Kuwait, and potential spillover from Southern Iraq. 
 
Impasse between Legislative and Executive Bodies 
--------------------------------------------- --------------- 
 
¶6.  (S) As a defense of GOK failings on CT, Muhaylan 
explained that candidates in the upcoming May 17 elections 
are keeping KSS and other security services distracted by 
engaging in illegal primaries or vote-buying schemes.  He 
lamented that the "parliamentary candidates are breaking the 
very laws that former MPs made."  He indicated current 
clampdowns on election infractions are ineffective because 
although Kuwait has "good laws" on the books, the executive 
body lacks will and vision and the judicial body is 
ineffective. 
 
 
KUWAIT 00000557  002 OF 003 
 
 
Need for Legislation/Press Promoting Voices of Extremists 
--------------------------------------------- ------------ 
 
¶7.  (S) Muhaylan lamented the lack of adequate legislation to 
fight terrorism and stated that Kuwaiti courts are not 
equipped to prosecute terrorists since a dissolution of 
security courts after the 1991 liberation.  He assessed that 
Kuwait,s concern with speech and press freedoms has 
overridden state security and charged that local press plays 
an active recruitment role for young jihadists, citing 
sympathy-garnering interviews with former GTMO detainees as 
an example, as well as a recent local newspaper interview 
with UNSCR 1267 designee Mubarak Mishkhas Sanad Al-Bathali, 
for which Al-Bathali was allegedly paid 300 KD. (USD 1,125). 
(Note:  Al-Bathali was arrested for his remarks and held for 
four days--the maximum one can be held without charge--and 
then released.  End note).  He complained, "We end up 
fighting the Ministry of Justice, and not the extremists." 
 
Need for Speed and Transparency 
--------------------------------------------- ---- 
 
¶8.  (S) AMB Jones and S/CT Dailey stressed the need for 
stronger bilateral cooperation and sharing of information and 
intelligence.  Explaining how extremists exploit governmental 
bureaucracies, through fast-moving technologies, i.e. the 
internet, S/CT Dailey urged Muhaylan to keep communication 
lanes open, reducing delays in sharing information from days 
to hours and minutes. 
 
¶9.  (S) While extolling recent Kuwaiti initiatives to combat 
money laundering, Dailey called for the GOK to expand its 
oversight into foreign charities that receive Kuwaiti 
donations and to deal directly with other nations where 
charities receive Kuwaiti funds.  He called for increased 
support for the Kuwait Central Bank's Financial Intelligence 
Unit.  He also extended offers of joint training at the 
national and regional level, showcasing the three most 
popular courses provided by the USG: cyber security, incident 
response, and leadership responsibility in crisis management. 
 
 
RIHS Designation:  "Individuals Gone Astray" 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10.  (S) Acknowledging that the GOK might not support a UNSCR 
1267 designation of the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society 
(RIHS, a Kuwait-based charity), and USG inability to release 
classified material that demonstrates RIHS connections to 
terror facilitation, Dailey urged that the GOK at least not 
block designation at the UNSC.  KSS officers pushed back, 
noting that the RIHS was associated with the GOK and 
therefore any effort to designate would damage the GOK's 
reputation as well.  Muhaylan argued that such designation 
might have been necessary 18 months earlier, but the GOK had 
since created a national oversight committee, with members 
from the Central Bank and Ministry of Finance.  "Select 
individuals were the problem;' Muhaylan said, 'not the 
institution itself."  AMB Jones noted that this matter would 
be raised during the June 1 visit of Treasury Secretary 
Paulson. 
 
Need for Tighter Controls 
-------------------------------- 
 
¶11.  (S) AMB Jones concluded the meeting by reiterating the 
need for greater transparency and speedier communication 
between KSS and its Embassy liaisons.  She urged tighter 
border security and stressed the need for GOK oversight and 
reviews of the status of all former GTMO detainees as well as 
jihadists known to have participated as foreign fighters 
outside of Kuwait. 
 
MFA Response 
------------------- 
 
¶12.  (S) S/CT Dailey delivered the same brief to the MFA, 
eliciting from Ambassador Khaled Muqamis, Director of MFA's 
Follow-up and Coordination Department and Ambassador Ali 
Al-Sammak, Director of the Americas Department, a promise to 
contact the Ministry of the Interior and ask that 
Al-Bathali's passport be confiscated.  (Note:  The FM was 
tied up with the Lebanon crisis and unable to attend.  End 
note.)  Muqamis also stressed that the GOK would continue to 
monitor the former GTMO detainees and that the GOK was 
currently looking for a mechanism to integrate them back into 
society.  He contended that the GOK is "very strict" and will 
take the issues conveyed seriously, noting that the GOK was 
 
KUWAIT 00000557  003 OF 003 
 
 
seeking a means to circumvent parliament in establishing a 
rehabilitation center.  (Note:  AMB Jones informed these MFA 
officials that, per her previous conversation with KSS, 
Al-Bathali had been released from detention.  End note). 
 
¶13.  (S/NF) The participants of the meetings, which took 
place at Kuwait State Security (KSS) Headquarters and MFA 
included: 
 
U.S. 
Ambassador Deborah K. Jones 
Ambassador Dell Dailey S/CT 
GRPO Head 
Tom Rosenberger (notetaker) 
 
KSS 
MG Suleiman Al-Muhaylan, Undersecretary for State Security 
Affairs and de facto KSS Director 
KSS Officers, names not provided 
 
MFA 
Ambassador Khaled Al-Muqamis, MFA Follow up and Coordination 
Department 
Ambassador Ali Al Sammak, MFA Director, the Americas 
Department 
 
¶14.  (U) This cable has been cleared by S/CT Dailey. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
JONES