VZCZCXRO2858
RR RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHDIR RUEHIHL RUEHKUK
DE RUEHKU #0471/01 1220813
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
R 010813Z MAY 08
FM AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1308
INFO RUEHZM/GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL COLLECTIVE
RUCNIRA/IRAN COLLECTIVE
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RUEHLB/AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 1109
RUEAIIA/CIA WASHDC
RHEHNSC/NSC WASHDC

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 KUWAIT 000471 
 
SIPDIS 
 
DEPT FOR NEA/ARP 
 
E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/07/2023 
TAGS: PGOV PINR PTER KISL SOCI ECON KU IZ IR
SUBJECT: AMONG KUWAITI SHI'A, NATIONAL LOYALTIES RUN DEEP 
 
REF: A. KUWAIT 0411 
     ¶B. KUWAIT 0313 
     ¶C. KUWAIT 0205 
     ¶D. KUWAIT 0175 
 
Classified By: The Ambassador for reasons 1.4 (b,d) 
 
¶1. (C) Summary: Kuwait has always had a significant 
percentage of Shi'a citizens, and Sunni/Shi'a relations are 
traditionally good.  According to most estimates, Shi'a 
currently constitute 30 percent of all Kuwaiti nationals, 
numbering some 350,000 individuals.  There are also between 
150,000 and 200,000 expatriate Shi'a currently residing in 
Kuwait, representing between 5 and 8 percent of the total 
population of 3,100,000.  Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains 
in the May 17 national elections, where they will likely 
benefit from a motivated and mobilized electoral base and a 
redistricting system that concentrates their votes in key 
constituencies; if so, they will likely attempt to redress 
their historical under-representation in the upper echelons 
of the government ministries and the military, in addition to 
advocating for more places of worship and increased Shi'a 
education in school curricula. 
 
¶2. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and foremost 
to Kuwait, which provides them with generous social and 
economic benefits.  Kuwaiti Shi'a have also enjoyed political 
access to the ruling family throughout their long history in 
Kuwait, although a relatively new breed of opposition 
politicians are angling to change the traditional Shi'a/Al 
Sabah dynamic.  Expatriate Shi'a appear to be largely 
apolitical, many having migrated to Kuwait to escape 
difficult political and economic conditions in their own 
countries.  As such, the overwhelming majority of expatriate 
Shi'a do not appear to act as agents of foreign influence, 
although the potential exists for a small, conservative 
minority within the Shi'a community to act in such a 
capacity.  End summary. 
 
Demographics 
------------ 
 
¶3. (U) According to most estimates, Shi'a constitute 30 
percent of all Kuwaiti nationals, numbering some 350,000 
individuals.  The Kuwaiti Shi'a trace their origins to 
several regions surrounding the Gulf.  Roughly 60 percent are 
of Persian origin, while 15 percent come from eastern Saudi 
Arabia (Al-Ahsa'), another 15 percent come from southern Iraq 
and the remaining 10 percent hail from Bahrain.  Persian 
Shi'a were the first to settle in Kuwait and began arriving 
approximately 200 years ago.  Their descendants now include 
many of the most influential and economically successful of 
the Kuwaiti Shi'a merchant families: the Behbehanis, the 
Dashtis, the Ma'rafis and the Qabazards. 
 
¶4. (U) There are also between 150,000 and 200,000 expatriate 
Shi'a currently residing in Kuwait, representing between 5 
and 8 percent of the total population of 3,100,000.  70,000 
of these are of Persian origin, while the remainder are 
predominantly from Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen.  These 
Shi'a are far less affluent than their Kuwaiti counterparts, 
and tend to work as laborers, craftsmen and small merchants. 
Generally speaking, these Shi'a came to Kuwait to escape 
difficult political and economic conditions in their home 
countries, although their economic and legal status here also 
remains precarious. 
 
Spiritual Influences 
-------------------- 
 
¶5. (U) According to Sayyid Mohammed Baqer Al-Mohri, a 
well-known and influential Shi'a cleric in Kuwait, Kuwaiti 
Shi'a tend to organize themselves according to their 
geographical origins and their spiritual leader, or "marja," 
which often coincide.  Among the majority of Kuwaiti Shi'a, 
Iraq's Grand Ayatollah Ali Husaini Al-Sistani is the 
pre-eminent marja.  Sistani is viewed as a moderate, 
apolitical figure who does not subscribe to the notion of 
"wilayat al-faqih" (authority of Islamic jurisprudence). 
Sistani is considered a moderating force in the region who is 
concerned with improving security in Iraq and enhancing the 
fundamental living conditions of Iraqi Shi'a.  Sistani 
supporters note his role in encouraging Shi'a participation 
in Iraqi democratic elections and his opposition to sectarian 
conflict. 
 
KUWAIT 00000471  002 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶6. (U) Several of Kuwait's most prominent Shi'a families of 
Persian origin adopt Iran's Ayatollah Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei 
(died 1992), and his son Majeed Al-Khoei (died 2003) as their 
marja.  These families include the Dashtis, the Qabazards, 
the Behbehanis, and the Ma'rafis.  Abu Al-Qasim Al-Khoei was 
noted for his scholarly and ascetic approach to Islam, and he 
championed the use of ijtihad (interpretation) as opposed to 
taqlid (imitation) in his treatment of the Qu'ran and the 
hadith.  Al-Khoei followers are essentially moderate and 
secular. 
 
¶7. (U) Some Kuwaiti Shi'a of Persian origin also regard 
Iran's Grand Ayatollah Sadiq Hussaini Shirazi as their marja. 
 Sadiq Shirazi is the brother of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 
Shirazi (died 2001), and the heir to Muhammad Shirazi's 
school of thought.  The Shirazi school espouses political 
moderation, nonviolence, freedom of expression and universal 
respect for human rights.  The Shi'a Justice and Peace 
Grouping, represented by MP Saleh Ashour in the 2006 
parliament, adopts Sayyid Shirazi as its marja and is highly 
involved in social outreach activities in Kuwait. 
 
¶8. (U) Hasawi Shi'a, those hailing from Al-Ahsa' in Saudi 
Arabia, claim Mirza Hasan Al-Ihqaqi (died 2006) as their 
marja.  Prominent Hasawi families are Al-Arbash, Khraibit and 
Al-Shawwaf.  Shi'a from Bahrain (the Baharna) take Hussein 
Bin-Asfour and Mirza Ibrahim Jamal Al-Deen as their marja 
Prominent Baharna families are Al-Qallaf, Al-Jum'ah, 
Al-Matrouk, Al-Sammak, Al-Khayyat, Al-Ostath, Al-Zaid and 
Karam. 
 
¶9. (U) Lastly, approximately 10-15 percent of Kuwaiti Shi'a 
regard Iran's Grand Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini (died 1989) 
and his successor, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their 
marja.  These Shi'a believe in "wilayat al-faqih" and are the 
most religiously conservative and politically radical of the 
Kuwaiti Shi'a. 
 
Early History Marked by Strong Integration ... 
--------------------------------------------- - 
 
¶10. (U) Shi'a have enjoyed a long and prosperous history in 
Kuwait.  This can be partly attributed to the Shi'as mutually 
beneficial relationship with the Kuwaiti ruling family, the 
Al Sabah.  At a time when many Shi'a were still financially 
modest, the Al Sabah granted their leaders and businessmen 
access to the royal family, consulting with them in the 
governance of Kuwait.  Beginning with the 1921 Shura 
(consultative) Council, the Al Sabah teamed with prominent 
Shi'a families to counterbalance Sunni urban political 
opposition.  This cooperative arrangement continued with the 
pre-independence legislative councils of 1938 and 1939, and 
after independence in the First (1963), Second (1967), Third 
(1971) and Fourth (1975) National Assemblies.  However, by 
the time of the Fifth National Assembly in 1981, the Shi'a 
political landscape had changed throughout the Muslim World. 
 
... But the Iranian Revolution Changes the Landscape 
--------------------------------------------- ------- 
 
¶11. (U) The 1979 Iranian Revolution was a watershed event for 
all Shi'a.  Its success was an inspiration to younger 
Kuwaitis, some of whom began to adopt the revolution's 
ideology and break with the pro-government policies of their 
elders.  Furthermore, nouveau-riche Kuwaiti Shi'a began to 
pursue broader agendas, such as fighting corruption and 
combating international injustice, and began drifting from 
the Al Sabah sphere of influence.  These currents led to the 
marginalization of traditional pro-government Shi'a 
politicians and the rise of opposition candidates.  This 
break first manifested itself in the Fifth National Assembly, 
which witnessed the election of the first Shi'a opposition 
MPs. 
 
¶12. (U) Concurrently, Kuwaiti Shi'a came under increasing 
suspicion from their Sunni countrymen during the 1980-1988 
Iran-Iraq War.  During that time, the largely pro-Saddam 
Kuwaiti media called into question the loyalties of Kuwait's 
Shi'a community and generally tarnished its reputation. 
Consequently, the GOK began to expel Shi'as from prominent 
government and private sector positions in the ministries, 
the military, the police and the energy industry.  Shi'a MPs 
who opposed GOK financial assistance to Iraq (e.g. Adnan 
Abdulsamad) also provoked Sunni ire. 
 
KUWAIT 00000471  003 OF 006 
 
 
 
¶13. (U) In addition, the rise of the Kuwait Islamic Da'wa 
Party in the 1970s and its increased militancy in the 1980s 
further compromised the Shi'a position.  Al-Da'wa originated 
as a sectarian political movement in Iraq during the 1960s. 
However, with the rise of Saddam Hussein and his Baathist 
regime, many Da'wa members were exiled from Iraq and some 
eventually settled in Kuwait.  While Al-Da'wa became 
politically active in Kuwait in the 1970s, it was its 
activities in the 1980s that earned it international infamy. 
In 1983, an Iranian Al-Da'wa cell led a foiled assassination 
attempt on Kuwait's Amir and was responsible for the 
simultaneous bombing of the French and U.S. Embassies in 
Kuwait.  Consequently, official discrimination against 
Kuwaiti Shi'a increased during the 1980s, leading many Shi'a 
to refer to this era as "The Black Time." 
 
1991 Brings Redemption 
---------------------- 
 
¶14. (U) After Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990, 
Kuwaiti Shi'a played a pivotal role in organizing an 
indigenous resistance movement prior to Kuwait's liberation 
by coalition forces in 1991.  In addition, some prominent 
Kuwaiti Shi'a remained to combat Saddam's forces, including 
MPs such as Abdulmohsen Al-Jamal and Nasser Al-Sarkhouh. 
These actions served to vindicate the Kuwaiti Shi'a in the 
eyes of their Sunni countrymen (although both Sunnis and 
Shi'a who took part in the resistance complain, with reason, 
that their acts have received scant recognition from the Al 
Sabah).  Since 1991, relations between Sunni and Shi'a 
Kuwaitis are much improved, and the Shi'a community has 
largely resumed its traditional pro-government, 
business-oriented role in Kuwaiti society.  Nevertheless, 
political eddies from Al-Da'wa and Hizballah still course 
through domestic politics, with ongoing implications for 
Kuwaiti Shi'a. 
 
The Mugniyah Eulogy ... 
----------------------- 
 
¶15. (C) On February 17, approximately 1500 Shi'a attended a 
eulogy ceremony for slain Hizballah terrorist leader Imad 
Mugniyah (ref C).  National Islamic Alliance (NIA) MPs Adnan 
Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari participated in the event, in 
addition to NIA President Saleh Al-Mousa, its Secretary 
General Shaykh Hussein Al-Maatouq, its Treasurer Hassan 
Salman, and former NIA MPs Abdulmohsen Jamal and Nasser 
Sarkhouh.  Abdulsamad reportedly proclaimed Mugniyah a 
"martyr" and threatened to grill the Minister of Interior, 
Shaykh Jaber Al-Khaled Al Sabah, who he claimed had no 
evidence tying Mugniyah to the murder of Kuwaiti citizens. 
(Note: The Interior Minister called Mugniyah's assassination 
"divine retribution" for his purported role in the death of 
two Kuwaiti nationals during the 1988 hijacking of Kuwait 
Airlines flight 422 (ref D).  Mugniyah was reportedly 
attempting to secure the release of 17 members of Kuwaiti 
Al-Dawa, including his brother-in-law.  End note.) 
 
... And Its Aftermath 
--------------------- 
 
¶16. (C) Reacting to a popular (Sunni) outcry against the 
eulogy and its organizers, the GOK condemned the rally and 
accused its organizers of inciting sectarian tension.  In the 
ensuing weeks, Kuwait's public prosecutor questioned three 
individuals and issued arrest warrants for five others on 
charges of sedition and belonging to an illegal political 
party.  (Note: Political parties are illegal in Kuwait. 
Although NIA is technically a political grouping, it is in 
essence the Kuwait political branch of Hizballah.  The GOK 
charged the NIA members on these grounds.  End note.)  The 
GOK also threatened to deport all third country nationals who 
partook in the eulogy.  By March 14, the GOK had released all 
of the detained individuals on bail, pending prosecution. 
However, to date the GOK has not begun a single prosecution 
or deported any individuals for participating in the eulogy. 
 
GOK Reaction Breeds Discontent 
------------------------------ 
 
¶17. (C) Many Kuwaiti Shi'a view the GOK's reaction as 
overblown and provocative, and criticize the media for 
sensationalizing its coverage of the eulogy.  Since early 
2008, the GOK has appeared determined to flex its muscles on 
 
KUWAIT 00000471  004 OF 006 
 
 
a number of issues (e.g. pay raises for public sector 
employees, demolishing private structures built on public 
land and forcefully curtailing election primaries in tribal 
areas), and this incident proved no exception.  Adnan 
Abdulsamad's comments about the Interior Minister, for which 
the minister subsequently filed a defamation suit, also 
likely played a role in provoking a strong GOK response.  In 
addition, Shi'a commentators such as Abdulhussein Al-Sultan, 
Editor of the Al-Nahar daily newspaper, have portrayed the 
GOK's response as a Hizballah witch hunt.  Other prominent 
Shi'a, such as Dr. Abdulwahed Al-Khalfan, Secretary General 
of the Shi'a Justice and Peace Grouping, speculate that 
National Security Bureau President Shaykh Ahmed Al-Fahd was 
attempting to settle old scores with Adnan Abdulsamad and 
break the power of the Shi'a opposition Popular Action Bloc 
(PAC) in Parliament.  (Note: The PAC expelled MPs Abdulsamad 
and Lari in February after their refusal to apologize for 
their role in the Mugniyah eulogy.  End note.) 
 
¶18. (C) While most Kuwaiti Shi'a disavow the Mugniyah eulogy, 
viewing it as a provocative and ill-conceived gesture, the 
community is universal in its condemnation of the GOK's 
response.  Many Shi'a draw comparisons to a similar eulogy 
for Sunni Al-Qaeda terrorist Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi in 2006, 
which elicited no official reaction.  Shi'a cite prior GOK 
knowledge of the event, its harsh response and its 
susceptibility to media influence as further evidence of the 
government's caprice and inconsistency.  As such, the Shi'a 
community intends to voice its disappointment via the ballot 
box in the upcoming May 17 election, and will likely vote 
more deliberately along sectarian lines. 
 
Shi'a May Gain in National Election 
----------------------------------- 
 
¶19. (C) Kuwaiti Shi'a stand to make gains in the May 17 
national election, and will likely benefit from a motivated 
and mobilized base.  Kuwaiti Shi'a are concentrated in the 
first, second and third constituencies of Kuwait.  In the 
first constituency, they represent 44 percent of registered 
voters (ref A).  Traditional Shi'a strongholds include the 
areas of Dasma, Bnaid Al-Gar, Qadisiya, Mansouriya, Di'iya, 
Rumaithiya, and Jabriya.  Shi'a voters have historically 
split their votes among both Sunni and Shi'a candidates, 
which led to under-representation in Parliament (e.g. Sunni 
MP Jamal Al-Kandari was elected in Rumaithiya in 2006).  Of 
the 50 members of the previous National Assembly, only four 
(8 percent) were Shi'a. 
 
¶20. (C) Most political analysts predict that Shi'a voters 
will vote along more sectarian lines in the upcoming national 
election.  This can be attributed to several factors.  First, 
Shi'a will be voicing their displeasure at the GOK's handling 
of the Mugniyah incident.  Second, Shi'a want to ensure more 
equitable representation in parliament.  Third, Shi'a will 
want to leverage their new demographic advantage under the 
new electoral redistricting system.  With the new system, 
registered voters may vote for up to four parliamentary 
candidates, and each electoral district will send 10 MPs to 
the National Assembly.  By concentrating their votes, Shi'a 
should be able to elect multiple Shi'a representatives in the 
first, second and third constituencies.  Under the old 
system, the Shi'a population was diluted across twenty-five 
electoral districts, making it difficult to secure an 
advantage in any of the constituencies. 
 
Shi'a MPs Likely to Remain in Opposition 
---------------------------------------- 
 
¶21. (C) In addition, Shi'a candidates may run on tickets with 
other Islamists, particularly the Islamic Constitutional 
Movement (ICM) (i.e. the Kuwait Muslim Brotherhood), to 
increase their chances of victory.  Of all Shi'a candidates, 
Adnan Abdulsamad and Ahmed Lari, the infamous Mugniyah duo, 
paradoxically have the best chance of re-election.  The GOK's 
strong response to the eulogy, and its concentration on these 
MPs specifically, has made them cult heroes among a portion 
of the Shi'a community.  They now portray themselves as Shi'a 
champions who have stood against official injustice.  As 
such, NIA can be expected to retain its representation in the 
new National Assembly, although it will likely be teaming 
with other opposition and Shi'a independent MPs to enhance 
its strength. 
 
NIA is Kuwait Hizballah 
 
KUWAIT 00000471  005 OF 006 
 
 
----------------------- 
 
¶22. (C) According to prominent Shi'a analysts, NIA is the 
Kuwaiti political arm of Hizballah.  By this, they mean that 
NIA subscribes to Hizballah's political ideology, that its 
members take Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as their marja and 
that they believe in "wilayat al-faqih."  NIA MPs Abdulsamad 
and Lari have both reportedly visited Lebanon and consulted 
with Hizballah leader Hassan Nasrallah on political matters. 
In addition, Kuwait Hizballah has organized itself 
politically along similar lines as its Lebanese counterpart. 
NIA's organizational structure incorporates a Shura 
(consultative) Bureau, a Policy Bureau, an Organizational 
Bureau, in addition to election committees, religious and 
social committees, charities, youth centers, and student 
bodies at both Kuwait University and the Public Authority for 
Applied Education.  Prominent NIA officers include: 
 
-- Saleh Al-Mousa (President, former Secretary General) 
-- Shaykh Hussein Al-Ma'touq (Secretary General, Shi'a cleric) 
-- Adnan Abdulsamad (former MP) 
-- Dr. Nasser Sarkhouh (former MP) 
-- Dr. Abdulmohsen Jamal (former MP, political activist and 
columnist) 
-- Ahmed Lari (former MP and former Municipal Council member) 
-- Dr. Fadhil Safar (Municipal Council member) 
-- Hassan Habib Al-Salman (former Municipal Council member) 
 
¶23. (C) NIA is an opposition political grouping that 
currently draws support from roughly 10-15 percent of the 
Kuwaiti Shi'a community.  While not the most powerful Shi'a 
political faction, the National Islamic Alliance is the most 
organized and dynamic.  In the previous parliament, NIA MPs 
teamed with other Shi'a opposition MPs to form the Popular 
Action Bloc (PAC).  NIA also cooperates with both the ICM and 
other opposition members in Parliament.  Nevertheless, Shi'a 
parliamentarians of all stripes have traditionally had 
contentious relations with Salafist members of parliament. 
This recently resurfaced when Salafi MPs led calls to strip 
MPs Abdulsamad and Lari of their parliamentary immunities for 
their role in the Mugniyah eulogy, clearing the way for their 
eventual prosecution.  (Note: The Amir's dissolution of 
parliament on March 19 effectively accomplished the same 
thing, although the GOK has made no move yet to disqualify 
either individual from the May 17 election.  End note.) 
 
¶24. (C) Shi'a analysts are also quick to point out, however, 
that NIA does not advocate change through violent means and 
that it is committed to the democratic process as practiced 
in Kuwait.  Kuwaiti Shi'a, they explain, have no interest in 
returning to "the Black Time" of official persecution and 
political marginalization, and have disavowed the defunct 
radical approach of groups such as Al-Da'wa.  As such, NIA is 
relatively more moderate than its 1980s counterparts and is 
apparently not interested in effecting political change in 
Kuwait through violence.  In contrast, the GOK views NIA's 
sponsorship of the Mugniyah eulogy as a deliberately 
provocative gesture, directed by Hizballah leadership in Iran 
and Lebanon, and intended to incite sectarian tension in 
Kuwait.  More likely is that NIA espouses positions that are 
calculated to draw sympathy from its Shi'a constituents, but 
that ultimately do not undermine Kuwaiti stability or 
jeopardize its position in parliament. 
 
Kuwaiti Shi'a Remain Loyal 
-------------------------- 
 
¶25. (S) Ultimately, Kuwaiti Shi'a are loyal first and 
foremost to Kuwait.  Several Shi'a merchant families, such as 
the Dashtis, the Behbehanis and the Ma'rafis, are among the 
wealthiest in all of Kuwait and enjoy access to the Al Sabah 
leadership comparable to the most influential of Sunnis. 
Kuwaiti Shi'a are pleased with their level of religious 
freedom and feel that PM Shaykh Nasser Al Sabah has been 
particularly even-handed in his treatment of them.  That 
being said, Kuwaiti Shi'a do want to redress a number of 
grievances in the new National Assembly.  In addition to 
being historically under-represented in Parliament, Shi'a are 
also under-represented in the upper echelons of the 
government ministries.  Of the 236 undersecretaries in 
Kuwaiti ministries, only six are currently Shi'a, which 
Kuwaiti Shi'a claim is the result of official discrimination. 
 This discrimination is also apparent in the intelligence 
services and the Kuwait Armed Forces, which has a pronounced 
lack of Shi'a in its senior officer corps; although Shi'a do 
 
KUWAIT 00000471  006 OF 006 
 
 
appear to have found a home in the Kuwait Navy.  Kuwaiti 
Shi'a would also like to see government restrictions lifted 
on the number of Husseiniyyas (Shi'a mosques) they are 
allowed to build and the inclusion of Shi'a education in 
school curricula. 
 
¶26. (S) Hana Ma'rafi, Public Relations Director at the Public 
Authority for Civil Information, notes that Kuwaiti Shi'a are 
satisfied with the generous economic benefits of Kuwait's 
welfare state and are not interested in jeopardizing these 
benefits, fearing a return to "The Black Time" of the 1980s. 
Kuwaiti Shi'a are quick to condemn the actions of Al-Da'wa in 
the 1980s and note that the Amiri assassination attempt and 
embassy bombings were the work of a single Iranian cell. 
Having learned from history, Kuwaiti Shi'a remain relatively 
immune to outside political influences that would seek to 
undermine the peace and stability of Kuwait.  Even NIA, which 
in theory would be the most susceptible to foreign influence, 
appears to be committed to the Kuwaiti democratic process, 
despite its questionable sponsorship of the Imad Mugniyah 
eulogy. 
 
Expat Shi'a Largely Apolitical 
------------------------------ 
 
¶27. (S) According to Shi'a analyst Dr. Abdul-reda Assiri, 
Chairman of the Political Science Department at Kuwait 
University, expatriate Shi'a are largely apolitical. 
Generally, these Shi'a have migrated to Kuwait to escape 
difficult political and economic conditions in their own 
countries.  As such, they tend to focus on their careers and 
avoid engaging in political activism.  Kuwaiti immigration 
law also threatens these expatriates with deportation for 
relatively minor offenses, which the GOK is often quick to 
employ.  Given their precarious economic and legal situation, 
the overwhelming majority of expatriate Shi'a do not appear 
to act as agents of foreign influence, although the potential 
exists for a small, conservative minority within the Shi'a 
community to act in such a capacity. 
 
Comment 
------- 
 
¶28. (C) On the whole, Kuwaiti Shi'a represent a vital 
component of the Kuwaiti political and economic landscape. 
They share a long history with the country and have a large 
stake in its continued prosperity.  It is likely that, with 
the new elections, Kuwaiti Shi'a will finally achieve 
proportional representation in the National Assembly. 
Kuwaiti Shi'a will likely leverage these gains to push for 
more equitable representation throughout the government and 
security apparatus, in addition to advancing their social 
agenda.  Opposition Shi'a MPs will likely continue to work in 
concert with other opposition parties, such as the ICM, to 
pressure the GOK for better governance and more conservative 
social policies.  Nevertheless, the balance of Shi'a power 
rests with its pro-government, business-oriented merchant 
class.  These elements can be expected to continue their 
traditional role as a counter-balance to domestic, Sunni 
opposition, and maintain a strong hand in the future course 
of Kuwaiti politics.  End comment. 
 
********************************************* * 
For more reporting from Embassy Kuwait, visit: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/?cable s 
 
Visit Kuwait's Classified Website: 
http://www.state.sgov.gov/p/nea/kuwait/ 
********************************************* * 
Jones